Arms race (1949-63)

Question 1

Reasons for arms race

Answer 1

• Growth of int’l tension:
  
  • Arms viewed as necessary to safeguard interests
  • Powers viewed nuclear capability of other w/ anxiety; convinced nuclear superiority was only way of guaranteeing security
• National/personal considerations:
  
  • Keeping ahead matter of national pride
    
    • National prestige imp. 1950s when both attempted to impress Third World of benefits of capitalism/communism
    • Khrushchev’s boasts prompted Eisenhower’s fears of ‘bomber gap’.
    • Despite surveillance USSR had no lead, Eisenhower found it hard to reduce spending
    • Kennedy felt vulnerable to soviet manipulation
      
      • inc. military spending
      • by 1962 expenditure reached $50 billion.
• Domestic factors:
  
  • Defence given h. priority
  • US - provided large sums to manufacturers, scientists and armed forces, led to h. employment
    
    • military-industrial complex able to wield enormous control of US politics
  • Military-industrial complex used to h.light danger posed by USSR; in turn, Soviet emphasised US threat in order to secure resources
• Thus both fed off e/o in perpetuating arms race, so power/influence within own country was maintained

Question 2

Development of weapons technology and advanced delivery systems:

Russia acquires atomic bomb (1949)

Answer 2

• Emerging CW led to superpower arms race, driven by nuclear technology - became part of wider ideological competition to demonstrate ‘superiority’ of US capitalism/Soviet communism
• US had nuclear monopoly until 1949; led to start of thermonuclear arms race/superpower rivalry
• 1950 President Truman announced development of a ‘super’ bomb

Question 3

Development of weapons technology and advanced delivery systems:

Bombs

Answer 3

• Baruch Plan (1946) called on Americans to share knowledge of nuclear technology, stipulated that no other nation would be allowed to develop atomic weapons
  
  • USSR saw attempt to maintain US nuclear monopoly
• US nuclear monopoly lasted until 1949 when USSR exploded its own a-bomb.
• When both equally matched in terms of possession of a-bomb, race to development super bomb commenced
• US succeeded in development of hydrogen bomb (1952)
  
  • ​1000x more destructive than a-bomb
• Few months later, Soviet successful in lithium bomb; US tested own lithium bomb (1954).

Question 4

Development of weapons technology and advanced delivery system:

Delivery systems

Answer 4

• US possessed first intercontinental bomber, B52 Stratofortress (1955)
  
  • USSR replied by developing TU20 Bear (1956).
• USSR launched its first ICBM and Sputnik, space satellite (1957).
• US developed first SLBM (1960).
• Yuri Gargarin orbited earth (1961).
• By 1962, US had 4,000 missile warheads compared to USSR’s 220.
• Khrushchev’s boasts of supremacy weren’t supported by reality; Moscow Air Show (1955) deceived foreign guests under illusion that they possessed more planes than they did

Question 5

The ‘missile gap’

Answer 5

• USSR successes (IBCM, Sputnik etc) led to US fears Soviets had more advanced military technology
• CIA Gaither Report (1957) reinforced idea of a ‘missile gap’ in USSR’s favour
• Successes of Soviet Sputnik project prompted USA to est. NASA (1958)
  
  • NASA’s director reported directly to the President — showed importance of developments to the President!

Question 6

‘Balance of terror’

Nuclear deterrence and limited war

Answer 6

• Destructive capacity of superpowers’ nuclear arsenals played major role in shaping US/USSR conduct
• Obvious danger of nuclear war prevented USA/USSR fr engaging in direct armed conflict; ultimately forced them to coop at key points (e.g. Cuban Missile Crisis)
• Nuclear deterrence and limited war:
  
  • USSR’s acquisition of a-bomb & determination to match US developments made nuclear deterrence a strategic reality for both
  • Concept of limited war — first emerged during Korean War
    
    • to avoid dangers of superpower nuclear confrontation, steps were taken for nuclear deterrence:
      
      • Stalin didn’t intervene directly in the war
      • Despite Gen. MacArthur’s call for use of nuclear weapons against China, Truman rejected, preferring use of military tactics to ensure war remained limited in scale
        
        • US restricted combat zone to Korea

Question 7

Massive retaliation

Answer 7

• US confidence of nuclear superiority in 1950s led Truman to introduce doctrine of massive retaliation (1954)
• Strategy of greater reliance on nuclear weapons involved use of brinkmanship to force enemy to back down
• Partly designed to reduce conventional arms spending
• Was deliberately vague about exact circumstances that would trigger US nuclear response!

Question 8

Flexible response and counterforce

Answer 8

• Considered possibility of limited nuclear war
• A ‘second strike’ capability was developed (based on bombers, ICBMs and submarines), so US could strike back at USSR after suffering nuclear attack
• 1962 introduced counterforce strategy to make USSR’s military installations (not Soviet cities) main targets of any future US nuclear strike
  
  • USSR didn’t endorse flexible response tactics, based plans on all-out nuclear attack

Question 9

Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)

Answer 9

• Gradual erosion of US nuclear superiority led to shift in US nuclear strategy
• By late 1960s, USSR achieved basic nuclear parity w/ US, superpowers reached position of MAD/deterrence
• MAD - based on understanding that neither superpower could defeat the other in nuclear war without also being destroyed

Question 10

Impact of arms race on the Cold War:

Stabilising effects

Answer 10

• Deterrent effect of nuclear weapons prevents direct US-Soviet confrontation
• Presence of nuclear weapons meant superpowers respected e/o’s spheres and didn’t intervene (as shown in Hungary, 1956)
• Superpowers had to co-op to regulate nuclear threat:
  
  • removal of nuclear missiles from Cuba/ Turkey (1962-63)
  • Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963)
  • Washington-Moscow ‘hotline’ (1963)
• US/Soviet leaders aware of living in nuclear age and acting responsibly
  
  • Khrushchev withdrew offer of help in nuclear programme from Mao

Question 11

Impact of arms race:

Destabilising effects

Answer 11

• Soviet acquisition of a-bomb (1949) precipitated a spiralling arms race
  
  • both competed to develop more powerful/sophisticated weapons e.g. hydrogen bomb, ICBMs and SLBMs
• Culture of secrecy surrounding development led fears that other side had military superiority: impact of Gaither report (1957)
• Nuclear weapons encouraged superpower brinkmanship - could’ve result in total devastation
  
  • e.g. US doctrine of ‘massive retaliation’ (1954) and Cuban missile crisis (1962)
• Cost of nuclear weapons imposed huge financial strains on both and destabilising effect on superpower relations:
  
  • Khrushchev compensated for USSR’s relative weakness by adopting antagonistic approach to negotiations w/ West
    
    • decision to station Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba was due to fact basing short-range missiles in Cuba cheaper than basing long-range weapons in USSR
• Didn’t stop other forms of superpower competition for influence
  
  • Soviet economic/military aid to developing countries e.g. Egypt; US support for anti-communist regimes in South Vietnam, South Korea and Taiwan.

Question 12

Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)

Answer 12

• 1960 Castro signed trade deal w/ USSR to nationalise US interests in Cuba worth over $1 billion
• US imposed an economic blockade on Cuba, refusing to buy its sugar
• 1961 Castro formally embraced communism
• Bays of Pigs Invasion (1961): Pres. Kennedy authorised CIA-backed invasion of Cuba
• Castro reacted by entering a defensive agreement w/ USSR - brought Soviet weapons/military advisers to Cuba
  
  • by early 1962, Khrushchev supplied MiG jets and surface-to-air missiles
• Operation Mongoose (1961) Kennedy’s secret programme designed to destabilise Cuban regime
  
  • large scale military exercises in Caribbean to inc. pressure on Cuba and demonstrate American armed might
• 1962 Khrushchev secretly started to install Soviet nuclear weapons on Cuba

Question 13

Results of the Cuban Missile Crisis

Answer 13

• Consequences for Kennedy — gave him a much-needed FP success, strengthened his presidency
• Consequences for Khrushchev — claimed credit for safeguarding Castro’s socialist revolution by obtaining US pledge not to invade Cuba
• Crisis brought superpowers to the brink of direct nuclear confrontation; both recognised measures needed to reduce tensions in crisis situations, to limit likelihood of nuclear war
• US/USSR signed important initiatives, which would help achieve this.
• The ‘hot-line’ agreement (1963) — crisis showed necessity for rapid communication b/w superpowers
  
  • ensure that any superpower misjudgements resolved before a serious crisis escalated
• Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963) — sobering impact of Cuban missile crisis led to superpowers to sign
  
  • banned conducting nuclear tests in atmosphere, under water/space
  • Underground testing still permitted!
• Beginnings of Détente — chastened by exp. of Cuban missile crisis, USA/USSR made greater efforts to avoid direct confrontation in future
  
  • superpowers only just avoided nuclear war (1962)
  • both sides keen to est. better relations
  • led to period of US-Soivet Détente

Question 14

The way nuclear weapons influenced the nature of Cold War

Answer 14

• Concept of limited war — used to reduce dangers of escalating conflict to nuclear deployment; used to avoid direct confrontation
  
  • e.g. Korean War:
    
    • despite calls by Gen. McArthur to use nuclear weapons against China, Truman preferred use military tactics to ensure war remained in limited scale
      
      • Nuclear weapons forced each to think twice before taking any measures to escalate war
• Massive retaliation — based on threat of using large no. of nuclear bombs against communist aggression
  
  • US still had nuclear superiority, would hopefully act as deterrent
    
    • result was brinkmanship
• **Development of MAD **— caused both to rethink strategies:
  
  • By 60s, both possessed enough nuclear missiles to destroy other to ensure a counter-strike possible
  • both recognised limitations of this all-or-nothing approach
    
    • ​decided flexible range of responses needed
• Impact of conventional arms — remained central to military strategy. Attempts to reduce this were undertaken by Eisenhower & Khrushchev
  
  • both saw nuclear weapons as cheaper alt.
  • Korean/Vietnam wars fought w/ conventional arms, showed need to keep numerical adv. in conventional weaponry
    
    • provided alt. to nuclear missiles (Kennedy’s ‘Flexible Response’)