Session 8 Flashcards
Q: What is the main argument of “Nuclear Blackmail” by Fuhrmann and Sechser?
A: The authors argue that nuclear weapons are effective for deterrence but not for coercion or blackmail; fears that states like North Korea or Iran can use nukes to force others into submission are exaggerated and unsupported by evidence.
Q: What is the difference between deterrence and compellence in nuclear strategy?
A: Deterrence prevents adversaries from acting and is more credible with nuclear weapons; compellence seeks to change the status quo but is less credible and more costly when backed by nuclear threats.
Q: What does empirical evidence say about the effectiveness of nuclear coercion?
A: A study of 200+ compellent threats shows nuclear states succeed less often (20%) than nonnuclear ones (32%); nuclear superiority and targeting nonnuclear states also do not improve success rates.
Q: Does having nuclear weapons make states more aggressive in territorial disputes?
A: No. Nuclear and nonnuclear states initiate territorial conflicts at similar rates and have similar outcomes. Nuclear weapons do not embolden successful territorial aggression.
Q: How do the authors critique preventive strikes as a response to nuclear proliferation?
A: They argue that fears of nuclear coercion are overblown and that preventive strikes are risky and often counterproductive. Diplomatic and economic tools are usually more effective.
Q: What is the policy takeaway from the chapter?
A: While nuclear proliferation poses risks, coercive fears are overstated. U.S. policy should focus on realistic threats and prioritize diplomacy over military solutions in nonproliferation efforts.
Q: How did nuclear weapons shape the Cold War dynamic?
A: Nuclear weapons intensified the Cold War through arms races and brinkmanship, but their destructive power also led both superpowers to exercise restraint and avoid direct conflict.
Q: Why was the Cuban Missile Crisis a turning point in nuclear diplomacy?
A: It exposed how easily nuclear war could erupt by accident, leading to new arms control efforts like the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) and direct U.S.–Soviet communication via the hotline.
Q: What was the purpose of early arms control and non-proliferation efforts?
A: To prevent further spread of nuclear weapons (e.g., NPT 1968) and manage the arms race through treaties like SALT I and the ABM Treaty, though these often coexisted with continued weapons development.
Q: What caused the collapse of détente and return of Cold War tensions in the late 1970s?
A: The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Euromissile crisis, and continued superpower rivalry undermined détente, reigniting fears of nuclear conflict and prompting new arms buildups.
Q: What made the early 1980s especially dangerous in nuclear terms?
A: Reagan’s “madman” strategy, SDI, and Soviet fears of a surprise U.S. attack (especially during Able Archer 1983) created a high-risk environment, though both sides avoided actual nuclear brinkmanship.
Q: What ended the Cold War and reversed the nuclear arms race?
A: Political leadership—especially Gorbachev’s rejection of Cold War ideology and Reagan’s openness to diplomacy—enabled breakthrough agreements like the INF Treaty (1987) and de-escalation of nuclear tensions.
Q: What is the main question addressed in “Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran”?
A: The article investigates whether the U.S. public supports the use of nuclear weapons and killing noncombatants, and whether norms like the nuclear taboo or noncombatant immunity meaningfully constrain public opinion.
Q: What did the 2015 survey experiment reveal about U.S. public opinion on nuclear use?
A: A majority of Americans supported using nuclear weapons on an Iranian city—killing up to 2 million civilians—if it meant saving 20,000 U.S. troops, showing weak evidence for a strong nuclear taboo.
Q: How did support for nuclear strikes compare with conventional bombing in the experiment?
A: Support for killing civilians was similarly high for both nuclear and conventional strikes, suggesting the public is more concerned with effectiveness and troop protection than weapon type.
Q: What do the findings say about the nuclear taboo and noncombatant immunity norms?
A: The study challenges both norms, showing that most Americans prioritize U.S. military lives over protecting foreign civilians, even when attacks deliberately target noncombatants.
Q: What justifications did respondents give for supporting mass civilian casualties?
A: Respondents often invoked retribution, enemy blame, and military necessity, indicating that moral principles like proportionality and discrimination are not deeply internalized.
Q: What are the implications of the study for U.S. policy and just war theory?
A: Public opinion may not constrain presidential decisions to use nuclear weapons; ethical norms are easily overridden in wartime scenarios involving high U.S. casualties.
Q: What is the central thesis of the report by Tannenwald and Acton?
A: The risk of nuclear war is increasing due to the erosion of nuclear norms and the development of destabilizing technologies and doctrines in a complex, multipolar world.
Q: According to Tannenwald, which three core norms of nuclear restraint are eroding?
A: Deterrence, non-use (nuclear taboo), and nonproliferation.
Q: What is the nuclear taboo, and why is it significant?
A: The nuclear taboo is a normative belief against the use of nuclear weapons. It has helped prevent nuclear use since 1945 and stigmatizes nuclear weapons as illegitimate tools of war.
Q: What technological developments are undermining stable deterrence, according to both authors?
A: Hypersonic missiles, precision-strike weapons, dual-use systems, and missile defense technologies that blur the line between nuclear and conventional forces.
Q: What is Acton’s concept of “entanglement,” and why is it dangerous?
A: Entanglement refers to the mixing of nuclear and nonnuclear systems (e.g., shared command centers), increasing the risk that conventional attacks are mistaken for nuclear strikes.
Q: How do new doctrines lower the threshold for nuclear use?
A: Strategies like Russia’s “escalate to de-escalate” or Pakistan’s battlefield nukes promote early or limited nuclear use in conflict, increasing escalation risk.
Q: What are the competing ethical views of nuclear weapons discussed by Tannenwald?
A: One sees them as tools governed by just war principles; the other sees them as inherently immoral, emphasizing disarmament and total illegitimacy.
Q: How has public and political discourse contributed to the weakening of the nuclear taboo?
A: Open threats of nuclear use by leaders (e.g., Trump, Putin) and the development of “more usable” nuclear weapons have normalized nuclear rhetoric and lowered the psychological barrier to use.
Q: What critique do nonnuclear states level against the nonproliferation regime?
A: Nonnuclear states argue that nuclear powers have failed to uphold their disarmament obligations, leading to normative inconsistency and erosion of legitimacy.
