Session 2 Flashcards
Why are state border wars and competition of conflict less prominent now?
- Due to the increased strength of the international system, global interdependence, trade, powerful weapons, globalizatoin (less travel time, easy to go into coalitions)
Why has NSA’s participation in conflicts increased?
- Communications technology is easier now.
- More Identity Politics in conflicts due to changes in realms of competition (less battlefield more abstract).
What is Clausewitz’s famous definition of war?
War is the continuation of politics by other means.
What does Clausewitz mean by the “fog of war”?
The uncertainty and chaos inherent in warfare, making it difficult to fully understand the battlefield situation.
What are the three elements of Clausewitz’s “trinity” of war?
The government, the military, and the people.
What role does chance play in Clausewitz’s theory of war?
War is unpredictable and influenced by chance, requiring commanders to be adaptable.
How does Clausewitz distinguish between limited war and total war?
Limited war is fought for specific, constrained objectives, while total war seeks the complete destruction of the enemy.
According to Clausewitz, why is war an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will?
Because war is fundamentally about imposing one’s will on the opponent through the use of violence.
How does Clausewitz’s theory explain why war is never purely rational?
Because war involves passion, fear, chance, and political factors that go beyond pure logic.
How does Kaldor challenge Clausewitz’s idea that war is primarily fought between states?
Kaldor argues that modern conflicts often involve non-state actors, such as militias, insurgents, and terrorist groups, rather than conventional state armies.
What is the role of identity politics in modern conflicts compared to Clausewitz’s traditional war?
Unlike Clausewitz’s focus on state interests, Kaldor highlights that many modern wars are driven by ethnic, religious, or sectarian identity struggles rather than clear political or territorial objectives.
How does Kaldor dispute Clausewitz’s notion that war is a rational political tool?
Argues that new wars are fragmented, chaotic, and fueled by economic motives and local grievances rather than clear strategic objectives.
Why does Kaldor reject Clausewitz’s idea that war has a decisive battlefield outcome?
Modern conflicts rarely end in clear military victories; instead, they are prolonged, involve multiple actors, and often result in ongoing instability rather than conclusive peace.
How does the concept of war economies challenge Clausewitz’s vision of war?
Kaldor points out that many modern wars sustain themselves through illicit economies (smuggling, extortion, humanitarian aid exploitation), whereas Clausewitz envisioned state-funded, organized military campaigns.
What role does globalization play in modern warfare, contradicting Clausewitz’s framework?
Kaldor argues that new wars are influenced by global networks, including foreign fighters, diaspora funding, and transnational criminal activities, making them less confined to national borders than Clausewitz assumed.
How do new wars blur the distinction between combatants and civilians, countering Clausewitz’s ideas?
In contrast to Clausewitz’s structured battles between uniformed soldiers, Kaldor notes that new wars frequently target civilians through ethnic cleansing, terrorism, and hybrid warfare tactics.
How does information warfare and media influence undermine Clausewitz’s focus on battlefield engagement?
Kaldor argues that modern conflicts are fought as much through propaganda, misinformation, and cyber attacks as through physical combat, making Clausewitz’s battlefield-centric model incomplete.
Why is Clausewitz’s emphasis on decisive victory less relevant in modern wars?
Kaldor highlights that many modern wars become protracted, with no clear winners, instead leading to ongoing cycles of violence, failed peace processes, and humanitarian crises.
How do international interventions challenge Clausewitz’s state-centric war theory?
Kaldor points out that many modern wars involve international organizations, NGOs, and coalitions rather than traditional state-led military campaigns, making Clausewitz’s model of state-controlled war increasingly outdated.
How do critics argue that “new wars” are not actually new?
Many features of “new wars,” such as irregular warfare, targeting of civilians, and economic motives, have existed in historical conflicts, including civil wars and colonial wars (e.g., the Thirty Years’ War, Napoleonic Wars, and guerrilla warfare in the 19th century).
Why do some scholars argue that state actors are still central to modern warfare?
While non-state actors play a significant role, most conflicts still involve states either directly (Russia-Ukraine War) or indirectly through sponsorship of militias and proxy wars (e.g., Iran supporting Hezbollah, U.S. involvement in Afghanistan).
How does the argument of “war economies” as a new phenomenon fall short?
Historically, war economies have always existed—piracy, mercenaries, looting, and war taxation were integral to wars throughout history (e.g., the Thirty Years’ War was sustained through plunder).
How do critics challenge Kaldor’s claim that modern wars lack decisive victories?
Many contemporary conflicts, including the Gulf War (1991) and the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict (2020), have had clear winners, showing that traditional military victory is still possible.
Why is the distinction between old and new wars considered too simplistic?
Many conflicts exhibit a mix of both “old” and “new” characteristics, such as conventional battles alongside insurgency and hybrid warfare (e.g., Russia’s use of both conventional and irregular tactics in Ukraine).
How does technological advancement undermine Kaldor’s “new wars” theory?
Kaldor downplays how modern conflicts still rely heavily on advanced state-run militaries, cyber warfare, and drone technology—elements that fit within traditional Clausewitzian strategic thinking rather than an entirely new form of warfare.
