Session 6 Flashcards
Q: What is the Afghan model of warfare?
A: A strategy relying on U.S. airpower, small numbers of Special Operations Forces (SOF), and indigenous allies instead of large-scale conventional U.S. ground forces.
Q: What are the two opposing views on the Afghan model after the 2001 Afghanistan campaign?
- One side saw it as a revolutionary approach to warfare,
- the other considered it a one-time fluke due to unique local conditions.
Q: What is Biddle’s main critique of the Afghan model?
- only works when indigenous allies have combat skills comparable to their enemies;
- otherwise, it fails against competent adversaries.
Q: What did Biddle observe about the Afghan model in Afghanistan (2001-2002)?
-worked well against untrained Taliban militias
- Failed against skilled Al-Qaeda fighters, requiring close combat to overcome defenses.
Q: What was the outcome of applying the Afghan model in Iraq (2003)?
- Succeeded against poorly trained Iraqi conscripts
- was not tested against skilled opponents, making its broader applicability uncertain.
Q: What policy risk does Biddle warn against regarding the Afghan model?
A: Over-reliance on airpower and SOF-led allies could weaken U.S. military capabilities and lead to failures in conflicts against skilled adversaries.
Q: How does contemporary counterinsurgency (COIN) relate to colonial practices?
A: Modern COIN strategies, especially in the War on Terror, retain colonial-era methods of military control and population management, despite claims of modernization.
Q: What is the paradox of the “hearts and minds” approach in counterinsurgency?
- COIN aims to win civilian support
- often involves coercion, surveillance, and violence,
- This undermining its supposed humanitarian intent.
Q: How does counterinsurgency function as a form of governance?
A: COIN is not just a military tactic but a method of managing populations, restructuring sovereignty, and exerting political control over occupied territories.
Q: How does counterinsurgency rely on racial and civilizational narratives?
- Often portrays insurgents as irrational or incapable of self-governance,
- This echoes colonial justifications for foreign intervention.
Q: Why does the author argue that counterinsurgency is often ineffective?
- Tends to fuel local grievances rather than resolve them,
- leads to prolonged conflicts and repeated failures, as seen in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Q: How does counterinsurgency contribute to perpetual warfare?
- COIN operations sustain endless military engagements rather than achieving decisive victories,
- Benifits military-industrial interests and reinforcing foreign dominance.
Q: What is the main theoretical weakness of modern COIN doctrine?
A: COIN lacks a solid theoretical foundation, selectively borrowing from historical cases without forming a universally applicable framework.
Q: Why do the authors critique COIN as a politically naïve strategy?
- Assumes governance, economic development, and “hearts and minds” campaigns can defeat insurgencies,
- Ignores political and ideological motivations of insurgents.
Q: How does COIN misinterpret historical conflicts?
- oversimplifies cases like the Malayan Emergency and Vietnam War,
- applies their lessons too broadly and leads to flawed strategies in different contexts like Iraq and Afghanistan.
Q: What is the myth of COIN as a “gentle war”?
A: Although COIN promotes population protection, it still relies on coercion, violence, and surveillance, contradicting its supposed humanitarian goals.
Q: Why is COIN ineffective against modern insurgencies?
- assumes insurgents are rational, state-centric actors,
- fails to account for their adaptability, decentralized structure, and ideological resilience.
Q: How has COIN become a self-perpetuating industry?
- COIN benefits defense contractors, policymakers, and military strategists,
- This ensures continued influence regardless of effectiveness.
Q: Why do Marks and Ucko describe counterinsurgency (COIN) as a cyclical fad?
- U.S. military repeatedly embraces COIN during conflicts
- quickly abandons it once the strategic focus shifts,
- preventing long-term institutional learning.
Q: What was a key strategic failure of COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan?
- COIN was misinterpreted as a quick fix instead of broader political strategy,
- leading to unrealistic expectations and ineffective implementation.
Q: How has COIN doctrine been historically misused?
A: U.S. policymakers selectively used cases like Malaya and Vietnam, leading to flawed strategies that ignored the unique political and social contexts of modern conflicts.
Q: What is the “Counterinsurgency Syndrome” in U.S. military history?
A: The U.S. neglects COIN until a crisis forces engagement, then discards it once the immediate need passes, preventing sustained expertise.
Q: How should COIN be understood within the broader scope of warfare?
A: COIN is part of irregular warfare, including insurgency and terrorism, but U.S. doctrine mistakenly separates war into “regular” and “irregular” categories, limiting adaptability.
Q: What is the risk of abandoning COIN lessons in favor of great-power competition?
A: While focusing on China and Russia, the U.S. risks neglecting insurgency and political violence, which remain persistent challenges in global security.
Q: Why does Todd Greentree argue that the U.S. failure in Afghanistan was not inevitable?
- failure resulted from strategic errors in how the war was fought,
-including a misunderstanding of Afghan political dynamics and the - lack of a sustainable political strategy.
Q: How did overmilitarization contribute to the U.S. failure in Afghanistan?
A: The U.S. relied too heavily on military force instead of integrating political and diplomatic solutions, leading to a reactive and ineffective counterinsurgency strategy.
Q: What missed opportunity in 2001 contributed to the prolonged insurgency?
- U.S. rejected Taliban reintegration efforts and peace negotiations,
- choosing military elimination instead, which
- turned a defeated enemy into a long-term insurgency.
Q: What governance issues undermined the U.S. nation-building efforts in Afghanistan?
A: The Afghan government was plagued by corruption, inefficiency, and a lack of legitimacy, and efforts to impose centralized democracy clashed with traditional governance structures.
Q: What strategic contradiction weakened U.S. operations in Afghanistan?
- U.S. pursued counterterrorism and counterinsurgency simultaneously,
- heavy firepower that alienated Afghan civilians and undermined efforts to win “hearts and minds.”
