Session 6 Flashcards
External governance; the EU's reach beyond candidate states
External governance perspective in academic research
An alternative view of the EU as a civilian power which has less to do with its common foreign and security policy (CFSP) or the EU’s international actorness, but more with the external dimension of internal policies.
External governance and boundaries
The legal boundaries of the EU can be extended without an institutional expansionDifferent boundaries: legal, institutional or transactional move in different degreesExpansion of EU activities that project internal policies was driven by:Perceptions of interdependence*EU’s own responsibilities to contribute to problem solving in given geographical areas
What is external governance?
Rule extension beyond the EU’s borders: ‘exterritorializationof EU policies’‘external governance takes place when parts of the acquis communautaireare extended to non-member states’ Lavenex2004:681-683*Participatory, horizontal and process-oriented mode of policy making often associated with ‘network governance’ (Lavenexand Schimmelfennig 2009)
What is policy?
PolicyObjectives defined by state/organisationProduced viaINTERNAL decision makingEvolves with internal political change and international context changeMostly one-sided and directed towards specific countries or regions or domestically, sectors
What is governance?
GovernanceObjectives jointly defined among actors(mostly) decentralized*Repeated interactions involve also lower level actors: experts, civil society, business
Modes of external governance
Hierarchical: e.g. enlargement, European neighbourhood policyNetworks –relations are formally equal, ongoing coordination*Markets (L&S 2009); EEA, free movement of persons, governance by externalization
EU external governance develops around agreements
Comprehensive forms of association: the European Economic Area (EEA);Multiple bilateral treaties Association: e.g. EU-Chile (2002 Association, 2022 Advanced framework agreement)Transatlantic cooperation, partnership and trade agreements: e.g. EU-JapanDevelopment cooperation with ACP statesNew generation association agreements: Deep and Comprehensive Trade agreement association –Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine: ‘everything but the institutions’*New generation trade and cooperation: CEPA Armenia
Enlargement governance agreements
Stabilisation and Association agreements (Western Balkans)Association ‘Europe’ agreements with CEE member states in the 1990s*Association agreements new generation: with Deep and Comprehensive Trade agreements (Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova
External governace agreements
Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) 2017,Armenia)Free Trade agreement (1972) SwitzerlandEU-Japan Economic Partnership agreement(2019)EU-Chile Association agreement (2002, under renegotiation)
How do agreements structure relations between EU and partners?
Legal framework: the treatiesTrade: usually the most important component: agreements structure accessAreas covered: defined in negotiationRegulation: what is adopted by third partiesDispute resolutionSpecial clauses linking functioning with democracy, human rights, rule of law: not in all agreements!Joint bodies: Partnership Council, Association CouncilParliamentary joint bodiesExpert joint bodies: joint committees*Civil society fora
Politics of an association agreement
Negotiating the AA with Ukraine took more than seven years, led by different presidentsSigning the agreement in November 2013 was rejected by former president Yanukovich, leading to mass protests: the Euromaidanor ‘Revolution of dignity’*Agreement was eventually signed by Poroshenko in 2014
Continuation of the Ukrainian association agreement
Russian annexation of the Crimea in March 2014Finally, the agreement was signed in June 2014Slow and problematic ratification: e.g.Dutch referendumIn force December 2016After signing, EU develops innovation with Ukraine supporting reforms and implementationThe Association agreement contains a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade agreement (DCFTA)Offers a template for reforms;A mixed agreement: EU and member states!
Beyond external governance
Multilateralism and efforts to sustain itCrisis of multilateralism has forced the EU and multilateral institutions into survival modeDefend multilateral institutions -WTOReform multilateral institutions: mixed record*Extend multilateral institutions (Schuette and Dijkstra 2023)
What is the Brussels effect?
*‘ …the EU’s unilateral ability to regulate global markets by setting the standards in competition policy, environmental protection, food safety, the protection of privacy, or the regulation of hate speech in social media.
De Jure and De facto aspect Brussels effect
Based on the size of the EU market, the Brussels effect hasde jure aspect: adoption of EU style regulations by foreign governments*de facto aspect: EU regulation changes the incentives of foreign companies and leads to the adoption of standards by companies (Bradford 2020:2)
What is needed for the Brussels effect to occur?
Large economy with a large marketRegulatory capacity activityInstitutional architecture that links market size with regulatory influenceNot all areas are subject to the effect. Also needed:*Stringent standards inelastic targets for regulation (consumer markets, not capital)indivisibility
EU regulatory activity
‘to unleash the potential of the Single Market’Maintaining the integrity of the single market and the protection of individuals’ rightsTo eliminate risks associated with the disparities between member states’ rulesEU standards have been externalized as a by-product of the mission to establish and maintain the single market (Bradford 2020:20)
Side effects EU regulatory activity
Increased attention for the external dimension of EU regulation over timeThe Commission: ‘The EU is emerging as a global rule maker, with the single market and the wider EU economic and social model increasingly serving as a reference point in third countries as well as in global and regional fora’ (The External Dimension of the Single Market review’ European Commission 2007 cited in Bradford 2020:21-23) From 2009 onwards: EU data privacy as a global benchmarkUniversal principles based on EU norms because ‘…data processing is globalized and calls for the development of universal principles for the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data
GDPR example
Regulation for the internal market evolves as a global benchmarkGDPR: the General Data Protection RegulationGDPR and EU’s Data Protection Directive from 1995 were created as internal market instruments, facilitating the creation of a digital single marketUpward harmonization: elevating data protection standards in low regulation countries rather than forcing high regulation member states to weaken data protection laws
GDPR contested process
Contested political process: pro-regulation member states such as Germany, France and Sweden, Green parties in the European ParliamentCriticism from the US: ‘unreasonable restraints on business practices’GDPR (2017) boosted the EU data protection regime with demanding standards and sanctions that are calculated based on the global turnover of data processorsEnforcement by the member states where headquarters of digital companies in Europe are located: capacity problems
Companies may adopt EU standards
Gradually, some companies started adopting EU standards: e.g. Appleprivacy policy reflecting GDPR Privacy by design –products and services to comply with privacy by defaultPrivacy impact assessment across all its products (Bradford 2020:143)Brussels effect occurs driven by economic and technological considerationsBranding: e.g. Sonos‘for reputational and brand related reasons, the companies may find it hard to deny privacy protections for some consumers while allowing them for others in another jurisdiction’ Bradford 2020:145
Companies may not adopt EU standards
But others do not or are slow to do so: slow compliance with the Digital Services ActTesla, Nissan’s pro pilot assist collect personal data against the GDPR rules outside the EU*Reuters reported that between 2019 and 2022 Tesla employees shared sensitive private camera recordings of customers taken via car cameras among each other via chats
Legal divisibility
Some companies limit their adaptations and introduce divisibility, adjusting their policies only in EU jurisdictionE.g. Facebook continues to combine Facebook and wat’s app data in the US, while in the EU Facebook was ordered to stop doing this by the European Commission and European privacy regulators
Constraints Brussels effect
EU setting standards throughwell-developedregulationin areas such as data protection, food safety, environmental protectionThe key to the effect is the dependence of foreign firms on access to the EU market –the importance of the EU as an import destinationThe Brussels effect is supported by the competence and capacity of the European Commission as the most important guardian of competitive marketsMay be less important in the future based on the diminishing share of the EU in global GDP, lagging technological innovation or decline of multilateralism
Is regulatory power enough for EU SA according to Bradford?
*Bradford (2020): ‘The year 2020 further entrenched this [the EU’s] global regulatory power with the unveiling of significant new regulatory acts and initiatives. Yet, the EU should not only strive to be a global referee in the technology race between the US and China; it must develop its own technological capabilities to become a more autonomous player.’
Is regulatory power enough for EU SA according to Draghi?
*Draghi (2024): ‘Between 2008 and 2021, close to 30% of the “unicorns” founded in Europe –startups that went on the be valued over USD 1 billion –relocated their headquarters abroad, with the vast majority moving to the US.’ ‘The EU faces a possible trade-off. Increasing reliance on China may offer the cheapest and most efficient route to meeting our decarbonisation targets. But China’s state-sponsored competition also represents a threat to our productive clean tech and automotive industries.’Need for a European Defence Industry authority for joint procurement
Competitiveness, innovation and security
Draghi: (2024) ‘Security is a precondition for sustainable growth. Rising geopolitical risks can increase uncertainty and dampen investment, while major geopolitical shocks or sudden stops in trade can be extremely disruptive. As the era of geopolitical stability fades, the risk of rising insecurity becoming a threat to growth and freedom is rising.’‘Peace is the first and foremost objective of Europe. But physical security threats are risingand we must prepare. The EU is collectively the world’s second largest military spender, but it is not reflected in the strength of our defence industrial capacity.’*The defence industry is too fragmented, hindering its ability to produce at scale, and it suffers from a lack of standardisation and interoperability of equipment, weakening Europe’s ability to act as a cohesive power. For example, twelve different types of battle tanks are operated in Europe, whereas the US produces only one.
