Session 1 Flashcards
EU at a critical juncture
How does the Ukraine conflict play into it?
Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and the prolonged conflict since 2013 challenged the image of the EU as an effective external relations actor (Chaban and Elgstrom 2022);Realisation of the return of power politics is now at the centre of the EU’s security policy planningThe EU has responded with relative consistency and mobilization, but…*The EU’s response to the conflict in Gaza lacks similar consistency
What is a critical juncture?
Arelatively short period when actors can take key decisions that set new trajectories (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007)A moment when fundamental factors such as the distribution of power, calculation of interest or social construction of actors are transformed (Drezner 2020:19)A moment when transformative change is triggered by shock, generating a discontinuous shift in key causal variables, e. g. after great power wars that redefine the balance of power (Drezner 2020:19-21, Ikenberry 2000).
Since 2022, EU and the return of war
tectonic shift in defense’ (Koenig 2022)Change of the times, ‘Zeitenwende’ in the history of the continent (Scholtz)A new level of ambition*A new turn in the debate about strategic autonomy of the EU (Helwig2023)
Quantum leap on defense?
Substantial increase in defensespendingA new sense of urgency More money invested for defense(Koenig 2022)In 2024, EU member states and NATO allies are spending 150 billion euro more per year on defensecompared to 2014 (Grand 2024:6)The Strategic Compass as a concrete roadmap for the EU as a security provider
why a strategic compass?
‘Europeans taking their fate into their own hands’ (Blockmans, Crosson and Paikin 2022)A ‘compass’ instead of a strategy: reflection and seeking consensus on a joint threat assessmentImplementation of the defence and security dimension of the EU’s Global Strategy (2016
Timeline strategic compass
A two year process starting in June 2020Draft paper to Council November 2021Finalized March 2022*Revised to take into account the Russian invasion of UkraineThis Photoby Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND
The strategic compass: war revision
A greater unity of purpose motivated by the warEU security and defence as of a ‘regional’ power?Commits the member states to defending the European security orderReinforced regional focusEastern flank and Western Balkans moved up the priority listIntensified the focus on hybrid and cyber threatsPlans for a hybrid toolbox*More money: pledge to invest more confirmed at the European Council in Versailles 10-11 March 2022
timeline of strategic autonomy and sovereignty
Strategic autonomy (SA): capacity of the EU to act autonomously in strategically important areas(EP Research service) 2013-2016: SA approach to security and defense2017-2019: SA a way to defend the EU’s interests in a hostile geopolitical environment2019-2022: SA reduce dependence on China in key supply chains2022-strategic autonomy and the war against Ukraine
How does Helwig conceptualize strategic compass?
The concept has stretched to encompass all kinds of policy areas: health, industrial policy, cyberStrategic autonomy from: act without interferenceStrategic autonomy to act in a competitive global arena, having capacity to actCapacities to protect from foreign aggression, secure the economic basis for policy, innovation, Green transition, and to protect EU norms and values(Helwig2023)Capacity = ability for collective and impactful decision-making
What are challenges to EU capacity to act?
Authority in security and defenseis limitedBudget does not allow military spending –European Peace Facility insteadEconomic area: a new doctrine of qualified opennessReassessing economic interdependenceEU sanctions policyEuropean support for Green transition and recovery: response to the IRA in the USAutonomy to protect –multilateral engagement with some (limited) success
What are the capabilities regarding the EU’s capacity?
There is a dramatic imbalance in military equipment owned by different EU member statesMassive cuts in the past -for more than two decades defenseplanning was based on efficiency and not massDifferent countries use different combat platforms many of which are ageing or obsolete*Multinational approaches are needed *Conventional military capabilities should be built to at least half of all forces and capabilities –possible if efforts are sustained (Grand 2024:11-12)
