Separation and Delegation of Powers Flashcards
RTC Judge Manzano, was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice pursuant to EO 856 as amended by EO 326. On examination of the foregoing presidential issuances, it was revealed that among the functions of the Committee is to receive complaints against any apprehending officer xxx who may be found to
have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action. Another function is to recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial
to the proper administration of criminal justice. Furthermore, the Committee was to be under the supervision of the Secretary of Justice.
May Judge Manzano accept his appointment to said Committee without violating the doctrine of Separation of Powers?
No. It is evident from the herein stated functions of the Committee that it performs administrative functions, which are defined as those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and
regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature xxx. Under Art VIII, Sec 12 of the Constitution, the members of the xxx courts xxx shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
The Electoral Commission was created pursuant to Art VI sec 4 of the 1935 Constitution (now sec 17) which conferred to it the power to “be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.” The National Assembly (NA) passed a resolution confirming the election of petitioner Angara as member of the NA on Dec 3, 1935. On Dec 9, 1935, the respondent Electoral Commission formally organized for the first time and resolved to fix the same date as the final day of filing of election protests. Ynsua, a candidate vying for the Angara’s position, filed
his election protest before the Electoral Commission on the same date. Angara sought to prohibit the Electoral Commission from taking further cognizance of the Ynsua’s motion Angara argues: the Constitution excludes from the Commission’s jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of such election
contests. Morever, the Commission can regulate the proceedings of election protests only if the NA has not availed of its primary power to so regulate such proceedings.
(1) Does the Electoral Commission have the constitutional power to promulgate rules of procedure (such as fixing a deadline for filing election protests) relating to election protests notwithstanding the
lack of express conferment of such power in the Constitution?
(2) Does it have the power the promulgate such rules notwithstanding the resolution of the NA?
(1) Yes. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred.
In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
(2) Yes. The purpose of the of the creation of the Electoral Commission was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the
Legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. The express lodging [in the
now Art VI, sec 17] of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the NA. If the NA is permitted to claim the power to regulate proceedings of election contests, then the grant of power to the Commission would be
ineffective for such power would be xxx subject at all times to the regulation of the NA. The purpose of the framers of our Constitution would be frustrated.
POEA was created by EO 797 which mandated it to protect OFWs to “fair and equitable employment practices.” Saco who was married to private respondent was killed in an accident while employed as Chief Officer of the vessel owned by petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines (ESL). Private respondent sued for damages. ESL argued that the complaint was not cognizable by the POEA but by the SSS. POEA
nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and ruled in favor of the private respondent in accordance with POEA MC No. 2. MC No. 2 prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by shipping companies. ESL went to this
Court to move for dismissal. It contests the validity of MC No. 2 stating that it is violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative powers, contending that it represents an exercise of legislative discretion. It
further avers that it has been denied due process because the same POEA that issued MC No. 2 has also sustained and applied it.
(1) Is MC No. 2 a violation of the principle of non-delegation of legislative powers?
(2) Did MC No. 2 deny the petitioner of due process?
(1) No. Because of the increasing complexity of the task of the govt and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention, specialization in legislation has become necessary and thus delegation of legislative power is in many instances permitted. The “power of subordinate legislation” or the authority to issue rules (supplementary regulations) to carry out the general provisions of the statute given to administrative bodies has become more and more necessary. MC No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. There are two accepted tests to determine
whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
(2) No. Administrative agencies, such as POEA, are vested with two basic
powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial. The first enables them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, and the second enables them to interpret and apply such regulations.
Yu was proclaimed elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections. His rival, petitioner Casibang, filed an election protest with
the CFI. Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution was ratified. Yu moved to dismiss on the ground that the CFI no longer had jurisdiction over the issue, that, in view of the ratification of the 1973 Constitution, a political
question outside the range of judicial review has intervened. He relied on Sec 9 of Art XVII and Sec 2 of Art XI of the new Constitution which granted
incumbent officials of the govt a privilege to continue in office at the pleasure of the incumbent President, and which conferred unto the National Assembly (NA) the power to enact a local govt code. This, he
avers, states clearly the new form of govt that was to be enforced. CFI ruled in favor of Yu hence this petition.
Is the issue in the electoral protest a political question?
No. The only issue in the electoral protest case xxx is who between protestant (Casibang) and protestee (Yu) was the duly elected mayor xxx and legally entitled to enjoy the rights, privileges xxx appurtenant thereto. That is the only consequence of a resolution of the issue therein involved – a purely justiciable question as it implies a given right, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted by law, for said breach of right.
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to the Citizen’s Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Tañada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
Whether or not the issue is a political question.
No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question. The term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked by Tañada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid – which is a judicial question. Note that the SET is a separate and independent body from the Senate which does not perform legislative acts.
Petitioner Rep. Daza represents the Liberal Party (LP) in the Commission on Appointments (CA). When Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized, the political realignment resulted in the swelling of the
number of LDP members to 159 and diminishing that of LP to 17. The House consequently revised its representation in the CA giving Daza’s seat to respondent Rep. Singson as additional member from the LDP. Daza now challenges his removal. Singson, in response, argues, among others, that the question raised by Daza is political in nature and thus beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.
Is the issue raised beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court?
No. What is involved is not a discretionary act of the House of Reps that may not be reviewed by the Court because it is political in nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the Daza from the CA. The issue presented is justiciable rather than political, involving as it does the manner of filling the CA as prescribed
in the Constitution [and not the discretion of the House in the choice of its representatives]. Even if the question were political in nature, it would still come within the powers of review of the Court under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon it by Art VIII, Sec 1 of the Constitution which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the govt.
Petitioners question the Attrition Act of 2005 and contend that by establishing a system of rewards and incentives when they exceed their revenue targets, the law (1) transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters; (2) violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection as it limits the scope of the law to the BIR and BOC; (3) unduly delegates to the President the power to fix revenue targets without sufficient standards; and (4) violates the doctrine of separation of powers by creating a Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the law’s implementing rules.
Is R.A. No. 9335 constitutional?
YES. R.A. No. 9335 is constitutional, except for Section 12 of the law which creates a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to review the law’s IRR.
That RA No. 9335 will turn BIR and BOC employees and officials into “bounty hunters and mercenaries” is purely speculative as the law establishes safeguards by imposing liabilities on officers and employees who are guilty of negligence, abuses, malfeasance, etc. Neither is the equal protection clause violated since the law recognizes a valid classification as only the BIR and BOC have the common distinct primary function of revenue generation. There are sufficient policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets as the revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and the BOC.
However, the creation of a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee for the purpose of reviewing the IRR formulated by agencies of the executive branch (DOF, DBM, NEDA, etc.) is unconstitutional since it violates the doctrine of separation of powers since Congress arrogated judicial power upon itself.
The Tariff and Customs Code (TCC) states that in the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security, the President, subject
to limitations therein provided, may increase xxx existing protective rates of import duty xxx when necessary. Pursuant to the TCC, the President
issued EO 475 and 478 imposing an additional duty of 9% ad valorem to imported crude oil and other oil products, and a special duty of P0.95 per
liter of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products. Rep. Garcia contests the validity of the foregoing EOs averring that they are violative of Sec 24, Art VI of the Constitution which provides: All
xxx revenue or tariff bills shall originate in the House of Representatives.
Are said EOs unconstitutional?
No. There is explicit Constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President to, “subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress]
may impose”, fix “within specific limits tariff rates and other duties or imposts.” Moreover, Garcia’s argument that the “protection of local industries” is the only permissible objective that can be secured by the
exercise of the delegated authority—that which was provided in the TCC to be exercised by the President in “the interest of national economy, general
welfare and/or national security”—is a stiflingly narrow one. We believe, for instance, that the protection of consumers is at the very least as important a dimension of the “the interest of national economy, general welfare and national security” as the protection of local industries.
RA 9337, an act amending certain sections of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, is questioned by petitioners for being unconstitutional. Procedural issues raised by petitioners are the legality of the bicameral proceedings, exclusive origination of revenue measures and the power of the Senate concomitant thereto. Also, Substantive issue was raised with regard to the undue delegation of legislative power to the President to increase the rate of value-added tax to 12%. Petitioners also argue that the increase to 12%, as well as the 70% limitation on the creditable input tax, the 60- month amortization on the purchase or importation of capital goods exceeding P1,000,000.00, and the 5% final withholding tax by government agencies, is arbitrary, oppressive, and confiscatory, and that it violates the constitutional principle on progressive taxation, among others.
WON Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the NIRC giving the President the stand-by authority to raise the VAT rate from 10% to 12% when a certain condition is met, constitutes undue delegation of the legislative power to tax.
NO. The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive.
No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word shall is used in the common proviso. The use of the word shall connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.
Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
YES. The supreme court said that The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. The usual standard and reasonable guidelines that said officers must observe in making the distribution are nowhere to be found; instead, they are to go about it as they may see fit. Obviously, this makes the exercise prone to partiality and abuse, and even corruption.
The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public respondents, and administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).
On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. Enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future.
Whether NMAT requirement for admission to medical colleges contravenes the Constitutional guarantee for the accessibility of education to all, and whether such regulation is invalid and/or unconstitutional.
NO. The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education “accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under “fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.” The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. The power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine. Legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental powers. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.
Thus, prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain scores as a condition for admission to medical schools do not constitute unconstitutional imposition.
The President of the Philippines, pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders No. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129, creating 33 municipalities. Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice-President and as a taxpayer, instituted a special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities. He alleged that the said EOs were null and void, as Sec 68 has been impliedly repealed by RA No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Petitioner argues, accordingly: “If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?”
Whether or not the power to create barrios has been duly delegated by Congress to the President of the Philippines
No. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. Wherefore, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities referred to.
Petitioner Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. (petitioner) is a company engaged in the business of laundry services. On 6 June 2001, the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) endorsed to respondent Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) the inspection report on the complaint of black smoke emission from petitioner’s plant located at 114 Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. On 22 June 2001, LLDA conducted an investigation and found that untreated wastewater generated from petitioner’s laundry washing activities was discharged directly to the San Francisco Del Monte River. Furthermore, the Investigation Report stated that petitioner’s plant was operating without LLDA clearance, AC/PO-ESI, and Discharge Permit from LLDA. On 5 September 2001, the Environmental Quality Management Division of LLDA conducted wastewater sampling of petitioner’s effluent. The result of the laboratory analysis showed non-compliance with effluent standards particularly Total Suspended Solids (TSS), Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD), Oil/Grease Concentration and Color Units. Consequently, LLDA issued to petitioner a Notice of Violation. Petitioner submitted its application for LLDA Clearance and Discharge Permit and informed LLDA that it would undertake the necessary measures to abate the water pollution. No compliance followed. It was reported that petitioner’s wastewater treatment facility was under construction. Subsequently, another wastewater sampling was conducted but the results still failed.
WON LLDA have the implied power to impose fines as set forth in PD 984.
YES. Petitioner asserts that LLDA has no power to impose fines since such power to impose penal sanctions, which was once lodged with the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC), is now assumed by the Pollution Adjudication Board pursuant to Executive Order No. 192 (EO 192). SC disagree. Presidential Decree No. 984 (PD 984) created and established the NPCC under the Office of the President. EO 192, which reorganized the DENR, created the Pollution Adjudication Board under the Office of the DENR Secretary which assumed the powers and functions of the NPCC with respect to adjudication of pollution cases. The Court ruled that LLDA, in the exercise of its express powers under its charter, as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, has the implied authority to issue a “cease and desist order.” In the same manner, we hold that the LLDA has the power to impose fines in the exercise of its function as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region.
Respondent Unjieng was convicted. Under the Probation Act (Act No. 4221), he later applied for probation. Judge Vera granted the probation.
Petitioners filed this action to the end that Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with the final judgment of conviction. Petitioners aver, among others, that said Act is unconstitutional as it is an invalid delegation of legislative powers to provincial boards. The challenged provision thereof reads: “[t]his Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the
salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals.
Does the Probation Act constitute an invalid delegation of legislative powers?
Yes. Act No. 4221 is thereby unconstitutional and void. The effectivity of the Act was made to depend upon an act to be done by the provincial boards, that is, the appropriating of funds for the salary of the probation
officer. But the Act does not xxx fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of this discretionary power. What is granted is a “roving commission”. It thus leaves the entire operation or
non-operation of the Act upon the provincial boards. The discretion vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and unlimited. This is a virtual surrender of legislative power to them.
The Philippine Legislature enacted Act 2868 with one of its salient provisions, Section 1, authorizing the governor-General “for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency
measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act”. Thus, on August 1, 1919, the Governor-General signed EO 53, fixing the price of rice. On August 6, 1919, Ang Tang Ho was caught selling a ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos, a price higher than that fixed by EO 53. Defendant was found guilty and now assails the constitutionality of the Act 2868 for invalid delegation of legislative powers.
Won Act 2868 is unconstitutional?
Yes. Said Act constituted an invalid delegation of power since the said Act authorized the Governor-General to promulgate laws and not merely rules and regulations to effect the law. The said Act was not complete when it left the legislature as it failed to specify what conditions the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation as the said Act states “for any cause”. It also failed to define “extraordinary rise” that such proclamation by the
Governor-General aims to prevent. Lastly, the said Act authorized the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures by the Governor-General.
