Declaration of Principles and State Policies

Question 1

Art II Sec 28

Answer 1

The state adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

Question 2

Art II Sec 26

Answer 2

The state shall prohibit political dynasties

Question 3

Art II Sec 18

Answer 3

The state shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare

Question 4

Art II Sec 16

Answer 4

The state shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology

Question 5

Art II Sec 8

Answer 5

Nuclear Free Policy

Question 6

Art II Sec 6

Answer 6

The separation of church and state shall be inviolable

Question 7

Art II Sec 4

Answer 7

The Government may call upon the people to defend the state

Question 8

Art II Sec 3

Answer 8

Civilian Authority is at all times supreme over the military.

Question 9

Art II Sec 2

Answer 9

Renounces war

Question 10

Constituent/Ministrant

Answer 10

the former constitutes the very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature; the latter are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general interest of society, and are merely optional.

Question 11

De Jure/ De Facto

Answer 11

De jure – government has rightful title but no actual power or control, either because this has been withdrawn from it or because it has not yet actually entered into the exercise thereof.
De facto –is a government in fact, that is, it actually exercises power or control without legal title.

Question 12

This was an original action in the Supreme Court for prohibition. Petitioner was an owner of a volkswagen beetle car, model 13035 already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights which could serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No 229, as amended, as well as the Implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No 1 issued by Land transportation Commission. Respondent Land Transportation commissioner Romeo Edu issued memorandum circular no 32 pursuant to Letter of Instructions No.229,as amended. It required the use of early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor vehicles. Petitioner alleged that the letter of instructions, as well as the implementing rules and regulations were unlawful and unconstitutional.
Whether the Letter of Instruction imposes valid measure of police power?

Answer 12

YES, The court held that the letter of Instruction No.229,as amended as well as the implementing rules and regulations were valid and constitutional as a valid measure of police power. The Vienna Convention on Road signs and signals and the United Nations Organization was ratified by the Philippine local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices. It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance, between the International law and municipal law in applying the rule municipal law prevails.

Question 13

Arturo E. Garcia finished the course of “Bachillerato Superior” and finished a law course in Spain and was thereafter allowed to practice law. He contends that under the provision of the Treaty of Academic Degree and the Exercise of Professions between the Philippines and Spain, he is entitled to practice law in the Philippines without submitting himself to the bar examinations.
Whether or not a treaty may enable Garcia to practice law in the Philippines

Answer 13

The provisions of the treaty cannot be invoked by the applicant for it was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain and Spanish citizens desiring to practice their profession in the Philippines. The petitioner is a Filipino citizen and is therefore subject to the laws of his own country. The treaty could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines for the reason that the executive department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

Question 14

Petitioner, also in behalf of other alien residents’ corporations and partnerships, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that RA 1180 is unconstitutional. Petitioner contends, among others, that said act violates the equal protection of laws and that it violates the treaty of the Philippines with China. Solicitor General contends that the act was a valid exercise of the police power and that not a single treaty was infringed by said act.
Whether or not RA 1180 violates the equal protection of laws (An act to regulate the retail business)

Answer 14

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination on the oppression of inequality. The real question at hand is whether or not the exclusion of the future aliens for the retail trade unreasonable. The equal protection clause “is not infringed by a specified class if it applies to all persons within such class and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not”. Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitute a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.

Question 15

Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorised the importation of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources. Gonzales filed a petition opposing the said implementation because RA No. 3542 which allegedly repeals or amends RA No. 2207, prohibits the importation of rice and corn “by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.”
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA 2207 is to be authorized by the President of the Philippines, and by or on behalf of the Government of the Philippines. They add that after enjoining the Rice and Corn administration and any other government agency from importing rice and corn, S. 10 of RA 3542 indicates that only private parties may import rice under its provisions.

Answer 15

Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. He may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.

Question 16

Aglipay v. Ruiz

Answer 16

The issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does not contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only ‘to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist’ and the government just took advantage of an event considered of international importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation of the Church and State.

Question 17

The National Traffic Commission, under the direction of respondent Williams, resolved to recommend to the Dir. of Public Works and to the Sec. of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be
prohibited from passing along parts of Rosario St. and Rizal Ave. during certain periods of time. Resolution was approved and executed. Petitioner Calalang, in his capacity as private citizen and as a taxpayer, prayed for a writ of prohibition against respondents contending, among others, that CA 548, under which said resolution was acted upon, infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice.
Is CA 548 an infringement of social justice?

Answer 17

No. The promotion of social justice xxx is to be achieved not through a
mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is neither
communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces
by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people.

Question 18

Ondoy, a fisherman, was indisputably drowned while employed in the fishing enterprise of Ignacio. In the hearing for the claim for compensation
filed by petitioner, Ignacio submitted affidavits executed by the chief engineer and oiler of the fishing vessel to the effect that Ondoy, undeniably a member of the working force of the ship, was in that ship,
but after being invited by friends to a drinking spree, left the vessel, and thereafter was found dead. On the other hand, the affidavit of the chiefmate of the fishing enterprise stated that “sometime in October 1968,
while xxx Ondoy xxx was in the actual performance of his work with [the] fishing enterprise, he was drowned and [he] died on October 22, 1968. That the deceased died in [the] line of duty.” The hearing officer summarily ignored the latter affidavit, and dismissed the claim for lack of merit.
Should the claim for compensation be granted?

Answer 18

Yes. There is evidence, direct and categorical, to the effect that the
deceased was drowned while “in the actual performance of his work” with said shipping enterprise. Even without such evidence, the petitioner could
have relied on the presumption of compensability under the [Workmen’s
Compensation] Act once it is shown that the death or disability arose in the
course of employment, with the burden of overthrowing it being cast on
the person resisting the claim.

Question 19

Respondent Farrales is the owner of a parcel of residential land in Olongapo City. Prior to the acquisition of the land, petitioner Salonga was
already in possession as lessee of a part of the land, on which she had erected a house. Due to non-payment of rentals, Farrales then filed an ejectment case against Salonga and other lessees. Decision was rendered
in favor of Farrales. Meanwhile, Farrales sold to the other lessees the parcels of land on which they respectively occupy so that when the decision was affirmed and executed on appeal, the ejectment case was then only against Salonga. Salonga persistently offered to purchase the subject land from Farrales but the latter consistently refused. Salonga filed an action for specific performance praying that Farrales be compelled to sell to him, but it was dismissed. In this appeal, she now invokes Art II, Sec 6 of the 1973 Constitution on social justice.

Answer 19

No. It must be remembered that social justice cannot be invoked to
trample on the rights of property owners who under the Constitution and
laws are also entitled to protection. The social justice consecrated in our
32
ARTICLE II. Fundamental Principles and State Policies
Constitution was not intended to take away rights from a person and give
them to another who is not entitled thereto.

Question 20

Meyer, a teacher in Nebraska, was convicted for unlawfully teaching the
subject of reading in the German language to a 10 year-old child who has
not passed 8th grade. He was prosecuted under the law “An Act Relating to
the Teaching of Foreign Language in the State of Nebraska”, which
prohibited teaching any subject in any language other than English to any
person who has not passed 8th grade. The statute was enacted to promote
civic development by inhibiting training and education of the immature in
foreign tongues and ideals before they could learn English and acquire
American ideals inimical to the best interests of the U.S. It is thus argued
that the enactment comes within the police power of the State.

May the State prohibit teaching the German language to children who
has not reached 8th grade in the exercise of its police power?

Answer 20

No. Evidently the legislature has attempted materially to interfere with, among others, the power of parents to control the education of their own. The power of the State to make reasonable regulations for all schools,
including a requirement that they shall give instructions in English, is not questioned.

Question 21

Concerned over the continued deforestation of the country, petitioners, all minors represented by their parents, instituted a civil complaint as a
taxpayers’ class suit “to prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforest” and “arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth.”
They pray for the cancellation of all existing timber license agreements (TLA) in the country and to order the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to cease and desist from approving new TLAs.
On motion of then DENR Sec. Factoran, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a cause of action. Factoran avers that the petitioners raise an issue political (whether or not logging should be permitted) which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches. Petitioners, claiming to “represent their generation as well as the generation yet unborn”, allege their fundamental right to a balanced and healthful ecology was violated by the granting of said TLAs. 

(1) Do petitioners have a cause of action “to prevent the misappropriation
or impairment of Philippine rainforest” and “arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country’s vital life support systems and continued
rape of Mother Earth”?
(2) Do the petitioners have a locus standi to file suit?

Answer 21

(1) Yes. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. xxx Thus,
the right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as
clear as the DENR’s duty to protect and advance the said right.43
(2) Yes. The case is a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of
common and general interest to all citizens of the Philippines and the
petitioners are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full
protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for
filing of a valid class suit44 are present. We find no difficulty in ruling

Question 22

The City Govt of Caloocan maintains an open garbage dumpsite at the Camarin area. Residents of the area filed a letter of complaint with the Laguna Lake Devt Authority (LLDA) praying to stop the operation due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the surrounding water. LLDA hence issued a cease and desist order (CDO), enjoining the Caloocan City Govt to completely halt dumping wastes in the said dumpsite.

Does the LLDA have the authority to issue the CDO?

Answer 22

Yes. LLDA is specifically mandated by RA 4850 and its amendatory laws
to adjudicate pollution cases in the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding
provinces including Caloocan. Said laws expressly authorizes LLDA to
“make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution”
and “to make whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its
jurisdiction”.

Question 23

Taiwanese investors formed the Bataan Petrochemical Corp. (BPC) which received its certificate of registration with the respondent Board of Investments (BOI) as a new domestic producer of petrochemicals. BPC
later proposed to amend its original registration to, among others, change the feedstock from naphtha only to “naphtha and/or LPG” and transferring the job site from Bataan to Batangas.

Did the BOI commit a grave abuse of discretion when it yielded to the
wishes of the investor, notwithstanding national interest?

Answer 23

Yes. In the light of all the clear advantages manifest in the plant’s remaining in Bataan, practically nothing is shown to justify the transfer to Batangas except a near-absolute discretion given by BOI to investors not only to freely choose the site but to transfer it from their own first choice for reasons which remain murky to say the least.

Question 24

The cases involved have been consolidated because they involve common legal questions, challenging the constitutionality of RA 6657 also
known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform law of 1988 and other supplementary laws thereto: PD 27 (provide for compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and specify maximum retention limits for landowners), EO 228 (declare full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27), Proc No. 131 (instituting CARP) and EO
229 (provide for the mechanics for implementation of CARP). Petitioners argued that the foregoing laws violated the constitutional provisions on just compensation, retention limits, equal protection and the doctrine of separation of powers.

(1) Did the CARP law violate the constitutional provision on just
compensation?
(2) Did the CARP law fail to provide retention limits as required by Art XIII Sec 4 of the Constitution?45
(3) Did the CARP law violate the constitutional provision on equal protection?
(4) Is the issuance of the foregoing presidential acts a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers?

Answer 24

(1) No. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full
and ample. However, the payment of just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money. The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not
unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits and other things of value
equivalent to the amount of just compensation.
(2) No. The argument that Proc No. 131 and EO 229 should be invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits is no longer tenable. RA 6657 does provide for such limits now.
(3) No. Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they belong
to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected.
(4) No. The promulgation of PD 27 by Pres Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial law has already been sustained n Gonzales v. Estrella and we find no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As
for the power of Pres Aquino to promulgate Proc No. 131 and EO 228 and 229, the same was authorized under Sec 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution

Question 25

PAGCOR, under PD 1869, is exempt from paying any “tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise as well as fees, charges or levies or whatever nature xxx”. Basco et al. now seeks to annul PAGCOR alleging, among
others, that it intrudes into the local govt’s (in the case at bar, the City of Manila) right to impose local taxes and license fees, contravening therefore with the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy.

Is the tax exemption granted to PAGCOR a violation of the principle of autonomy of local govts?

Answer 25

No. The contention is without merit. Only the National Govt has the power to issue “licenses or permits” for the operation of gambling. The local govts have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Govt such as PAGCOR. Otherwise, its operation might be subject to control by a mere local govt; consequently, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies.

Question 26

Petitioner Pamatong filed his certificate of candidacy for President but respondent COMELEC refused to give due course to said certificate of candidacy. He was one of those declared as nuisance candidates who
could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency. In this petition for certiorari, Pamatong avers the
denial of his certificate of candidacy is a violation of his right to “equal access to opportunities for public service” under Sec 26, Art II of the Constitution.

Is the denial of Pamatong’s candidacy violative of Art II, Sec 26 of the Constitution?

Answer 26

No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. What is recognized in Art II, Sec 26 is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. The [equal access clause] neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

Question 27

Petitioner Legaspi requested for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Dept. of Cebu City. These govt employees had allegedly represented themselves
as civil service eligible who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians. However, respondent CSC denied the request. Claiming his right to public information has been denied, Legaspi now prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel CSC to disclose the information.

Does Legaspi have the right to compel CSC to disclose the information?

Answer 27

Yes.48 The information sought is a public concern. Public office being a public trust, it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligible. The information sought is not exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. CSC has failed to cite
any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the Legaspi’s right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligible. Notably, the names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in licensure
examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one’s civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. In the absence of express limitations under the law upon
access to the register of civil service eligible for said position, the duty of the CSC to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative.

Question 28

Petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent GSIS General Manager Belmonte requesting him to be furnished with the list of names of the opposition members (members of UNIDO and PDP-Laban) of the Batasang Pambansa
who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. In reply to the letter, GSIS Dep. General Counsel said that GSIS cannot furnish Valmonte the list of names because of the confidential relationship that exists between GSIS and all those who borrow from it. Valmonte et al. now seek to compel Belmonte to release the information, invoking his right to information. Valmonte et al.

(1) Is the information sought a matter of public interest and concern so as to come within the policy of full public disclosure?
(2) Supposing the information sought comes within the policy of full public disclosure, may GSIS be compelled to prepare lists of names of opposition members requested?

Answer 28

(1) Yes. The public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public
office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern. Wherefore, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations it may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the
end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured.
(2) No. Although citizens are afforded the right to information and,
pursuant thereto, are entitled to “access to official records,” the
Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of
official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in
their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.

Question 29

Petitioner Sarmiento, a member herself of MTRCB, requested that she be allowed to examine the Board’s records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual Board members after a review of the
movies and TV productions. Her request was denied by respondent MTRCB Chairman Morato arguing that such records partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely private and
personal. The Board later issued a resolution declaring as confidential, private and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members.

Does the denial of the examination of the individual voting slips constitute a violation of the constitutional right of access to official records?

Answer 29

Yes. The decisions of the respondent Board and individual members concerned are not considered private. As may be gleaned from PD
creating the Board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public in character. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his
private capacity. There can be no invasion of privacy in the case at bar since what is sought to be divulged is a product of action undertaken in the course of performing official functions.