Sensations and Brain processes Flashcards
Smart’s view
Smart believes in materialism
reality is made out of stuff like atoms - the most fundamental properties of reality is the thing that physics studies
Dualism and sensations
sensations are something non physical
Sensations
a non physical event taking place in your mind
All that we’re aware of is these sensations and experiences happening in our mind
Smart against dualism
Smart against dualism
Dualist: sensations correlated with brain processes via fundamental psychophysical laws
Nomological danglers
There are leftover things that need some kind of special explanation
Objections
Occam’s razor:
entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity
Smell test - such laws would be like nothing so far known in sciences
“something smells funny”
Eg. Gravitational attraction between tel objects is directly proportional to the mass of each one - this is a physical law that connects the fundamental properties
how would smarts law about sensations relating to brain processes look like
The laws of nature that connects to sensations would be different from the fundamental laws of physics that we know
Behaviourism
sensations are behavioural dispositions
there are different kinds of materialism
At least some kinds of mental states, specifically sensations are identical to brain events
Behaviourism - mental states ultimately are behavioural dispositions
To be in a mental state is to be disposed to act the way someone body in the mental state behaves
sometimes mental states are compared to behaviours
Eg. Fragility - it will break easily - under certain conditions it will produce a response
If somebody is irritable, they would get annoyed easily
That’s a disposition - like the glass that is fragile
If being annoyed is another mental term, we haven’t actually explained what irritably is in physical terms
The behaviourist says that they will engage in annoyed behaviour and behave in the way an annoyed person would
When somebody believes it’s going to snow today, that means they are disposed to do the kinds of things that people with that belief would do
If somebody is disposed to act in this way, that’s all that it really takes to have this belief
this is what sensations are - their behavioural dispositions
Wittgenstein on pain
- what does “she is in pain” mean?
- It means that “she is disposed to…
- She has certain observable behavioural dispositions
- When someone is in pain, we expect certain things out of her behaviou
- What does I’m in pain mean
- We’re not saying that we’re going to engage in those pain behaviours
- We are engaging in pain behaviours by saying that “I’m in pain”
- The general behaviourist line is that claims about other people’s mental states is claims about behaviour that they are disposed to engage in
Objection: pain hurts
There’s something about what pain feels like that is not shown in pain behaviours
Physicalism
sensations are brain processes
- when we’re feeling pain, the sensation of pain is taking place within your brain
- Sensations are events taking place in your brain just like the after Image of the optical illusion
Objection to physicalism
Sensation does not mean the same as brain processes
In particular, when somebody says I’m in pain, they don’t mean, I’m undergoing brain events such and such in this part of my brain
Little kids can tell you that they’re in pain without knowing they have a brain or about specific processes within the brain
Eg. Lightning is electrical discharge and that’s what lightning is
That’s not something distinct from lightning that causes lightning - that’s what lightning is
This is not a statement of our pre-existing definion of lightning
It’s a discovery of the thing we were referring to called lightning
Analytic vs synthetic identity statements
Two kinds of truths
Analytic - definition
Synthetic - substantive claims on reality
Analytic - bachelors are unmarried men
intended of statements of definition
Synthetic - lightning bolts are electric discharge
synthetic identity statements
Descartes-type objection to sensations being brain processes
- I can imagine myself turned to stone and get having images, aches, pains and so on
- What I can imagine is possible
- If it is possible to have sensations without brain processes, then they are really distinct
- Sensations and Brian processes are really distinct
Those against dualism want to argue against premise 2
It’s not a definitive truth that I can imagine something so it’s true and possible
Objection to sensations being brain processes: H2O and water
Water = H2O
Meaning of water does not equal meaning of H2O
When we think of the meaning of water it is not the same of the meaning of H2O
This is not all we mean by water
Smart thinks that we are not limited to common sense definition to explain sensations
- Synthetic identity - Water is H2O
- requires one thing to have two sets of properties
- chemical properties (H2O)
- Ordinary perceptible properties (water)
Functional states
- internal states analytically tied to behaviour
- not individually behaviourally definable
- multiply realizable
Physicalism and Functionalism
Physicalism: mental states supervene on physical states
Functionalism: mental states supervene on functional states
supervenience claims on behaviourism, functionalism and physicalism
Behaviourism: mental states are behavioural dispositions
- supervenience claim: same behaviour = same mental state
functionalism: mental states are functional states
- supervenience claim: same functional states = same mental states
Physicalism: mental states are physical states
- supervenience claim: same physical states = same mental states