Self and Identity Flashcards
What have been some of the historical influences on how we view ‘the self’?
The very idea that you or I might have a self is relatively new. Roy Baumeister (1987) paints a picture of medieval society in which social relations were fixed and stable and legitimised in religious terms. People’s lives and identities were tightly mapped out according to their position in the social order – by visible attributes that go with birth, such as family membership, social rank, birth order and place of birth. In many ways, what you saw was what you got, so the idea of a complex individual self lurking underneath it all was difficult to entertain and probably superfluous. This started to change in the sixteenth century and has gathered momentum ever since. The forces for change included the following: • Secularisation – the idea that fulfilment would occur in the afterlife was replaced by the idea that you should actively pursue personal fulfilment in this life.
• Industrialisation – people were increasingly seen as units of production who would move from place to place to work, and thus would have a portable personal identity that was not locked into static social structures such as the extended family.
Enlightenment – people felt that they could organise and construct differ ent, better, identities and lives for themselves by overthrowing orthodox value systems and oppressive regimes (e.g. the French and American revolutions of the late eighteenth century).
• Psychoanalysis – Freud’s theory of the human mind crystallised the notion that the self was unfathomable because it skulked in the gloomy depths of the unconscious. Together, these and other social, political and cultural changes caused people to think about self and identity as highly complex. Theories of self and identity propagated and flourished in this fertile soil.
What is the debate about individual vs. collective self about? How does it relate to the question of what is a group?
Freud, like many other psychologists, viewed the self as very personal and private – the high point of individuality: something that uniquely describes an individual human being. When someone says ‘I am . . .’ they are describing what makes them different from all other human beings. But think about this for a moment. When Peter Allen sang the lyrics of I Still Call Australia Home in 1980, he made a significant point. It is more than an ‘I’ statement. Today, more than the population of Australia could sing along with Peter – with a formidable variety of accents! It is in this sense that the self can also be a shared or collective self – a ‘we’ or ‘us’. Sometimes these two aspects are breathtakingly close. Think of the moment that an athlete stands on a Olympic podium, wearing a medal as an individual, ‘I’, and listening to an anthem for a nation, ‘we’. make of this. Is the self an individual or a collective phenomenon? For much of this time, advocates of the individual self have tended to prevail. This is largely because social psychologists have considered groups to be made up of individu als who interact with one another rather than individuals who have a collective sense of shared identity. Individuals interacting in aggregates make up the province of social psychology, whereas groups as collectives are the province of several other social sciences, such as sociology and political science (see Chapters 1 and 7). This perspective on groups, summed up by Floyd Allport’s legendary procla mation that ‘There is no psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely William McDougall (1920) argued that out of the interac tion of individuals there arose a ‘group mind’, which had a reality and existence that was qualitatively distinct from the isolated individuals making up the group. There was a collective self that was grounded in group life.
Note what is ‘symbolic interactionism’. Now try to reflect on what comes first for you: what I think of myself or what society thinks of me. Think back to last week’s topic on culture – what role might culture play here?
Early psychologists such as William James (1890) distinguished between self as stream of consciousness, ‘I’, and self as object of perception, ‘me’. In this way, reflexive knowledge is possible because ‘I’ can be aware of ‘me’, and people can thus know themselves. However, people’s self knowledge is not particularly accurate. People tend to reconstruct who they are without being aware of having done it, as Tony Greenwald (1980) has noted. Although people may be aware of who they are in terms of their attitudes and preferences, they are rather bad at knowing how they arrived at that knowledge
Symbolic
interactionism Theory of how the self emerges from human interaction that involves people trading symbols (through language and gesture) that are usually consensual, and represent abstract properties rather than concrete objects.
Symbolic
interactionism Theory of how the self emerges from human interaction that involves people trading symbols (through language and gesture) that are usually consensual, and represent abstract properties rather than concrete objects.
pg 68.
What is the ‘looking glass self’ and where does this idea develop from?
Symbolic interactionism offers a quite sophisticated and complex model of how the self is formed. And yet it generates a very straightforward prediction. Because forming our concept of self comes from seeing ourselves as others see us, which is the idea of the looking-glass self, how we rate ourselves should be closely con nected to how others rate us. Sidney Shrauger and Thomas Schoeneman (1979) reviewed sixtytwo studies to see if this was true. What they found was that people did not tend to see themselves as others saw them but instead saw themselves as they thought others saw them.
Tice intended the public condition to be the one that would engage the looking glass self. As predicted, subsequent descriptions of self were more radically altered under public conditions than private conditions.
Tice’s is that people do not see themselves as others see them, but instead see themselves as they think others see them. pg 69
Note what is mean by self-awareness. How might self-awareness help or hinder academic performance?
icklund (1972) argued that selfawareness is a state in which you are aware of yourself as an object, much as you might be aware of a tree or another person. Thus they speak of objective selfawareness. When you are objectively selfaware you make comparisons between how you actually are and how you would like to be – an ideal, a goal or some other standard. The outcome of this comparison is often a sense that you have shortcomings, along with negative emotions associated with this recognition. People then try to rectify their faults by bringing the self closer into line with ideal standards. This can sometimes be very difficult, and people can give up trying, experience reduced motivation, and feel even worse about themselves.
Objective selfawareness is generated by anything that focuses your attention on yourself as an object: for example, being in front of an audience (see Chapter 6) or catching your image in a mirror. Indeed, a very popular method for raising selfawareness in laboratory studies is precisely this – place participants in front of a mirror. Charles Carver and Michael Scheier (1981) elaborated selfawareness theory. They distinguished between two types of self that we can be aware of: 1. the private self – your private thoughts, feelings and attitudes; 2. the public self – how other people see you, your public image. Private selfawareness leads us to match our behaviour with our internalised standards, whereas public selfawareness is oriented towards presenting yourself to others in a positive light. Being selfaware can be very uncomfortable. We all feel selfconscious from time to time and are only too familiar with how it affects our behaviour – we feel anxious, we become tonguetied, or we make mistakes on tasks. We can even feel slightly paranoid (Fenigstein, 1984). However, sometimes being selfaware can be a terrific thing, particularly on those occasions when we have accomplished a great feat. In March 2006, having won 84 Gold Medals, 69 Silver and 64 Bronze, the Australian Commonwealth Games team paraded through Swanston and Collins Streets in Melbourne in front of a crowd of 50 thousand screaming fans. They were exhausted from the Games and overwhelmed at the reception, but certainly did not suffer from the crowd’s adulation. Selfawareness can also make us feel good when the standards against which we compare ourselves are not too exacting: for example, if we compare ourselves against standards derived from ‘most other people’ or from people who are less fortunate than ourselves (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Selfawareness can also improve introspection, intensify emotions and improve performance of controlled effort sensitive tasks that do not require undue skill, such as checking over an essay you have written. The reverse side of being objectively selfaware is being in a state of reduced objective selfawareness. Because elevated selfawareness can be stressful or aver sive, people may try to avoid this state by drinking alcohol, or by more extreme measures such as suicide (Baumeister, 1991). Reduced selfawareness has also been identified as a key component of deindividuation, a state in which people are blocked from awareness of themselves as distinct individuals, fail to monitor their actions, and can behave impulsively. Reduced selfawareness may be implicated in the way that crowds behave and in other forms of social unrest.
Remind yourself of the definition of a schema.
mental representations of a part of the social world eg (a person, role, or event)
self-schemas, are mental frameworks we use to store information/discriptions about our selves.
we can describe ourselves in numerous ways which all can go on to form self-schemas.
What is known about self-schemas? For example, are compartmentalisations good or bad?
similar to what we do for other people (see Chapter 2). However, the outcome is much more varied.
According to Helen Markus, the selfconcept is neither a ‘singular, static, lump
like entity’ nor a simple averaged view of the self – it is complex and multifaceted, with a relatively large number of discrete selfschemas (Markus, 1977; Markus & Wurf, 1987). People tend to have clear conceptions of themselves (i.e. selfschemas) on some dimensions but not others – i.e. they are schematic on some but asche matic on others. People are selfschematic on dimensions that are important to them, on which they think they are extreme and on which they are certain the opposite does not hold. For example, if you think you are sophisticated, and being sophisticated is important to you, then you are selfschematic on that dimension – it is part of your selfconcept. If you do not think you are sophisticated, and if this does not bother you, then being sophisticated is not one of your selfschemas. We try to use our selfschemas strategically. Patricia Linville (1985) used a colourful phrase to describe what we usually do: ‘Don’t put all your eggs in one cognitive basket’. Having a variety of selfschemas provides a buffer from some of life’s misfortunes: we can always pull some selfschemas out of other baskets to derive some satisfaction. Selfschemas that are rigidly compartmentalised have disadvantages (Showers, 1992). If some selfschemas are very negative and some are very positive, events may cause extreme mood swings according to whether a positive or negative self schema is primed. Generally, more integrated selfschemas are preferable. For example, if James believes that he is a wonderful cook but an awful musician, he has compartmentalised selfschemas – contexts that prime one or the other self schema will produce very positive or very negative moods. Contrast this with Sally, who believes that she is a reasonably good cook but not a great musician. She has selfschemas where the boundaries are less clear – context effects on mood will be less extreme.
What is Bem’s (1967; 1972) self-perception theory and what does it propose?
One of the most obvious ways to learn about who you are is to examine your private thoughts and feelings about the world – knowing what you think and feel about the world is a very good clue to the sort of person you are. However, when these internal cues are weak we may make inferences about ourselves from what we do – our behaviour. This idea underpins Daryl Bem’s self-perception theory (Bem, 1967, 1972). Bem argued that we make attributions not only for others’ behaviour (see Chapter 2) but also for our own, and that there is no essential difference between selfattributions and other attributions. Furthermore, just as we construct an impression of someone else’s personality on the basis of being able to make internal dispositional attributions for their behav iour, so we construct a concept of who we are, not by introspection but by being able to attribute our own behaviour internally. So, for example, I know that I enjoy eating curry because, if given the opportunity, I eat curry of my own free will and in preference to other foods, and not everyone likes curry – I am able to make an internal attribution for my behaviour.
How we perceive ourselves can also be based on simply imagining ourselves behaving in a particular way. For example, sports psychologist Geraldine van Gyn
and her colleagues divided runners into two groups; one group practised power training on exercise bikes, the other did not. Half of each group used imagery, i.e. also imagined themselves sprint training, whereas the others did not. Of course, the sweaty business of power training itself improved subsequent performance; but, remarkably, those who imagined themselves sprint training did better than those who did not. The researchers concluded that imagery had affected selfconception, which in turn produced performance that was consistent with that selfconception (van Gyn, Wenger & Gaul, 1990).
What is the overjustification effect? Provide a real-world example of its impact.
External rewards can decrease motivation to do the behaviour.
pic in page 73.
Selfattributions have important implications for motivation. The theory pre dicts that if someone is induced to perform a task by either enormous rewards or heavy penalties, task performance is attributed externally and thus motivation to perform is reduced. In the absence of external factors to which performance can be attributed, we will instead look to enjoyment or commitment as causes, so motiva tion increases. This has been called the overjustification effect (see Figure 3.2), for which there is now substantial evidence (Deci & Ryan, 1985). For example, Mark Lepper and his colleagues had nurseryschool children draw pictures. Some of the children simply drew of their own free will, while the rest were induced to draw with the promise of a reward, which they were subsequently given. A few days later, the children were unobtrusively observed playing; the children who had previously been rewarded for drawing spent half as much time drawing as did the other group. Those who had received no extrinsic reward seemed to have greater intrinsic interest in drawing (Lepper, Greene & Nisbett, 1973).
What are the major tenets of social comparison theory?
Social comparison Comparing our
behaviours and opinions with those of others in order to establish the correct or socially approved way of thinking and behaving.
Leon Festinger (1954) developed social comparison theory in just this way, to describe how people learn about themselves through comparisons with others. People need to be confident about the validity of their perceptions, attitudes, feelings and behav iour, and because there is rarely an objective measure of validity, people ground their cognitions, feelings and behaviour in those of other people. In particular, they seek out similar others to validate their perceptions and attitudes, which can, to some extent, be read as meaning that people anchor their attitudes and selfconcept in the groups to which they feel they belong. According to Thomas Wills (1981), when it comes to performance we try to compare ourselves with people who are slightly worse than us – we make down ward social comparisons, which deliver an evaluatively positive selfconcept. Often, however, our choices are limited: for example, younger siblings in families often have no option but to compare themselves with their more competent older brothers and sisters. Joanne Wood (1989) has suggested that some upward com parison can have a harmful effect on self-esteem.
Describe the self-evaluation maintenance model. How does this relate to self-esteem?
Self-evaluation maintenance (SEM) concerns discrepancies between two people in a relationship. The theory posits that two people in a relationship each aim to keep themselves feeling good psychologically through a comparison process to the other person. Self-evaluation is the way people view themselves.
According to Abraham Tesser’s (1988) self-evaluation maintenance model, we try to downplay our similarity to the other person or with draw from our relationship with that person. Victoria Medvec and her colleagues conducted an intriguing study along these lines. They coded the facial expressions of medal winners at the 1992 Olympic Games in Barcelona and found that the bronze medallists expressed noticeably more satisfaction than the silver medal lists! Silver medallists were constrained to make unfavourable upward comparisons with gold medallists, whereas bronze medallists could make selfenhancing down ward comparisons with the rest of the field, who received no medal at all (Medvec, Madley & Gilovich, 1995). Downward comparisons also occur between groups. Groups try to compare
themselves with inferior groups in order to feel that ‘we’ are better than ‘them’. Indeed, intergroup relations are largely a struggle for evaluative superiority of one’s own group over relevant outgroups (Hogg, 2000). This in turn influences self conception as a group member – social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). According self-categorisation theory, an extension of social identity theory, the underlying process is one in which people who feel they belong to a group categorise them selves as group members and automatically internalise as a selfevaluation the attributes that describe the group – if the group is positive, the attributes are posi tive, and thus the self is positive,
Self-categorisation theory
Turner and associates’ theory of how the process of categorising oneself as a group member produces social identity and group and intergroup behaviours.
How does BIRGing relate to self-esteem?
BIRGing
Basking In Reflected Glory – that is, name-dropping to link yourself with desirable people or groups and thus improve other people’s impression of you.
With reference to Higgin’s (1987) self-discrepancy theory: (i) what are the major types of self-schema? (ii) when will we engage in self-regulation? (iii) what sorts of emotions occur when there is a discrepancy between the actual and ideal selves? (iv) what sorts of emotions occur when there is a discrepancy between the actual and ought selves?
Self-discrepancy theory
Higgins’ theory about the consequences of making actual–ideal and actual–’ought’ self comparisons that reveal self-discrepancies.
Regulatory focus theory
People use self-regulation to bring themselves into line with their standards and goals, using either a promotion system or a prevention system.
Self discrepancy theory and the general notion of self regulation have recently been elaborated into regulatory focus theory. Higgins (1997) made it clear that he wanted to go beyond Freud’s pleasure-pain principle, that we are bent on procuring the first and avoiding the second. At the root of this simplistic proposition, argued Higgins, is a motivational principle with two separate selfregulatory systems related to the pursuit of different types of goals. Consider the case of students: • The promotion system – you are motivated to attain your hopes and aspirations: your ideals. You will be on the lookout for positive events. When you focus in this way you adopt an approach strategy to attain your goals – e.g. you might try to improve your grades, find new challenges and treat problems as interest ing obstacles to overcome.
• The prevention system – you are motivated to fulfil your duties and obligations: your oughts. You will be on the lookout for negative events. When you focus in this way you adopt an avoidance strategy to attain your goals – e.g. you might try to avoid new situations or new people, and concentrate more on avoiding failure than achieving the highest possible grade.
Some people are habitually more promotionfocused and others more preventionfocused, a difference that can arise during childhood. A promotion focus is encouraged when children are habitually hugged and kissed for behaving in a desired way, or when love is withdrawn as a form of discipline. A prevention focus can arise when children are encouraged to be alert to potential dangers or when punished and shouted at for acting badly (Higgins & Silberman, 1998). Research by Penelope Lockwood and her associates shows that people who are promotionfocused look for inspiration to positive role models who emphasise strategies for achieving success. People who are preventionfocused behave quite differently – they are most inspired by negative role models who highlight strate gies for avoiding failure (Lockwood, Jordan & Kunda, 2002)
Describe the differences between the promotion and the prevention systems associated with the regulatory focus theory.
The promotion system – you are motivated to attain your hopes and aspirations: your ideals. You will be on the lookout for positive events. When you focus in this way you adopt an approach strategy to attain your goals – e.g. you might try to improve your grades, find new challenges and treat problems as interest ing obstacles to overcome.
• The prevention system – you are motivated to fulfil your duties and obligations: your oughts. You will be on the lookout for negative events. When you focus in this way you adopt an avoidance strategy to attain your goals – e.g. you might try to avoid new situations or new people, and concentrate more on avoiding failure than achieving the highest possible grade.
How do most researchers characterise the self nowadays?
The Concept of Self, Kenneth Gergen (1971) depicts the selfconcept as containing a repertoire of relatively discrete and often quite varied identities, each with a distinct body of knowledge. My identities probably grew from the many different social relationships in my life. These are anchoring points ranging from close personal relationships with friends and family, from relationships and roles defined by work groups and professions, and from relationships defined by ethnic ity, nationality and religion.
According to social identity theory, what are the two major classes of identity? Make sure you can define and understand each of these types.
- social identity, which defines self in terms of group memberships;
- personal identity, which defines self in terms of idiosyncratic personal relation ships and traits.
What forms of the relational self did Brewer and Gardner (1996) propose?
Marilynn Brewer and Wendi Gardner (1996) asked the question ‘Who is this “we”?’ and distinguished three forms of self: 1. the individual self – based on personal traits that differentiate the self from all others;
2. the relational self – based on connections and role relationships with significant others);
3. the collective self – based on group membership that differentiates ‘us’ from ‘them’.
The relational self is interesting. Although in one sense it is an interpersonal form of self, it can also be considered a particular type of collective self. As Masaki Yuki (2003) observed, some groups and cultures (notably East Asian cultures) define groups in terms of networks of relationships. Not surprisingly, Elizabeth Seeley and her colleagues found that women place a greater importance than men on their relationships with others in their groups (Seeley, Gardner, Pennington & Gabriel, 2003).
What are the three self-motives discussed in your text?
self assessment to validate ourselves;
self verification to be consistent;
self enhancement to look good.
We have a simple desire to have accurate and valid information about ourselves – there is a self-assessment motive, as an overview by Yaacov Trope (1986) has shown. People strive to find out the truth about themselves, regardless of how unfavourable or disappointing the truth may be. But people also like to engage in a quest for confirmation – to confirm what they already know about themselves they seek out selfconsistent information through a self-verification process, as Bill Swann (1987) has described. So, for example, people who have a negative self image will actually seek out negative information to confirm that image.
Above all else, people like to learn things about themselves that make the self look good. We like to learn new things that are favourable about ourselves as well as finding ways to revise existing views that are unfavourable. People are guided by a self-enhancement motive (e.g. Kunda, 1990). Using self-affirmation theory, David Sherman and Geoffrey Cohen (2006) described how this motive reveals itself. People strive publicly to affirm positive aspects of who they are; this can be done blatantly by boasting or more subtly through rationalising or dropping hints. The urge to selfaffirm is particularly strong when an aspect of one’s selfesteem has been damaged. So, for example, if someone draws attention to the fact that you are a lousy artist, you might retort that while that might be true, you are an excellent dancer. Selfaffirmation rests on people’s need to maintain a global image that they are competent, good, coherent, unitary, stable, capable of free choice and capable of controlling important outcomes.
What were Sedikides’ (1993) findings in relation to these self-motives?
Which motive is more fundamental and more likely to prevail in the pursuit of
selfknowledge – selfassessment, selfverification or selfenhancement? In a series of experiments, Constantine Sedikides (1993) pitted the three motives against one another. His participants used a selfreflection task in which they ask themselves questions. Some of these involved central traits that applied their selves whereas other questions related to more peripheral traits about their selves. The degree of selfreflection should depend on which of the three selfmotives is operating: • Self-assessment – greater selfreflection on peripheral than central traits of self, whether the attribute is desirable or not, indicates a drive to find out more about self (people already have knowledge about traits that are central for them).
• Self-verification – greater selfreflection on central than on peripheral traits, whether the attribute is positive or not, indicates a drive to confirm what one already knows about oneself.
• Self-enhancement – greater selfreflection on positive than on negative aspects of self, whether the attribute is central or not, indicates a drive to learn positive things about self. Sedikides found that selfenhancement was strongest, with selfverification a distant second and selfassessment an even more distant third. The desire to think well of ourselves reigns supreme; it dominates both the pursuit of accurate selfknowledge and the pursuit of information that confirms selfknowledge. (Does this apply to you? See the second focus question.) Because selfenhancement is so important, people have developed a formidable repertoire of techniques to pursue it. People engage in elaborate selfdeceptions to
enhance or protect the positive aspects of their selfconcepts
Read Real World 3.3 on page 82. Review the sorts of esteem-enhancing and protecting behaviours that are utilised: How many are you guilty of?
- take credit for the sucesses but deny blame for their failures- this is a self-serving bias
- they forget failure feedback more reasdily than sucess or praise
- they accept praise uncritically but recieve criticism sceptically
- they try to dismiss interpersonal criticism as being motivated by prejudice
- they perform a biased serch of self-knowledge to support a favorable self-image
- they place a favourable spin on the meaning of ambiguous traits that define self.
- they persuade themselves that there flaws are widely shared human attributes but that their qualities are rare and distinctive.
What explanations have been offered for the pursuit of self-esteem?
Shelley Taylor and Jonathon Brown (1988) concluded that people normally overestimate their good
points, overestimate their control over events and are unrealistically optimistic. Sedikides and Gregg (2003) call these three characteristics of human thought the self-enhancing triad.
We all know people who seem to hold themselves in very low regard and others who seem to have a staggeringly positive impression of themselves. Do these differ ences reflect enduring and deepseated differences in selfesteem? The main thrust of research on selfesteem as a trait is concerned with establishing individual differences in selfesteem and investigating the causes and consequences of these differences. One view that has become somewhat entrenched, particularly in the United States, is that low selfesteem is responsible for a range of personal and social problems such as crime, delinquency, drug abuse, unwanted pregnancy and under achievement in school. This view has spawned a huge industry, with accompanying mantras, to boost individual selfesteem, particularly in childrearing and school contexts. However, critics have argued that low selfesteem may be a product of the stressful and alienating conditions of modern industrial society, and that the selfesteem ‘movement’ is an exercise in rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic that merely produces selfish and narcissistic individuals.
So, what is the truth? American research suggests that individual selfesteem tends to vary between moderate and very high, so that most people feel relatively positive about themselves (Baumeister, Tice & Hutton, 1989). However, Shinobu Kitayama and his colleagues reported lower selfesteem in Japanese students studying in Japan or the United States (Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto & Norasakkunkit, 1997).
Even if we focus on those people who have low selfesteem, there is little evidence that low selfesteem causes the social ills that it is purported to cause. For example, Baumeister, Smart and Boden (1996) searched the literature for evidence for the popular belief that low selfesteem causes violence. They found quite the opposite. Violence was associated with high selfesteem; more specifically, violence seems to erupt when individuals with high selfesteem have their rosy selfimages threatened. However, we should not lump together everyone who happens to have high
selfesteem. Consistent with common sense, some people with high selfesteem are quietly selfconfident and nonhostile, whereas others are arrogant, conceited and overly assertive (Kernis, Granneman & Barclay, 1989). These latter individuals also feel ‘special’ and superior to others, and they actually have relatively volatile self esteem – they are narcissistic (Rhodewalt, Madrian & Cheney, 1998). One study has shown that narcissistic individuals were more aggressive towards people who had provoked and offended them (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998). (Knowing this, you might want to learn a bit more about Manfred. See the third focus question.) Overall, research into selfesteem as an enduring individual trait provides quite
a clear picture of what people with high and low selfesteem are like (Baumeister, 1998; see Table 3.2).
What is terror management theory?
Jeff Greenberg and his associates suggested an intriguing, but somewhat gloomy, reason why people pursue selfesteem: it is to overcome their fear of death. In their terror management theory, they argue that knowing death is inevitable is the most fundamental threat that people face, and therefore it is the most powerful motivat ing factor in human existence. Selfesteem is part of a defence against that threat. Through high selfesteem, people can escape from the anxiety that would otherwise arise from continual contemplation of the inevitability of one’s death – the drive for selfesteem is grounded in terror of death. High selfesteem makes people feel good about themselves. They feel immortal, and positive and excited about life.
In support of this analysis, Greenberg and his colleagues conducted an experi ment in which selfesteem was shown to act as a buffer to anxiety. Participants did or did not receive success and positive personality feedback (manipulation of self esteem) and then either watched a video about death or anticipated painful electric shocks (Greenberg et al., 1992). They found that participants who had had their selfesteem raised experienced lower physiological arousal and reported less anxiety (see Figure 3.5)
How does strategic self-presentation and self-monitoring interact?
Since the self that we project has consequences for how others react, we try to control the self that we present. In The presentation of self in everyday life, the sociologist Erving Goffman (1959) likened this process of impression management to theatre, where people play different roles for different audiences. There is a vast amount of evidence that people behave differently in public from the way they do in private (Leary, 1995). There are two general classes of motive for selfpresentation: strategic and expressive. Research by Mark Snyder (1974) into individual differences in self-monitoring suggests that high selfmonitors adopt strategic selfpresentation strategies because they typically shape their behaviour to project the impression they feel their audience or the situation demands, whereas low selfmonitors adopt expres sive selfpresentation strategies because their behaviour is less responsive to changing contextual demands. Check Table 3.3 again for items that sample selfmonitoring. How did you score on this test?
Ned Jones and Thane Pittman (1982) identified five strategic motives in the way we attempt to present ourselves:
- self-promotion – trying to persuade others that you are competent; 2. ingratiation – trying to get others to like you; 3. intimidation – trying to get others to think you are dangerous; 4. exemplification – trying to get others to regard you as a morally respectable individual;
- supplication – trying to get others to take pity on you as helpless and needy.
You or others that you know may have acted in ways that reflect these motives (see Chapter 5 on persuasion tactics). In fact, ingratiation and selfpromotion serve two of the most common goals of social interaction: to get people to like you and to get people to think you are competent (Leary, 1995).
Research suggests that ingratiation has little effect on an observer’s liking for you but a big effect on the target – flattery can be hard to resist
The key to getting people to like you through strategic self-presentation is to be subtle enough so that it does not look too obviously like ingratiation. According to Jones (1990), there are four principal strategies you should adopt: 1 Try to agree with people’s opinions (similarity enhances attraction – see Chapter 10). When you do so make it credible: (a) agree on important issues but keep disagreement to trivial issues and (b) balance forceful agreement with weak disagreement.
2 Be selectively modest, but be careful by (a) making fun of your standing on unimportant issues and
(b) putting yourself down in areas that do not matter very much.
3 Try to avoid appearing too desperate for others’ approval. Try to get others to do the strategic self-presentation for you. If it is left up to you, use the strategy sparingly. Do not use it when it would be expected.
4 Basking in reflected glory really does work. Make casual references to your connections with winners. Only make links with losers when the links cannot be turned against you.
How do expressive self-presentation and social validation interact?
Strategic self-presentation focuses on manipulating others’ perceptions of you. Expressive motives for selfpresentation involve demonstrating and validating our selfconcept through our actions – the focus is more on oneself than on others (Schlenker, 1980). But we are not naive: we usually seek out people who would validate who we are. The expressive motive for selfpresentation is a strong one, because a particular identity or selfconcept is worthless unless it is recognised and validated by others – it is of little use to me if I think I am a genius but no one else does. Identity requires social validation for it to persist and serve a useful function. For example, research by Nicholas Emler and Steve Reicher (1995) shows that delinquent behaviour among boys is almost always performed publicly, or in forms that can be publicly verified, because its primary function is identity validation – validation of possession of a delinquent reputation. Social validation of expressed behaviour also seems to be implicated in self concept change. Refer back to Tice’s experiment in Figure 3.1, in which she asked her participants to act as if they were either emotionally stable or emotionally vola tile. Half of them performed the behaviour publicly and half privately. They all then completed ratings of what they believed their ‘true self’ was like. Tice found that only publicly performed behaviour was internalised as a description of their self. What is important in selfconcept change is that other people perceive you in a particular way – this is social validation. It is not enough for you, and only you, to perceive your self in a particular wa
what strategies do people use to construct a coherent sense of self?
Restrict your life to a limited set of contexts. Because our various selves come into play as contexts keep changing, by reducing their number you will protect yourself from selfconceptual clashes.
• Keep revising and integrating your ‘autobiography’ to accommodate new identi ties. Along the way, get rid of any worrisome inconsistencies. In effect you are rewriting your history to make it work to your benefit.
• Attribute changes in the self externally to changing circumstances, rather than internally to fundamental changes in who we are. This is an application of the actor–observer effect (see Chapter 2).
We can also develop a selfschema that embodies a core set of attributes that we
feel distinguishes us from all other people – that makes us unique.
