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Philosophy > Searle - Chapter 1 > Flashcards

Searle - Chapter 1 Flashcards

1
Q

What is the name of Searle’s theory of mind?

A

Biological naturalism

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2
Q

Why is it known as biological naturalism?

A

Biological: Searle believes mental states are a biological phenomena
Naturalism: Mind is explicable as a part of the natural world; not dualist or supernatural

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3
Q

What does Searle aim to do?

A

Marry our ‘common sense picture of ourselves as human beings’ with ‘our overall scientific conception of the physical universe’

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4
Q

According to Searle, what are the 4 intractable features of the mind?

A

Consciousness, intentionality, subjectivity and mental causation

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5
Q

What is Searle’s argument? (3 premises and C)

A

P1: Mental phenomena are caused by brain processes
P2: Mental phenomena are features of the brain
P3: Mental states are subjective and not reducible to the physical
C: The brain causes consciousness in the same way as the stomach causes digestion and the lover causes bile to be secreted. It is a biological phenomenon. BIOLOGICAL NATURALISM

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6
Q

Quote that likens consciousness to other biological processes

A

“Consciousness is a biological process like digestion, photosynthesis, or the secretion of bile”

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7
Q

Support for P1 Mental phenomena are caused by brain processes

A
  • Phantom limb pains caused by artificially stimulating relevant parts of the brain; pain is intimately tied to the nervous system
  • Rules out substance dualism as can’t have mental states without brain
  • Strongly suggests mental supervenes on physical
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8
Q

What does Searle mean when he says mental phenomena ARE features of the brain?

A
  • Mental states are “surface” or “macro” features of the brain; “system properties” of brain states
  • Both caused by and realised in the brain
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9
Q

Quote Searle’s explanation of micro and macro features

A

“surface feature [i.e. mental states]…is realised in the system that is made up of the micro-elements…the surface features are just higher level features of the very system whose behaviour at the micro-level causes those features”

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10
Q

How does Searle uphold both P1 and P2?

A

He says we need to reject the Humean model of causation for something more “sophisticated” (scientific definition)

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11
Q

What is traditional Humean causation? E.g.?

A

The relationship between two separate and distinct state of affairs where one gives rise to the other e.g. a cog moving another cog which moves the clock hand

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12
Q

What is the scientific use of causation? E.g.?

A

Causation as explanation or reduction e.g. molecular structure ‘causes’ liquidity but liquidity just is a particular molecular structure, there’s only one state of affairs

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13
Q

How does Searle avoid charges of epiphenomenalism?

A

He adopts the scientific use of causation: if mental states are just ‘surface features’ of the micro states it follows that they share all causal properties that the micro states do

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14
Q

Quotes to illustrate Searle’s P3 that mental states are subjective and not reducible to the physical

A

‘consciousness has a first-person ontology…therefore, it cannot be reduced to something that has a third-person ontology, something that exists independently of experience’
‘the existence of subjectivity is an objective fact of biology’

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15
Q

According to Searle, how can the brain be conscious? What sort of issue is this?

A
  • It is not a philosophical issue but a scientific/biological empirical challenge
  • Science has already shown how we can get macro properties (e.g. liquidity) that are very different in kind to the properties of their underlying micro states
  • H20 gives water properties and is water
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16
Q

Searle’s comparison between molecules and neurons to show why we shouldn’t be philosophically perplexed that the macro states of the brain are so different from the micro neurons

A

NO MOLECULE IS WET in the same way no neuron is conscious

17
Q

What is strength 1 of BN?

A

If it’s true, it marries naïve mentalism with naïve physicalism so we can hold onto common sense view that everything is ultimately physical as well as our folk psychology that mental states are real with real causal powers

18
Q

What is strength 2 of BN?

A

Analogies from science show how something can be both caused by and realised in the microstructures even though the micro has no properties associated with the macro states

19
Q

What is strength 3 of BN?

A

Biological precedents: demystifying understanding of life by abandoning elan vital (life force) in favour of understanding in terms of biological processes

20
Q

What is the problem of causality as set out by Jaegwon Kim?

A
  • Searle rejects the Humean model of causation which means we don’t have 2 phenomena but 1 viewed from 2 perspectives
  • Hence one level of description cannot cause another level of description; one level can be the explanation of the other - not causation
21
Q

How could Searle respond to Kim or Maslin on causation?

A
  • They presuppose the mental is distinct from the physical
  • S is not a PD and therefore he doesn’t need to invoke the Humean models in the way his critics suggest
  • Merit of S’s reply is only as good as his assertion that BN is NOT PD
22
Q

What is a problem for Searle when it comes to being realised in? What are the 3 possible outcomes?

A

Unclear as to how we’re supposed to understand it…

1) Consciousness is the aggregate stat of molecules? = MBIT (Searle once states that the feeling of thirst is localised in the hypothalamus)
2) Consciousness is the ‘process’ that takes place through the neurons? = Functionalism
3) Consciousness emerges from the neurological states? = PD

23
Q

What could Searle define realised in as? What are the issues then arise from this?

A

He could say a mental state is just the behaviour of the neurons as an aggregate of the physical level…BUT

  • Cannot marry this with irreducibility of mental states
  • Supervenience doesn’t entail reduction; then he’s a non-reductive materialist
24
Q

What’s wrong with Searle’s arguments by analogy?

A

ARGUMENTS BY ANALOGY ARE ONLY AS GOOD AS THE ANALOGY

  • Consciousness is not an accessible or observable feature, it’s subjective
  • We can observe the liquidity of water in its macro state which is not the case with consciousness; this is what the hard problem of consciousness really is
  • Every other biological process we know is observable (in both the macro and micro states) but consciousness is not
  • Same for the hammer analogy to escape epiphenomalism
25
Q

Why does BN seem like PD in disguise?

A
  • There’s only one substance
  • Mental states are ‘systemic properties’ of the brain
  • Mental states are essentially ‘subjective features’ of the brain and can’t be reduced to the physical
26
Q

What is the main problem with PD that Searle tries to escape?

A

Mental causal power does not exist; mental states do not cause physical states

27
Q

How does Searle deny he is a PD?

A
  • He doesn’t have the problem of epiphenomenalism but for a PD like Chalmers, the irreducibility of mental states implies they are ‘distinct from’ or ‘over and above’ neurobiological states
  • BUT for Searle, no metaphysical consequences from saying mental properties are subjective and irreducible; epistemological claim, not a metaphysical one
28
Q

How does Searle explain the irreducibility of consciousness?

A
  • Where consciousness is concerned appearance is reality
  • For Searle, consciousness ‘by definition it falls outside the pattern of reduction’
  • ‘It has no deep metaphysical consequences for the unity of our overall scientific world view. It does not show that consciousness…cannot be brought into our overall physical conception of the universe.’
29
Q

What does Searle believe the hammer analogy demonstrates?

A

Searle uses the hammer analogy to illustrate his point that the brain and mental states (micro and macro features) have the same causal power

30
Q

What is the hammer analogy?

A

Just as it’s true to say a hammer can cause a nail to move in virtue of the hammer’s solidity (macro feature), it is equally true that the nail moves in virtue of the micro-elements that make up the hammer.

So is the case with mental states: when I raise my arm, I am caused to do so by my conscious desire to do so (macro state of the brain) though it would be equally true to say that I am caused to do so because of the arrangement of neurons (micro) in my brain.

31
Q

How does Chalmers view of consciousness contrast with Searle’s?

A

He believes the fact of subjectivity/qualia etc. has deep metaphysical consequences for ho we are to understand the universe and what is needed to understand it; he believes consciousness is a basic and fundamental part of the world akin to atoms

Philosophy (14 decks)

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