Right to Counsel Flashcards
Is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment violated when a trial judge in a capital case fails to appoint the defense counsel until the day of trial?
Yes. In capital cases, if a defendant is unable to employ his own counsel and cannot adequately represent himself, a trial judge must appoint counsel, whether requested or not by the defendant.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to notice and a hearing. In capital cases, the right to a hearing includes the right to counsel because a layman is generally not familiar with legal proceedings and is therefore not adequately prepared to assert his own defense.
This right to counsel includes the ability to consult with one’s attorney prior to trial in order to properly prepare a defense.
Must a state provide counsel for any indigent defendant, regardless of the crime charged?
No. At the state level, due process does not necessarily require that the appointment of counsel for any defendant that cannot obtain counsel on her own, regardless of the crime charged and the nature of the trial.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not specifically incorporate every right in the Sixth Amendment against the states. Nevertheless, a state’s denial of one of the guarantees contained in the first eight amendments may constitute a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In any given case, the totality of the circumstances must be judged to determine whether due process was violated.
Does the Fourteenth Amendment incorporate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the states?
Yes. The Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the states. The Fourteenth Amendment incorporates those provisions of the Bill of Rights that are “fundamental and essential to a fair trial.”
Does the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extend to a defendant charged with a petty or misdemeanor offense?
Yes. At common law in England, the right to counsel was guaranteed in misdemeanor cases but limited in felony cases. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution expanded that right, and the language and subsequent case law do not support the notion that the Sixth Amendment revoked the right to counsel for misdemeanor offenses. The fact that offenses carrying a sentence of less than six months imprisonment may be tried before a judge instead of a jury does not mean that there is no right to counsel.
Do the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require that states provide defendants counsel whenever imprisonment is an authorized penalty?
No. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require only that indigent defendants be appointed counsel when imprisonment is actually imposed. There is doubt that the Sixth Amendment initially guaranteed more than simply the right of a defendant in criminal cases to employ counsel on his behalf.
While precedence has extended the scope of this constitutional right, cases such as Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1969), and Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), have recognized the severity of imprisonment over other forms of punishment. (These cases established that a defendant has a right to trial by jury whenever he faces the possibility of at least six months imprisonment.)
Is a defendant who receives a conditional or suspended sentence with the possibility of jail time entitled to counsel under the Sixth Amendment?
Yes. The Sixth Amendment does not allow a defendant who did not receive advice of counsel during prosecution to be deprived of his liberty or imprisoned. When the prison term within a suspended sentence is triggered, the defendant is imprisoned for the crime he was convicted of; not for violating the terms of his probation. This is exactly what the Sixth Amendment does not allow unless the defendant had counsel present during his prosecution.
In situations where a suspended sentence may be imposed, the defendant deserves the appointment of counsel at the stage where his guilt or innocence is determined because the defendant will be imprisoned if he violates his probation.
Can an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction still be used to enhance a prison sentence when, after being given counsel, a defendant is convicted of a second crime?
Yes. Under Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), a defendant does not have a right to counsel where no prison was imposed. A “logical consequence” of Scott is that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction where no prison term was imposed can be used to enhance a prison sentence when, after being given counsel, a defendant is convicted of a second crime.
Does a probationer have the constitutional right to have counsel present before sentencing takes place?
Yes. In Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), we held that indigent individuals have the right to have counsel appointed for them. Gideon and other cases stand for the proposition that indigents have the right to counsel at “every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected.”
For example, in this case the sentencing judge is required by statute to make a recommendation to the probation board about the length of time the probationer should serve. Since this recommendation is very important in determining the length of incarceration, it is important for the probationer to be represented by counsel, for that counsel could introduce mitigating factors and marshal salient facts in his client’s defense.
Is an indigent defendant entitled to representation at state expense for discretionary appeals?
the state is not required to provide appellate review. When the state chooses to afford the opportunity for appellate review, equal protection demands that it afford equal opportunity for review to all defendants, irrespective of the defendant’s ability to pay the costs of appellate review. The state is not required to provide counsel at every step of the appellate process in order to provide meaningful access to the system. The state is simply prohibited from adopting arbitrary standards that exclude an individual from the opportunity to receive fair appellate review.
Does an indigent defendant have a right to have counsel appointed during the defendant’s first appeal as a matter of right?
Yes. An indigent defendant has a right to have counsel appointed during the defendant’s first appeal as a matter of right. Denying an indigent defendant the right to counsel during an appeal as of right is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Does a criminal defendant convicted on a guilty or nolo contendre plea have the right to request appointment of counsel when applying for first level appellate review?
Yes. Although a state is not required to allow appellate review of criminal cases, once it opens that door, it cannot bar indigent defendants from seeking appellate review.
Under the Due Process Clause, may a court commit a juvenile to a juvenile facility without notice of the charges, without access to counsel, without the right to confrontation and cross-examination, and without appellate review?
No. Under the Due Process Clause, a court may not commit a juvenile to a juvenile facility without notice of the charges, without access to counsel, without the right to confrontation and cross-examination, and without appellate review
Does the Constitution require the state to provide the services of a psychiatrist when the sanity of a defendant is likely to be at issue in criminal proceedings?
The state must afford a fair opportunity for an individual to defend against criminal charges. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the state from depriving any individual of the opportunity to meaningfully participate in his own defense on the basis of poverty. A person charged with a crime has a fundamental interest in the preservation of his life or liberty. The state has a compelling interest in achieving the fair and accurate disposition of criminal cases. The state’s financial concerns related to the provision of psychiatric assistance are not substantial when compared against the state’s interest in criminal procedure and the individual’s liberty interests. When a defendant’s guilt or innocence depends upon his mental state, the services of a psychiatrist may be critical to his defense. Ultimately, the jury must decide whether a defendant’s mental condition relieves the defendant of culpability. A defendant’s inability to present his own psychiatric evidence poses a high risk of an erroneous jury assessment of the defendant’s mental state. The defendant must make a threshold showing that his mental state is likely to be a significant issue at trial. When a defendant makes that threshold showing, the state must provide access to a psychiatrist.
Does the Due Process Clause require a right to counsel for an indigent individual at a civil contempt proceeding when there is a prospect of incarceration?
No. The Court has long held that the Sixth Amendment grants an indigent criminal defendant the right to state-appointed counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
However, the Sixth Amendment does not govern civil contempt proceedings. In such a proceeding, a court may not impose punishment unless it is shown that the contemnor cannot comply with the court order. Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 638, n. 9 (1988). Although there is no case that directly applies to the facts of the case at bar, the Court can examine “distinct factors” that are useful when deciding what safeguards the Due Process Clause requires in order to make a civil proceeding fundamentally fair. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Those factors include:
(1) the nature of “the private interest that will be affected,”
(2) whether the private interest can be protected by “additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” and
(3) the nature and magnitude of any opposing interest in not providing “additional or substitute procedural requirements.” Id. The private interest affected here is Turner’s right to be free from bodily restraint, namely incarceration.
