Miranda

Question 1

Does the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment control the issue of whether a confession is involuntary in state criminal trials?

Answer 1

Yes. In state criminal trials, wherever a question arises as to whether a confession is incompetent, the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment controls the issue.

Question 2

Without certain hallmark warnings regarding the right to remain silent and the right to counsel, are statements made during custodial interrogation inadmissible at trial?

Answer 2

Yes. Without certain hallmark warnings regarding the right to remain silent and the right to counsel, statements made during custodial interrogation are inadmissible at trial. Custodial interrogation occurs if law-enforcement officers question a person who has been arrested and taken into custody, or otherwise deprived of freedom of action in any significant way. Custodial interrogation is inherently coercive.

Question 3

Does the holding in Miranda establish a constitutional rule that cannot be superseded by an act of Congress?

Answer 3

Yes. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), is a constitutional decision, and Congress cannot supersede it by passing legislation. A number of factors support the position that Miranda was a constitutional decision.
(1) Miranda, and two of its companion cases, applied the new rule to state cases and, since then, Miranda has been applied to cases arising out of state courts.
(2) the Miranda decision acknowledged that it was establishing “constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.”
(3) the Miranda opinion recognized that Congress had the authority to create new guidelines, but any subsequent legislation had to be at least as effective in informing suspects of the right against self-incrimination.
(4) the doctrine of stare decisis forbids the overruling of Miranda.

Question 4

May statements made by a suspect who has not received the Miranda warnings be admitted at trial for impeachment purposes?

Answer 4

Yes. Unwarned statements may be used at trial for impeachment purposes. Miranda prohibits the prosecution from using unwarned statements to prove its case in chief. This serves to deter police from violating Miranda. Although dicta contained in the Miranda opinion suggests that unwarned statements may never be admitted, those pronouncements are not binding.

Question 5

Are a criminal defendant’s due-process rights violated if the trial court allows the prosecution to cross-examine the defendant about an exculpatory version of events that the defendant did not reveal to police after receiving Miranda warnings?

Answer 5

Yes… The Miranda warnings are intended to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of the accused by informing the accused of his right to remain silent, his right to the assistance of counsel, and the fact that any statements he offers may be used against him. The Miranda warnings carry an implicit assurance that no penalty will attach to the exercise of the right to remain silent.

Question 6

Does the use for impeachment purposes of a defendant’s silence prior to arrest violate the defendant’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights?

Answer 6

No. A defendant cannot be impeached if he chooses to exercise his right not to testify. When a defendant chooses to testify, impeachment necessarily follows in the interest of promoting an accurate assessment of guilt or innocence. As such, the use of a defendant’s prearrest silence for impeachment purposes does not run afoul of the Fifth Amendment. Likewise, the use of prearrest silence for impeachment purposes does not violate a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial.

Question 7

Is a criminal defendant denied due process if the prosecution impeaches the defendant for the defendant’s post-arrest silence when Miranda warnings were not read to the defendant upon arrest?

Answer 7

No. In Doyle v. Ohio, 658 U.S. 610 (1976), this court held that it violates a defendant’s due process rights if he is impeached for post-arrest silence when Miranda warnings are given. The reasoning is that the government had induced the defendant’s silence by assuring the defendant that silence would not be used against him.

Question 8

If a criminal defendant gives police the name of a witness during a custodial interrogation conducted without a full Miranda warning, is a trial court required to exclude from evidence the testimony of that witness?

Answer 8

No. If a defendant who has not been given a full Miranda warning makes self-incriminating statements, then those statements must be excluded from evidence at trial, as must statements made because of coercive police conduct. In deciding whether to exclude evidence at trial, the Court balances the strong societal interest in allowing the trier of fact to hear all reliable and relevant evidence against the constitutional protections afforded the accused.

Question 9

If the police initially fail to administer a suspect his Miranda warnings, are subsequent statements that are made after the police administer the Miranda warnings, inadmissible because they are “tainted” by the initial failure?

Answer 9

No. A violation of Miranda has no fruit except for the statement itself so a subsequent statement, made after the Miranda warnings have been read, is not tainted and is admissible at trial. Miranda violations differ from Fourth Amendment violations where the exclusionary rule applies because a Miranda warning is a procedural safeguard; it is not in itself a constitutional right. In addition, the goals of the exclusionary rule and the Fifth Amendment are not necessarily invoked by an initial violation of Miranda. The exclusionary rule seeks to deter illegal police conduct, and one of the purposes of the Fifth Amendment is to ensure trustworthy evidence. Neither concern is present in a case where a suspect is free to speak or remain silent after he has been read his Miranda warnings.

Question 10

Is a second confession after a Miranda waiver admissible if there was a long enough break following the initial confession without a Miranda waiver to give a reasonable suspect the belief that he or she had a right not to speak to officers?

Answer 10

Yes. At issue is the practice of two-stage, “question-first” interrogation, in which officers ask a suspect questions, typically wait for the suspect to confess, and then advise the suspect of his or her Miranda rights and ask for a waiver, so that any post-waiver statements will be admissible against the suspect. This practice has become increasingly popular and threatens Miranda’s goal of decreasing the risk that coerced confessions will be used against suspects.

Question 11

Must physical evidence found as a result of a suspect’s voluntary statements be suppressed because Miranda warnings were not given?

Answer 11

No. Physical evidence found on the bases of a suspect’s voluntary but unwarned statements is admissible at trial. Miranda warnings are required to protect a suspect’s rights under the Self-Incrimination Clause, but admission of physical evidence found on the basis of a suspect’s voluntary but unwarned statement does not violate the clause.

Question 12

Is there a public-safety exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect’s statements may be admitted into evidence at trial?

Answer 12

Yes. If public safety demands it, a suspect in police custody may be questioned without first being read his Miranda warnings. The holding in Miranda assumed that custodial interrogations are inherently coercive and established a necessary safeguard. However, although Miranda prioritized a suspect’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination over the potential for greater numbers of convictions, if public safety is a concern, the social cost outweighs a suspect’s constitutional safeguards.

Question 13

In a criminal case, may police officers deprive a person of his freedom of action in any significant way, without first informing the person of his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and his right to a lawyer?

Answer 13

No. In a criminal case, police officers may not deprive a person of his freedom of action in any significant way, without first informing the person of his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and his right to a lawyer. The record in Orozco’s case shows that Orozco was under arrest at the time of his interrogation. It makes no difference that the interrogation took place in Orozco’s own apartment, rather than under police station isolation.

Question 14

Does the duty to issue Miranda warnings only arise when a person is subject to custodial interrogation?

Answer 14

Yes. whether an interrogation is custodial or noncustodial is an objective determination based on the totality of the circumstances. If a reasonable person in the suspect’s place would believe that they were not free to leave and could not end the interview, then that is a custodial interrogation.

Question 15

Is the age of a child subjected to police questioning relevant to whether the child is in custody under Miranda?

Answer 15

Yes. The age of a child subjected to police questioning is relevant to whether the child is in custody under Miranda. Whether a suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes is an objective inquiry. The age of a child subjected to police questioning is relevant to whether that child is in custody, so long as the age was known to the officer or would be objectively apparent to a reasonable officer.

Question 16

Are Miranda warnings required to interrogate an incarcerated prisoner who is told he or she is free to end questioning and return to his or her cell?

Answer 16

No. The case law does not support a categorical rule that questioning a prisoner away from the general prison population about events outside prison is always custodial. Those circumstances alone are not enough to create a custodial interrogation. In Miranda case law, the first step in determining if interrogation is custodial is determining whether a reasonable person would have felt free to end the interrogation and leave. Factors considered include location and duration, statements made to the suspect, use of any physical restraints, and the suspect’s release after questioning. Restraining the suspect’s freedom of movement is not necessarily dispositive.

Question 17

Must police issue Miranda warnings before questioning a suspect taken into custody during a stop for a minor traffic offense?

Answer 17

Yes. Police must issue Miranda warnings prior to all custodial interrogations, regardless of the nature or severity of the offense. However, a motorist is not subject to custodial interrogation for the purpose of Miranda when he is questioned on the side of the road during a routine traffic stop.
staements during traffic stop = admissible
statements made after taken from traffic stop to police station = inadmissible

Question 18

Has a suspect been “interrogated” for the purpose of Miranda where he is in a car with police officers who are expressing their concern about public safety?

Answer 18

No. Under Miranda, “interrogation” is not limited to situations where the police actually question a suspect. The Miranda opinion was concerned with the entire interaction between police officers and a suspect in custody. This includes direct questioning but also police techniques such as line-ups where a witness is coached by the police, and the various psychological ploys, such as blaming the victim. Miranda therefore applies when a suspect is subject to questioning or its functional equivalent.

Question 19

Have police conducted an interrogation if, without orchestrating the conversation as a ploy to elicit incriminating statements, they allow a suspect to hold a conversation about a crime and record the conversation for use as evidence?

Answer 19

No. Because there is no evidence that police engaged in coercive practices, the conversation between the Mauros was not an interrogation and Mr. Mauro’s right to counsel was not violated.

Question 20

Must an undercover officer provide Miranda warnings to an incarcerated person before engaging in questioning that could induce incriminating statements?

Answer 20

No. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was concerned with threat to the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination created by official custodial interrogations. In those situations, a suspect may feel coerced or compelled to answer questions or face harsher punishment and retaliatory behavior by officials. The element of coercion is not present when a suspect speaks freely to an undercover officer that the suspect believes to be a fellow inmate. The fact that the suspect is in custody does not mean that an undercover officer cannot investigate and gather information.

Question 21

Does Miranda require an explicit, exact formulation of words to be communicated to a suspect before custodial interrogation?

Answer 21

No. Miranda requires that a suspect be “clearly informed” before custodial interrogation that he has, among other rights, “the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation.” So long as Miranda’s essential messages are reasonably conveyed, Miranda does not require an explicit, exact formulation of words to be communicated to a suspect before custodial interrogation.

Question 22

Under the Due Process Clause, is a statement made by a mentally ill person involuntary and therefore inadmissible even if there was no coercion by police?

Answer 22

No. A statement made by a mentally ill person is not involuntary for purposes of the Due Process Clause if there is no coercive behavior by police. case law makes clear that there must be coercion and overreaching by police for a violation to occur. While courts have considered the mental state of a suspect in determining whether some form of psychological coercion has occurred, the suspect’s mental state alone does not render a statement involuntary for purposes of the Due Process Clause.

Question 23

Does an accused’s invocation of his right to counsel for purposes of making a written statement but not for purposes of speaking to police preclude police from obtaining a verbal confession from the accused?

Answer 23

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right to counsel and the right to remain silent, but it does require an accused to exercise these rights. an accused who understands his Miranda rights is free to waive them. Further, an accused may fully understand his rights while not fully understanding the consequences of his decisions. The Fifth Amendment requires an understanding of rights, but it does not require an understanding of consequences.

Question 24

Must a suspect be aware of all the possible subjects of questioning in advance of interrogation for the suspect’s waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights to be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent?

Answer 24

No. This awareness requirement simply is not in the Constitution. Any additional information that law enforcement gives prior to questioning may affect the wisdom (from the suspect’s perspective) of a suspect’s waiver, but not whether it was voluntary, knowing, or intelligent.

Question 25

If a suspect has knowingly waived his Miranda rights, does the fact that officers deceived a lawyer seeking to represent the suspect and refused to inform the suspect that his family had obtained a lawyer for him invalidate the suspect’s Miranda waiver?

Answer 25

No. To be valid, a defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights must be voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently given. Circumstances of which a defendant is unaware have no effect on his ability to knowingly give up his constitutional rights. Moreover, Miranda warnings are designed to protect the suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights during interrogation, and a rule regarding how police interact with lawyers does not further that goal.

Question 26

Does Miranda forbid subsequent questioning of a suspect who previously invoked his right to remain silent?

Answer 26

No. Miranda requires police to immediately stop questioning a suspect in custody once the suspect indicates he does not wish to speak. However, Miranda provides no guidance as to when and if a suspect who has invoked the right may be interrogated later. Construing Miranda to require an infinite bar to any future custodial interrogations of any suspect who has exercised his right to remain silent would produce absurd results. This construction would unduly impede legitimate law enforcement and prevent suspects from making informed decisions about when and if they should invoke the right.

Question 27

Once a suspect has received his Miranda warnings and invoked his right to counsel, may the police further interrogate the suspect if the suspect has not been given access to counsel, and the suspect did not initiate the further communication with the police?

Answer 27

No. If a suspect subject to custodial police interrogation invokes his right to have counsel present, the suspect’s responses to further police questioning are not sufficient to constitute a valid waiver of his rights.

However, even if the suspect has invoked his right to have counsel present, the suspect may initiate further conversations or exchanges with the police. In that circumstance, if the suspect initiates the further conversations and provides incriminating information during those conversations, police are not precluded from listening to the suspect’s voluntary statements and using them against the suspect at trial.

Question 28

If an accused asserts his right to counsel but subsequently initiates a conversation with police about a topic related to the investigation, does his initiation of the conversation waive his right to counsel?

Answer 28

The determination of whether an accused has waived his right to counsel requires a two-step analysis.

(1) the accused must initiate a further conversation that relates directly or indirectly to the investigation. Some questions by the accused do not meet this standard. For example, asking for a drink of water is a routine inquiry rather than an attempt to start a conversation.

(2) if an accused initiates further conversation relating to the investigation, the prosecution must show that, under the totality of the circumstances, the accused knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.

Question 29

Under Edwards, must police stop a custodial interrogation if a suspect makes an ambiguous reference to consulting an attorney?

Answer 29

No. Miranda requires police to stop questioning a suspect who has requested an attorney. Subsequent case law makes clear that police may not attempt to interrogate a suspect who has requested an attorney until the attorney is present. These are bright line rules easily applied by police officers. Nevertheless, police are not required to stop questioning a suspect who has made only an ambiguous reference to consulting an attorney.

Question 30

May a suspect who has requested legal counsel during a police custodial interrogation be subjected to further interrogation, including interrogation related to a separate investigation, before counsel is provided if the suspect does not initiate the communication himself?

Answer 30

No. The purposes of this rule are to ensure that Miranda-warnings protections are not overcome by the inherent pressures of police custodial interrogations and to permit a suspect the full opportunity to exercise his privilege against self-incrimination, even while in police custody. This bright-line rule provides clear and unequivocal guidance to law enforcement. It would be unreasonable to hold that this rule should not apply to an otherwise prohibited subsequent interrogation just because it was undertaken for a separate investigation.

Question 31

If a suspect who invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel has been given an opportunity to consult an attorney, may police conduct a custodial interrogation of that suspect without an attorney present?

Answer 31

No. The goal of Edwards is to ensure that police do not pressure suspects to waive already invoked rights. When the clear and easily applied rule set forth in Edwards is followed, judges need not attempt to determine whether a statement was voluntary or coerced. The presence of an attorney ensures that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is protected. The objectives of Edwards are not met if police are allowed to resume interrogating a suspect who has merely had the opportunity to consult with an attorney some time before the interrogation. Once a suspect has asserted his right to counsel, police must stop questioning and may not resume interrogating the suspect without an attorney present.

Question 32

Does a break in custody end the presumption of involuntariness established in Edwards v. Arizona?

Answer 32

Yes. Since the Edwards rule is court-imposed, the rule is only justified if its benefits outweigh its costs. One benefit of the rule is that the accused is protected from coercive interrogation. However, this benefit is diminished where an accused has, in the interim, been released to his normal life before the second attempted interrogation. In such circumstances, it is unlikely that an accused’s willingness to be interrogated without counsel in the second interrogation is the result of the pressures of prolonged custody. Moreover, the cost of the Edwards rule, namely that voluntary confessions are excluded and officers are deterred from trying to obtain them, would only be increased.

Question 33

When a defendant invokes his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during a judicial proceeding, has he effectively invoked his Miranda right to counsel for offenses for which he has not yet been formally charged?

Answer 33

No. The Sixth Amendment is offense specific. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches once a prosecution begins, so invoking it for one offense does not invoke the right for all future prosecutions.

The purpose of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is to protect laymen from the awesome power of the state after the adverse relationship between citizen and state has been solidified by formal proceedings. The Miranda-Edwards right, on the other hand, is intended to simply protect a suspect’s desire to deal with custodial interrogation by the police only through counsel.

Question 34

Does a violation of the Miranda rules provide a basis for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?

Answer 34

Under § 1983, a plaintiff has a cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives the plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or a federal statute. As Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and this Court’s subsequent caselaw make clear, a Miranda violation is not itself a violation of the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. Rather, Miranda imposed prophylactic rules intended to protect that Fifth Amendment right. A Miranda violation is thus not a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution for purposes of a § 1983 action.