REMinisce Flashcards
Petitioners filed a complaint for quieting of title against Concepcion. The complaint is grounded upon their claims of ownership over the disputed properties and insistence that the latter’s acts of instituting tenants and receiving a share from the produce of the land cloud their title. The averments show that the remedy sought constitutes an accion reivindicatoria. Can the court determine the ownership over the disputed properties in an action for quieting of title where such is not included in the reliefs prayed for?
Yes. The true nature of the action is not determined by the caption of the pleading, but by the allegations it contains. The court should grant the relief warranted by the allegations, substantiated by proof, even if no such relief or a different relief is prayed for. As the allegations in this case constitute an accion reivindicatoria, the court should determine ownership of the properties and award possession to the lawful owner, even if the complaint prayed for the quieting of title. (Spouses Velarde v. Heir of Candari, G.R. No. 190057, October 17, 2022)
Is the CIR guilty of forum shopping when it posted for a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review with the Supreme Court under Rule 45, while having sought reconsideration before the CTA En Banc for the decision rendered by the BIR’s Litigation Division?
No. There is forum shopping when there exist: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such parties as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to res judicata in the other case. Here, there is an identity of parties in both cases. However, there is no identity of rights asserted. The first is a request for more time to file a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, while the other is a motion filed with the CTA En Banc for reconsideration of the Decision. Moreover, a “judgment” rendered in first will not amount to res judicata as the Resolution will be limited to the granting or denying the motion for time. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. East Asia Utilities Corporation, G.R. No. 225266, November 16, 2020)
Vitarich Corporation filed an action for sum of money against Femina before the RTC Branch 11 of Malolos City. Upon receipt of summons, Femina’s counsel, Atty. Solilapsi, moved to dismiss the case on ground of improper venue. On August 17, 2010, the RTC denied the motion and directed Femina to answer the complaint. Atty. Solilapsi received the Order on November 3, 2010 but Femina did not submit any responsive pleading. On January 5, 2011, Vitarich sought to declare Femina in default. Meantime, Femina’s new counsel, Atty. Emilio Quianzon, Jr, entered his appearance and filed on January 31, 2011 a motion to admit answer. On February 8, 2011, RTC declared Fermina in default thereby allowing Vitarich to present its evidence ex parte and ruled in favor of Vitarich. Was the RTC correct in declaring Fermina in default?
No, the RTC should have considered Femina’s answer since it was filed before the declaration of default. The rule is that the defendant’s answer should be admitted where it is filed before a declaration of default and no prejudice is caused to the plaintiff. Where the answer is filed beyond the reglementary period but before the defendant is declared in default and there is no showing that defendant intends to delay the case, the answer should be admitted. Femina moved to admit her answer before she was declared in default. Femina filed her motion through registered mail on January 31, 2011 while the order of default was issued on February 8, 2011.
Also, there is no showing that Femina intended to delay the proceedings. Thus, this circumstance must be fully appreciated in favor of Femina. The RTC should have considered Femina’s answer since it was filed before the declaration of default. (Vitarich Corporation v. Femina R. Dagmil, G.R. No. 217138, August 27, 2020)
Myrna initiated a Complaint for Quieting of Title against respondents, asserting that their father had sold the disputed parcel of land to a beach resort and subsequently to her. Respondents countered with an answer seeking dismissal, alleging that the deeds of sale were falsified due to forged signatures. The case was initially scheduled for pre-trial on September 28, 2016, but was postponed several times, eventually happening on June 28, 2017. RTC set the trial to commence on October 25, 2017, but it was repeatedly postponed at the instance of Myrna or her counsel. Instead of proceeding to trial, the RTC ordered the case to undergo mediation on June 27, 2018, leading respondents to file a Motion for Leave for an Amended Answer. RTC denied the motion, citing that the case had already undergone preliminary and pre-trial conferences. Is the RTC correct?
No. Bona fide amendments to pleadings are allowed at any stage of the proceedings so that every case may, as much as possible, be determined on its real facts, affording complete relief to all the parties involved in the case. The Motion for Leave and the Amended Answer should be examined with circumspection, keeping in mind the purpose of the rules in allowing amendments to pleadings, and the general policy that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. The only limitation under the rules was that the leave to amend the pleading may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. Here, the RTC denied the Motion for Leave essentially because the case had already gone through pre-trial conference, and a Pre-Trial Order had already been issued. This constitutes grave abuse of discretion as the facts show that the delay is attributable to several postponements of trial at the instance of the complainant. (Heirs of Pio Tejada v. Hay, in substitution of Myrna L. Hay, G.R. No. 250542, October 10, 2022)
Antonio and Remedios formed Metro Isuzu Corporation (MIC) and secured loans from Westmont Bank through signed promissory notes. Remedios later filed a complaint alleging forgery of her signatures on loan documents, seeking to nullify the Real Estate Mortgage (REM) and amendment. At the trial, Westmont Bank presented witnesses and documentary evidence, and during rebuttal, Remedios identified checks and receipts as proof of her genuine signature. She also resubmitted the previously expunged NBI QDR and PNP Crime Laboratory Report as part of her rebuttal evidence, which the trial court admitted despite objections from Westmont Bank. Is the admission in evidence of the BPI checks showing Remedios’ sample signatures, and the various promissory notes containing her forged signatures during the rebuttal stage proper?
No. The admission in evidence of the BPI checks and various promissory notes during the rebuttal stage is not justified. Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court provides that the parties may respectively adduce rebutting evidence only, unless the court, for good reasons and in the furtherance of justice, permits them to adduce evidence upon their original case. Thus, a plaintiff is bound to introduce all evidence that supports his case during the presentation of his evidence in chief before the close of the proof, and may not add to it by the device of rebuttal. The circumstances in which additional evidence may be allowed at the rebuttal stage are: a) when it is newly discovered; b) where it has been omitted through inadvertence or mistake; or c) where the purpose of the evidence is to correct evidence previously offered. Here, Remedios failed to justify the presentation of the promissory notes and the BPI checks containing her forged and genuine signatures as rebuttal evidence. These documents constitute direct proof of forgery, which is the main issue of the case, hence, these should have been presented as evidence in chief. It was an error on the part of the trial court to allow these evidence on rebuttal. (Strong Fort Warehousing Corporation vs. Banta, G.R. Nos. 222369 and 222502, November 16, 2020)
What is the doctrine of immutability of judgments?
Under the doctrine, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest once a judgment becomes final. No other action can be taken on the decision except to order its execution. The decision becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. (U R Employed International Corporation et al vs. Pinmiliw et al.,, G.R. No. 225263, March 16, 2022)
What are the exceptions of immutability of judgments?
The principle of immutability of judgment admits several exceptions: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. The Court has further allowed the relaxation of the rule on finality of judgments in order to serve substantial justice, taking into account: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor, or property; (2) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (3) the merits of the case; (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. (Estrella et al vs. COA, G.R. No. 252079, September 14, 2021)
LCL Capital, Inc. obtained a loan from Bank of Philippine Islands secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over its two condominium units. Due to LCL’s failure to pay, BPI applied for extrajudicial foreclosure. LCL filed an action against BPI for the annulment of the certificates of title alleging that the consolidation of ownership is premature having been made before the lapse of the redemption period. The RTC, in its November 14, 2008 decision, declared the consolidation void and directed the Register of Deeds of Pasig City to reinstate the certificates of title of LCL subject to the exercise of its right of redemption, but did not mention the actual amount of the redemption price. CA considered the RTC Decision is already final and executory. Later, LCL asked the RTC to determine the cost of redemption. The RTC ruled the total amount due with legal interest of 6%. BPI sought reconsideration then elevated the case to the CA through a petition for certiorari. Did the recomputation of the redemption price violate the doctrine of immutability of judgment in light of the November 14, 2008 decision of the RTC?
No. It is undisputed that the RTC Decision dated November 14, 2008 declaring void the consolidation of the condominium certificates of title in BPI’s name and directing the Register of Deeds of Pasig City to reinstate the certificates of title of LCL subject to the exercise of its right of redemption, already lapsed into finality. The recomputation of the redemption price will not violate the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment. The RTC Decision dated November 14, 2008, did not mention the actual amount of the redemption price. The CA and the RTC have conflicting findings as to the applicable interest rate. Thus, there is no final determination yet on the correct computation of the redemption price. (Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. LCL Capital, Inc., G.R. No. 243396, September 14, 2021)
What are the three modes of appeal from decisions of the Regional Trial Court?
The first mode is through an ordinary appeal before the Court of Appeals under Rule 41 where the decision assailed was rendered in the exercise of the RTC’s original jurisdiction. In ordinary appeals, questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law may be raised. The second mode is through a petition for review before the CA under Rule 42 where the decision assailed was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. In petitions for review, questions of fact, law, or mixed questions of fact and law may be raised. The third mode is through an appeal by certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45 where only questions of law shall be raised. (Sugar Regulatory Administration vs. Central Azucarera de Bais, G.R. No. 253821, March 6, 2023)xxx
May the Supreme Court review the factual findings made by NLRC?
Yes, but it is only when the factual findings of the NLRC and the appellate court are in conflict that this Court will review the records to determine which finding should be upheld as being more in conformity with the evidentiary facts. Where the CA affirms the findings of the labor agencies and there is no showing whatsoever that said findings are patently erroneous, this Court is bound by those findings. (U R Employed International Corporation et al vs. Pinmiliw, et al., G.R. No. 225263, March 16, 2022)
Is a motion for reconsideration required when filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45?
No. Rule 45 of the Rules of Court does not require the filing of a motion for reconsideration for this Court to take cognizance of appeals through petitions for review on certiorari. The use of the word “or” in Section 2 indicates an alternative or choice, as opposed to being mandatory. Verily, the petitioner has an option to file a motion for reconsideration of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or directly file an appeal or a petition for review to the appellate court without filing a motion for reconsideration. (Zonio v. 1st Quantum Leap Security Agency, G.R. No. 224944, May 5, 2021)
After a robbery incident, the Adjudication and Settlement Board found Estelita’s estate liable to pay P1,300,000.00 payroll money. Estelita elevated the case to the COA through a petition for review but COA denied Estelita’s petition on April 13, 2015. Estelita sought reconsideration, however, on June 6, 2016, COA denied the motion for being filed out of time and for lack of merit. Estrelita averred that she received the decision on August 18, 2016. Hence, on September 19, 2016, she filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Was the petition for certiorari timely filed?
No. Under Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, an aggrieved party may file a petition for review on certiorari within 30 days from notice of the COA’s judgment. The reglementary period includes the time taken to file the motion for reconsideration, and is only interrupted once the motion is filed. If the motion is denied, the party may file the petition only within the period remaining from the notice of judgment. The aggrieved party is not granted a fresh period of 30 days. In this case, Estelita’s Petition for Certiorari was filed beyond the reglementary period.
Estelita sought for a reconsideration before the COA, which would no longer entitle her to the full 30-day period to file a petition for certiorari unless such motion was filed on the same day that she received the decision denying her appeal, which did not happen in this case. To be sure, COA denied Estelita’s motion for reconsideration because it was belatedly filed and has no merit. (Estelita A. Angeles v. Commission on Audit , G.R. No. 228795, December 01, 2020)
In their petition for review before the Court of Appeals, Spouses Cordero only attached copies of the judgments and orders of the trial courts. CA dismissed Spouses Cordero’s petition because the Spouses Cordero failed to append to the petition a legible duplicate original or true copy of the assailed decision, as well as other pertinent portions of the records necessary for a thorough evaluation of the case. Was the dismissal of CA proper?
No. Spouses Cordero complied with the requirement of attaching copies of the judgments and orders of the trial courts. These attachments are already sufficient to enable the CA to pass upon the assigned errors and to resolve the appeal even without the pleadings and other portions of the records since the assailed decisions of the trial courts substantially summarized the contents of the omitted records. Likewise, the CA can resolve the issues by relying on the principle that the factual findings of the lower courts are entitled to great weight. It can also direct Spouses Cordero to submit additional documents or the clerk of court of the RTC and MCTC to elevate the original records of the case. Thus, the subsequent and substantial compliance of a party may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. (Spouses Cordero v. Octaviano, G.R. No. 241385, July 7, 2020)
Is denial of due process of law a ground for annulment of judgment under Rule 47?
Yes. A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting. Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the grounds for annulment of judgment are: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Jurisprudence, however, recognizes a third ground – denial of due process of law. Thus, a decision which is patently void may be set aside on grounds of want of jurisdiction or non compliance with due process of law, where mere inspection of assailed judgment is enough to demonstrate its nullity. (Charnnel Shane Thomas v. Rachel Trono, G.R. No. 241032, March 15, 2021)
What must be established for the court to issue a Writ of Preliminary Injunction?
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules provides that a preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established: 1) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts either for a limited period or perpetually; 2) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or 3) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. (De Lima v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 199972, August 15, 2022)
What is the nature of an action to quiet title?
An action to quiet title or remove clouds over the title is a special civil action specifically governed by Rule 63 of the Rules on declaratory relief and similar remedies.
Distinguished from ordinary civil actions, the subject matter. In special civil actions under Rule 63 is a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance. The issue is the validity or construction of documents; and the relief sought is the declaration of the parties’ rights or duties vis-à-vis, the questioned documents.
Two indispensable requisites must concur for an action for quieting of title to prosper, namely: (1) the plaintiff has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on their title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
What are the rules that should be observed with respect to the legal standing of private complainants in assailing judgments or orders in criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals?
The private complainant has the legal personality to appeal the civil liability of the accused or file a petition for certiorari to preserve his or her interest in the civil aspect of the criminal case. The appeal or petition for certiorari must allege the specific pecuniary interest of the private offended party. The failure to comply with this requirement may result in the denial or dismissal of the remedy. The reviewing court shall require the OSG to file comment within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from notice if it appears that the resolution of the private complainant’s appeal or petition for certiorari will necessarily affect the criminal aspect of the case or the right to prosecute. The comment of the OSG must state whether it conforms or concurs with the remedy of the private offended party. The judgment or order of the reviewing court granting the private complainant’s relief may be set aside if rendered without affording the People, through the OSG, the opportunity to file a comment.
In a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Renato against Puregold, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in Renato’s favor. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) remanded the case due to LA’s failure to acquire jurisdiction over Puregold for improper service of summons. Despite denial of Renato’s Motion for Reconsideration on October 28, 2016 which resolution was received by his counsel on December 29, 2016 and Renato himself on February 12, 2017, Renato filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). Puregold claimed that Renato filed beyond the 60-day reglementary period. Renato argued that the reglementary period should be reckoned on February 12, 2017 when he received the assailed resolution. Is Puregold’s contention meritorious?
Yes. Petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. There can no longer be any extension of the 60-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari save in exceptional or meritorious cases anchored on special or compelling reasons. Contrary to Renato’s contention, the reglementary period to avail the remedy of certiorari must be reckoned on December 29, 2016 or the date his counsel received the NLRC Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, and not on February 12, 2017 when he received the assailed resolution. When a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and notices must be made upon such counsel. Notice to the client or to any other lawyer other than the counsel of record, is not notice in law. Moreover, while decisions, resolutions, or orders are served on both parties and their counsel/representative, for purposes of appeal, the period shall be counted from receipt of such decisions, resolutions, or orders by the counsel representative of record. Thus, Renato had 60 days counted from the date his counsel received the NLRC resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, or until February 27, 2017, within which to avail of a petition for certiorari. (Puregold Price Club, Inc v. Court of Appeals and Renato M. Cruz, G.R. No. 244374, February 15, 2022)
What is grave abuse of discretion?
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer concerned, which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
Gloria died testate and named Salvio as executor. Salvio then filed a petition for the probate of the will and the issuance of letters testamentary to himself. Norma, the legitimate child of Gloria, filed an opposition. The lower court initially ruled in favor of Salvio due to Norma’s American citizenship. For the failure of Salvio to comply with his duties, the lower court finds that Norma is the most suitable person to replace Salvio. Salvio moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied. Norma then filed an omnibus motion against Salvio and Diana (who claimed to be a legitimate child), to revoke the letters of special administration issued to Salvio for Gloria’s estate, to issue new letters of special administration to her. Does Diana have legal standing to file a petition for certiorari assailing the order?
Yes. Diana may be considered a person aggrieved, permitted to initiate the special civil action for certiorari against the assailed RTC Orders. A person aggrieved refers to one who was a party in the proceedings before the lower court. To have the legal standing to avail of the remedy of certiorari, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the assailed act. She is an heir of the decedent and has a material interest to the administration of their estate. Thus, it cannot be denied that she would suffer or sustain direct injury in the event the estate is dissipated. (In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Gloria Novelo Vda. De Cea, G.R. No. 197147, February 03, 2021)
When can a petition for mandamus be availed?
It is available when a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office. The remedy lies to compel the performance of a ministerial duty. It cannot direct the exercise of judgment unless there is grave abuse of discretion. The following requirements must be present to warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus, to wit: (1) the petitioner has a clear and unmistakable legal right to the act demanded; (2) it is the duty of the respondent to perform the act because it is required by law; (3) the respondent unlawfully neglects the duty enjoined by law or unlawfully excludes the petitioner from the use or enjoyment of the right or office; (4) the act to be performed is ministerial; and (5) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
What must be alleged in a complaint for unlawful detainer?
A complaint for unlawful detainer must sufficiently allege and prove (1) initially, the possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. (Galacgac v. Bautista, G.R. No. 221384, November 09, 2020)
Merly Maligaya filed a petition for correction of entries in her birth certificate under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court before the RTC. In her petition, Merly prayed to change her first name from “MERLE” to “MERLY.” As supporting evidence, Merly presented the original and certified original copies of her SSS Member’s Data E-4 Form, Voter’s Registration Record, Voter’s Certification, Voter’s Identification Card, Police Clearance and NBI Clearance. After finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC ordered the publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for three consecutive weeks. After trial, RTC granted the petition to reflect Merly’s accurate personal circumstances and to avoid confusion on her public and private documents. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved for a reconsideration and argued that the mistake is clerical that must be corrected through administrative proceedings under RA No. 9048, as amended by RA No. 10172. Is the error in Merly’s first name a clerical error under R.A. No. 9048?
Yes. RA No. 9048 amended Rule 108 and authorized the local civil registrars, or the Consul General, as the case may be, to correct clerical or typographical errors in the civil registry, or make changes in the first name or nickname, without need of a judicial order. The law provided an administrative recourse for the correction of clerical or typographical errors, essentially leaving substantial corrections to Rule 108. The correction of Merly’s first name from “MERLE” to “MERLY” refers to a clerical or typographical error. It merely rectified the erroneous spelling through the substitution of the second letter “E” in “MERLE” with the letter “Y,” so it will read as “MERLY.” The correction will neither affect nor prejudice any substantial rights. The innocuous errors in Merly’s first name may be corrected or changed under RA No. 9048 by referring to related documents. (Republic of the Philippines v. Merle M. Maligaya, G.R. No. 233068, November 9, 2020)
Sandiganbayan convicted petitioners Ismael and Ajijon for violating Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019 or Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Section 3.3.1 of the IRR of RA No. 8291 or Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997. The petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the dismissal of the cases by attacking the validity of the Information filed against them. While the the two Informations against petitioners charged them for their failure to perform their duties as mayor and treasurer to ensure full and timely remittance of the municipality’s GSIS contributions, they claim that the information was insufficient as they alleged conspiracy but some conspirators were not impleaded nor their participation in the alleged conspiracy stated. Petitioners argued that their constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the accusations against them was violated. Are the petitioners correct?
No. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides the necessary allegations to a criminal information, namely: (1) the accused’s name; (2) the stature’s designation of the offense; (3) the acts or omissions complained of that constitute the offense; (4) the offended party’s name; (5) the approximate date of the offense’s commission; and (6) the place where the offense was committed. The two Informations against petitioners clearly and sufficiently stated that they were being charged for their failure to perform their duties as mayor and treasurer to ensure full and timely remittance of the municipality’s GSIS contributions. The indictment of the purported conspirators, as well as a statement of their part in the alleged conspiracy, is not necessary to sustain the sufficiency of the Informations. So long as the criminal information clearly alleges the acts constituting the offense specifically imputed against the accused for them to properly prepare their defense, the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusations is not transgressed. (Ismael v. People, G.R. Nos. 234435-36. February 06, 2023)