CIVILization Flashcards
Newspaper of General Circulation
To be a newspaper of general circulation, it is enough that it is published for the dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; and that it is published at regular intervals. The newspaper must not also be devoted to the interests or published for the entertainment of a particular class, profession, trade, calling, race or religious denomination. The newspaper need not have the largest circulation so long as it is of general circulation. (Perez vs. Perez, G.R. No. 143768, March 28, 2005)
May procedural laws be given retroactive effect?
Yes. Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in rules of procedure.
Do interpretations of law made by courts have retroactive effect?
Yes. Interpretations of law made by courts necessarily always have a “retroactive” effect. The Supreme Court (SC), in construing the law, merely declares what a particular provision has always meant. It does not create new legal obligations. The SC does not have the power to legislate.
The general rule that a rule of procedure can be given retroactive effect admits of exceptions, such as
a. where the rule itself expressly; or
b. by necessary implication provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation; or
c. where to apply it to pending proceedings would impair vested
rights.
Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is
Contrary to:
a. law
b. public order
c. public policy
d. morals or
e. good customs
or prejudicial to a third person with a right to be recognized by law
For there to be a valid waiver, the following requisites are essential:
(1) that the person making
the waiver possesses the right
(2) that he has the capacity and power to dispose of the right
(3) that the waiver must be clear and unequivocal although it may be made expressly or impliedly, and
(4) that the waiver is not contrary to law, public policy, public order, morals, good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
Pro hac vice
Pro hac vice means a specific decision does not constitute a precedent because the decision is for the specific case only, not to be followed in other cases. A pro hac vice decision violates statutory law — Article 8 of the Civil Code — which states that “judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.”
The decision of the Court in this case cannot be pro hac vice because by mandate of the law every decision of the Court forms part of the legal system of the Philippines. If another case comes up with the same facts as the present case, that case must be decided in the same way as this case to comply with the constitutional mandate of equal protection of the law. Thus, a pro hac vice decision also violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Knights of Rizal vs. DMCI Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 213948, April 25, 2017
A year is composed of
Under the Administrative Code of 1987, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.
Forum non conveniens
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court in a conflict-of-laws case may assume jurisdiction if it chooses to do so, provided, that the following requisites are met:
(1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to;
(2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and
(3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.
Doctrine of processual presumption
Under the doctrine of processual presumption, the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. However, where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. (In the Matter of the Testate Estate of Aida A. Bambao, Linda A. Kucskar v. Sekito Jr., G.R. No. 237449, December 2, 2020)
Is the effect of foreign judgment automatic?
No. The effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.
Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
Rule of lex nationalii
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that “laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.”
Lex loci rei sitae
All matters concerning the title and disposition of real property are determined by what is known as the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title can pass from one person to another, or by which an interest therein can be gained or lost.
It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state where it is located. The reason is found in the very nature of immovable property — its immobility. Immovables are part of the country and so closely connected to it that all rights over them have their natural center of gravity there.
This general principle includes all rules governing the descent, alienation and transfer of immovable property and the validity, effect and construction of wills and other conveyances. This principle even governs the capacity of the person making a deed relating to immovable property, no matter what its nature may be. Thus, an instrument will be ineffective to transfer title to land if the person making it is incapacitated by the lex loci rei sitae, even though under the law of his domicile and by the law of the place where the instrument is actually made, his capacity is undoubted. Orion Savings Bank vs. Suzuki, G.R. No. 205487,
November 12, 2014
Lex contractus
The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus means the “law of the place where a contract is executed or to be performed.” Hasegawa vs. Kitamura, G.R. No. 149177, November 23, 2007
Lex fori
On this note, we highlight that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum, which is the State of California in this case. This Court is well aware that foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proven. Mercantile
Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Yi, G.R. No. 234501, March 18, 2019
Lex loci delicti
This is in consonance with the lex loci delicti commisi theory in determining the situs of a tort, which states that the law of the place where the alleged wrong was committed will govern the action. Navida vs. Dizon, Jr., G.R. No. 125078, May 30, 2011
Lex loci solutionis
Philippine law is definite as to what governs the formal or extrinsic validity of contracts. The first paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that “[t]he forms and solemnities of contracts shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed” (i.e., lex loci celebrationis).
Established mode of settling conflict of laws situations on matters pertaining to substantive content of contracts
In contrast, there is no statutorily established mode of settling conflict of laws situations on matters pertaining to substantive content of contracts. It has been noted that three (3) modes have emerged: (1) lex loci contractus or the law of the place of the making; (2) lex loci solutionis or the law of the place of performance; and (3) lex loci intentionis or the law intended by the parties. Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) vs. Rebesencio, G.R. No. 198587, January 14, 2015
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner needs to
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court.
To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office. Fujiki vs. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013
Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on _____
Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits.
Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that “the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.”
Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment.
Article 19 of the Civil Code
Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties must act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. In this regard, case law states that “a right, though by itself legal because it is recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.”
Article 19 is the general rule which governs the conduct of human relations. By itself, it is not the basis of an actionable tort. Article 19 describes the degree of care required so that an actionable tort may arise when it is alleged together with Article 20 or Article 21. Lomarda and Raso vs. Fudalan, G.R. No. 246012, June 17, 2020
Carolyn and Joselito are lovers. During their relationship, Joselito had drinking and gambling habits. With a promise to reform, Carolyn married Joselito and gave birth to their children. During the marriage, Joselito physically and verbally abused Carolyn and their children, and he spent time gambling and drinking instead of providing for the needs of the family. She filed for Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and presented the testimony of Dr. Soriano who diagnosed Joselito with a defective superego and Antisocial-Dependent Personality Disorder based on the narration of Carolyn and Mamerto, Joselito’s father who disclosed his behavior as a child. Is the testimony of Dr. Soriano enough to prove that the psychological incapacity of Joselito has juridical antecedence?
Yes. Article 36 explicitly requires the psychological incapacity to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage, even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. Proof of juridically antecedent psychological incapacity may consist of testimonies describing the environment where the supposedly incapacitated spouse lived that may have led to a particular behavior. Here, Dr. Soriano concluded that Joselito’s gross neglect of his responsibilities, immaturity, disregard of his partner’s needs and feelings, and abusive behavior are symptoms of a disorder called Antisocial-Dependent Personality Disorder which existed prior to his marriage with Carolyn. The diagnosis was based on the statements of Carolyn and Mamerto. The clear and understandable causation between Joselito’s condition pre-existing before his marriage and its incapacitating nature regarding the performance of the essential marital covenants clearly proved the juridical antecedence requirement. (Mutya-Sumilhig v. Sumilhig, G.R. No. 230711, August 22, 2022)
Carolyn and Joselito are lovers. During their relationship, Joselito had drinking and gambling habits. With a promise to reform, Carolyn married Joselito and gave birth to their children. During the marriage, Joselito physically and verbally abused Carolyn and their children, and he spent time gambling and drinking instead of providing for the needs of the family. She filed for Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and presented the testimony of Dr. Soriano who diagnosed Joselito with a defective superego and Antisocial-Dependent Personality Disorder based on the narration of Carolyn and Mamerto, Joselito’s father who disclosed his behavior as a child. Do the testimony and diagnosis of Dr. Soriano prove that the psychological incapacity of Joselito is incurable?
Yes. The psychological incapacity contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code is incurable, not in the medical, but in the legal sense. This simply means that the incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a situation where the couple’s respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage. There must be an undeniable pattern of such persisting failure to be a present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive spouse. There are no medications that may be taken or intervention that may be done as treatment for Joselito’s psychological incapacity to enable him to fulfill his obligations as husband to Carolyn because what is involved here is Joselito’s personality structure. Dr. Soriano’s assessment of Joselito’s condition was based on the information she gathered from Carolyn herself and Joselito’s father. (Mutya-Sumilhig v. Sumilhig, G.R. No. 230711, August 22, 2022)
Are the testimonies of the spouse, respondent’s father, and expert witness who diagnosed the respondent without the latter’s personal appearance enough to satisfy the totality of evidence rule to sustain a finding of the respondent’s psychological incapacity in a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage?
Yes. The narratives in an Article 36 petition are often solely those of petitioner and their witnesses, and frequently, all the trial court has by way of respondent’s version is the clinical narration of the factual basis of the expert report, which, in turn, typically arises from the examination of petitioner and other resource persons. There is probative value in the testimonies of expert witnesses who diagnosed a respondent without the latter’s personal appearance because there is no legal and jurisprudential requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician. (Mutya-Sumilhig v. Sumilhig, G.R. No. 230711, August 22, 2022)
In his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Antonio claimed that he and his wife Maribel are both psychologically incapacitated to comply with their basic marital obligations. Antonio allegedly has affairs with other women. He engages in womanizing and gambling, returning home in the early hours. In the Psychiatric Evaluation, the psychiatrist described Antonio as the ambitious but disconcerted son of a businessman, who had 11 children with four other women. He had a series of short-lived relationships before he met Maribel. Would Antonio’s acts of infidelity be an indication of psychological incapacity and, therefore, sufficient grounds to declare a marriage void?
Yes. To be considered as a form of psychological incapacity, infidelity must satisfy the requirements of (1) gravity or severity, (2) antecedence, and (3) legal incurability or persistence during the marriage. Antonio’s failure to show sincere remorse for his blatant infidelity and the lack of desire to fix his ways to save their marriage clearly amount to psychological incapacity, which is grave in nature. His chronic infidelity is not only comprised of multiple illicit amorous relations as his affairs are not casual mistakes as these were shown to be deeply rooted in his psychopathology which was in place even before his marriage. Further, Antonio’s incapacity is incurable. It is persistent throughout the marriage and is specifically directed at his wife Maribel. (Quiogue v. Quiogue, G.R. No. 203992, August 22, 2022)
What are the varying guidelines for determining the existence of psychological incapacity as a ground to declare a marriage void, as discussed in the recent case of Tan-Andal v. Andal?
First, the psychological incapacity must have juridical antecedence because Article 36 explicitly requires it to exist at the time of the marriage celebration, even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. Such a requirement does not require proof that the psychological incapacity stems from a medically-identified mental or psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity has always been a legal concept — it is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder in a strict medical sense. Proof of juridically antecedent psychological incapacity may consist of testimonies describing the environment where the supposedly incapacitated spouse lived that may have led to a particular behavior. Second, the psychological incapacity must also be grave to distinguish it from “mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” generally brought about by human nature and the natural dynamics of every personal relationship. Finally, psychological incapacity must be incurable in the legal sense, meaning, the incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a situation where the couple’s respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage. (Dedicatoria v. Dedicatoria, G.R. No. 250618, July 20, 2022)
The DENR awarded lots to former military officers, including the respondents, in December 1996 and November 1998. But the respondents were unable to introduce any improvements because the Philippine Navy and the Golf Club were already occupying the lands. The golf course was developed only in 1976. The respondents filed an accion reinvindicatoria against the Philippine Navy and the Golf Club before the RTC. Can the Philippine Navy and the Golf Club invoke the exclusionary clause in Proclamation No. 461 (issued in 1965), and claim that the land developed as a golf course is not included in the alienable and disposable lots in the AFP Officer’s Village?
No. The exclusionary clause applies only to areas that are being used or earmarked for public or quasi-public purposes. Here, the golf course did not yet exist at the time Proclamation No. 461 was issued in 1965. The golf course was developed only in 1976. As such, the empty land, on which the golf course now stands, remains part of the alienable and disposable public land of the AFP Officers’ Village. The exclusionary clause cannot comprehend the golf course which was non-existent at the time the proclamation was issued. There is no basis to identify whether the empty land is being used for public or quasi-public purposes. Moreover, no subsequent law or proclamation earmarked the land for the construction of the golf course. (Philippine Navy Golf Club, Inc. et. al, v. Abaya, et.al., G.R. No. 235619, July 13, 2020)
Petitioners filed a complaint for quieting of title against Concepcion. The complaint is grounded upon their claims of ownership over the disputed properties and insists that Concepcion’s acts of instituting tenants and receiving a share from the produce of the land cloud their title. Are the petitioners correct in filing an action for quieting of title?
No. Petitioners’ cause of action is grounded upon their claims of ownership, which they argue to have been clouded by Concepcion’s exercise of proprietary rights — instituting tenants and collecting rentals and products. What they perceive as clouds over their title were Concepcion’s intrusive acts of dominion over the properties. Physical intrusion is not a ground for quieting of title. With an allegation of a violation of a right, petitioners do not seek a declaratory relief or mere removal of cloud over their title. Ultimately, they seek to recover full possession of the properties as an element of their ownership, which was disturbed by Concepcion’s physical intrusion. Thus, petitioners’ claims and arguments clearly speak of an accion reivindicatoria — a suit to recover full possession of a parcel of land as an element of ownership. (Spouses Velarde v. Heir of Candari, G.R. No. 190057, October 17, 2022)
Spouses Patenia owned a 9,600-square meter lot situated in Tagum City and registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-168688. After Spouses Patenia’s death, their children discovered that TCT No. T-168688 has been cancelled by virtue of a Deed of Donation dated January 18, 2002 that their parents supposedly executed in favor of the respondents. The children argued that the donation is void because the notary public failed to require the parties to sign the notarial register. Is the Deed of Donation void for failing to comply with the legal formalities required of such a document?
No. There is nothing in the law that obligates the parties to a notarized document to sign the notarial register. This requirement was subsequently included only the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice which provides that a notary public should not notarize a document unless the signatory to the document is in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization, and personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified through competent evidence of identity. At the time of notarization, the signatory shall sign or affix with a thumb or mark the notary public’s notarial register. The present deed of donation, however, was executed and acknowledged before the notary public on January 18, 2002, when there is no rule yet that requires the parties to sign the notarial register. (Rowena Patenia-Kinatac-an v. Enriqueta Patenia-Decena, G.R. No. 238325, June 15, 2020)
On various dates beginning 2000, Nida purchased on credit from Libra Fishing crude oil and other petroleum products. As payment for the July 26, 2000, November 12, 2000, and November 27, 2000 purchases, Nida issued three checks which were dishonored by the drawee banks. On May 15, 2013, Regina, the sole proprietor of Libra Fishing, demanded payment for the outstanding balance but Nida failed to heed the demand. On June 4, 2013, Regina filed a complaint for a sum of money against Nida. Nida argued that Regina’s action had prescribed. Regina counters that the prescriptive period should be reckoned from the date of last partial payment of the outstanding debt by the debtor, or from the date of extrajudicial demand. Does issuing checks transform an agreement into a written contract, thereby subjecting it to a prescriptive period of 10 years?
No. The checks issued did not convert their agreement into a written contract. To be a written contract, all its terms must be in writing, and, a contract partly in writing and partly oral is, in legal effect, an oral contract. Also, the three checks are not the kind of “writing” or “written agreement” contemplated by law for the 10-year limitation to apply. A “writing” for the payment of money sued in an action, within the meaning of the ten-year statute of limitations, is one which contains either an express promise to pay or language from which a promise to pay arises by fair implication. Nothing in the three dishonored checks indicate any promise to pay. Clearly, no written contract was executed by the parties, instead they verbally agreed for Nida to sell the petroleum products of Regina. (Regina Q. Alba vs. Nida Arollado, G.R. No. 237140, October 05, 2020)
Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) entered into an Amended Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Central Bay Reclamation and Development Corporation (Central Bay), formerly known as AMARI, a private corporation, to develop three reclaimed islands with a combined titled area of 157.84 hectares known as the Freedom Islands. The agreement provided that Central Bay will acquire and own 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands and 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of the Manila Bay. Is the JVA valid?
No. The JVA is not valid since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. (Central Bay Reclamation and Development Corporation vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 252940, April 5, 2022)
Aida, a naturalized American citizen, executed a Last Will and Testament in California where she nominated her cousin, Cosme, as a special independent executor over her assets located in the Philippines. She died in California and left behind an adopted minor child and a sister. Cosme filed a petition for the allowance of the will in the Philippines, which was opposed by Aida’s sister. The Court found no copy of the pertinent California law presented as evidence pursuant to the requirements of the rules and does not comply with the Philippine laws. Is the will executed by Aida in California valid and can be allowed in the Philippines?
No. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes. Here, Aida is a naturalized American citizen and that she executed the will in California, USA where she was residing at the time of her death. As such, the Philippine courts must examine the formalities of Aida’s will in accordance with California law. However, the Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. No copy of the pertinent California law presented as evidence pursuant to the requirements of the rules. (In the Matter of the Testate Estate of Aida A. Bambao, Linda A. Kucskar v. Sekito Jr., G.R. No. 237449, December 2, 2020)
Elena borrowed P1.4 Million from China Banking Corporation (China Bank) to increase the working capital of her general merchandising business. On April 3, 1990, Elena and her common-law husband and business partner Daniel executed a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) over a parcel of land. Later, the REM was amended several times increasing the loan. The amendments contained a “blanket mortgage clause” stating that the REM would secure the payment of obligations already incurred or which may be subsequently incurred. China Bank filed a petition for foreclosure of the REM with the RTC alleging that Elena and Daniel obtained P5 Million succeeding loan accommodations. Elena argued that the REM only covered the loan secured on April 3, 1990 and its amendments. Are the amendments to the REM void for being contracts of adhesion?
No. The amendments contained a blanket mortgage clause which subsumes all debts of past or future origins and makes additional funds available to a borrower without the need to execute separate security documents, thus, saving time, costs, and other resources. Jurisprudence recognizes the validity of this clause but its terms must still be judiciously examined. Here, the amendments are contracts of adhesion which are not entirely prohibited. The one adhering is free to give his consent inasmuch as he is also free to reject it completely. In this case, it was China Banking Corporation which drafted and prepared the standard forms on which Elena and Daniel adhered into by merely affixing their signatures. Corollarily, any ambiguity in the provisions of these documents must be interpreted against China Banking Corporation. (Elena R. Quiambao vs. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 238462, May 12, 2021)
Lydia offered to sell her entire lot in Boracay to Ulysses, but Ulysses only agreed to buy a portion of the area. Ulysses drafted a Deed of Absolute Sale over the 800-square meter lot for a beach resort which the parties signed. Upon payment of the purchase price, Ulysses discovered that the land described in the deed of sale refers to the elevated and rocky portion and not the flat area which he bought and occupied. Lydia convinced Ulysses to buy an additional 400-square meter portion of the lot under the condition that the first contract be amended. Ulysses asked Lydia to prepare the amended deed of sale but she refused because of the unpaid balance. Ulysses filed against Lydia an action for specific performance and damages before the trial court, claiming that the first contract is distinct from the additional 400-square meter lot. The trial court ordered the reformation of the Deed of Absolute Sale and ordered them to execute another contract of sale in favor of Ulysses. Is the trial court correct in its order?
Yes. If the contract is reduced into writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and is presumed to set out the true covenant of the parties. However, equity orders the reformation of a written instrument when the real intention of the contracting parties are not expressed by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident. In an action for reformation, the court does not attempt to make another contract for the parties but the instrument is made or construed to express or conform to their real intention. Specifically, an action for reformation of instrument may prosper only upon the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) there must have been a meeting of the minds of the parties to the contract; (2) the instrument does not express the true intention of the parties; and (3) the failure of the instrument to express the true intention of the parties is due to mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident. Here, all these requisites are present. There was a mistake in identifying the exact location of the lot in the first sale which caused the failure of the instrument to disclose the parties’ real agreement. (Ulysses Rudi V. Banico v. Lydia Bernadette M. Stager, G.R. No. 232825, September 16, 2020)
In a pacto de retro sale, would the failure of the vendee a retro to consolidate his title impair such title or ownership?
No. The essence of a pacto de retro sale is that title and ownership of the property sold are immediately vested in the vendee a retro, subject to the resolutory condition of repurchase by the vendor a retro within the stipulated period. Failure thus of the vendor a retro to perform said resolutory condition vests upon the vendee by operation of law absolute title and ownership over the property sold. As title is already vested in the vendee a retro, his failure to consolidate his title under Article 1607 of the Civil Code does not impair such title or ownership for the method prescribed is merely for the purpose of registering the consolidated title. (Spouses Velarde v. Heir of Candari, G.R. No. 190057, October 17, 2022)
On September 10, 1992, Ricardo sold his 1/4 undivided share in a parcel of land registered under the names of Hermelina, Ricardo, Lucina, and Victoria, to Spouses Nogra. Upon full payment, Ricardo and Spouses Nogra executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 13, 2001. Hermelina claimed that she had no knowledge of this sale until they sought assistance from the barangay through conciliation proceedings. During these proceedings, Hermelina offered to redeem the property, Spouses Nogra refused to provide a copy of the DOAS and its details. On September 26, 2007, Ricardo gave them a copy of the DOAS. Subsequently, Hermelina then filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Redemption before the RTC on October 16, 2007. Spouses Nogra argued that Hermelina’s exercise of redemption right occurred beyond the 30-day period stipulated in Article 1623 of the New Civil Code. Is this contention correct?
No. The written notice of sale is mandatory. The Court has long established the rule that notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and status. Mere actual knowledge of the sale is not sufficient to commence the running of the 30-day period absent all the necessary information pertinent for the proper exercise of the right. The 30-day redemption period under Article 1623 should be reckoned from Hermelina’s receipt of the Deed of Absolute Sale on September 26, 2007. Hermelina, therefore, validly exercised and enforced her right by filing the complaint for redemption on October 16, 2007, which is within the 30-day period under Article 1623. (Hermelina Rama And Baby Rama Lauron v. Spouses Medardo Nogra And Purita Nogra And Spouses Ricardo Rama And Mariles Rama, G.R. No. 219556, September 14, 2021)
What is a “blanket mortgage clause” or “dragnet clause”?
A “blanket mortgage clause” or “dragnet clause” subsumes all debts of past or future origins and makes additional funds available to a borrower without the need to execute separate security documents, thus, saving time, costs, and other resources. Jurisprudence recognizes the validity of this clause but its terms must still be judiciously examined. Thus, a mortgage containing a dragnet clause will not be extended to cover future advances, unless the document evidencing the subsequent advance refers to the mortgage as providing security therefor, or unless there are clear and supportive evidence to the contrary. (Elena R. Quiambao vs. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 238462, May 12, 2021)
Elena borrowed P1.4 Million from China Banking Corporation (China Bank) to increase the working capital of her general merchandising business. She executed a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) over a parcel of land. Later, the REM was amended several times increasing the loan. The amendments contained a “blanket mortgage clause” stating that the REM would secure the payment of obligations already incurred or which may be subsequently incurred. China Bank filed a petition for foreclosure of the REM with the RTC alleging that Elena and Daniel obtained P5 Million succeeding loan accommodations covered by eight promissory notes (PNs). Elena argued that the REM only covered the first loan but not her succeeding loans for P5 Million. Does the “blanket mortgage clause” in the latest amendment to the REM cover the P5 Million succeeding loans under the eight PNs?
No. A mortgage containing a dragnet clause will not be extended to cover future advances, unless the document evidencing the subsequent advance refers to the mortgage as providing security therefor, or unless there are clear and supportive evidence to the contrary. Jurisprudence recognizes the validity of this clause but its terms must still be judiciously examined. In a case, the foreclosure proceedings were declared void because there is uncertainty on whether the promissory notes were secured or not. It was not shown that the PNs are within the terms of the limited liability of the debtor. Here, the eight PNs likewise failed to allude to Elena and Daniel’s liability under the latest amendment to the REM. The PNs do not even make any reference to the REM as a security. The latest amendment to the REM cannot be interpreted to cover the P5,000,000.00 succeeding loans under the eight PNs for which the mortgage was foreclosed. (Elena R. Quiambao vs. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 238462, May 12, 2021)
During the settlement of the estate of Corona Jimenez, her children Danilo, Sonia, Vilma, Federico, and Chona (Jimenez siblings) discovered a Deed of Donation allegedly executed by Corona in favor of Damian (also Corona’s child) over the 532-square meter property. Damian mortgaged the property to Calubad and Keh. Jimenez siblings learned about the mortgage, but only Sonia registered her Affidavit of Adverse Claim, which was annotated at the back of the said TCT. Sonia was informed that the property was scheduled for auction. This prompted Jimenez siblings to file a complaint for the annulment of the Deed of Donation and TCT No. N-217728 and cancellation and annulment of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage. The RTC sustained the validity of the TCT issued in the name of Calubad and Keh as they were found to be innocent mortgagees for value and good faith. Danilo argues that while Calubad and Keh may be mortgagees in good faith, they are not purchasers in good faith as they were aware of Sonia’s adverse claim when they purchased the property during the public auction. Is his contention correct?
No. Under the doctrine of “the mortgagee in good faith,” all persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title, as buyers or mortgagees, are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title. The doctrine applies when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) the mortgagor is not the rightful owner of, or does not have valid title to, the property; (b) the mortgagor succeeded in obtaining a Torrens title over the property; (c) the mortgagor succeeded in mortgaging the property to another person; (d) the mortgagee relied on what appears on the title and there exists no facts and circumstances that would compel a reasonably cautious man to inquire into the status of the property; and (e) the mortgage contract was registered. All these requisites were satisfied in this case. Accordingly, Sonia’s adverse claim, which was annotated after the registered mortgage in favor of Calubad and Keh, cannot prevail over Calubad and Keh’s rights as mortgagees in good faith and purchasers in the foreclosure sale. Being mortgagees in good faith, they have a superior lien over that of Sonia, and their right to foreclose is reserved. Their knowledge of the adverse claim is of no moment because their right as mortgagees in good faith extends up to the time of the foreclosure sale and in their capacity as purchasers. (Danilo Santiago F. Jimenez v. Damian F. Jimenez, Jr., et.al., G.R. No. 228011, February 10, 2021)
Antonio and Remedios formed Metro Isuzu Corporation and secured loans from Westmont Bank through signed promissory notes (PNs). In 1995, Antonio executed a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) to secure a loan from Westmont Bank, covering conjugal properties. Remedios later filed a complaint alleging forgery of her signatures on loan documents, seeking to nullify the REM and amendment.The trial court declared the REM and amendment void, and the PNs without legal effect insofar as Remedios is concerned. Does the nullification of the subject deeds of mortgage affect the validity of the promissory notes?
No. A mortgage is merely an accessory agreement and does not affect the principal contract of loan. The mortgages, while void, can still be considered as instruments evidencing the indebtedness. Being merely accessory contracts, the nullity of the subject deeds of real estate mortgage on account of the forged signature of Remedios, does not result in the invalidation of the loan obligation of Antonio. (Strong Fort Warehousing Corporation vs. Remedios T. Banta, G.R. Nos. 222369 and 222502, November 16, 2020)
A City Government in Visayas entered into a compromise agreement with Spouses AAA in the purchase of the latter’s land so that the city government can construct a road over said land. The compromise agreement was approved by the RTC, and the City Council ratified said agreement. Months later, the City Council issued a Resolution withdrawing its ratification of said agreement as they found out the land is too big for the city’s needs. The City Council informed Spouses AAA that the City Government will not proceed anymore with said purchase. Can the City Government rescind the compromise agreement?
No. A compromise agreement is in the nature of both a contract and a judgment on the merits. As a contract, the compromise agreement can only be avoided on grounds of illegality, lack of consent, fraud or duress. In this case, the City Government and Spouses AAA freely and voluntarily entered into a compromise agreement. Moreover, the RTC approved the agreement and the city council ratified it. The parties knew exactly the rights and duties they assumed. It is settled that a compromise agreement, once stamped with judicial imprimatur, becomes more than a mere contract and acquires the force and effect of a judgment that is immediately final and executory. Thus, the City Government cannot, later, relieve itself of liability simply because the city council changed its position. (City Government of Tacloban v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 221554, February 3, 2021)
What is solutio indebiti and when may one be absolved from the liability to settle the disallowed transaction under this principle?
Under the principle of solutio indebiti, if something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises. Under this principle, recipients may only be absolved from the liability to settle the disallowed transaction: (1) upon a showing that the disallowed amounts were genuinely given in consideration of services rendered; or (2) excused by the Court on the basis of undue prejudice, social justice considerations, and other bona fide exceptions depending on the purpose, nature, and amount of the disallowed transaction relative to the attending circumstances. (PSALM v. COA, G.R. No. 213425, April 27, 2021)
What are the essential elements that must be present for an accion in rem verso to prosper?
An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary action, available only when there is no other remedy on contract, quasi-contract, crime, and quasi-delict. In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must be present: (1) that the defendant has been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict. (National Power Corporation vs. Benguet Electric Cooperative, G.R. No. 218378, June 14, 2021)
Almario, who was hired by Skanfil as a mess person on board M/V “DIMI” POS TOPAS, fell from a ladder while working. Consequently, he suffered injuries. He was brought to a hospital and was diagnosed with blunt head and back injuries and brain concussion. He was then repatriated and was referred to company-designated physicians. The physicians examined Almario and he was subsequently referred to other specialists to better address his concerns. The specialists treated, gave medications and assisted Almario in rehabilitation. After weeks of treatment and rehabilitation, he was cleared by the specialists and the company-designated physicians. Unconvinced, Almario consulted another physician who declared him permanently unfit to resume sea duties. He filed a complaint against Skanfil. Is Almario entitled to moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees?
The award of moral and exemplary damages shall be deleted, but attorney’s fees must be retained. Moral damages are awarded as compensation for actual injury suffered and not as a penalty. The award is proper when the employer’s action was attended by bad faith or fraud, oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions, and may only be awarded in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
However, the award of attorney’s fees is proper. Article 2208 (8) of the Civil Code provides that attorney’s fees may be recovered “in actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability laws.”
NPC and BENECO entered into a Contract of Sale of Electricity and subsequently executed a Transition Contract whereby NPC will supply electric power and energy to BENECO at multiple points of delivery. NPC granted BENECO a 3% every month as long as BENECO’s account was fully paid and updated. However, BENECO’s employee studied BENECO’s operations and discovered its low system losses. It was found that NPC had been billing BENECO at half the correct amount of electricity delivered to it. NPC informed BENECO of its underbilling from 2000 to 2004 and requested BENECO to pay the amount. NPC argues that BENECO’s non-payment would constitute unjust enrichment. Is the NPC correct?
No. Unjust enrichment exists when a person unfairly retains a benefit, money, or property against the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience. To be applicable, (a) a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (b) such benefit is derived at another’s expense or damage. Thus, for an action to prosper, he essential elements must be present: (1) that the defendant has been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict. There is no unjust enrichment when the person who benefited has a valid claim to such benefit. In this case, NPC and BENECO executed a Contract of Sale of Electricity and a Transition Contract to govern their rights and obligations in the supply of electric power and energy. Therefore, any action that one may bring against the other shall be based on the provisions of their contract. (National Power Corporation vs. Benguet Electric Cooperative, G.R. No. 218378, June 14, 2021)
Breach of promise to marry
Under our laws, a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable unless it would unjustifiably contradict good customs.
A mere breach of a promise to marry is not an actionable wrong, as long as it is not of such extent as would palpably and unjustifiably contradict good customs. In any case, the party seeking to recover damages must have acted in good faith. Here, petitioner called off the engagement after she had discovered respondent’s lies and deception. As the Court of Appeals found, respondent’s actions were tainted with fraud and deceit; he did not have the purest intentions in marrying petitioner. He lied about his marital status, and even hid his true name from petitioner. These acts suffice to justify the wedding’s cancellation. Finding out that one’s betrothed is still married to another person, and that they are not who they say they are, are reasons enough to conclude bad faith. Since respondent himself did not act in good faith, he cannot claim damages under the New Civil Code.
Unjust enrichment
There is unjust enrichment when: (1) A person is unjustly benefited; and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another.
Thoughtless extravagance
Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display during a period of acute public want or emergency may be stopped by order of the courts at the instance of any government or private charitable institution. Civil Code, Article 25
Juridical capacity vs. Capacity to act
Article 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
Can a seller transfer title over a lot, through a Deed of Absolute Sale, to a person who has already died, as the deceased has no more civil personality or juridical capacity.
A seller cannot transfer title over a lot, through a Deed of Absolute Sale, to a person who has already died, as the deceased has no more civil personality or juridical capacity.
Juridical persons
Article 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.
Residence
The term “residence” in Commonwealth Act No. 63 has already been interpreted to mean the actual or constructive permanent home otherwise known as legal residence or domicile. A place in a country or state where he lives and stays permanently, and to which he intends to return after a temporary absence, no matter how long, is his domicile.
In other words, domicile is characterized by animus manendi. “Residence” imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also presence coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. So an alien who has been admitted into this country as a temporary visitor, either for business or pleasure, or for reasons of health, though actually present in this country cannot be said to have established his domicile here because the period of his stay is only temporary in nature and must leave when the purpose of his coming is accomplished.
If an American citizen who was born in New York, migrated to California, resided there for nine years, came to the Philippines in 1913, and very rarely re-turned to California and only for short visits, and who appears to have never owned or acquired a home or properties in that state – shall he be considered to have his domicile in the Philippines?
Yes. Aznar vs. Garcia, No. L-16749, January 31, 1963
Judicial declaration of an absentee spouse is necessary when
Judicial declaration of an absentee spouse necessary, when he has properties to be taken care of or administered by a representative or when the absentee’s spouse is asking separation or administration of property.
The need to have a person judicially declared an absentee is when he has properties which have to be taken care of or administered by a representative appointed by the Court (Article 384, Civil Code); the spouse of the absentee is asking for separation of property (Article 191, Civil Code) or his wife is asking the Court that the administration of all classes of property in the marriage be transferred to her (Article 196, Civil Code). The petition to declare the husband an absentee and the petition to place the management of the conjugal properties in the hands of the wife may be combined and adjudicated in the same proceedings.
Rationale for allowing Filipino spouse in a mixed marriage to re-marry after a decree of divorce
Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two (2) parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it.
True, marriage is an inviolable social institution and must be protected by the State. But in cases like these, there is no more “institution” to protect as the supposed institution was already legally broken. Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it.
Formal Requisites of Marriage
The formal requisites of marriage are: (1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; (2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45. An
irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Art.
35.
In which cases can a marriage license be legally waived?
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, and the absence thereof, save for marriages of exceptional character, renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3).
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, and the absence thereof, save for marriages of exceptional character, renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3).
“Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (3) consular marriages, (4) ratification of marital cohabitation, (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (7) mixed marriages.”
To reiterate, in any of the aforementioned marriages of exceptional character, the requirement of a valid marriage license is dispensed with.
The parties are exempted from complying with the required issuance of marriage license insofar as the subsequent religious ceremony is concerned. For this exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua non that: (1) the parties to the religious ceremony must already be married to each other in accordance with law (civil marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in nature.
Article 77 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 77. In case two (2) persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in conformity with the regulations, rites, or practices of any church, sect, or religion, it shall no longer be necessary to comply with the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any ratification made shall merely be considered as a purely religious ceremony.
The foregoing provision pertains to a religious ceremony performed with the purpose of ratifying a marriage which was solemnized civilly. In the eyes of the law, the marriage already exists; the subsequent ceremony is undertaken merely to conform to religious practices. Thus, the parties are exempted from complying with the required issuance of marriage license insofar as the subsequent religious ceremony is concerned. For this exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua non that: (1) the parties to the religious ceremony must already be married to each other in accordance with law (civil marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in nature.
Does paragraph 2 of Article 26 still apply if, in a mixed marriage, it is the Filipino spouse that initiates the divorce?
Yes. The purpose of paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino
spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction.
In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter’s national law.
Pending a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, may the parties file a motion for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the properties in the same proceeding?
Upon the filing of the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the trial court also acquired jurisdiction over matters incidental and consequential to the marriage.
Owing to the interrelatedness of the issues, a party to a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may, in the same proceeding, file a motion for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the properties of the spouses under Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Upon the filing of the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the trial court also acquired jurisdiction over matters incidental and consequential to the marriage.
Among these incidental and consequential matters is the settlement of the parties’ common properties, which entails a determination of which properties are included in and excluded from the co-ownership.
If a person is suffering from psychosis, is he automatically psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations?
No. That a person is suffering from a certain psychosis, such as schizophrenia, will not make them automatically psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code.
This was clear in Tan-Andal vs. Andal, where this Court emphatically declared that psychological incapacity is a legal concept, not a medical one.
Psychological Incapacity
Instead of being a medical illness, psychological incapacity is “a durable or enduring aspect of a person’s personality, called ‘personality structure,’ which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family. The spouse’s personality structure must make it impossible for him or her to understand and, more important,
to comply with his or her essential marital obligations.” As a legal concept, psychological incapacity cannot be characterized as incurable. Instead, it is permanent relative to a specific partner. However, psychological incapacity can be grave, not in the sense that it is a serious or
dangerous mental illness, but that it excludes “mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts.” The incapacity must be shown to be due to a genuinely serious psychic cause and, as explicitly required by the law, the incapacity must have existed
before or during the celebration of the marriage.
Do irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,
physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36?
Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibilities and duties as a married person; incapacity must be so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, that the only result of the union would be the
inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage. It must be stressed that an unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.
Can the court consider drug addiction as psychological incapacity for declaration of nullity of marriage, and not for legal separation?
Yes.
While drug addiction is a ground for legal separation, the same will not prevent the Court from voiding the marriage where drug addiction is likewise a veritable manifestation of one’s psychological incapacity.
True, physical and verbal abuse, neglect and abandonment of spouse and children, or acts of infidelity including adultery or concubinage, each constitutes a ground for legal separation. But where each one of these grounds or a combination thereof, at the same time, manifest
psychological incapacity that had been existing even prior to marriage, the court may void the marriage on ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
What is important is that the totality of evidence must support a finding of psychological incapacity.
Is expert testimony required to prove psychological incapacity?
Expert testimony or the testimony of a psychologist/psychiatrist is no longer required to prove psychological incapacity.
Ordinary witnesses who have been present in the spouses’ lives before they contracted marriage may testify on their observations as to the incapacitated spouse’s behavior.
What is important is that the totality of evidence is sufficient to support a finding of psychological incapacity.
Incurability requirement in psychological incapacity
With regard to the requisite of incurability, it must now be recognized that psychological incapacity is incurable only in the legal (not medical) sense in that the incapacity is “so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a situation where the couple’s respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage.”
In order for the said requisite to obtain, there must be “an undeniable pattern of a persisting failure to be a present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive spouse that must be established so as to demonstrate that there is indeed a psychological anomaly or incongruity in the spouse relative to the other.
Gravity in psychological incapacity
The requisite of gravity in psychological incapacity must be such that it is caused by a genuinely psychic cause, and not just “mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes or occasional emotional outbursts” nor mere “refusal, neglect, difficulty, much less ill will.”
As such, “a deeper and fuller assessment of the alleged incapacity must be done such that it is clearly and convincingly shown that the fulfillment of the essential marital obligations is not merely feigned or cumbersome but rather, practically impossible, because of the distinct
psychological makeup of the person relative to his or her spouse.”
Juridical antecedence in psychological antecedence
The requisite of juridical antecedence (which - to note - is explicitly necessitated by the phrase “at the time of the celebration of the marriage” in Article 36) means that the incapacity is determined to exist during the time of celebration.
While it may indeed be difficult - if not scientifically impossible - to determine the existence of psychological incapacity at the exact point in time that the couple exchanged their ‘I dos,’ it is sufficient, however, that the petitioner demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that the incapacity, in all reasonable likelihood, already exists at the time of the marriage’s celebration.
To determine the reasonable likelihood of its existence at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the Court, in Tan-Andal, held that “proof of juridically antecedent psychological incapacity may consist of testimonies describing the environment where the supposedly incapacitated spouse lived that may have led to a particular behavior.”
The concept of juridical antecedence must be understood to include the ordinary experiences of the spouses not only prior to the marriage itself, but more importantly, during their “lived conjugal life” together since, as the law itself states, a marriage can be declared null and void under Article 36 “even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.”
As the parties have yet to assume any of the essential marital obligations prior to being married, the Court discerns that the experience of marriage itself is the litmus test of self-realization, reflecting one’s true psychological makeup as to whether or not he or she was indeed capable of assuming the essential marital obligations to his or her spouse at the time the marriage was entered into.
In determining that a person is psychologically incapacitated, following parameters are to be noted:
1) The psychological incapacity must be shown to have been existing at the time of the celebration of marriage;
2) Caused by a durable aspect of one’s personality structure, one that was formed prior to their marriage;
3) Caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause; and
4) Proven by clear and convincing evidence.
The Court meticulously reviewed and revised the Molina guidelines in the case of Tan-Andal vs. Andal (Tan-Andal). The guidelines, as modified by current case law, are summarized below:
1) The first Molina guideline states that “the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence, and continuation of the marriage, and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family.”
In addition to the foregoing guideline, the Court in Tan-Andal emphasized that there is a presumption of validity of marriage, and that such presumption can only be rebutted by a clear and convincing evidence. Hence, the plaintiff-spouse in an action to nullify a valid marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has the burden of proving his or her case with clear and convincing evidence.
2) The second Molina guideline which provides that “the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in the decision” was modified in the Tan-Andal case. In the Tan-Andal case, the Court categorically abandoned the requirement that psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and proven through expert opinion as the term “psychological incapacity” does not refer to a mental incapacity or a personality disorder, to wit:
In light of the foregoing, this Court now categorically abandons the second Molina guideline. Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through expert opinion. There must be proof, however, of the durable or enduring aspects of a person’s personality, called ‘personality structure,’ which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family.
The spouse’s personality structure must make it impossible for him or her to understand and, more important, to comply with his or her essential marital obligations.
Proof of these aspects of personality need not be given by an expert. Ordinary witnesses who have been present in the life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage may testify on behaviors that they have consistently observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse. From there, the judge will decide if these behaviors are indicative of a true and serious incapacity to assume the essential marital obligation.
Reiterating this Court’s pronouncement in Marcos vs. Marcos, the medical examination by an expert of the spouse concerned is no longer required as courts may rely on the totality of evidence to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
3) The third Molina guideline entails that “incapacity must be proven to be existing at ‘the time of the celebration of the marriage,”‘ which is also clearly stated in Article 36 of the Family Code. Although the “psychological incapacity” may not be perceivable at the time of the celebration of the marriage, such “psychological incapacity” must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) The fourth Molina guideline which requires that “such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable” has already been abandoned.
The case of Tan-Andal clarifies that “the psychological incapacity contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code is incurable, not in the medical, but the legal sense”, and that the requirement of incurability means that “the incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a situation where the couple’s respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be inevitable and irreparable breakdown of marriage.” The Tan-Andal case further refers to the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Perlas-Bernabe which provides that “an undeniable pattern of such persisting failure [to be a present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive spouse] must be established as to demonstrate that there is indeed a psychological anomaly or incongruity in the spouse relative to the other.”
5) The Tan-Andal case retains the fifth Molina guideline that requires that “[s]uch illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage”, but further provides that there must be a clear and convincing evidence showing that such incapacity is caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause. The Court, in the Molina case, further elaborates: Thus, ‘mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts’ cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The sixth Molina guideline identifies the essential marital obligations to be the obligations “embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.” The Tan-Andal case affirms that the obligation of the spouses to their children becomes part of their obligations to each other as spouses and, thus, failure to attend to their obligations to their children may be a ground to nullify the marriage of the parties. However, it must be clearly shown that such failure reflects on the capacity of at least one of the spouses.
7) The seventh Molina guideline which provides that the interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, is persuasive is retained in the Tan-Andal case.
8) The eighth and final Molina guideline provides that “[t]he trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.”
The Court allowed lay persons to prove psychological incapacity through evidence of a personality structure or psychic causes that manifest itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermine the family. The types of evidence that a lay person may adduce for this purpose are
(i) the reputation of the incapacitated spouse being psychologically incapacitated - that is, the viewpoint of reasonable members of the spouses’ relevant communities;
(ii) the character of the incapacitated spouse relevant to or indicative of such incapacity,
(iii) the everyday behavior, acts or conduct of the incapacitated spouse,
(iv) the offended spouse’s own experience of neglect, abandonment, unrequited love, and infliction of mental distress, among others.
These types of evidence may establish circumstances probative of the dysfunctional acts inimical to the family. The relevant circumstances to be proven may include (i) instances of violence against women and their children as defined in Republic Act No. 9262 (RA 9262), (ii) zero probability of reconciliation between the spouses, and (iii) failure of the spouse or the spouses to perform his, her, or their marital duties and obligations in a manner clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The third category of circumstances refers to the characterization, i.e., clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage, that was once used to describe the personality disorder that gave rise to psychological incapacity.
This characterization may now be appropriated to capture the essence of the problematic personality structure or psychic causes that spawn psychological incapacity.
Embraced in this inclusive circumstance are such facts as (i) forms of addiction demonstrative of such insensitivity or inability, (ii) abandonment by one spouse of the other, or (iii) instances of mutual actual loss of trust, love, and respect for each other. Distinctive of these and other instances is the harsh reality that spouses coerced together in a meaningless marital relationship would only physically or psychologically endanger either or both of them as they cannot both move on to more productive relationships but be forced to live double or secret lives.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be
(1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer
A “freely given” consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.
Effect if any of the essential requisites of marriage are inexistent
Article 4 of the Family Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Fraud that would constitute a marriage void
Under Art. 46
(1) nondisclosure of a previous conviction involving moral turpitude;
(2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man;
(3) concealment of a sexually
transmitted disease; and
(4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality.
No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage.
Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party.
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable.
In case of legal separation of the parents, the custody of the minor children shall be awarded to
In case of legal separation of the parents, the custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, unless otherwise directed by the court in the interest of the minor children, but when the husband and wife are living separately and apart from each other, without decree of the court, the court shall award the care, custody, and control of each child as will be for his best interest.
But when the husband and wife are living separately and apart from each other, without decree of the court, the court shall award the care, custody, and control of each child as will be for his best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent he prefers to live with if he is over seven (7) years of age unless the parent so chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness or poverty.
Rules on alienation of conjugal property
1) The alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal property, without the wife’s consent, made before the effectivity of the Family Code, is not void but merely voidable. The applicable laws are Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code. The wife may file an action for annulment of contract within 10 years from the transaction; and
2) The alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal property, without the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse, made after the effectivity of the Family Code is void. The applicable law is Article 124 of the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights in the property acquired before August 3, 1988. Unless the transaction is accepted by the non-consenting spouse or is authorized by the court, an action for declaration of nullity of the contract may be filed before the continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person becomes ineffective.
Is implied acceptance sufficient enough for donations proper nuptias to be valid?
Yes.
Article 127 thereof provides that the form of donations propter nuptias are regulated by the Statute of Frauds. Article 1403, paragraph 2, which contains the Statute of Frauds requires that the contracts mentioned thereunder need be in writing only to be enforceable.
However, as provided in Article 129, express acceptance “is not necessary for the validity of these donations.” Thus, implied acceptance is sufficient.
Each spouse’s liability in case conjugal property is not enough to answer for the liabilities
Article 94 of the Family Code governing the Absolute Community of Property regime, explicitly holds the spouses solidarily liable with each other if the conjugal properties are not enough to answer for the liabilities.
The last paragraph points to the “subsidiary but solidary liability of the separate properties” of the spouses for liabilities enumerated in the Article. This Article, similar to Article 94 of the Family Code governing the Absolute Community of Property regime, explicitly holds the spouses solidarily liable with each other if the conjugal properties are not enough to answer for the liabilities.
In this case, if the conjugal properties of the Reyes Spouses are not enough to answer for the loan, petitioner can recover the remaining unpaid balance from the separate properties of either respondent or his wife Lilia.
Property relations before the effectivity of the Family Code
Juan and Mercedes appear to have been married before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. There being no indication that they have adopted a different property regime, the presumption is that their property relations is governed by the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
Does the grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property automatically dissolve the absolute community regime?
Yes, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 of the Family Code.
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138.
Effect of declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological capacity
The declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological capacity will create a special co-ownership between the parties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Since the petitioner and the respondent suffer no legal impediment and exclusively lived with each other under a void marriage, their property relation is one of co-ownership under Article 147 of the Family Code. The said provision finds application in this case even if the parties were married before the Family Code took effect by express provision of the Family Code on its retroactive effect for as long as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Here, no vested rights will be impaired in the application of the said provision given that Article 147 of the Family Code is actually just a remake of Article 144 of the 1950 Civil Code.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. Family Code, Article 68
The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. Family Code, Article 69
The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from their separate properties. Family
Code, Article 70
The management of the household shall be the right and duty of both spouses. The expenses for such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70. Family Code, Article 71
When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief. Family Code, Article 72
Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:
1) The objection is proper, and
2) Benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith. Family Code, Article 73
Rule on suit between family members
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed.
This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
Art. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.
Petitioner argues that the property should be exempt from forced sale, attachment, and execution, based on Article 155 of the Family Code.
Article 155 of the Family Code explicitly provides that debts secured by mortgages are exempted from the rule against execution, forced sale, or attachment of family home.
Petitioner and his family have been neighbors with respondent since 1992, before the execution of the mortgage contract. Even though petitioner’s property has been constituted as a family home, it is not exempt from execution.
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: . . . (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution. Since petitioner’s property was voluntarily used by him as security for a loan he obtained from respondent, it may be subject to execution and attachment.
How is filiation proved?
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
The Rule on DNA Evidence permits the use of any biological sample, including bones, in DNA testing. This Court has sanctioned the exhumation of bodies for DNA testing. In Estate of Ong vs. Diaz, this Court affirmed the use of DNA testing in an instance when the putative father was dead.
To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child,
“To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity.”
Here, the single instance that Antonio allegedly hugged Randy and promised to support him cannot be considered as proof of continuous possession of the status of a child. To emphasize, “the father’s conduct towards his son must be spontaneous and uninterrupted for this ground to exist.” Here, except for that singular occasion in which they met, there are no other acts of Antonio treating Randy as his son. Neither can Antonio’s paternity be deduced from how his sister Lelita treated Randy.
Can baptismal certificates prove filiation?
Just like in a birth certificate, the lack of participation of the supposed father in the preparation of a baptismal certificate renders this document incompetent to prove paternity.
Anent Randy’s baptismal certificate, we cannot agree with the CA that the same is a good proof of Antonio’s paternity of Randy. Just like in a birth certificate, the lack of participation of the supposed father in the preparation of a baptismal certificate renders this document incompetent to prove paternity. And “while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s paternity. Thus, baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.”
Rights of legitimate children
Legitimate children shall have the right:
1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames;
2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper cases, their brothers and sisters, in conformity with the provisions of this Code on Support; and
3) To be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights granted to them by the Civil Code. Family Code, Article 174
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Family Code, Article 174
To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are thus given the right to seek recognition (under Article 285 of the Civil Code) for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age.
This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code. Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of minors who could not have filed suit, on their own, during the lifetime of their putative parents.
Angela, who was not yet born when the Family Code took effect, has the right to prove that she was her father’s daughter under Article 285 of the Civil Code within four years from attaining the age of majority. Under Article 402 of the Civil Code, the age of majority is 21 years old. Angela attained majority on October 9, 1999.
She had until October 9, 2003 to assert her right to prove her filiation with Arturo. Thus, when she moved to be included in the distribution and partition of Miguel’s estate on July 17, 2003, she was not yet barred from claiming her filiation. However, there is no provision in the Civil Code that guides a child, who was born after their father’s death, in proving filiation with him.
Article 164 of the Family Code provides that “children conceived or born during the marriage of the parties are legitimate.”
How do you rebut this presumption?
The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child.
To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to make marital intimacy impossible. This may take place, for instance, when they reside in different countries or provinces and they were never together during the period of conception or the husband was in prison during the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through the violation of prison regulations.
In what instance may a child born out of wedlock be legitimated?
Article 177 of the Family Code provides that “only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated.”
Article 178 states that “legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents.” In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute the fact that BBB is not CCC’s biological father. Such being the case, it was improper to have CCC legitimated after the celebration of BBB and AAA’s marriage. Clearly then, the legal process of legitimation was trifled with. BBB voluntarily but falsely acknowledged CCC as his son.
Article 1431 of the New Civil Code pertinently provides: Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
Rights of Legitimated Children
Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate children. Family Code, Article 179
Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse;
(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the husband, except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or
(3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence.
Who may be adopted
The following may be adopted:
a) Any child who has been issued a Certificate Declaring a Child Legally Available for Adoption;
b) The legitimate child of one spouse by the other spouse;
c) An illegitimate child by a qualified adopter to improve status of legitimacy;
d) A Filipino of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopters as their own child for a period of at least three (3) years;
e) A foster child;
f) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded;
g) A child whose biological or adoptive parents have died: Provided, That no proceedings shall be initiated within six (6) months from the time of death of said parents; or
h) A relative of the adopter. Domestic Administrative Adoption and Alternative Child Care Act, Section 22
Whose consent is necessary to the Domestic Adoption
After being properly counseled and informed of the right to give or withhold approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption are hereby required:
a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
b) The biological parents of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child, except in the case of a Filipino of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated as their own child by the adopters for at least three (3) years;
c) The legitimate and adopted children, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopters, if any;
d) The illegitimate children, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter if living with said adopter or over whom the adopter exercises parental authority and the latter’s spouse, if any; and
e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted. Provided, That children under ten (10) years of age shall be counseled and consulted, but shall not be required to execute within consent. Domestic Administrative Adoption and Alternative Child Care Act, Section 23
Effects of Adoption on legitimacy
The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes and as such in entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate children born to them without discrimination of any kind.
To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the family.
The legitimate filiation that is created between the adopter and adoptee shall be extended to the adopter’s parents, adopter’s legitimate siblings, and legitimate descendants.
The adopter is also given the right to choose the name by which the child is to be known, consistent with the best interest of the child.
Effects of Adoption on parental authority
Upon issuances of the Order of Adoption, adoption shall cease as alternative care and becomes parental care.
Adoptive parents shall now have full parental authority over the child. Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parents and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopters. In case spouses jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
Effects of Adoption on Succession
In testate and intestate succession, the adopters and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiations. However, if the adoptees and their biological parents have left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern. Domestic Administrative Adoption and Alternative Child Care Act, Sections 41 to 43
Rectification of Simulated Birth Record
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, a person or persons who, prior to the effectivity of this Act, simulated the birth of a child, and those who cooperated in the execution of such simulation, shall not be criminally, civilly, or administratively liable for such act: Provided, That the simulation of birth was made for the best interest of the child and that the child has been consistently considered and treated by such person or persons as her, his, or their own daughter or son: Provided, further, That such person or persons has or have filed a petition for adoption with an application for the rectification of the simulated birth record within ten (10) years from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, finally, That all the benefits of this Act shall also apply to adult adoptees. Simulated Birth Rectification Act, Section 4
Administrative Adoption and Rectification
A person or persons who simulated the birth of a child under the conditions provided under Section 4 of this Act may avail of administrative proceedings for the adoption and rectification of the simulated birth record of such child: Provided, That the child has been living with the person for at least three (3) years before the effectivity of this Act: Provided, further, That a certificate declaring the child legally available for adoption (CDCLAA) is issued by the DSWD in favor of such child. Simulated Birth Rectification Act, Section 5
Required Consent in Administrative Adoption
After being properly counseled and informed of the right to give or withhold approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following shall be required:
a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
b) The legitimate and adopted daughters and sons, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter and adoptee, if any;
c) The illegitimate daughters and sons, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter if living with said adopter and the latter’s spouse, if any; and
d) The spouse, if any, of the adoptee. Simulated Birth Rectification Act, Section 8
Sec. 5(e) and (i) of RA 9262
The portions of Sections 5(e) and 5(i) of RA 9262 that deal with denial or deprivation of financial support punish different things. Section 5(e) punishes the deprivation of financial support for the purpose of controlling the woman or to make her and/or her child or children lose their agency.
Section 5(i), on the other hand, punishes the willful infliction of mental or emotional anguish, or public ridicule or humiliation upon the woman and/or her child or children by denying her and/or her child or children financial support that is legally due her and/or her child or children. Thus, while the portions of Sections 5(e) and 5(i) that deal with denial or deprivation of financial support may seem similar at first glance, they, in reality, deal with different matters and penalize distinct acts. Finally, the Court clarifies that in either case, whether the accused is prosecuted under Section 5(e) or Section 5(i), the mere failure to provide financial support is not enough. In other words, neither Section 5(e) nor 5(i) can be construed to mean that mere failure or inability to provide support is sufficient for a conviction. Those entitled to support and are not given any have the remedy of filing a civil case for support against the delinquent person, consistent with the provisions of the Civil Code and the Family Code. In order to be liable under the penal provisions of R.A. 9262, therefore, it is necessary to allege and prove the existence of the facts that qualify the act of denial or deprivation of financial support from one in which mere civil liability may arise to one where a person may be criminally liable.
Extent of support
Under Article 195 (4) of the Family Code, a parent is obliged to support his child, comprising everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling clothing, medical attendance, education, and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. The amount of support shall be in proportion to the necessity of the recipient and the means of the person obliged to give support.
The obligation to give support shall only be demandable from
The obligation to give support shall only be demandable from the time the person entitled to it needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. Support pendente lite may also be claimed, in conformity with the manner stipulated by the Rules of Court.
Is an illegitimate child born out of wedlock entitled to support?
Yes. An illegitimate child, “conceived and born outside a valid marriage,’’ as is the admitted case with petitioner’s daughter, is entitled to support. To claim it, however, a child should have first been acknowledged by the putative parent or must have otherwise previously established his or her filiation with the putative parent. When “filiation is beyond question, support shall then follow as a matter of obligation.”
How is a judgment for support never final?
A judgment for support is never final in the sense that not only can its amount be subject to increase or decrease but its demandability may also be suspended or re-enforced when appropriate circumstances exist.
Thus, the order of support may be demanded or modified depending on the circumstances, even if the judgment has become final and executory. After the final judgment nullifying the marriage, “the obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases.”
Petitioner and respondent’s marriage having been declared void, they are no longer obliged to give spousal support to each other. Nonetheless, the rest of the reliefs granted under the Permanent Protection Order in favor of respondent shall remain in full force and effect. Unlike in an ordinary case for spousal support, the grant of support under a permanent protection order also serves to protect the offended party from harm and violence and help them recover and regain control over their life. This added layer differentiates it from ordinary legal support between spouses and other dependents provided under the Family Code, which is solely meant to provide subsistence.
Tender age presumption
Article 213 of the Family Code provides for the so-called tender age presumption, stating that “no child under seven (7) years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.”
Article 213 of the same Code provides for the so-called tender age presumption, stating that “no child under seven (7) years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.” The rationale behind the rule was explained by the Code Commission in this wise: The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for “compelling reasons” for the good of the child; those cases must indeed be rare, if the mother’s heart is not to be unduly hurt. According to jurisprudence, the following instances may constitute “compelling reasons” to wrest away custody from a mother over her child although under seven (7) years of age: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable disease.
Article 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following person shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated:
Article 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following person shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Article 214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and
(3) The child’s actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed. The order of preference laid down by Article 216 is mandatory, unless special circumstances require otherwise.
In the case at bar, in default of Irish’s biological parents and her deceased adoptive father, the parties claiming custody are the mother of her adoptive father and her biological aunt who is also her actual custodian.
Choice of a child for custody
The choice of a child over seven (7) years of age (first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code) and over ten (10) years of age (Rule 99 of the Rules of Court) shall be considered in custody disputes only between married parents because they are, pursuant to Article 211 of the Family Code, accorded joint parental authority over the persons of their common children.
On the other hand, this choice is not available to an illegitimate child, much more one of tender age (second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code), because sole parental authority is given only to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit or unsuitable (Article 176 of the Family Code).
Succession
Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death. These provisions emphasize that what is passed by a decedent to his heirs by succession are those which he owned at the time of his death. It follows then that his heirs cannot inherit from him what he does not own anymore.
When are rights to the succession transmitted?
Rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
Article 774 of the Civil Code defines Succession as a mode of transferring ownership as follows:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law.
Are contractual rights and obligations transmissible to the successors?
Yes. A party’s contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors.
The spouses Basas have already passed away, since Estefania died on June 24, 1999, 105 while her husband, Dominador, died on March 9, 2005. However, their death did not extinguish their contractual obligations in the instant case since as a rule, “a party’s contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors.” The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his [or her] death to another or others either by his [or her] will or by operation of law. XXX
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his [or her] death. XXX
Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property received from the decedent.
In determining which rights are intransmissible (extinguished by a person’s death) or transmissible (not extinguished by his death), the following general rules have been laid down:
First: That rights which are purely personal, not in the inaccurate equivalent of this term in contractual obligations, but in its proper sense, are, by their nature and purpose, intransmissible, for they are extinguished by death; examples, those relating to civil personality, to family rights, and to the discharge of public office.
Second: That rights which are patrimonial or relating to property are, as a general rule, not extinguished by death and properly constitute part of the inheritance, except those expressly provided by law or by the will of the testator, such as usufruct and those known as personal servitudes.
Third: That rights of obligation are by nature transmissible and may constitute part of the inheritance, both with respect to the rights of the creditor and as regards the obligations of the debtor.
The third rule stated above has three exceptions, especially with respect to the obligations of the debtor. They are: (1) those which are personal, in the sense that the personal qualifications and circumstances of the debtor have been taken into account in the creation of the obligation, (2) those that are intransmissible by express agreement or by will of the testator, and (3) those that are intransmissible by express provision of law, such as life pensions given under contract.
Rules on obligations passed on to successor/s
The heirs are no longer personally liable for the debts of the deceased; such debts must be collected only from the property left upon his [or her] death, and if this should not be sufficient to cover all of them, the heirs cannot be made to pay the uncollectible balance.
This should not be understood to mean, however, that “obligations” are no longer a part of the inheritance. Only money debts are chargeable against the estate left by the deceased; these are the obligations which do not pass to the heirs, but constitute a charge against the hereditary property. There are other obligations, however, which do not constitute money debts; these are not extinguished by death, and must still be considered as forming part of the inheritance. Thus, if the deceased is a lessee for a definite period, paying a periodical rental, then his [ or her] heirs will inherit the obligation to pay the rentals as they fall due together with the rights arising from the lease contract.
In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language “understood and known” to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the testatrix “and translated into Filipino language”.
Is the will valid?
A will written in English, which was not known to the Igorot testator, is void and was disallowed.
That could only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. Thus, a will written in English, which was not known to the Igorot testator, is void and was disallowed.
According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as follows:
(1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of,
(2) the proper objects of the testator’s bounty, and
(3) the character of the testamentary act
Does the state of being forgetful make a person mentally unsound to execute a will?
The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will.
We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will.
Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Article 799 of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.
Holographic will
A holographic will must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself—it is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. Article 810, NCC
Requisites of a will
- Subscribed by testator
- Subscribed by 3 or more credible witnesses
- Each page shall be signed, except the last, on the left margin
- Every page shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page
- Attestation shall state the number of pages
Art. 805
Last page of the will that requires signature
As the probate court correctly appreciated, the last page of the will does not contain any testamentary disposition; it is but a mere continuation of the Acknowledgment.
The respondents take a skewed stance in insisting that the testator Legaspi and the instrumental witnesses should have signed on the last page of the subject will.
When Article 805 of the Civil Code requires the testator to subscribe at the end of the will, it necessarily refers to the logical end thereof, which is where the last testamentary disposition ends. As the probate court correctly appreciated, the last page of the will does not contain any testamentary disposition; it is but a mere continuation of the Acknowledgment.
The purpose of requiring the number of pages to be stated in the attestation clause
The purpose of requiring the number of pages to be stated in the attestation clause is to make the falsification of a will more difficult.
As to whether the failure to state the number of pages of the will in the attestation clause renders such will defective, the CA, citing Uy Coque v. Naves Sioca, 43 Phil. 405 (1922), and In re: Will of Andrada, perceived such omission as a fatal flaw.
In Uy Coque, one of the defects in the will that led to its disallowance is the failure to declare the number of its pages in the attestation clause.
The Court elucidated that the purpose of requiring the number of pages to be stated in the attestation clause is to make the falsification of a will more difficult.
While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause, Richard likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and testament that it “consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written” cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence aliunde.
Extrinsic validity of an alien’s will
Articles 816 and 817 of the Civil Code both allow the application of Philippine Law.
Article 817 provides that a will by an alien executed in the Philippines shall be treated as if it were executed according to Philippine Laws, if it was validly executed and accordingly could have been probated under the laws of the alien’s country of nationality.
Further, Article 817 does not exclude the participation of Philippine courts in the probate of an alien’s will, especially when the will passes real property in the Philippines. It provides an option to the heirs or the executor: to use Philippine Law, or plead and prove foreign law. Thus, it does not remove jurisdiction from the Philippine court.
This option is clear from the clause “which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own country,” which implies that either the alien’s national law or Philippine Law applies in the probate proceedings. Additionally, the clause “shall have the same effect as if executed in accordance with the laws of the Philippines” creates a fiction that foreign law if proven will have the same effect as Philippine Law.
Clearly, as to the extrinsic validity of an alien’s will, Articles 816 and 817 of the Civil Code both allow the application of Philippine Law.
Will failure to strictly observe other formalities result in the disallowance of a holographic will?
Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding noncompliance with the provisions of Article 814. Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator’s signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.
Which requirements are essential to the probate of a holographic will?
Only the requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil Code—and not those found in Articles 813 and 814—are essential to the probate of a holographic will.
It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article 810). The distinction can be traced to Articles 678 and 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which the present provisions covering holographic wills are taken. This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil Code—and not those found in Article 813 and 814 of the same Code—are essential to the probate of a holographic will.
Article 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Qualifications of a witness in attestation
Article 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in article 805 of this Code. (n)
Article 821. The following are disqualified from being witnesses to a will:
(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines;
(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony.
Article 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases:
(1) By implication of law; or
(2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of wills; or
(3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction. If burned, torn, cancelled, or obliterated by some other person, without the express direction of the testator, the will may still be established, and the estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents, and due execution, and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration are established according to the Rules of Court.
To constitute an effective revocation of a will…
To constitute an effective revocation, the physical act of destruction of a will must be coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator.
It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator.
It is not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person but under the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself.
Doctrine of Presumed Revocation
The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of the will to be preserved. It therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the cancellation or revocation of wills. The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken place must either remain unproved or be inferred from evidence showing that after due search the original will cannot be found. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed.
The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator.
Is revocation done outside the Philippines valid?
Article 829. A revocation done outside the Philippines, by a person who does not have his domicile in this country, is valid when it is done according to the law of the place where the will was made, or according to the law of the place in which the testator had his domicile at the time; and if the revocation takes place in this country, when it is in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
Extrinsic validity of will
Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.
Probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad
Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.
The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it.
Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.
Fideicommissary substitution
Article 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of the inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided further, that the fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are living at the time of the death of the testator.
Article 870. The dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than twenty years are void.
When substitution of heir occurs
Substitution occurs only when another heir is appointed in a will “so that he may enter into inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted.”
Legitime
Legitime is defined as that part of the testator’s property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs.
Preterition
Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will, either because he is not named or, although he is named as a father, son, etc., he is neither instituted as an heir nor assigned any part of the estate without expressly being disinherited — tacitly depriving the heir of his legitime.
Preterition requires that the omission is total, meaning the heir did not also receive any legacies, devises, or advances on his legitime. In other words, preterition is the complete and total omission of a compulsory heir from the testator’s inheritance without the heir’s express disinheritance.
Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code.
Effect of preterition of a compulsory heir
Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line shall annul the institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall remain valid insofar as the legitimes are not impaired.
Consequently, if a will does not institute any devisees or legatees, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line will result in total intestacy. In the present case, the decedent’s will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or devisee. As the decedent’s illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory heir in the direct line.
Unless Morales could show otherwise, Francisco’s omission from the will leads to the conclusion of his preterition.
Is prior determination of heirship in a special proceeding required before one can file an ordinary civil action to enforce ownership rights by virtue of succession?
No. The Court laid down in Treyes vs. Larlar that a prior determination of heirship in a special proceeding is not a prerequisite before one can file an ordinary civil action to enforce ownership rights by virtue of succession.
Given the clear dictates of the Civil Code that the rights of the heirs to the inheritance vest immediately at the precise moment of the decedent’s death even without judicial declaration of heirship, and the various Court En Banc and Division decisions holding that no prior judicial declaration of heirship is necessary before an heir can file an ordinary civil action to enforce ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession through the nullification of deeds divesting property or properties forming part of the estate and reconveyance thereof to the estate or for the common benefit of the heirs of the decedent, the Court hereby resolves to clarify the prevailing doctrine.
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator to make a will or to change one already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parent or ascendant who disinherits such child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant;
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.
Article 920. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of parents or ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) When the parents have abandoned their children or induced their daughters to live a corrupt or immoral life, or attempted against their virtue;
(2) When the parent or ascendant has been convicted of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(3) When the parent or ascendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found to be false;
(4) When the parent or ascendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator;
(5) When the parent or ascendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator to make a will or to change one already made;
(6) The loss of parental authority for causes specified in this Code;
(7) The refusal to support the children or descendants without justifiable cause;
(8) An attempt by one of the parents against the life of the other, unless there has been a reconciliation between them.
Article 921. The following shall be sufficient causes for disinheriting a spouse:
(1) When the spouse has been convicted of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When the spouse has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment of six years or more, and the accusation has been found to be false;
(3) When the spouse by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence cause the testator to make a will or to change one already made;
(4) When the spouse has given cause for legal separation;
(5) When the spouse has given grounds for the loss of parental authority;
(6) Unjustifiable refusal to support the children or the other spouse.
Effect of disinheritance on the share of the heir
Article 923. The children and descendants of the person disinherited shall take his or her place and shall preserve the rights of compulsory heirs with respect to the legitime; but the disinherited parent shall not have the usufruct or administration of the property which constitutes the legitime.
How will disinheritance be valid?
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified; Maltreatment of a parent by a child presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of the latter.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundo’s intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.
With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code.
ART. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect:
(1) If the testator transforms the thing bequeathed in such a manner that it does not retain either the form or the denomination it had;
(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing bequeathed or any part thereof, it being understood that in the latter case the legacy or devise shall be without effect only with respect to the part thus alienated. If after the alienation the thing should again belong to the testator, even if it be by reason of nullity of the contract, the legacy or devise shall not thereafter be valid, unless the reacquisition shall have been effected by virtue of the exercise of the right of repurchase;
(3) If the thing bequeathed is totally lost during the lifetime of the testator, or after his death without the heir’s fault. Nevertheless, the person obliged to pay the legacy or devise shall be liable for eviction if the thing bequeathed should not have been determinate as to its kind, in accordance with the provisions of Article 928.
There might be here an intention on the part of Anacleto to alienate through the SREI unit 632A subsequent to the execution of his will although it subsequently became inefficacious, or without obligatory force, by reason of the nonfulfillment of the positive suspensive condition of full payment of the purchase price by spouses Estipona on the stipulated date.
When a person dies intestate, his or her estate may generally be subject to judicial administration proceedings. There are, however, several exceptions.
One such exception is provided for in Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. This Section states: Sec. 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs.—If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds.
The parties to an extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be filed under Section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two (2) years after the death of the decedent. The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
According to this provision, when the deceased left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, the heirs may divide the estate among themselves without judicial administration. The heirs may do so extrajudicially through a public instrument filed in the office of the Register of Deeds.
In case of disagreement, they also have the option to file an action for partition.
In default of the heirs of the decedent,
In default of the heirs of the decedent, the State will inherit the decedent’s share and will thus be a co-petitioner entitled to possession and enjoyment of the property.
In the same vein, there is no merit in petitioner’s claim that he has the legal personality to file the present unlawful detainer suit because the ejectment of respondents would benefit not only him but also his alleged co-owners. However, petitioner forgets that he filed the instant case to acquire possession of the property and to recover damages. If granted, he alone will gain possession of the lot and benefit from the proceeds of the award of damages to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana. Hence, petitioner cannot successfully capitalize on the alleged benefit to his co-owners. Incidentally, it should be pointed out that in default of the said heirs of Graciana, whom petitioner labeled as “fictitious heirs,” the State will inherit her share and will thus be petitioner’s co-owner entitled to possession and enjoyment of the property.
Right of representation
Article 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded.
In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts.
The right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces); It cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces).
Article 973. In order that representation may take place, it is necessary that the representative himself be capable of succeeding the decedent.
Article 976. A person may represent him whose inheritance he has renounced.
Article 977. Heirs who repudiate their share may not be represented.
Rule on proximity
The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply. Thus, Article 962 of the Civil Code provides:
“ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place. “Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions of Article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division between the paternal and maternal lines.”
Does right of representation apply to collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree?
No. The right of representation does not apply to “other collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree” (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, of the decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction.
Iron curtain rule
As ruled by the Supreme Court, when a nonmarital child seeks to represent their deceased parent to succeed in their grandparent’s estate, Article 928 of the Civil Code applies. In turn, the language of Article 982 does not make any distinctions or qualifications as to the birth status of the “grandchildren and other descendants” granted the right of representation. To allow grandchildren and other descendants, regardless of their birth status, to inherit by right of representation will protect the legitime of the compulsory heir they represent; otherwise, the legitime will be impaired, contrary to protections granted to this legitime in other areas of our law on succession. Thus, provided Angge proves her filiation, she is not barred by the iron curtain rule from inheriting from her grandparent.
We adopt a construction of Article 992 that makes children, regardless of the circumstances of their births, qualified to inherit from their direct ascendants-such as their grandparent-by their right of representation.
This Court abandons the presumption xxx that nonmarital children are products of illicit relationships or that they are automatically placed in a hostile environment perpetrated by the marital family. We are not duty bound to uncritically parrot archaic prejudices and cruelties, to mirror and amplify oppressive and regressive ideas about the status of children and family life.
The best interest of the child should prevail. We adopt a construction of Article 992 that makes children, regardless of the circumstances of their births, qualified to inherit from their direct ascendants-such as their grandparent-by their right of representation. Both marital and nonmarital children, whether born from a marital or nonmarital child, are blood relatives of their parents and other ascendants. Nonmarital children are removed from their parents and ascendants in the same degree as marital children.
Nonmarital children of marital children are also removed from their parents and ascendants in the same degree as nonmarital children of nonmarital children.
To emphasize, this ruling will only apply when the nonmarital child has a right of representation to their parent’s share in her grandparent’s legitime. It is silent on collateral relatives where the nonmarital child may inherit by themself. We are not now ruling on the extent of the right of a nonmarital child to inherit in their own right. Those will be the subject of a proper case and, if so minded, may also be the subject of more enlightened and informed future legislation.
May an heir to an inheritance dispose of his/her hereditary rights to whomever he/she chooses?
In the case of Intestate Estate of Josefa Tangco, et al. v. De Borja, 46 SCRA 577 (1972), the Court has already ruled that an heir to an inheritance could dispose of his/her hereditary rights to whomever he/she chooses. This is because:
[A]s a hereditary share in a decedent’s estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor-in-interest, there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.
Further, still according to Intestate Estate of Josefa Tangco, this alienation by the heirs of their aliquot portion of the inheritance is recognized by no less than the Civil Code, viz.: [A]nd as already shown, that eventual share she owned from the time of Francisco’s death and the Court of Nueva Ecija could not bar her selling it. As owner of her undivided hereditary share, Tasiana could dispose of it in favor of whomsoever she chose. Such alienation is expressly recognized and provided for by Article 1088 of the present Civil Code:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale of the vendor. If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a coheir could not be forbidden.
Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire estate to himself
Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir of the estate.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly adjudicated Josefa’s estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear.
Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate.
If a donation is irrevocable, does it necessarily exempt the donated properties from collation?
No. Fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the donated properties from collation as required under Art. 1061, Civil Code; Given the precise language of the deed of donation the decedent-donor would have included an express prohibition to collate if that had been the donor’s intention.
We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated properties.
As the said court correctly observed, the phrase “sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli” merely described the donation as “irrevocable” and should not be construed as an express prohibition against collation.
We surmise from the use of such terms as “legitime” and “free portion” in the deed of donation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also presume he understood the legal consequences of the donation being made. It is reasonable to suppose, given the precise language of the document, that he would have included therein an express prohibition to collate if that had been the donor’s intention. Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of Article 1062.
Intention to exempt donated properties from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the general rule in Art. 1062, Civil Code; Absent such a clear indication of that intention, the rule not the exception should be applied.
Effect of acceptance of inheritance
Under Article 1056 of the Civil Code, the acceptance of an inheritance, once made, is irrevocable and cannot be impugned, except when it was made through any of the causes that vitiate consent or when an unknown will appears.
In this case, the summary settlement and distribution of the estate—both of the husband and his deceased wife—was not only an adjudicated matter; it was actually accepted by the heirs and carried out. Some took actual possession, others had their shares transferred in their names and a few sold and disposed of their shares in favor of third persons. A new project of partition with respect to the same properties is no longer legally feasible.
Can a testator dispose his property in favor of a definite class or group of persons?
Article 845. Every disposition in favor of an unknown person shall be void, unless by some event or circumstance his identity becomes certain. However, a disposition in favor of a definite class or group of persons shall be valid.
Distribution of inheritance in case the testator includes his siblings, both full blood and half blood
Article 848. If the testator should institute his brothers and sisters, and he has some of full blood and others of half blood, the inheritance shall be distributed equally unless a different intention appears.
There are three (3) kinds of property of public dominion:
ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
With respect to provinces, cities and municipalities or local government units (LGUs), property for public use “consist of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.”
(3) those intended for the development of national wealth
The Civil Code classifies property of private ownership into three (3) categories
The Civil Code classifies property of private ownership into three categories:
(1) patrimonial property of the State under Articles 421 and 422;
(2) patrimonial property of LGUs under Article 424; and
(3) property belonging to private individuals under Article 425, hence:
ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.
ART. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.
ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consist of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities. All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
ART. 425. Property of private ownership, besides the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private persons, either individually or collectively. From the foregoing, property of private ownership or patrimonial property of the State may be subclassified into:
(1) “By nature or use” or those covered by Article 421, which are not property of public dominion or imbued with public purpose based on the State’s current or intended use; and
(2) “By conversion” or those covered by Article 422, which previously assumed the nature of property of public dominion by virtue of the State’s use, but which are no longer being used or intended for said purpose. Since those properties could only come from property of public dominion as defined under Article 420, “converted” patrimonial property of the State are separate from and not a subset of patrimonial property “by nature or use” under Article 421. With respect to lands, which are immovable property pursuant to Article 415(1) of the Civil Code, they can either be lands of public dominion or of private ownership following the general classification of property under Article 419.
Effect of voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes
The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government.
While tax declarations are not per se conclusive evidence of ownership, they cannot simply be ignored especially where, as here, since the 1940s, tax declarations had already been registered in the name of petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest.
While it is true that tax receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute credible proof of a claim of title over the property.
Coupled with actual possession of the property, tax declarations become strong evidence of
ownership.
The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government.
Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. Hence, the constant filing by the Melendreses of tax declarations covering the subject property spanning several decades, taken together with the other pieces of evidence, shows that petitioners’ claim of title over the subject property is consistent, providing sufficient basis in proving their possession over the said property.
Does the registered owner automatically have right of possession no matter the conditions?
No. The registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property.
Proper proceedings shall be resorted to.
Who has the right to whatever is built, planted, or sown on the land of another, and the improvements or repairs made thereon?
Whatever is built, planted, or sown on the land of another, and the improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land; It is the owner of the land who is allowed to exercise the option to acquire improvements because his right is older and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.
Where, however, the planter, builder, or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating what Manresa calls a state of “forced co-ownership,” the law has provided a just and equitable solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay the proper rent.
It is the owner of the land who is allowed to exercise the option because his right is older and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.
The landowner has to make a choice between appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land. But even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building to remove the building from the land without first exercising either option. It is only if the owner chooses to sell his land, and the builder or planter fails to purchase it where its value is not more than the value of the improvements, that the owner may remove the improvements from the land. The owner is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.
Two options of the seller/owner of the land when the builder believes that he is the owner of the land and has applied improvements thereon
Article 448 of the Civil Code applies when the builder believes that he is the owner of the land or that by some title he has the right to build thereon, or that, at least, he has a claim of title thereto.
The seller (the owner of the land) has two options under Article 448:
(1) he may appropriate the improvements for himself after reimbursing the buyer (the builder in good faith) the necessary and useful expenses under Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code; or
(2) he may sell the land to the buyer, unless its value is considerably more than that of the improvements, in which case, the buyer shall pay reasonable rent.
Builder in good faith
The term “builder in good faith” as used in reference to Article 448 of the Civil Code, refers to one who, not being the owner of the land, builds on that land believing himself to be its owner and unaware of the land, builds on that land, believing himself to be its owner and unaware of the defect in his title or mode of acquisition. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one’s right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach another.
In the instant case, the Spouses Aguilar cannot be considered as builders in good faith on account of their admission that the subject lot belonged to the Spouses Aquino when they constructed the building.
At the onset, petitioners were aware of a flaw in their title and a limit to their right to possess the property. By law, one is considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
Objective in an action for quieting of title
In an action for quieting of title, the objective is for the competent court to remove the cloud by determining the rights of the parties so that the ones entitled to the subject property may exercise said rights without fear, disturbance, or interference from those who have no right over the same.
Two requisites must be established in order that a complaint for quieting of title may prosper
First, the plaintiff must have a legal or equitable title or interest in the property subject of the complaint.
Second, the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding allegedly casting doubt over one’s title must be proven to be in truth invalid, void or inoperative despite the prima facie appearance of validity.
Legal or equitable title or interest in the property subject of the complaint
On one hand, legal title means registered ownership, where the subject property is registered under the name of the complainant in an action to quiet title, which may be evidenced by presenting the certificate of title in the latter’s name.
On the other hand, equitable title denotes beneficial ownership, which is “ownership recognized by law and capable of being enforced in the courts at the suit of the beneficial owner.”
Rule on impleading co-owner in a suit to protect their rights over the co-owned property
Where the suit is brought by a co owner, without repudiating the co ownership, then the suit is presumed to be filed for the benefit of the other co-owners and may proceed without impleading the other coowners.
However, where the co-owner repudiates the co-ownership by claiming sole ownership of the property or where the suit is brought against a co-owner, his co-owners are indispensable parties and must be impleaded as party-defendants, as the suit affects the rights and interests of these other co-owners.
May a co-owner alienate an inchoate portion of the subject property which belongs to him or her?
Yes. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides for the rights of the co owners over a co-owned property, thus, each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Can the same court in the same proceeding, handle matters of annulment of titles in an action for partition?
Yes. This Court has previously allowed the annulment of titles in an action for partition.
The case of Sps. Villafria vs. Plazo provides, the fact that respondents’ complaint also prayed for the annulment of title and recovery of possession does not strip the trial court off of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Asking for the annulment of certain transfers of property could very well be achieved in an action for partition, as can be seen in cases where courts determine the parties’ rights arising from complaints asking not only for the partition of estates but also for the annulment of titles and recovery of ownership and possession of property.
Each co-owner has the full ownership of his part or share in the co-ownership and may, therefore, alienate, assign or mortgage it except when
Each co-owner has the full ownership of his part or share in the co ownership and may, therefore, alienate, assign or mortgage it except when personal rights are involved.
Can the co-heirs or co-owners acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of the co-heirs or co-owners?
Only if there is a clear repudiation of the co-ownership.
Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of the co-heirs or co-owners absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership.
Requisites before a co-owner’s possession may be deemed adverse to the other co-owners
Since possession of co-owners is like that of a trustee, in order that a co owner’s possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, the following requisites must concur:
(1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owners,
(2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, and
(3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing
Concept of possession in forcible entry suits
Possession in forcible entry suits refers to nothing more than physical possession, not legal possession.
Ownership carries the right of possession, but the possession contemplated by the concept of ownership is not exactly the same as the possession in issue in a forcible entry case.
Possession in forcible entry suits refers only to possession de facto, or actual or material possession, and not possession flowing out of ownership; these are different legal concepts for which the law provides different remedies for recovery of possession. The word “possession” in forcible entry suits refers to nothing more than prior physical possession or possession de facto, not possession de jure or legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law.
Essence of a forcible entry suit
In a forcible entry case, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself.
Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. He cannot be ejected by force, violence or terror - not even by its owners. For these reasons, an action for forcible entry is summary in nature aimed only at providing an expeditious means of protecting actual possession. Ejectment suits are intended to prevent breach of peace and criminal disorder and to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his.
Thus, lest the purpose of these summary proceedings be defeated, any discussion or issue of ownership is avoided unless it is necessary to resolve the issue of de facto possession.
How is possession acquired?
Possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one’s will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.
Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession. Examples of these are donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments, inscription of possessory information titles and the like. The reason for this exceptional rule is that possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession.
It is sufficient that petitioner was able to subject the property to the action of his will.
Discuss the concept of proof in an unlawful detainer suit
An action for unlawful detainer is a summary action which may be filed for the purpose of recovering possession against one who illegally withholds the same after the expiration or termination of his or her right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied.
To sustain an action for unlawful detainer, the plaintiff bears the burden of alleging and proving, by preponderance of evidence, the following jurisdictional facts:
(i) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(ii) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession;
(iii) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(iv) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
Is unlawful detainer proper to compel a public utility to vacate a property?
As ordained in the leading case of National Transmission Corp. v. Bermuda Development Corp., 899 SCRA 598 (2019), for reasons of public policy and public necessity, as well as equitable estoppel, the remedy of unlawful detainer is unavailing to compel a public utility to vacate subject property.
“The proper recourse is for the ejectment court: (1) to dismiss the case without prejudice to the landowner filing the proper action for recovery of just compensation and consequential damages; or (2) to dismiss the case and direct the public utility corporation to institute the proper expropriation or condemnation proceedings and to pay the just compensation and consequential damages assessed therein; or (3) to continue with the case as if it were an expropriation case and determine the just compensation and consequential damages pursuant to Rule 67 (Expropriation) of the Rules of Court, if the ejectment court has jurisdiction over the value of the subject land.”
Thus, it is well-settled that a case filed by a landowner for recovery of possession or ejectment against a public utility corporation, endowed with the power of eminent domain, which has occupied the land belonging to the former in the interest of public service without prior acquisition of title thereto by negotiated purchase or expropriation proceedings, will not prosper. Any action to compel the public utility corporation to vacate such property is unavailing since the landowner is denied the remedies of ejectment and injunction for reasons of public policy and public necessity as well as equitable estoppel.
Main issue in ejectment proceedings
The only issue in ejectment proceedings is who between the parties is entitled to physical or material possession of the premises; that is, to possession de facto, not possession de jure. Issues as to the ownership are not involved in the action; evidence thereon is not admissible, except only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession.
Given the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action, there is no need to discuss the parties’ respective claim of ownership. Besides, it is settled that even the registered owner of a real property cannot simply wrest possession from whoever is in its actual possession. This is especially true where the occupation of the property was not obtained through the means, or held under the circumstances contemplated by the rules on summary ejectment.
We reiterate that in giving recognition to ejectment suits, the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession, and in case of a controverted proprietary right, the law requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one or the other sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of ownership.
What must be alleged in an action for forcible entry?
In an action for forcible entry, it must be alleged that the complainant was deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, and that the action was filed anytime within one (1) year from the time the unlawful deprivation of possession took place, except that when the entry is through stealth, the 1-year period is counted from the time the complainant learned of the dispossession.
Accion interdictal
Accion interdictal is a summary action that seeks the recovery of physical possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one (1) year, and is to be exclusively brought in the proper inferior court.
The issue involved is material possession or possession de facto.
The action is either forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (deshhucio).
Forcible entry vs. Unlawful detainer
In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats or stealth, but in unlawful detainer, the defendant illegally withholds possession of real property after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied.
The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which a party has prior de facto possession, while in unlawful detainer, the possession of the defendant is originally legal but becomes illegal because of the expiration or termination of the right to possess.
Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land by the defendant in case of forcible entry, and within one year from the date of last demand in case of unlawful detainer.
Forcible entry
The elements of forcible entry are: (1) prior physical possession of the property; and (2) unlawful deprivation of it by the defendant through force, intimidation, strategy, threat or stealth.
Possession in forcible entry cases means nothing more than physical possession or possession de facto; not legal possession. Only prior physical possession, not title, is the issue. For forcible entry to prosper, an appreciable length of time of prior physical possession is not required. However short it is, for as long as prior physical possession is established, recovery of possession under Rule 70 of the Rules may be granted.
Accion publiciana
Accion publiciana is an ejectment suit where the cause of dispossession is not among the grounds for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, or when possession has been lost for more than one (1) year and the action can no longer be maintained under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
The objective of the plaintiff in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.
Accion publiciana is the second possessory action. It is a plenary action to recover the right of possession, and the issue is which party has the better right of possession (possession de jure). It can be filed when the dispossession lasted for more than one year. It is also used to refer to an ejectment suit where the cause of dispossession is not among the grounds for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, or when possession has been lost for more than one year and the action can no longer be maintained under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The objective of the plaintiff in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.
When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should be
When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
This Court stresses that to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, without resort to parol testimony, as these proceedings are summary in nature.
In short, the jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
Accion reivindicatoria
An accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership over real property. Article 434 of the New Civil Code provides that to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove two things:
first, the identity of the land claimed by describing the location, area, and boundaries thereof;
and second, his title thereto.
Hence, with regard to the first requisite, in an accion reivindicatoria, the person who claims that he/she has a better right to the property must fix the identity of the land he/she is claiming by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof. Anent the second requisite, i.e., the claimant’s title over the disputed area, the rule is that a party can claim a right of ownership only over the parcel of land that was the object of the deed.
Main issue in an accion reivindicatoria
The issue involved in and determined through accion reivindicatoria is the recovery of ownership of real property.
The last possessory action is accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion. It is an action whereby the plaintiff alleges ownership of the parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. The issue involved in and determined through accion reivindicatoria is the recovery of ownership of real property. This action can be filed when the dispossession lasted for more than one year.
How are boundary disputes settled?
Settled is the rule that a boundary dispute can only be resolved in the context of an accion reivindicatoria, and not in an ejectment case.
In Manalang v. Bacani, 745 SCRA 27 (2015), the Court held that boundary dispute cannot be resolved in ejectment proceedings as it involves different issues. The boundary dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that is, whether the property claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiff’s property. A boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings under which are limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds the possession of the premises upon the expiration or termination of his right to hold such possession under any contract, express or implied. The defendant’s possession was lawful at the beginning, becoming unlawful only because of the expiration or termination of his right of possession. In forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and the issue centers on which between the plaintiff and the defendant had the prior possession de facto.
Right of way easement
A right of way easement is one such encumbrance which is imposed for the benefit of another immovable which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway.
The requisites for the establishment of a right of way easement are:
- The immovable benefiting from the right of way (referred to by law as the dominant estate) is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway;
- The owner, user, or holder of the dominant estate must pay proper indemnity to the owner of the immovable on which the easement is being imposed;
- The isolation of the dominant estate is not the result of its owner, user, or holder’s own acts; and
- The claimed right of way must be at the point least prejudicial to the immovable on which the easement is being imposed (referred to by law as the servient estate); and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance of the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
In a proceeding for the compulsory imposition of a right of way easement, the burden of proving compliance with the foregoing requisites lies with the owner, holder, or user of the dominant estate.
Remedy if the easement is intended to perpetually deprive the owner of his proprietary rights
If the easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely deprive the owner of his proprietary rights through the imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use, free enjoyment and disposal of the property or through restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent with the exercise of the attributes of ownership, or when the introduction of structures or objects which, by their nature, create or increase the probability of injury, death upon or destruction of life and property found on the land is necessary, then the owner should be compensated for the monetary equivalent of the land.
Nuisance
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines “nuisance” as any act, omission, establishment, business, condition or property, or anything else that
(1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others;
(2) annoys or offends the senses;
(3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality;
(4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or
(5) hinders or impairs the use of property.
Nuisances are of two kinds
Nuisances are of two kinds: nuisance per se and nuisance per accidens.
The first is recognized as a nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace to public health or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated summarily under the undefined law of necessity.
The second is that which depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance.
Article 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:
(1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance: or
(2) A civil action; or
(3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
Article 701. If a civil action is brought by reason of the maintenance of a public nuisance, such action shall be commenced by the city or municipal mayor.
Article 705. The remedies against a private nuisance are:
(1) A civil action; or
(2) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, there are generally two (2) classifications of the modes of acquiring ownership
Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, there are generally two (2) classifications of the modes of acquiring ownership, namely, the original mode, that is, “through occupation, acquisitive prescription, law or intellectual creation,” and derivative mode “through succession mortis causa or tradition as a result of certain contracts, such as sale, barter, donation, assignment or mutuum.”
Can occupation vest title?
Unless occupation is coupled with hostility toward the true owner, occupation no matter how long will not vest title.
As pointed out by the RTC and the CA, petitioners cannot acquire the subject property by mere occupation.
In the absence of their adverse possession of the property, even if petitioners had declared it for taxation purposes, is not sufficient to establish ownership.
At the same time, their claim of ownership over the improvements thereon remained unsubstantiated and thus, without merit.
Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be categorized as:
Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be categorized as: (1) pure or simple; (2) remuneratory or compensatory; (3) conditional or modal; and (4) onerous.
A pure or simple donation is one where the underlying cause is plain gratuity. This is donation in its truest form. On the other hand, a remuneratory or compensatory donation is one made for the purpose of rewarding the donee for past services, which services do not amount to a demandable debt.
A conditional or modal donation is one where the donation is made in consideration of future services or where the donor imposes certain conditions, limitations or charges upon the donee, the value of which is inferior than that of the donation given.
Finally, an onerous donation is that which imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation or, to be more precise, this is the kind of donation made for a valuabie consideration, the cost of which is equal to or more than the thing donated.
Article 739. The following donations shall be void:
1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in consideration thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by reason of his office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action.
Article 740. Incapacity to succeed by will shall be applicable to donations inter vivos.
Article 765. The donation may also be revoked at the instance of the donor, by reason of ingratitude in the following cases:
(1) If the donee should commit some offense against the person, the honor or the property of the donor, or of his wife or children under his parental authority;
(2) If the donee imputes to the donor any criminal offense, or any act involving moral turpitude, even though he should prove it, unless the crime or the act has been committed against the donee himself, his wife or children under his authority;
(3) If he unduly refuses him support when the donee is legally or morally bound to give support to the donor.
Can a deed of conditional donation be automatically revoked if the conditions are not complied with?
The deed of conditional donation expressly provided for the automatic revocation and/or reversion in case of breach of any of the conditions therein. If the donee fails to comply with or violate any of the conditions stated in the donation, the title over the subject property shall ipso facto revert to the donor, his heirs, successors or assigns and alI improvements, structures or buildings thereon shall be forfeited in favor of the donor.
Such provision was upheld in De Luna vs. Abrigo as it is in the nature of an agreement granting a party to rescind a contract in case of breach, without need of going to court; “upon the happening of the resolutory condition or non-compliance with the conditions of the contract, the donation is automatically revoked without need of a judicial declaration to that effect.” However, if the done challenges the propriety thereof, the Court can conclusively settle whether the resolution is proper or not. The judicial intervention is not for the purpose of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by reason of the parties’ agreement but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper.
Onerous donation
In the case bar, the donation involved is an onerous one since the burden imposed upon the donee is to build a mental hospital on the donated property.
Thus, the provisions of the Civil Code on the rules on contracts shall govern, to wit: “Article 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed.”
Can one file a complaint for revocation or action of rescission in behalf of the donor even in the presence of a stipulation on the automatic revocation of donation?
Although the deed of conditional donation contained a stipulation on the automatic revocation of donation in case of failure of the donee to comply with any or all of the conditions, the estate’s complaint for revocation or action for rescission in behalf of the donor, Rodriguez, is a valid exercise of the latter’s right to determine the propriety of the revocation.
Article 1144 of the Civil Code provides that all actions upon a written contract shall be brought within ten (10) years from accrual of the right of action. Petitioner’s complaint for revocation of the donation therefore has not yet prescribed since the cause of action accrued only upon the alleged failure of the Republic to comply with any or all of the conditions of the donation.
Although the deed of conditional donation contained a stipulation on the automatic revocation of donation in case of failure of the donee to comply with any or all of the conditions, the estate’s complaint for revocation or action for rescission in behalf of the donor, Rodriguez, is a valid exercise of the latter’s right to determine the propriety of the revocation.
Can the donor unduly restrict the right of the donee to dispose the donated property perpetually?
The donor could not unduly restrict the right of the donee to dispose the donated property perpetually or for an unreasonable period of time.
The provision in the deed of conditional donation did not expressly state a period of restriction on the Republic’s right to dispose of the donated property. It simply stated that the Republic could not lease, let, convey, dispose or encumber the donated property without the prior and express knowledge of the donor as it was the latter’s intention to devote the use of the donated property exclusively for the mental hospital.
Applying by analogy the Roman Catholic Archbishop case, the donor could not unduly restrict the right of the donee to dispose the donated property perpetually or for an unreasonable period of time. The prohibition in the deed of donation that the Republic cannot lease, let, convey, dispose, or encumber the donated property without specifying the duration of the restriction should be declared as an illegal or impossible condition within the contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code as it is contrary to public policy. Although the parties did not agree on the period of validity of the restriction as in Roman Catholic Archbishop, the same may be viewed as perpetual or permanent which constitutes undue restriction for unreasonable period of time.
When will rescission not be granted?
Rescission will not be granted in the following: (1) where the breach is only slight or casual; (2) where there has been substantial compliance; and (3) where the court finds valid reason for giving a period of fulfillment of the obligation.
In general, rescission will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach of the contract, but only for such breaches that are substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in making the agreement. The right to rescind or resolve by the injured party is not absolute as the third paragraph of Article 1191 authorizes the court to fix a period.
Validity of donation of immovable property
According to Article 749 of the Civil Code, in order for a donation of an immovable property to be considered valid, the donation must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
Instead of simply donating the property, Labnao opted to simply simulate a contract of sale. Unfortunately, even as a transfer of the subject lot to the respondents Heirs of Julita, the Deed of Absolute Sale cannot be considered a valid donation. In the instant case, as already explained, the Deed of Absolute Sale was not properly notarized, making it a private document. Hence, there was no donation made in a public document.
Acceptance of donation
Article 749 of the Civil Code additionally requires that the donee manifests his/her acceptance of the donation of the immovable property in either the same public instrument or in a separate instrument.
If the donee accepts the donation in a separate instrument, the donor should be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.
There are two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil Code
- Acquisitive
- Acquisition of a right by the lapse of time as expounded in paragraph I, Article 1106
- Also known as adverse possession and usucapion - Extinctive
- Rights and actions are lost by the lapse of time as defined in paragraph 2, Article 1106 and Article 1139
- Another name is litigation of action
Extinctive prescription
Extinctive prescription refers to the rule that bars even the registered owner from availing of remedies to vindicate their right over the subject lot.
It is a shield rather than a sword the mere fact that the party seeking recovery can no longer sue the party in possession does not mean automatically that the latter already has the right to possess or own. The present case demonstrates the legal principle that the law aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus jura subverniunt.
Laches
The principle of laches is a creation of equity which, as such, is applied not really to penalize neglect or sleeping upon one’s right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation.
The time-honored rule anchored on public policy is that relief will be denied to a litigant whose claim or demand has become “stale”, or who has acquiesced for an unreasonable length of time, or who has not been vigilant or who has slept on his rights either by negligence, folly or inattention. In other words, public policy requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of claims grown stale for non-assertion; thus laches is an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right which has become, under the circumstances, inequitable or unfair to permit.
There is no hard and fast rule in determining whether a party is guilty of laches. It is not merely a question of time, and its application depends on the circumstances of a particular case. Ultimately, however, the question of laches is addressed to the court’s sound discretion and, since it is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable consideration.
Regalian Doctrine
In essence, the Regalian doctrine espouses that lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are generally presumed to form part of the public domain belonging to the State.
1987 CONST., art. XII, sec. 2
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least 60 per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of waterpower, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.
Exception to the regalian doctrine
This general rule admits of a single exception: native title to land.
Claims of private ownership pursuant to native title are presumed to have been held even before the Spanish conquest. Thus, lands subject of native titles are deemed excluded from the mass of lands forming part of the public domain.
Nationality Restrictions on Land Ownership
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Section 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
Public domain categories
At present, Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into five (5) categories – agricultural lands, forest lands, timber lands, mineral lands, and national parks.
The provision states, Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks.
Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. In turn, Section 3 mandates that only lands classified as agricultural may be declared alienable and susceptible of private ownership. It bears noting, however, that private ownership contemplates not only ownership by private ownership, but also ownership by the State, provinces, cities, and municipalities in their private capacity.
The Civil Code classifies property into two (2) categories:
The Civil Code classifies property into two (2) categories: (i) property of public dominion (that held by the State in its public capacity for public use, public service or the development of national wealth for the common and public welfare), or
(ii) patrimonial property (that held by the State in its private capacity to attain economic ends).
Being private in nature, patrimonial property is subject to alienation and disposition in the same way as properties owned by private individuals, and may thus be subject to prescription and be the object of ordinary contracts or agreements.
Examples of patrimonial property of the State include those acquired by the government in execution sales and tax sales, friar lands, mangrove lands and mangrove swamps.
Patrimonial property of the State may be further classified into two sub-categories:
Patrimonial property of the State may be further classified into two sub categories: (i) those which are not property of public dominion or imbued with public purpose based on the State’s current or intended use, and may thus be classified as patrimonial property “by nature” pursuant to Article 421; and
(ii) those which previously assumed the nature of property of public dominion by virtue of the State’s use, but which are no longer being used or intended for said purpose, and may thus be classified as “converted” patrimonial property pursuant to Article 422. Thus, the proper interpretation of Article 422 in relation to Article 420 and 421 is that “converted” patrimonial property can only come from property
of public dominion under Article 420.
Hence, “converted” patrimonial property should not be understood as a subset of patrimonial property “by nature” under Article 421.
Discuss the rule on inalienability of public land.
There is no doubt that forest lands, timber lands, mineral lands, and national parks which are lands of the public domain under the Constitution fall under property of public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code, as do agricultural lands. It is also clear that land classified as agricultural and subject to the State’s current or intended use remains property of public dominion.
However, these agricultural lands, once declared as alienable and disposable, become “converted” patrimonial property of the State. In effect, the classification of agricultural land as alienable and disposable serves as unequivocal proof of the withdrawal by the State of the said land from the public dominion, and its “conversion” to patrimonial property. The clear intention of such conversion is to open the land to private acquisition or ownership.
Such converted patrimonial property remains within the broader constitutional concept of public domain precisely as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Exception to the rule on inalienability of public land
A recognized exception to the rule on inalienability of public land is if the forest or mineral land has been statutorily reclassified and considered as ancestral land, openly and continuously occupied by a member of an indigenous cultural community. Ancestral lands are defined in Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 8371, or The Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997:
b) Ancestral Lands – Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/Ips since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.
A, a Filipino citizen, acquired land. At the time of registration, he was already a foreign citizen. Will the registration prosper?
A foreign national may apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration under the law.
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for registration of the properties in question, said properties as discussed above were already private lands; consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the public domain. They are already private in character since private respondents’ predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of 1,000 sq. m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185). It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural-born citizens of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that private respondents were able to prove the requisite period and character of possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their application for registration of title must perforce be approved.
Unrecorded deed of sale of registered land
Unrecorded deed of sale of registered land is valid between the parties.
Interpreting Section 50, Land Registration Act, this Court has ruled that an unrecorded deed of sale between vendor and the vendee is binding between them because actual notice is equivalent to registration. It is also binding on the vendor’s privies. Reason therefor is that the purpose of registration is to give notice to third persons. And privies are not third persons. The vendor’s heirs are his privies. Against them, failure to register will not vitiate or annul the vendee’s right of ownership conferred by such unregistered deed of sale.
Torrens System
The Torrens system was adopted to “obviate possible conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further.” One need not inquire beyond the four corners of the certificate of title when dealing with registered property.
Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 known as the Property Registration Decree recognizes innocent purchasers in good faith for value and their right to rely on a clean title:
Section 44. Statutory liens affecting title. - Every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted in said certificate and any of the following encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely:
First. Liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the laws and Constitution of the Philippines which are
not by law required to appear of record in the Registry of Deeds in order to be valid against subsequent
purchasers or encumbrances of record.
Second. Unpaid real estate taxes levied and assessed within two years immediately preceding the
acquisition of any right over the land by an innocent purchaser for value, without prejudice to the right of
the government to collect taxes payable before that period from the delinquent taxpayer alone.
Third. Any public highway or private way established or recognized by law, or any government irrigation
canal or lateral thereof, if the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such highway or
irrigation canal or lateral thereof have been determined.
Fourth. Any disposition of the property or limitation on the use thereof by virtue of, or pursuant to,
Presidential Decree No. 27 or any other law or regulations on agrarian reform.
If a deed is registered, does it overcome all presumptions of invalidity?
The act of registration does not validate petitioner’s otherwise void contract.
Registration is a mere ministerial act by which a deed, contract, or instrument is sought to be inscribed in the records of the Office of the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of the certificate of title covering the land subject of the deed, contract, or instrument. While it operates as a notice of the deed, contract, or instrument to others, it does not add to its validity nor converts an invalid instrument into a valid one as between the parties, nor amounts to a declaration by the state that the instrument is a valid and subsisting interest in the land. The registration of petitioner’s void deed is not an impediment to a declaration by the courts of its invalidity.
Does the Registration of Deeds have jurisdiction to determine whether a registered title was done in fraud?
Since registration of documents is a ministerial act and merely creates a constructive notice of its contents against all third persons, the Register of Deeds is not authorized to determine whether or not fraud was committed in the document sought to be registered.
Registration is a mere ministerial act by which a deed, contract, or instrument is sought to be inscribed in the records of the Office of the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of the certificate of title covering the land subject of the deed, contract, or instrument. Being a ministerial act, it must be performed in any case. The public officer having this ministerial duty has no choice but to perform the specific action which is the particular duty imposed by law. The purpose of registration is to give notice to all persons. It operates as a notice of the deed, contract, or instrument to others, but neither adds to its validity nor converts an invalid instrument into a valid one between the parties. Since registration of documents is a ministerial act and merely creates a constructive notice of its contents against all third persons, the Register of Deeds is not authorized to determine whether or not fraud was committed in the document sought to be registered. In this case, the owner’s duplicate copy of title attached to the real estate mortgage was written in an official paper of the Land Registration Authority and contained all the markings of a genuine title. The Office of the Register of Deeds is not mandated to investigate further than necessary when documents presented before it appear authentic.
Is a certificate title subject to collateral attack?
Section 43 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree, states that a certificate of title shall not be subject to a collateral attack and cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
A direct attack is an action whose main objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of a judgment pursuant to which a registration decree is issued, if the judgment has not yet been implemented, or if already implemented, to seek the recovery of the property. On the other hand, a collateral attack transpires when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack is incidentally made against the judgment.
A collateral attack is prohibited because the integrity of land titles and their indefeasibility are guaranteed by the Torrens system of registration.
The Torrens system was adopted precisely to quiet titles to lands and to put a stop forever to any question of legality of the titles, except claims which were noted at the time of registration or which may arise subsequent thereto. By guaranteeing the integrity of land titles and their indefeasibility, the Torrens system gives the registered owners complete peace of mind.
Will tax declarations prove ownership over the property?
It is only when these tax declarations are coupled with proof of actual possession of the property that they may become the basis of a claim of ownership.
Indeed, there is nothing in this case which would substantiate the respondents’ claim that they have been in possession of the subject properties since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The earliest tax declaration that was presented in the name of Dalumpines was issued only in 1967. Although the respondents presented a tax declaration over the subject property issued to Pablo in 1948, they failed to establish the relationship of Pablo to Dalumpines.
In any case, the respondents’ claim of ownership of the subject properties based on the tax declarations they presented will not prosper. It is only when these tax declarations are coupled with proof of actual possession of the property that they may become the basis of a claim of ownership.
In this case, the respondents miserably failed to prove that they] and their predecessors-in-interest actually possessed the properties since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
A decree of registration may be reopened or reviewed by the proper Regional Trial Court upon concurrence of five essential requisites.
It is the teaching of the foregoing provisions that a decree of registration may be reopened or reviewed by the proper Regional Trial Court upon the concurrence of five essential requisites, to wit: (a) that the petitioner has a real and a dominical right; (b) that he has been deprived thereof; (c) through fraud (d) that the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree; and (e) that the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value.
No valid transfer certificate of title can issue from a void certificate of title, unless an innocent purchaser for value has intervened.
Established is the rule that the rights of an innocent purchaser for value must be respected and protected notwithstanding the fraud employed by the sellers in securing their title.
Purchaser in good faith
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property.
To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and titled land need only show that he relied on the face of the title to the property. He need not prove that he made further inquiry for he is not obliged to explore beyond the four corners of the title.
Such degree of proof of good faith, however, is sufficient only when the following conditions concur: first, the seller is the registered owner of the land; second, the latter is in possession thereof; and third, at the time of the sale, the buyer was not aware of any claim or interest of some other person in the property, or of any defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his capacity to convey title to the property. Absent one or two of the foregoing conditions, then the law itself puts the buyer on notice and obliges the latter to exercise a higher degree of diligence by scrutinizing the certificate of title and examining all factual circumstances in order to determine the seller’s title and capacity to transfer any interest in the property. Under such circumstance, it is no longer sufficient for said buyer to merely show that he relied on the face of the title; he must now also show that he exercised reasonable precaution by inquiring beyond the title. Failure to exercise such degree of precaution makes him a buyer in bad faith.
To successfully invoke and be considered as a buyer in good faith, the presumption is that first and foremost, the “buyer in good faith” must have shown prudence and due diligence in the exercise of his/her rights.
X sells property to Y. The property is in possession of Z. Can Y invoke good faith?
The buyer must investigate the rights of the actual possessor in cases where the purchased land is in possession of a person other than the seller.
The “honesty of intention” which constitutes good faith implies a freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry. If the land purchased is in the possession of a person other than the vendor, the purchaser must be wary and must investigate the rights of the actual possessor. Without such inquiry, the purchaser cannot be said to be in good faith and cannot have any right over the property. Applied to the present case, what is not disputed is that despite La Vilma Realty being the registered owner, petitioners are in actual possession of Lot 12. Hence, following the discussion above, respondents cannot merely rely on the face of La Vilma Realty’s title but must now exercise a higher degree of diligence and investigate petitioners’ claim. On this score, we find that the CA erred in finding that respondents were buyers in good faith. To the Court’s mind, that Marcelino verified the title with the Register of Deeds; inspected the property and confirmed that some of the heirs of Isabelo, Sr. and Antonio were in possession of Lot 12; and was able to speak with Libertad from whom he discovered that the petitioners were also claiming ownership on the basis of Angela’s Affidavit, and even warned him not to buy the property, do not meet the higher degree of diligence required under the circumstances. Rather, what these circumstances establish is that as a result of such inspection, respondents were already aware of petitioners’ possession and adverse claim over Lot 12. This should have prompted them to investigate La Vilma Realty’s capacity to convey title to them and consequently lead them to ascertain the veracity of Visitacion’s Confirmation of Ownership; however, respondents have not shown that they undertook such steps before finally deciding to purchase Lot 12. As such, the Court cannot sustain the CA’s conclusion that respondents were innocent purchasers for value. Not being innocent purchasers for value, respondents cannot have a better right over Lot 12.
A prospective buyer must observe the following precautionary measures and diligence to ensure the legality of the title and the accuracy of the metes and bounds of the lots to be purchased:
- verify the origin, history, authenticity, and validity of the title with the Office of the Register of Deeds and the Land Registration Authority;
- engage the services of a competent and reliable geodetic engineer to verify the boundary, metes, and bounds of the lot subject of said title based on the technical description in the said title and the approved survey plan in the Land Management Bureau;
- conduct an actual ocular inspection of the lot;
- inquire from the owners and possessors of adjoining lots with respect to the true and legal ownership of the lot in question;
- put up signs that said lot is being purchased, leased, or encumbered; and
- undertake such other measures to make the general public aware that said lot will be subject to alienation, lease, or encumbrance by the parties.
Mirror doctrine
The mirror doctrine provides that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and is in no way obliged to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property.
Every registered owner and every subsequent purchaser for value in good faith holds the title to the property free from all encumbrances except those noted in the certificate.
As such, a defective title, or one the procurement of which is tainted with fraud and misrepresentation — may be the source of a completely legal and valid title, provided that the buyer is an innocent third person who, in good faith, relied on the correctness of the certificate of title, or an innocent purchaser for value.
Exceptions to the mirror doctrine
(1) when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make further inquiry;
(2) when the buyer has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor; or
(3) when the buyer/mortgagee is a bank or an institution of similar nature as they are enjoined to exert a higher degree of diligence, care, and prudence than individuals in handling real estate transactions
X sells property to bank Y. The property is in possession of Z. Can Y invoke good faith?
When the purchaser or the mortgagee is a bank, the rule on innocent purchasers or mortgagees for value is applied more strictly.
Being in the business of extending loans secured by real estate mortgage, banks are presumed to be familiar with the rules on land registration. Since the banking business is impressed with public interest, they are expected to be more cautious, to exercise a higher degree of diligence, care and prudence, than private individuals in their dealings, even those involving registered lands. Banks may not simply rely on the face of the certificate of title. Hence, they cannot assume that, simply because the title offered as security is on its face free of any encumbrances or lien, they are relieved of the responsibility of taking further steps to verify the title and inspect the properties to be mortgaged. As expected, the ascertainment of the status or condition of a property offered to it as security for a loan must be a standard and indispensable part of a bank’s operations.
Forged deed
A forged deed is a nullity and conveys no title.
As for the agreement that Pilar is an innocent purchaser for value, such principle would apply only if the title is not null and void.
All transactions subsequent to the alleged sale are likewise void. Even if parties have in their favor a certificate of title in their name, it has no beneficial effect on them and their title cannot be used to validate the forgery or cure the void sale.
This is in view of the legal truism that the spring cannot rise higher than its source. Because Pilar acquired no title over the subject property, it remained in the name of the original registered owner, Serapio, Francisco, and his siblings, as heirs of Serapio, thus became co-owners of Lot No. 5762. As such, they may exercise all attributes of ownership over the property, including selling it to Paxton.
X buys property from Y. After purchase, X learns of the property’s encumbrances. X continues to register the title. Can he still invoke good faith?
No. Buyers of registered land must be continuing purchasers for value and in good faith until the registration of the conveyance.
In the event of a buyer of registered land who has yet to register the conveyance is made aware of any claim or interest of some other person in the property, or of any defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his or her capacity to convey title, the buyer shall no longer be considered to be in good faith even if he or she subsequently registers the conveyance. It is only upon registration of the conveyance in good faith will the purchaser acquire such rights and interest as they appear in the certificate of title, unaffected by any prior lien or encumbrance not noted therein. The buyer must purchase the property and register the deed of conveyance without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pay a full and fair price of the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he or she has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property.
The (1) property must be bought for consideration, and (2) purchase should have no knowledge or notice of adverse claim or interest until registration. In the event of a buyer of registered land who has yet to register the conveyance be made aware of any claim or interest of some other person in the property, or of any defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his or her capacity to convey title, the buyer shall no longer be considered to be in good faith even if he or she subsequently registers the conveyance.
When shall the buyer be considered to have duly registered the conveyance?
A purchaser is deemed the registered owner once he or she: (a) files a duly notarized valid deed of sale, (b) the sale is entered into the day book, (c) the buyer surrenders or presents the owner’s duplicate certificate of title covering the land sold, and (d) pays the registration fees.
