POLlination Flashcards

Question

What is the process of amending the Constitution?

Answer 1

1. Proposal, which is the adoption of the suggested change in the Constitution. A proposal may come from: a. Congress, by a vote of ¾ of all its members b. Constitutional Convention, which may be called into existence either by a 2/3 vote of all the members of Congress, or by a majority vote of all the members of Congress whether or not to call a Convention to be resolved by the people in a plebiscite c. The people, through. the power of initiative. (NAGHURA, p. 14), 2. Ratification, the process wherein the proposed amendment shall become part of the Constitution when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite (NACHURA, p. 16).

Answer 2

There is no fixed number in the number of delegates in a constitutional convention. The number of delegates in the constitutional convention is to be determined by the Congress (Imbong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-32432, September 11, 1970).

Answer 3

Yes. Plebiscite may be held on the same day as the regular election, provided that the people are sufficiently. informed of the amendments to be voted upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon, to express their willin a genuine manner (Gonzales v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967).

Answer 4

1. There must be a petition; 2. Full text of the proposed changes must be in the petition itself and it may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it; 3. Petition must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the voters registered therein; 4. There must be an enabling law; 5. People's initiative may be exercised by the people once every 5 years; 6. Petition must be signed personally by the people; and 7. It shall cover only amendments and not revisions (NACHURA, p. 14-15).

Answer 5

1. Initiative on the Constitution - petition proposing amendments to the Constitution; 2. Initiative on Statutes - petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and 3. Initiative on Local Legislation - petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance (R.A. No. 6735, Sec. 3(a)).

Answer 6

Indirect initiative is the exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action (R.A. 6735, Sec. 3(b)).

Answer 7

Referendum is the power of the electorate to approve or reject legislation through an election called for that purpose (R.A. No: 6735, Sec. 2 (c))

Answer 8

1. Referendum on Statutes - petition to approve or reject an act or law or part 2. 2. Referendum on Local Laws - legal process whereby the registered voters of thereof, passed by Congress (CONST. Art. Vil Sec: 32) and the local government units may approve, amend, or reject any ordinance enacted by the Sanggunian (LGC, Sec. 126).

Answer 9

The territorial sea is a belt of sea outwards from the baseline and up to 12 nautical miles beyond. The width of this territorial belt of water has been the subject of much disagreement. The original rule was the “cannon shot” rule, that is, the width of water was measured in terms of the range of shore-based artillery. Later this became the three-mile rule. The three-mile rule has now been discarded in favor of the twelve-mile rule now found in Article 3 of the 1982 Law of the Sea. (Art. 3, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea)

Answer 10

The outer limit of the territorial sea is the line every point of which is at a distance from the nearest point of the baseline equal to the breadth of the territorial sea. (Art. 4, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea)

Answer 11

1. Except as provided in Part IV, waters on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea form part of the internal waters of the State. 2. Where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with the method set forth in Article 7 has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which had not previously been considered as such, a right of innocent passage as provided in this Convention shall exist in those waters. (Art. 8, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea)

Answer 12

The contiguous zone is an area of water not exceeding 24 nautical miles from the baseline. It thus extends 12 nautical miles from the edge of the territorial sea. The coastal state exercises authority over that area to the extent necessary to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitation authority over its territorial waters or territory and to punish such infringement. (Art. 33, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea)

Answer 13

The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention. (Art. 55, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea)

Answer 14

1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has: (a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds; (b) jurisdiction with regard to: (i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; (ii) marine scientific research; (iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment; (c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention. 2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention. (Art. 56, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea)

Answer 15

The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. (Art. 57, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea)

Answer 16

1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention. 2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part. 3. In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part. (Art. 58, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea)

Answer 17

The continental shelf, archipelagic or insular shelf for archipelagos, refers to: (a) the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coastal state but outside the territorial sea, to a depth of two hundred meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth allows exploitation; and (b) the seabed and subsoil of areas adjacent to islands. (Art. 76, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) Note: The coastal state has the right to explore and exploit its natural resources, to erect installations needed, and to erect a safety zone over its installations with a radius of 500 meters. The right does not affect the right of navigation of others. Moreover, the right does not extend to non-resource material in the shelf area such as wrecked ship and their cargoes. (Art. 77, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea)

Answer 18

The Doctrine of Separation of Powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government. To the legislative branch of government, through Congress, belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through the President, belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the Court, belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, "each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere" (Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013).

Answer 19

Blending of powers is necessary to properly address the complexities brought about by a rapidly developing society and which the traditional branches of government have difficulty coping with. Although the principle of separation of powers must be observed, it does not necessarily follow that an entire and complete separation is either desirable or was ever intended, for such a complete separation would be impracticable if not impossible; there may be-and frequently are-areas in which executive, legislative, and judicial powers blend or overlap; and many officers whose duties cannot be exclusively placed under any one of these heads (Ople v. Torres, et.al., G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998).What are the examples of the principle of blending of powers?

Answer 20

1. The President prepares a budget and the Congress enacts an appropriation bill pursuant to that budget (CONST. Art. VII, Sec. 22); 2. The President enters into and ratifies a treaty with other States and the Senate concurs with the same (CONST. Art. VII, Sec. 21); and 3. The grant of amnesty by the President is subject to the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress (CONST. Art. VII, Sec. 19, par. (2)).

Answer 21

This is a mechanism by which one department is allowed to resist encroachments upon its prerogatives or to rectify mistakes or excesses committed by the other departments (NACHURA, p. 97). However, the Supreme Court is the final arbiter to determine whether there has been an encroachment between the branches (Angara v. The Electoral Commission G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936).

Answer 22

The doctrine of State immunity is also available to foreign States in so far as they are sought to be sued in the courts of the local State (Syquia v. Lopez, G.R. No. L-1648, August 17, 1949). Immunity is enjoyed by all States consonant with the public international law principle par in parem non habet imperium that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another (Minucher v. CA, G.R. No. 142396, February 11, 2013).

Answer 23

In order that a suit may lie against the State, it must give its consent, whether express or implied (DOTC v. Spouses Abecina, G.R. No. 206484, June 29, 2016).

Answer 24

Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. In this jurisdiction, a general law waiving the immunity of the state from certain suits is found in Act No. 3083.

Answer 25

(PBSI) 1.When the State enters into a Private contract, unless the contract is only incidental to the performance of a government function. This concept of restrictive theory holds that the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis (Republic of indonesia.v. Vinzon, G.R. No. 154705, June 26, 2003); 2. When the State enters into an operation that is essentially a Business operation, unless the business operation is only incidental to the performance of a governmental function, as"for instance, arrastre service (Mobil Philippines v. Customs Arrastre Service, G.R. No. L-23139, December 17, 1966); 3.When the state Sues a private party, it becomes vulnerable to counterclaim, unless the suit is entered into only to resist a claim (Lim v. Brownell, G.R. No. L-8587, March 24, 1960); and 4. When the application of the doctrine of state immunity would serve as an instrument for perpetrating an Injustice to a citizen, as when the State enters and takes possession of a private property without just compensation and without first initiating regular expropriation proceedings (DOTC v. Spouses Abecina, G.R. No. 206484, June 29, 2016).

Answer 26

Where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit the action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law (Republic v. Villasor, G.R. No. L30671, November 28, 1972). Before levy on execution may proceed, a claim for payment of the judgment award must first be filed with the COA, which has the primary jurisdiction to examine, audit, and settle "all debts and claims of any sort" due from or owing the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities, including Government-owned and/or controlled corporations (GOCCs) (Agra v. COA, G.R. No. 167807, December 6, 2011).

Answer 27

As a general rule, government funds deposited with PNB or authorized depositories cannot be subject to garnishment (PNB v. Pabalan, G.R. No. L-33112, June 15, 1978). Exceptions: 1. Where law or ordinance has already been enacted appropriating a specific amount to pay a valid governmental obligation; 2. Funds belonging to government corporations which can sue and be sued that are deposited with a bank (Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-61744, June 25, 1984); or 3. If the funds belong to a public corporation or a GOCC which is clothed with a personality of its own, separate and distinct from that of the government, then its funds are not exempt from garnishment (National Housing Authority v. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, G.R. No, 154411, June 19, 2003).

Answer 28

As a general rule, the government cannot be made to pay interests. Exceptions: 1. Expressly stipulated (Sarasola v. trinidad, G.R. No. 14595, October 11, 1919); 2.Eminent domain 3.Erroneous collection of taxes (Sarasola v. Trinidad, supra); or 4.Where the government agrees to pay interest pursuant to law (Sarasola v. Trinidad, supra). 5. When the application of the doctrine of state immunity would serve as an instrument for perpetrating an Injustice to a citizen, as when the State enters and takes possession of a private property without just compensation and without first initiating regular expropriation proceedings (DOTC v. Spouses Abecina, G.R. No. 206484, June 29, 2016).

Answer 29

The rule is potestas delegate non delegari potest - what has been delegated cannot be delegated. It is based upon the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another (Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005).

Answer 30

(PETAL) 1.Delegation to the People at large, such as: a. System of initiative and referendum (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 32 and The Initiative and Referendum Act (R.A. 6735)); and b. Requirement of plebiscite in the creation, division, merger, and abolition of LGUs (CONST. Art. X, Sec. 10); 2.Emergency Powers of the President (CONST. Art, VI Sec. 23(2)); 3.Tariff Powers of the President (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 28(2)); 4.Delegation to Administrative Bodies of the power of subordinate legislation (Gerochi v. DENR, G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007); and 5.Delegation to Local Government Units (People v. Vera, G.R. No. L-45685, November 16, 1937).

Answer 31

1. Completeness test - the law is complete when ti sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and 2. Sufficient standard test - to be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate's authority and identify the conditions under which the legislative policy so announced is to be implemented (Abakada Guro Partylist v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008). Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative (Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, G.R. No 76633, October 18,1988)

Answer 32

1. Police Power; 2. Power of Eminent Domain; and 3. ThePower of Taxation. They are considered inherent because they belong to the very essence of government and without them no government can exist. A constitution does not grant these powers (BERNAS, p.23). They are supposed ot co-exist with the State. The moment the State comes into being, ti si deemed invested with these three powers as its innate attributes (CRUZ, Law on Public Officers, supra at 80).

Answer 33

Police Power pertains to the state's authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare (Edu v. Ericta, G.R. No. L-32096 October 24, 1970). tI is the most pervasive, the least limitable, and the most demanding of the three fundamental powers of the State. The justification is found in the Latin maxims salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your property as not to injure the property of others). As an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which virtually extends to all public needs, police power grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the State, as parens patriae, gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers (Gerochi, et al., v. DOE, G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007).

Answer 34

Police Power has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent, and the least limitable of al powers, extending as it does to al the great public needs (Ermita- Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Ass'n., Inc., v. City Mayor of Manila, G.R. No. L-24693, July 31, 1967).

Answer 35

1.Due Process Clause; and 2.Equal Protection Clause (CONST. Art. Il, Sec. 1).

Answer 36

1. Lawful subject - the power wil be exercised to promote the interests of the public in general, as distingüished from those of a particular class. 2. Lawful means - the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive on individuals (Planters Products, Inc., v. Fertiphil Corporation, G.R. No. 156278, March 29, 2004).

Answer 37

For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit ot enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (CUP2GU) 1. Must not Contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2. Must not be Unfair or oppressive; 3. Must not be Partial or discriminatory; 4. Must not Prohibit but may regulate trade; 5. Must be General and consistent with public policy; and 6. Must not be Unreasonable (White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009).

Answer 38

The inherent power of the State to take or appropriate private property for public use. The Constitution requires that private property shal not be taken without due process of law and payment of just compensation (Manila Memorial Park v. Sec of DSWD, G.R. No. 175356, December 3, 2013).

Answer 39

The formula for determination of just compensation is consequential damage to the property not taken minus consequential benefits to the property taken plus the fair market value (FMV) of the property i.e. [(Consequential Damage - Consequential Benefits) + FMV. However, in no case shall the owner be deprived of the fair market value of his property (RULES OF COURT, Rule 67, Sec. 6). Note: The Local Government Code provides that the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court based on the FMV at the time of taking of the property.

Answer 40

No. Before LGUs can exercise the right, some law must exist conferring the power upon it. The conditions before an LGU may exercise eminent domain are: 1.That a law or authority exist for the exercise of the right of eminent domain; and 2.That the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law (City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, G.R. No. 14355, October 31, 1919).

Answer 41

Yes. There are traditional distinctions between the Police Power and the Power of Eminent Domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the sametime on the same subject. Recent trends, however, would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the police power and the power of eminent domain, with the latter being used as an implement of the former. (Association of Smal Landowners ni the Philippines, Inc., v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989).

Answer 42

(N35-RAW-VR2) 1. Natural-born citizen of the Philippines; 2. At least 35 years of age on the day of the election; 3.Able to Read And Write; 4. Registered Voter; and 5. Resident of the Philippines for not less than 2 years immediately preceding the day of the election (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 3).

Answer 43

The term of office of the Senators shall be 6 years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the 30th day of June next following their election. No Senator shall serve for more than 2 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the ful term for which he was elected (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 4).

Answer 44

The HOR shall be composed of not more than 250 members unless otherwise fixed by law, consisting of: 1. District Representatives - elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area (CONST. Art. V,I Sec. 5, par. (1)); and 2. Party-list Representatives - shall constitute 20% of the total number of representatives, elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties of organizations. (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 5 (1), (2); R.A. No. 7941, otherwise, known as "The Party-List System Act").

Answer 45

The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law (Mariano v. COMELEC,G.R, No. 118577, March 7, 1995).

Answer 46

The Members of the HOR shall be elected for a term of 3 years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the 30th day of June next folowing their election. No Member of the HOR shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption ni the continuity of his service for the ful term for which he was elected (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 7).

Answer 47

(N25-RAW-VR1) 1. Natural-born citizen of the Philippines; 2. At least 25 years of age on the day of the election; 3. Able to Read And Write; 4. A registered Voter in the district in which he shall be elected; and 5. Resident of the district in which he seeks to be elected for a period of not less than 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 6).

Answer 48

Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. Aman can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining wil constitute domicile (Romualdez-Marcos .v COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995).

Answer 49

1.The 20% allocation - 20% of the total membership of the House of Representatives is the maximum number of seats allocated for party-list representatives. In other words, there is one party-list seat for every four legislative districts seat. 2.The 2% threshold - A guaranteed seat for a party-list organization garnering 2% of the total votes cast. The guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a first round of seat allocation to parties that receive at least two percent of the total party-list votes. 3.Proportional representation - The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be distributed to the party- list organizations including these that received less than 2% of the total votes. 4.The three-seat cap - Each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes ti actually obtained, is entitled only to a maximum of 3 seats (Banat v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179295, April 21, 2009).

Answer 50

(N25-RAW-VR1-M) 1. Natural born citizen; 2. At least 25 years of age on the day of the election, or in case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be 25 but not more than 30 years old on the day of the election; 3. Able to Read And Write; 4. A registered voter, 5. A Resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election, and 6. A bona fide Member of the party or organization which he seeks ot represent for at least 90 days preceding the day of the election (R.A. No. 7941, Sec. 9).

Answer 51

Any elected party-list representative who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shal forfeit his seat: Provided, that fi he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within 6 months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his new party or organization (R.A. No. 7941, Sec. 15).

Answer 52

In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for party-list representatives, the vacancy shal be automatically filed by the next representative from the list of nominees ni the order submitted ot the COMELEC by the same party, organization, or coalition, who shal serve for the unexpired term. fI the list si exhausted, the party, organization, or coalition concerned shall submit additional nominees (R.A. No. 7941, Sec. 16).

Answer 53

The salaries of Senators and Members of the HOR shall be determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of al the Members of the Senate and the HOR approving such increase (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 10).

Answer 54

1. Privilege from arrest - In all offenses punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment, a Senator or a member of the House shall be privileged from arrest while the Congress is ni session (CONST. Art. V,I Sec. 11). "Session" - covers the entire period from its initial convening until its final adjournment (CRUZ, Philippine Political Law, supra at 228-229); 2. Parliamentary privilege of speech and debate - They shall not be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate made ni the Congress or in any committee thereof (CONST. Art. V,I Sec. 11). However, they can be subjected to disciplinary action by the Congress itself (Chavez v. JBC, G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013).

Answer 55

1.The remarks must be made while the legislature or the legislative committee is in session; and 2. The remarks must be made in connection with the discharge of official duties (Trillanes VI v. Castillo-Marigomen, G.B. No. 223451, March 14,2018, citing Jimenez v. Cabangbang, G.R. No. L-15905, August 3, 1966).

Answer 56

Yes. As to the members of Congress, there is no general prohibition as to the practice of their professions. However, members of Congress who are also members of the Bar may practice law subject to the constitutional limitation that they shall not personally appear as counsel before any court of justice, the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 14).

Answer 57

A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members ni such manner and under such penalties as such House may determine (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 16, par. (2).

Answer 58

The basis for determining the existence of aquorum ni the Senate shall be the total number of Senators who are in the country and withinthe coercive jurisdiction of the Senate (Avelino v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821, March 4, 1949). The same principle maybe applied for the determination of quorum ni the HOR.

Answer 59

This refers to an "Absolute Majority" which requires the majority of al electors regardless of the number of members present or absent during the time a question is put to a vote, provided a quorum exists. For example, even if only 23 Senators are present at the vote, an absolute majority would require the concurrence of at least 13 senators or (24/2) + 1. For the HOR, the number would be 126 which si (250/2) + 1

Answer 60

This refers to a type of "Simple Majority" which requires the concurrence of more than half the electors that are within the coercive jurisdiction of the House, provided there is a quorum. For example, suppose 3 Senators are abroad, then, a simple majority is at least 1 which is more than half the Senators who are within the coercive jurisdiction of the Senate.

Answer 61

A bill is signed by its authors and filed with the Secretary of the House. It may originate from either the lower or upper House, except appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, which shall originate exclusively from the House of Representatives. 1. First reading - reading of the number and title of the bill, which is then referred to the appropriate Committee for study and recommendation, which may include the conduct of public hearings. The Committee will submit its report and recommendation for Calendar for second reading; 2. Second reading - reading of the bill in full with the amendments proposed by the Committee, fi any, unless copies thereof are distributed and such reading is dispensed with. The bill will be subject to debates, pertinent motions, and amendments. After the amendments shall have been acted upon, the bill will be voted on second reading (Id.); 3. Third reading - submission of the bill as approved on second reading for a final vote by yeas and nays; 4. Conference Committee reports - transmittal of the bill approved on third reading by one House to the other House for concurrence. The other House shall follow the same procedure. If the other House approves the bill without amendments, the bill is passed b y Congress and the same will be transmitted to the President. If the other House introduces amendments, with which the originating House does not agree, the differences will be settled by the Conference Committees of both Houses. The Conference Committee's report will have to be approved by both Houses in order that it will be considered passed by Congress and thereafter sent to the President; 5. Authentication of bills - signing by the Speaker and the Senate President of the printed copy o f the approved bill, followed by t h e certification by the respective secretaries of the both Houses, before ti is sent to the President; 6. President's approval or veto - transmittal of the authenticated bill to the President. If he approves the same, h e shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto ti and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. The President shall communicate his veto of any bil to the House where ti originated within 03 days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, ti shall become a law as fi he had signed it (CONST. Art. V,I Sec. 27(1)); and 7. Reversal of veto - If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of al the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, ti shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which ti shall likewise be reconsidered, and fi approved by two-thirds of al the Members of that House, ti shall become a law (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 27(1)).

Answer 62

Every bil passed by the Congress shall be presented to the President. If he approves, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return it to the House where it originated. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds (2/3) of al the members of such House shall agree to pass the bil, ti shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which ti shal likewise be reconsidered, and fi approved by, two-thirds (2/3) of al the members of that House, it shall become law. To override the veto, at least, two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of each House must agree to pass the bil. In such case, the veto is overridden and becomes a law without need of presidential approval. (CONST. Sec. 27 (1), Art VI).

Answer 63

The power of appropriation is the power ot specify how money shall be spent (Gonzales v. Macaraig, G.R. No. 87636, November 19, 1990). Also called the "power of the purse", it belongs to Congress, subject only to the veto power of the President. It carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law (Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994).

Answer 64

1.General appropriation law - passed annually, intended for the financial operations of the entire government during one fiscal period; and 2. Special appropriation law - designed for a specific purpose (CRUZ, Political Law, supra at 306).

Answer 65

Pork barrel is "an appropriation of government/spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily ot bring money to a representative's district.” Pork Barrel System is the collective body of rules and practices, in whatever name or form, that govern the manner by which lump-sum discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members (Belgica v. Ochoa, supra).

Answer 66

Yes. The Supreme Court declared its latest iteration as the "Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)" as unconstitutional with a vote of 14-0 (Belgica v. Ochoa, supra).

Answer 67

1. Congressional Pork Barrel - which is a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the fund's utilization through various post-enactment measures and/or practices; and 2.Presidential Pork Barrel - which is a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization (Belgicav. Ochoa, supra).

Answer 68

It violates: 1. Separation of powers - from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight but allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution (Belgica v. Ochoa, supra); 2. Non-Delegability of Legislative Power - the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as ti confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Sec. 29, par. (1), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law; 3. Checks and Balances - the lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a "budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President's power of item veto; 4. Accountability - the mechanism here is normally done through the power of congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators are given post- enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested observers when scrutinizing, investigating, or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law; and 5. Local Autonomy - authorizing individual legislators to intervene in purely local matters through the use of their pork barrel funds for local government projects subverts genuine local autonomy (Belgica v. Ochoa, supra).

Answer 69

Aprogram designed by the DBM to ramp up spending after sluggish disbursements had caused the growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to slow down. The funds under the DAP were taken from: (1) unreleased appropriations; (2) unprogrammed funds; (3) carry-over appropriations unreleased from the previous year; and (4) budgets for slow- moving items or projects that had been realigned to support faster-disbursing projects (Araullo v. Aquino, supra).

Answer 70

In Araullo v. Aquino, the SC declared as unconstitutional the 4 acts and practices under the DAP, to wit: 1. The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in the General Appropriations Act (GAA); 2. The cross-border transfers of the savings of the executive to augment the appropriations of other offices outside the executive (prohibited cross-border augmentation); 3. The funding of Programs, Activities and Projects (PAPs) that are not covered by any appropriation in the GAA since augmentation can only be made from one existing item to another existing item in the budget; and 4. The use of unprogrammed funds in the absence of a legally required certification by the National Treasurer that the whole revenue collections exceeded the total revenue targets.

Answer 71

Appropriations that provided standby authority to incur additional agency obligations for priority PAPs when revenue collections exceeded targets, and when additional foreign funds are generated (Araulo v. Aquino, supra). In a resolution dated February 3, '2015, the SC partially granted the motion for reconsideration filed by the OSG and allowed the funding of PAPs not covered by any appropriation in the GAA. Thus, only acts (1), (2), and (4) are now deemed illegal. The SC also upheld the efficacy of DAP-funded projects by applying the operative fact doctrine.

Answer 72

If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill'is passed by the Congress (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 25, Par. 7)

Answer 73

Legislative inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or appropriation, or in connection with any proposed legislation, or for the formulation of, or in connection with, future legislation, or wil aid in the review or formulation of a new legislative policy or enactment. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone (Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, Sec. 1). Legislative inquiry is inherent in Congress. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member (Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950).

Answer 74

1. Power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure; 2. Power to issue summons and notices in connection with matters subject of its investigation or inquiry; 3. Power to punish or declare a person ni contempt during or ni the course of legislative investigation; and 4. Power to determine the rules of its proceedings (Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950).

Answer 75

The period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt by the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry under which the said power si invoked (Balag v. Senate, GR. . No. 234608, July 3, 2018).

Answer 76

The legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates on two instances: (a) upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report; or (b) upon the expiration of 1Congress so that all pending matters and proceedings, such as unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and ti is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not ni the same status, but as fi presented for the first time (Balag v. Senate, G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018).

Answer 77

1. It must be in aid of legislation; 2. It must be in accordance with duly published rules of procedures; and 3. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiry shall be respected (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 21).

Answer 78

The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each house shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least 3 days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shal not be limited to the writen questions but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires, the appearance shal be conducted ni executive session (CONST, Ar.t V,I Sec. 22).

Answer 79

The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 23, Par. 1).

Answer 80

In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject ot such restrictions as ti may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper ot carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 23, Par. 2).

Answer 81

In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, the President may, for a period not exceeding 60 days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law (CONST. Art. VIl, Sec. 18, Par. 1).

Answer 82

No. Within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or ni writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of al its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 18, Par. 1)

Answer 83

Yes. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, fi the invasion or rebellion shall persist, and public safety requires it (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 18, Par. 1).

Answer 84

The HOR shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment (CONST. Art. XI, Sec. 3, Par. 1). The Senate has the sole power to try and decide al cases of impeachment (CONST. Art. XI, Sec. 3, Par 6).

Answer 85

1. Initiate impeachment proceedings: 1/3 of ALL members of the House 2. Convict an impeachable officer: 2/3 of ALL members of Senate 3. Proposal to amend or revise the Constitution: 3/4 of ALL members of Both Houses (Constituent Assembly) 4. Constitutional Convention: 3/4 of Both Houses 5. Concur in treaties or international agreements: 2/3 of ALL members of Senate 6. Override the veto of the President in the passage of a Bill: 2/3 of ALL members of Both Houses, voting separately 7. Declare the existence of war: 2/3 of Both Houses, voting separately in Joint session assembled 8. Concur in Executive’s power to grant amnesty, reprieves, commutations, and pardons: Majority of ALL members of Both Houses 9. Submit to the electorate the question of calling a Constitutional Convention: Majority of ALL members of Both Houses 10. Declare the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office: 2/3 of Both Houses, voting separately 11. Revoke of extend the President’s suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus or proclamation of Martial Law: Majority of ALL members of Both houses, voting separately 12. Call a Constitutional Convention: 2/3 of ALL members of both houses 13. To put the yeas and nays in the journal: 1/5 of each house 14. To elect a Senate President: 2/3 of ALL members of the Senate 15. To elect the Speaker of the HOR: 2/3 of ALL members of HOR 16. To determine the rules of its proceedings, suspend for at most 60 days or expel a member of such House, or discipline members for disorderly behavior: 2/3 of ALL members of Each house 17. In case of vacancy by the VP, confirmation of a new VP nominated by the President: Majority of ALL members of both houses, voting separately 18. Law granting tax exemption: majority of ALL members of Both houses 19. To constitute a quorum to do business: majority of each House

Answer 86

SENATE: The basis in determining the existence of a quorum in the Senate shall be the total number of Senators who are in the country and within the coercive jurisdiction of the Senate. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L- 2821, March 4, 1949)

Answer 87

a majority (1/2 + 1) of all the members.

Answer 88

Once a Bill has been approved by both houses, the Bill is enrolled, and this Enrolled Copy of the Bill bears the certification of the Presiding Officer of the house (either Senate President or Speaker of the House) that this Bill as enrolled is the version passed by each house. The purpose of the certification is to prevent attempts at smuggling in “riders”. The enrolled copy is then sent to the President for his action. The Supreme Court, in upholding the enrolled bill, explained that its basis is the separation of powers, so that the remedy of an aggrieved party is not a judicial decree but a legislative amendment or curative legislation. (Morales vs. Subido, G.R. No. L-29658, November 29, 1968) Note however the case of Astorga v Villegas (G.R. No. L23475, April 30, 1974), upon being informed that the enrolled bill did not contain the amendment proposed by Senator Tolentino (regarding the powers of the Vice-Mayor of Manila) when the house bill was raised to the Senate, the Senate President, withdrew his signature and notified the President of the mistake, who then likewise withdrew his signature. In short because of the withdrawal, there was no occasion, then, to apply the enrolled bill theory. The enrolled bill will prevail if there is a discrepancy between the enrolled bill and any other copy of the bill. (Mabanag v Lopez Vito, G.R. No. L-1123, March 5, 1947)

Answer 89

In Astorga vs. Villegas, by way of obiter dictum, the Supreme Court indicated that the journal might really prevail over the enrolled bill, since a journal is required by the Constitution, while the enrollment of a bill is just a legislative practice that is not even mentioned in the Constitution. Further, enrollment does not add to the validity of the bill, for what makes it valid are the votes of the members. This ruling however seems to contradict the ruling in Morales v. Subido that the enrolled copy prevails over the journal. Reconciling these two decisions, as to matters required by the Constitution to be placed in the journal, the journal is conclusive. But aside from these matters, any other matter does not enjoy such conclusiveness.

Answer 90

Congress shall convene every fourth (4th) Monday of July for its regular session unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty (30) days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time. (Sec. 15, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without consent of the other, adjourn for more than three (3) days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting. (Sec. 16[5], Article VI, 1987 Constitution)

Answer 91

● May be called at any time by the President, at his absolute discretion, to consider such subjects as he may determine. ● Congress, however, determines the number of days it needs for such session. (Sec. 15, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)

Answer 92

● To pass a bill calling for the holding of a special election when there is a vacancy in the office of the President and Vice President. (Sec. 10, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution) ● To determine by 2/3 vote whether the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. (Sec. 11, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution) ● To canvass the Presidential elections (Sec. 4, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution) ● To exercise the power of impeachment (Sec. 3, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution) ● To extend or revoke the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Sec. 18[2], Art.VII, 1987 Constitution).

Answer 93

All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. (Sec. 24, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)

Answer 94

1. When the President signs it; 2. When the President vetoes it but the veto is overridden by 2⁄3 vote of all the members of each House; and 3. When the President does not act upon the measure within 30 days after it shall have been presented to him. (Sec. 27, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)

Answer 95

1. The President; 2. The Vice President; 3. Members of the Supreme Court; 4. Members of the Constitutional Commissions; and 5. The Ombudsman. (Section 2, Article IX, 1987 Constitution) NOTE: The enumeration in the Constitution of the impeachable officers is exclusive. The Ombudsman is only one man, not including his Deputies. (Office of the Ombudsman vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146486, March 4, 2005)

Answer 96

An impeachable officer who is a member of the Bar cannot be disbarred without first being impeached. Complainant’s availment of Section 1 (1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution to skirt this rule is specious. It bears emphasis that the provision that majority of Comelec members should be lawyers pertains to the desired composition of the Comelec. While the appointing authority may follow such constitutional mandate, the appointment of a full complement of lawyers in the Comelec membership is not precluded. At the time the complaint was filed, respondents and three other commissioners were all lawyers. As an impeachable officer who is at the same time a member of the Bar, respondent Borra must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment before he may be held to answer administratively for his supposed errant resolutions and actions. (Marcoleta vs Borra, A.C. No. 7732, March 09, 2009)

Answer 97

A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offence which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of which would amount to removal from office. It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that its Members or the other constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there are fundamental procedural requirements that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings. (In Re: Gonzales, A.M. No. 8845433, April 15, 1998)

Answer 98

1. Culpable violation of the Constitution - wrongful, intentional or willful disregard or flouting of the fundamental law. This act must be deliberate and motivated by bad faith to constitute as a ground for impeachment. 2. Treason - committed by any person who, owing allegiance to the government of the Republic of the Philippines, levies war against it or adheres to its enemies, giving them aid and comfort. (Art. 114, Revised Penal Code) 3. Bribery - committed by any public officer who shall agree to perform an act, whether or not constituting a crime, or refrain from doing an act which he is officially required to do in connection with the performance of his official duties, inconsideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by him personally or through the mediation of another, or who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason of his office. (Arts. 210- 211, Revised Penal code) 4. Other high crimes - refers to those offenses which, like treason and bribery, are of so serious and enormous a nature as to strike at the very life or the orderly workings of the government. (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, 2003 ed., p.1112; Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1934, pp. 854-855) 5. Graft and corruption - those prohibited acts under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, 2003 ed., p.1113) 6. Betrayal of Public Trust - a catch-all ground to cover all manner of offenses unbecoming a public functionary but not punishable by the criminal statutes, like inexcusable negligence of duty, tyrannical abuse of authority, breach of official duty by malfeasance or, misfeasance, cronyism, favoritism, obstruction of justice. (Record of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, p. 272)

Answer 99

The Electoral Tribunal acts as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the respective members of each House (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 17).

Answer 100

Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of 9 Members, 3 of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining 6 shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 17).

Answer 101

The Electoral Tribunal is independent of the Houses of Congress (Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. 45081, July 15, 1936) and its decisions may only be reviewed by the Supreme Court upon showing of grave abuse of discretion in a special civil action for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Peña v. HRET, G.R. No. 123037, March 21, 1997).

Answer 102

Membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group (Bondoc v. Pineda, G.R. No. 97710, September 26, 1991).

Answer 103

It is independent of the COMELEC. Cases before the Electoral Tribunal are governed by the Tribunal's own rules (Lazatin .v HRET, G.R. No. L-84297, December 8, 1988).

Answer 104

Once a winning candidate has been duly proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed ofice as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs' jurisdiction over election contests relating to the candidate's election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins (Limkaichong v. COMELEG, G.R. Nos. 178831-32, April 1, 2009).

Answer 105

1. Sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective Members. (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 17); and 2. Power ot promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before ti (Lazatin v. HRET, G.R. No. L-84297, December 8, 1988)

Answer 106

The Commission on Appointments acts as a legislative check on the appointing authority of the President. tI shall act on all appointments submitted to ti within 30 session days of the Congress from their submission (CONST. Art. V,l Sec. 18).

Answer 107

There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, 12 Senators, and 12 Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 18). For the Senate, a political party must have at least 2 members to be entitled to one seat in Commission on Appointments. Rounding off is not allowed (Guingona v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 106971, October 20, 1992).

Answer 108

The Commission on Appointments is independent of the two Houses; its employees are not technically employees of Congress. It has the power to promulgate its own rules of proceedings. It does not legislate when it confirms or refuses a Presidential appointment (Pimentel J.r v. Ermita, G.R. No 164978, October 13, 2005).

Answer 109

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint: 1. Heads of executive departments (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 16); 2. Ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 16); 3. Officers of the AFP from the rank of colonel or naval captain; 4. Officers whose appointments are vested in him by the Constitution: a.Regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 8, par. (2)); b.Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights (Bautista v. Salonga, G.R. No. 86439, April 13, 1989); and c. Sectoral representatives during the three-consecutive terms after the ratification of the Constitution (CONST. Art, VI, Sec. 5(2); CONST. Art. XVIII, Sec. 7; Quintos-Deles v. Commission on Appointments, G.R. No. 83216, September 4, 1989)

Answer 110

1. Appointment of the Vice President to a Cabinet Position (CONST. Art VI, Sec.3): 2. Members of the Supreme Gourt and judges of lower courts (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 9); 3. The Ombudsman and his deputies (CONST Art. X,I Sec.9); 4. All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint, e.g.: a. Commissioner of Customs (Sarmiento v. Mison, G.R. No. 79974, December 17, 1987); b. Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights (Bautista v. Salonga, G.R. No. 86439, April 13, 1989); and c. Appointments and promotions in the Philippine Coast Guard (Soriano v. Lista, GR. No. 153881, March 24, 2003).

Answer 111

1. Nomination by the President; 2. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; 3. Issuance of commission; and 4. Acceptance by the appointee (Lacson v. Romero, G.R. No. L-3081, October 14, 1949).

Answer 112

The Commission on Appointments shall rule on all nominations or appointments brought before it by a majority vote of all its members. Only members present shall be entitled to vote. The ex officio Chairman shall not vote except to break a tie. All other matters shall be decided by a majority vote of the members present constituting a quorum (Rules of the Commission on Appointments, Ch. Il, Sec. 15). Voting by the Commission on any nomination or appointment submitted for confirmation shall be by viva voce; except, upon request of any members, the voting shall be nominal (Rules of the Commission on Appointments, Ch. IV, Sec. 23).

Answer 113

Nominations or appointments submitted by the President of the Philippines which are not finaly acted upon at the close of the session of Congress shall be returned to the President and, unless new nominations or appointments are made, shall not again be considered by the Commission (Rules of the Commission on Appointments, Ch. IV, Sec. 17).

Answer 114

The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while Congress is in session, at the cal of its Chairman or a majority of all its members (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 19).

Answer 115

Any member may move for the suspension of action by the Commission on Appointments on any nomination or appointment favorably recommended by a standing committee, and the Chairman shall suspend the consideration, of said nomination or appointment: Provided, that, such suspension may b e taken up on the next succeeding session of the Commission; Provided, further, that this section shal not apply ot nominations or appointments taken up by t h e Commission during the last session prior to a sine die adjournment of Congress (Rules of the Commission on Appointments, Ch. N, Sec. 20)

Answer 116

The second sentence of Section 17, Article VIl is referred to as the "take care power" of the President and also sometimes called the "faithful execution clause." Under this provision, the President si bound ot ensure the faithful execution of laws regardless of his belief in the legality of said laws. Until and unless a law is declared unconstitutional, the President has aduty to execute it regardless of his doubts as to its validity (CONST. Art. VI, Secs. 1&17).

Answer 117

(N40-RAW-VR10) 1. Natural-born citizen of the Philippines; 2. At least 40 years of age on the day of the election; 3. Able to Read And Write; 4. Registered Voter; and 5. A Resident of the Philippines for a period of at least 10 years immediately preceding the day of the election (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 2).

Answer 118

The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 4, Par. (1)). The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of al the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. ,4 Par. (5).

Answer 119

The following requisites must concur before special election may be held: 1. Death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and the Vice-President; 2. If the vacancies occur more than 18 months before the next regular presidential election; and 3. A law passed by Congress calling for a special election to elect a President and Vice-President to be held not earlier than 45 days nor later than 60 days from the time of such call (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 10).

Answer 120

The President shall serve for a term of 6 years which shall begin at noon on the 30th day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date 6 years thereafter (CONST. Art. VI, Sec 4, Par. (1).

Answer 121

No. The President shall not be eligible for any reelection (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 4, Par. (1)).

Answer 122

The Vice-President shall serve for a term of 6 years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth (30th day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date 6 years thereafter (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 4, Par. (1)).

Answer 123

Yes. However, the Vice-President shall not serve for more than 2 consecutive terms (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 4, Par. (2).

Answer 124

If he succeeded and served as President for 4 years or less, he may be reelected as President. fI he succeeded and served as President for more than 4 years, he shall not be qualified for election to the same office at any time (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 4, Par. (1)).

Answer 125

If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice-President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have been chosen and qualified; 1. In case of failure of President-elect to qualify, the Vice-President-elect shall act as President until the President-elect shall have qualified; 2. In case of death or permanent disability of the President-elect, the Vice- President-elect shal become President; 3. In case no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified, or where both shall have died or become permanently disabled, the Senate President , or in case of his inability, the Speaker of the HOR shall act as President until a President or a Vice President shall have ben chosen and qualified; or 4. In case of death, permanent disability, or inability of the President, Vice- President, Senate President and the Speaker of the HOR, the Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as President shall be selected until a President or a Vice-President shall have qualified (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 7)

Answer 126

1. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall become, President ot serve the unexpired term; 2. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and the Vice-President, the Senate President, or in case of his inability, the Speaker of the HOR shall act as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 8, Par. 1); or 3. In case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of the President and the Vice-President, the Senate President, and the Speaker of the HOR, the Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President until the President or the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified (CONST. Art. VIl, Sec. 8, Par. 2).

Answer 127

Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the HOR who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 9).

Answer 128

Presidential immunity in this jurisdiction attaches during the entire tenure of the President. The immunity makes no distinction with regard to the subject matter of the suit; it applies whether or not the acts subject matter of the suit are part of his duties and functions as President (De Lima v. Pres. Duterte, G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019). While the President is immune from suit, she may not be prevented from instituting suit (Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988). The President, like the judges of the courts and the members of the Legislature, may not be personally charged in civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in the performance of his official duties. After his tenure, however, the President is liable when he acts in a case so plainly outside of his power and authority that he cannot be said to have exercised discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to act. The same is true where the cases filed against a non-sitting president are criminal in character. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity. is a n inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions: The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser (Estrada v, Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15 & 146738, March 2, 2001).

Answer 129

There is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege (Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988).

Answer 130

Executive Privilege is the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public (Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006, citing Rozell, Executive Privilege and the Modern Presidents: In Nixon's Shadow (83 Minn. L. Rev. 1069)).

Answer 131

Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings, like the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either House of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government (Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006).

Answer 132

Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Executive officials are not exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure (Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006).

Answer 133

The President may invoke executive privilege. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power (Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 1697775 Apfil 20, 2006).

Answer 134

Executive power pertains to the power to enforce and administer the laws. tI shall be vested ni the President of the Philippines and exercised through the manifold offices of the executive department (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 1). On the other hand, administrative power refers to the President's control over all such executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that laws are faithfully executed (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 17).

Answer 135

Appointment is the selection or designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to fill an office or public function and discharge the duties of the same (Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993).

Answer 136

No. Appointment differs from a designation in that the latter simply involves the imposition of additional and/or higher duties to be performed by a public official/employee which is temporary and can be terminated anytime at the pleasure of the appointing authority officer/authority. Designation may involve the performance of duties of another position on a concurrent capacity or on full-time basis (Section 13 (c), Rule IV, CSC Memorandum Circular No. 14, s. 2018).

Answer 137

Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results insecurity of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure bécause of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official. xXx Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term. However where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and-may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.

Answer 138

1. The President has no constitutional or legal obligation to only make permanent appointments when Congress is in session. 2. The President can also make temporary appointments even when the CA isin session (Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005). 3. The President is constitutionally prohibited from making "midnight appointments" except under certain conditions (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 15).

Answer 139

1. Regular presidential appointments, with or without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, including "recess" or "ad interim" appointments (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 16); 2. Appointments made by an Acting President (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 14); and 3. Midnight appointments are appointments made by a President within 2 months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term (CONST. Art VI, Sec. 15, see General v. Uro, G.R. No. 191560, March 29, 2011; and Sana v. Career Executive Service Board, GR. . No. 192926, November 15, 2011).

Answer 140

(RALN) 1. Those other officers lower in Rank whose appointment is vested by law in the President alone; 2. Those vested by the Constitution on the President Alone; 3. Those whom he may be authorized by Law to appoint; and 4. Those whose appointments are Not otherwise provided for by law (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 16).

Answer 141

1. Heads of executive departments (CONST. Art. VII, Sec. 16); 2. Ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 16); 3. Officers of the AFP from the rank of colonel or naval captain; 4. Officers whose appointments are vested ni him by the Constitution: a.Regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council (CQNST. Art. VI, Sec. 8, par. (2)); b.Chairmen and members ofthe Constitutional Commissions (CONST. Art. IX-B, Sec. 1, par. (2)); and c. Sectoral representatives during the three-consecutive terms after the ratification of the Constitution (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 5(2); CONST. Art. XVI, Sec, 7; Quintos-Deles v. Commission on Appointments, G.R. No. 83216, September 4, 1989).

Answer 142

A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the CA at the close of the session of Congress. There is no final decision by the CA ot give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution (Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002).

Answer 143

Nominations or appointments submitted by the President of the Philippines which are not finally acted upon at the close of the session of Congress shall be returned to the President and, unless new nominations or appointments are made, shall not again be considered by the Commission on Appointments (The New Rules of the Commission on Appointments, March 7, 2017, Sec. 17)

Answer 144

An ad interim appointment is one made by the President while Congress is not in session. This is intended to prevent interruptions ni vital government services that would otherwise result ni prolonged vacancies ni government offices (NACHURA, supra at 357).

Answer 145

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment, unless otherwise indicated (PLM v. IAC, G.R. No. L-65439, November 13, 1985). This is because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that ti is subject to confirmation by the CA does not alter its permanent character (Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002).

Answer 146

An ad interim appointment ceases to be valid if a) disapproved by the Commission on Appointments; or b) upon the next adjournment of the Congress. nI hte latter case, the appointment si demed "by-passed" through inaction (NACHURA, supra at 357-358). When an ad interim appointment is terminated by disapproval by the CA, the appointee can no longer be extended a new appointment, inasmuch as the disapproval si final and binding on both the appointee and the appointing power. On the other hand, when the ad interim appointment si bypassed because of lack of time or failure of the CA to organize, there si no final decision by the Commission to give or withhold its consent to the appointment. Hence, the President si free ot renew the ad interim appointment (Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 449036, April 2, 2002).

Answer 147

There are two prohibited appointments under Section 15, Article VIl: (1) those made for buying votes; and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential election and are similar ot those which are declared election ofenses in the Omnibus Election Code. The second type of appointments consists of the so-called "midnight" appointments (De Castro v. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010).

Answer 148

Appointments extended by an acting President shall remain effective unless revoked by the elected President within ninety days from his assumption of office (CONST, Sec. 14, Art. VI)

Answer 149

Midnight appointments are appointments made by a President within 2 months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term. Such appointments are prohibited by the Constitution except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein wil prejudice public service or endanger public safety (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 15). This is based on the principle that after the election of a new President, the outgoing president becomes no more than a “caretaker” administrator, whose duty is to “prepare for the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President.”

Answer 150

The President or Acting President may make temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will: 1. Prejudice public service; or 2. Endanger public safety (CONST. Art: VI, Sec. 15).

Answer 151

Yes. The general rule is that the power of removal is an implied power derived from the express power of appointment (CRUZ, Political Law, supra at 407).

Answer 152

1.Those appointed by him where the Constitution prescribes certain methods for separation from public service, e.g.impeachment (Id.); 2. Judges of lower courts, likewise appointed by the President, are subject to the disciplinary authority o f and may b e removed only by the Supreme Court (CONST. Art. VIII, Sec. 11); 3. Those elected local officials since the power is exclusively vested ni the proper courts (LGC, Sec 60); and 4. In all other cases where the power of removal may be exercised only for cause as may be provided by law and ni accordance with the prescribed administrative procedure (CONST. Art. IX-B, Sec. 2, par. (3)).

Answer 153

The separation from office of members of the Cabinet or other executive officials whose term of office is determined at the pleasure of the President is effected not by the process of removal, but by the expiration of their term (CRUZ, Political Law, supra at 408).

Answer 154

Under the doctrine of qualified political agency or the alter ego principle, the acts of the Secretaries of Executive departments when performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive (Carpio v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 96409, February 24, 1992). Thus, the Executive Secretary, when acting by authority of the President, may reverse the decision of another department secretary (Lacson- Magallanes v. Pano, G.R. No. L-27811, November 17, 1967).

Answer 155

Where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that h e acts personally (Carpio v. Executive Secretary, GR.. No. 96409, February 24, 1992)

Answer 156

Power of general supervision. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments (CONST Art. X, Sec, 4). The President may only interfere ni the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she findsthat the latter had acted contrary to law. Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-confirming judgment onlocal affairs of an LGU is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments ni governing municipal corporations (Dadole v. COA, G.R. No: 125350, December 3, 2002).

Answer 157

1.Call out the armed forces; 2. Suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and Declare a state of martial law (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 18).

Answer 158

Whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 18, Par. (1)). tI is the most benign of the military powers of the president and is merely incidental to his authority to determine the disposition of the armed forces and what degree of force a particular crisis demands. It is limited however to ordinary police action necessary to maintain public order (IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000).

Answer 159

The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeascorpus and/or declaring martial law may be exercised only when the folowing concur: 1.Actual invasion or rebellion; and 2.Public safety requires the exercise of such power (CONST, Art. VI, Sec. 18, Par. (1)).

Answer 160

In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to convince himself that there is probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than not a rebellion was committed or is being committed. To require him to satisfy a higher standard of proof would restrict the exercise of his emergency powers (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 &231774, July 4, 2017).

Answer 161

(60-Re NJuC) 1. It is only limited to an initial period of 60 days; 2. Within 48 hours from the proclamation or suspension, the President shall submit a Report in person or in writing to the Congress; 3. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of al its Members in regular or special session, may Revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 18, Par. 1); 4. The SC may Review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 18, Par. 3); 5. A state of martial law does Not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of t h e civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction o n military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 18, Par. 4); 6. The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons Judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with the invasion (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 18, Par. 5); and 7. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially Charged within 3 days, otherwise he shall be released (CONST. Art. VIl, Sec. 18, Par. 6:)

Answer 162

The Supreme Court's power to review is limited to the determination of whether the President in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had sufficient factual basis (Lagman v. Pimentel III,G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018).

Answer 163

(EPReN) 1. There is war or other Emergency; 2. The delegation by Congress to the President of the authority to exercise emergency power must be for a limited Period only; 3. The delegation of power is subject to such Restrictions as the Congress may prescribe; and 4. Emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a National policy declared by Congress (David v. Arroyo, GR.. No. 171396, May 3, 2006).

Answer 164

Section 17, Article XI must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress.Thus, when Section 17 states that "the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest," it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate ti to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof (David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006).

Answer 165

The exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary in the President and may not be interfered with by Congressor the Court, except only when ti exceeds the limits provided for by the Constitution (Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015). In granting the power of executive clemency upon the President, the Constitution does not distinguish between criminal and administrative cases (Llamas .v Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 99031, October 15, 1991).

Answer 166

1. It can be granted only after conviction by final judgment (except amnesty) (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 19); 2. It cannot be granted in cases of impeachment (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 19); 3. It cannot be granted in violations of election laws without the favorable recommendation of the COMELEC (CONST. Art. IX-C, Sec. 5); 4. It cannot be granted in cases of legislative contempt or civil contempt (CRUZ, Philippine Political Law, supra at 444-445); 5. It cannot absolve a convict from civil liability; 6. It cannot restore public offices forfeited (Monsanto v. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989).

Answer 167

1. Reprieves; 2. Commutations; 3. Pardons; 4. Remission of fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment; and 5. Amnesty, with the concurrence of a majority of al the members of the Congress (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 19).

Answer 168

Pardon is an act of grace that exempts a n individual on whom it is bestowed from punishment which the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. A pardon is a deed, for the validity of which delivery si essential, and delivery si not complete without acceptance. It can be rejected.

Answer 169

1. Conditional pardon - in the nature of a contract between the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal; by the pardonee's consent to the terms stipulated in the contract, the pardonee has placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty bound to see ot it that the pardonee complies with the conditions of the pardon (Torres v. Gonzales, GR. . No. 76872, July 23, 7987); 2. Absolute pardon - pardon is absolute if it is not only unconditional, it is also unrestricted in scope, complete and plenary in character (Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, GR., No. 206666, January21,2015).

Answer 170

Pardon relieves the party from al the punitive consequences of his criminal act, including the disqualifications or disabilities based on the finding of guilt. But it relieves him from nothing more. It does not blot out the guilt of an individual. Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from al the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence (which is rare), ti cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. This must be constantly kept ni mind lest we lose track of the true character and purpose of the privilege (Monsanto v. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989).

Answer 171

Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense (Magdalo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012).

Answer 172

No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred with at least 2/3 of al the Members of the Senate (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 21).

Answer 173

1. Commutation - remission of a part of the punishment; a substitution of a less penalty for the one originally imposed (People v. Vera, G.R. No. L-45685, November 16, 1937); 2. Reprieve - the temporary suspension of the execution of a sentence (Director of Prisons v. Judge of First Instance of Cavite, G.R. No. L-10543, January 23, 1915); 3. Parole - refers to the conditional release of an offender from a correctional institution after he serves the minimum term of his prison sentence (People v. Abesamis, G.R. No. 140985, August 28, 2007); and 4. Remission of fines and forfeiture - merely prevents the collection of fines or the confiscation of forfeited property; ti cannot have the effect of returning property which has been vested in third parties or money already in public treasury (BERNAS, Reviewer supra at 315).

Answer 174

The power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify ti (Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005).

Answer 175

A treaty is "an international agreement concluded between states ni written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or m o r e r e l a t e d instruments and whatever its particular designation" (The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 2[hereinafter VCLT]). An executive agreement is similar to a treaty, except that the former does not require legislative concurrence, is usually less formal, and deals with a narrower range of subject matters (Bayan Muna .v Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011). International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties. But international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out wel- established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature usually take the form of executive agreements (Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, G.R. No. L-14279, October 31, 1961).

Answer 176

Yes. The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Senate approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history, we have entered into executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these have never been seriously questioned by our courts (Bayan Muna v. Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011). However, the President may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce the laws enacted by Congress. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws (Gonzales v. Hechanova G,R. No. L-21897, October 22, 1963)

Answer 177

The President shall submit to the Congress within thirty days from the opening of every regular session, as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures. (Sec. 22, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution) The President may propose the budget, but still the final say on the matter of appropriations is lodged in the Congress. (Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. (Sec. 25 [5], Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)

Answer 178

The President, President of the Senate, Speaker of the House, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, heads of Constitutional Commissions may by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriation. (Art. VI, Sec. 25, par. (5), 1987 Constitution) Under the doctrine of qualified political agencies, power of augmentation could be well extended to the Cabinet Secretaries as alter egos. (Nazareth vs. Villar, G.R. No. 188635, January 29, 2013)

Answer 179

1. If the President-elect dies or becomes permanently disabled, the Vice President-elect shall become President. 2. If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice-President-elect shall act as President until the President-elect shall have qualified. 3. If the President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have been chosen and qualified. 4. If no President and Vice President have been chosen nor shall have qualified or both shall have died or become permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall act as President until a President or a Vice President shall have been chosen and qualified. In the event of inability of the officials mentioned, Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as President shall be selected until a President or a Vice President shall have qualified. (NACHURA, p. 286).

Answer 180

1. If the President dies or becomes permanently disabled, the Vice President shall become President. 2. If the President resigns or is removed from office, the Vice President shall become President. 3. If both the President and Vice President died, became permanently disabled, have resigned or were removed from office, Senate President or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall act as President until a President or Vice President shall be elected and qualified. Congress, by law, shall provide for the manner in which one is to act as President in the event of inability of the officials mentioned above.

Answer 181

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. tI is vested in one Supreme Court and ni such lower courts as may be established by law.

Answer 182

Article VI, Section 1, Par, 2 of the 1987 Constitution conferred upon the Supreme Court the authority ot determine whether any branch or instrumentality of the government has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (Mamba .v Lara, GR. . No. 165109, December 14,2009).

Answer 183

Grave abuse of discretion, under Rule 65, has a specific meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due t o passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at al in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross (Reyes V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264 (Resolution), June 25, 2013).

Answer 184

The Supreme Court, whether sitting en banc or in Division, acts as a collegial body as it exercises judicial power through the collective action of its individual members. While most of the Supreme Court's work is performed by its three divisions, the Supreme Court remains one court - single, unitary, complete, and supreme. Flowing from this is the fact that, while individual justices may dissent or only partially concur, when the Supreme Court states what the law is, ti speaks with only one voice. Any doctrine or principle of law aid down by the court may be modified or reversed only by the Supreme Court en banc (Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines v. PAL, G.R. No. 178083, March 13, 2018). It also means that "although the Chief Justice is primus inter pares, he cannot legally decide a case on his own because of the Supreme Court's nature as a collegial body. Neither can the Chief Justice, by himself, overturn the decision of the Court, whether of a division or the en banc" (Complaint of M.r Aurelio Indencia Arrienda against Justice Reynato S. Puno et. al., AM. . No. 03-11-30-SC, June 09, 2005).

Answer 185

Judicial review is the power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts ni light of their conformity with the Constitution. This is not an assertion of superiority by the courts over the other departments, but merely an expression of the supremacy of the Constitution (Angara .v Electoral Commission, GR. . No. 45081, July 15, 1936).

Answer 186

(ASEL) 1. There must be an Actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; 2. The person challenging the act must have the Standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; 3. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the Earliest opportunity; and 4. The issue of constitutionality must be the very Lis mota of the case (Villafuerte v. Securities and Exchange Commission, G.R. No. 208379. March 29, 2022).

Answer 187

A person has standing to challenge the validity of governmental act only if he has a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. (People v. Vera, G.R. No. L-45685, November 16, 1937).

Answer 188

Yes. The Court has ruled that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bill. Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of the authority vested on the President by the Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domain of the Legislature arises (Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994).

Answer 189

The term "political question" connotes what ti means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. I refers to those questions which, under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

Answer 190

The scope of the political question doctrine has been limited by Art. VI, Sec. 1, Par. 2 of the Constitution particularly the portion which vests in the judiciary the power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

Answer 191

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness (Deutsche Bank AG London v. Kormasing, Inc., G.R. No. 201700. April 18, 2022).

Answer 192

(GERRP) 1. There is Grave violation of the Constitution; 2. There is an Exceptional character of the situation and paramount public is involved; 3. The constitutional issues raised Require formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; 4. The case is capable of Repetition yet evasive review (David .v Macapagal- Arroyo, supra); and Note: There are 2 factors to be considered before a case is deemed one capable of repetition yet evading review: 5. There is Paramount public interest (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Fastech Synergy Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 206150, September 8, 2017).

Answer 193

1. The President appoints from among a list of at least 3 nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy (CONST. Art. VIII, Sec. 9.). 2. For lower courts, President shall issue the appointment within 90 days from submission of the list (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 9.). 3. Any vacancy in t h e Supreme Court shall b e filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof (CONST, Art. VIl, Sec. 4(1)).

Answer 194

(N-40-15-CIPl) 1. Natural-born citizen; 2. At least 40 years old; 3. 15 years or more as a judge of a lower court or has been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines for the same period; and 4. A person of proven Competence, Integrity, Probity, and Independence (CONST. Art. VIl, Sec. 7).

Answer 195

The same qualifications as those provided for Justices of the Supreme Court must be satisfied for a person seeking to become Presiding Justice or Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 7.)

Answer 196

(C-35-10-CIPI) 1. Citizen of the Philippines 2. At least 35 years old; and 3. Has been engaged for at least 10 years in the practice of law in the Philippines or has held public office in the Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite (B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 15); and 4. A person of proven Competence, Integrity, Probity, and Independence (CONSTI, Art. VI, Sec. 7, par. (3)).

Answer 197

(C-30-5-CIPI) 1. Citizen of the Philippines; 2. At least 30 years old; 3. Has been engaged for at least 5 years in the practice of law in the Philippines or has held public office in the Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite (B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 26); and 4. A person of proven Competence, Integrity, Probity, and Independence (CONSTI, Art. VIII, Sec. 7, par.(3) .

Answer 198

1. Chief Justice a s ex officio/Chairman; 2. Secretary of Justice a s ex officio member; 3. Representative of the Congress a s ex officio member; 4. Representative of the Integrated Bar; 5. Professor of law, 6. Retired Member of the Supreme Court; and 7. Representative of the private sector (CONST. Art VI, Sec. 8, par. (1)).

Answer 199

The Supreme Court si composed of a Chief Justice and 41 Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or ni its discretion, in divisions of three, five of seven members. Any vacancy shal be filed within 90 days from occurrence thereof (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 4(1)).

Answer 200

1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus; 2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue. d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved; 3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts ot other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned; 4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice; 5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for al courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court; 6. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary ni accordance with the Civil Service Law (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 5); and 7. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over al courts and the personnel thereof (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 6).

Answer 201

1. Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, executive order, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question; 2. Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty or reclusion perpetua; 3. Cases raising novel questions of law; 4. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; 5. cases involving decisions, resolutions, and orders of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit; 6. Cases where the penalty recommended or imposed is the dismissal of a judge, the disbarment of a lawyer, the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one year, or a fine exceeding forty thousand pesos; 7. Cases covered by the preceding paragraph and involving the reinstatement in the judiciary of a dismissed judge, the reinstatement of a lawyer in the roll of attorneys, or the filing of a judges' suspension of a lawyers' suspension from the practice of law; 8. Cases involving the discipline of a Member of the Court, or a Presiding Justice, or any Associate Justice of the collegial appellate court; 9. Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the Court en banc or by a Division my be modified or reversed; 10. Cases involving conflicting decisions of two or more divisions; 11. Cases where three votes in a Division cannot be obtained; 12. Division cases where the subject matter has a huge financial impact on businesses or affects the welfare of a community, 13. Subject to Section 1 (b) of this rule, other division cases that, in the opinion of at least three Members of the Division who are voting and present, are appropriate for transfer to the Court en banc; 14. Cases that the Court en banc deems of sufficient importance to merit its attention; and 15. all matters involving policy decisions in the administrative supervision of all courts and their personnel (Supreme Court Internal Rules, Rule 2, Sec. 3).

Answer 202

Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 5).

Answer 203

Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: 1. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. 2. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or tol, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. 3. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue. 4. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. 5. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 6).

Answer 204

The commissions are constitutionally created, and may not be abolished by law (CONST. Art. IX-A, Sec. 1).

Answer 205

1. Civil Service Commission (CSC); 2. Commission on Elections (COMELEC); and 3. Commission on Audit (COA) (CONST. Art. IX-A, Sec. 1).

Answer 206

The COMELEC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over al contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shal be final, executory, and not appealable (CONST Art. IX-C, Sec. 2, Par. 2).

Answer 207

The COA, by mandate of the 1987 Constitution, is the guardian of public funds, vested of broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property, including the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, to establish the techniques and methods for such review, and to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations. COA si given a wide latitude of discretion "to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of government funds" and has the power to ascertain whether public funds were utilized for the purpose for which they had been intended by law (Nayong Pilipino Foundation, Inc., v. Chairperson Pulido Tan et al., G.R. No. 213200, September 19, 2017).

Answer 208

The determining factor of COA's audit jurisdiction is government ownership or control of the corporation. It generally covers public entities. However, its authority to audit extends even to non-governmental entities insofar as the latter receives financial aid from the government. Thus, ti is clear that the determination of COA's jurisdiction over a specific entity does not merely require an examination of the nature of the entity. Should the entity be found ot be non-governmental, further determination must be had as to the source of its funds or the nature of the account sought to be audited by the COA. (Commission On Audit v. Pampilo G.R. Nos. 188760, 189060 &189333; June 30, 2020).

Answer 209

Yes. The Constitution vests ni the COA audit jurisdiction over "government-owned and controlled corporations with-original charters." a s well a s "government-owned or controlled corporations without original charters." GOCCs with original charters are subject to COA pre-audit, while GOCCs without original charters are subject to COA post- audit. The determining factor of COA's audit jurisdiction is government ownership or control of the corporation (Feliciano .v COA, G.R. No. 147402, January 14, 2004). The COAs' audit jurisdiction generally covers public entities. However, its authority to audit extends even to non-governmental entities insofar as the latter receives financial aid from the government. Thus, it is clear that the determination of COAs' jurisdiction over a specific entity does not merely require an examination, of the nature of the entity. Should the entity be found to be non-governmental further determination must be had a s to the source of its funds or the nature of the account sought to be audited by the COA. In the analysis of an entity's nature, the Court, ni prior cases, examined the statutory origin, the charter, purpose and the relations that a particular entity has with the State (COA v. Pampilo, G.R. Nos. 188760, 189060 &189333, June 30, 2020).

Answer 210

Yes. LGUs, though granted local fiscal autonomy, are still within the audit jurisdiction of the COA (Veloso, et.al., v. COA, G.R. No. 193677, September 6, 2011).

Answer 211

Yes. The coconut levy funds were collected for a public purpose which is to advance the government's avowed policy of protecting the coconut industry. Courts take judicial notice of the fact that the coconut industry is one of the major industries supporting the national economy. Hence, coconut levy funds are special public funds of the government that is properly within the jurisdiction of COA (Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc., (COCOFED), et al., v. Republic, G.R. Nos. 177857-58 &G.R. No. 178193, January 24, 2012).

Answer 212

1. Civil Service Commission Who: By the aggrieved party Where: Court of Appeals under Rule 43 When: Within 15 days from notice (Revised Rules on Administrative Cases ni the Civil Service (RRACCS), Rule 13, Sec. 70; RULES OF COURT, Rule 43) 2. Commission o n Audit Who: By the aggrieved party. Where: Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 When: Within 30 days from notice (RULES OF COURT, Rule 64, Sec. 3). 3. Commission on Elections Who: By the aggrieved party Where: Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 When: Within 03 days from notice (RULES FO COURT, Rule 64, Sec. 3.) Note: Only decisions of the COMELEC len banc may be brought to the Supreme Court by certiorari under Rule 65 (Reyes v. RTC, G.R. No 108886, May 5, 1995). The Supreme Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC. (Ambit Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 143398, October 25, 2000; Dumayas, Jr. .v COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 141952-53, April 20, 2001).

Answer 213

The certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is limited to decisions rendered in actions or proceedings taken cognizance of by the Commissions in the exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. It does not refer to purely executive powers such a s those which relate to the COMELEC's appointing power (ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133486, January 28, 2000).

Answer 214

Yes. As an exception, the Supreme Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to review an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC on the ground of the issuance being made without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it does not appear to be specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the matter is one that the COMELEC en banc may sit and consider, or a Division is not authorized to act, or the members of the Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc. Of necessity, the aggrieved party can directly resort to the Court because the COMELEC-en banc is not the proper forum ni which the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory order can be reviewed (Cagas v. COMELEC, GR. . No. 194139, January 24, 2012)

Answer 215

The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bil of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder. (People v. Marti, G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991).

Answer 216

The due process clause protects the right to life, liberty, and property (CONST. Art. I, Sec. 1).

Answer 217

The right to life guarantees essentially the right to be alive-upon which the enjoyment of all other rights si preconditioned (Mamba V. Bueno, G.R. No. 191416, February 7, 2017).

Answer 218

The right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. It is not merely freedom from physical restraint but it is also the right of man to enjoy his facilities, subject only to such restraint as arenecessaryfor the common welfare (City or Manila v. Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005, citing Justice Malcolm).

Answer 219

Property is anything that can come under the right of ownership and be the subject of the contract, and includes al things - real, personal, tangible and intangible - that are within the commerce of man (CRUZ, Constitutional Law, supra at 211-212).

Answer 220

The aspects of due process are substantive due process and procedural due process. Substantive due process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with a person's life, liberty, or property rights. Procedural due process means compliance with the procedures or steps, even periods, prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the standard of fair play and without arbitrariness on the part of those who are called upon to administer it (Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., et al., v. Hon. Janette Garin, et al., G.R. Nos. 217872 and 221866, April 26, 2017).

Answer 221

1.The interests of the public in general, as distinguished from those of a particular class, which require the intervention of the State (Lawful subject); and 2. The employment of means which are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive on individuals (Lawful means) (City of Manila v. Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005).

Answer 222

The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process, and neither of these elements can be eliminated without running afoul of the constitutional guaranty (Vinta Maritime Co., Inc., v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113911 January 23, 1998).

Answer 223

No. The right ot appeal is not a natural right or part of due process. It si a mere statutory right, but one given, denial constitutes violation of due process (Boardwalk Business Ventures Inc., v. Vilareal, G.R. No. 181.182, April 10, 2013)

Answer 224

It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause si not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if ti applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds, exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not (Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No: L-7995, May 31, 1957)

Answer 225

(SAGE) 1. Such classification rests upon Substantial distinctions; 2. It Applies equally to all members of the same class; 3. It isGermane to the purposes of the law; and 4. It is not limited to Existing conditions only (Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014). Note: It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics ni equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally.

Answer 226

The standards of judicial review are: 1. Rational basis test - the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on reasonable classification. This standard of review is typically quite deferential; legislative classifications are presumed to be valid largely for the reason that "the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one" (British American Tobacco v. Camacho, G.R. No. 163583, August 20, 2008); 2. Intermediate scrutiny test - ti is used is a test evaluating classifications based on gender and legitimacy (White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009). The government must show that the challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission); and 3. Strict scrutiny test (Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017).

Answer 227

1. A determination of Probable cause; 2. The determination of probable cause was made personally by a Judge; 3. The determination by the judge was based on an examination under Oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce 4. The complainant and/or witnesses testified to facts within their personal Knowledge; and 5. The warrant issued must particularly Describe the place to be searched or the persons or things ot be seized (CONST. Art. Il, Sec. 2).

Answer 228

Probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, exists when there are facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place ot be searched (Sy Tan v. Sy Tiong Gue, G.R. No. 174570, February 22, 2010). Probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, exists where there are facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested (Webb v. De Leon, G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995).

Answer 229

1. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. tI pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial; and 2. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.

Answer 230

A scatter-shot warrant is a warrant issued for more than one specific offense. It is void, because ti violates the constitutional requirement that there must be particularity of the things to be seized and persons and places to be searched (Leon Tambasen v. People, et al., G.R. No. 89103, July 14, 1995).

Answer 231

A general warrant is one that allows the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another and gives the officer executing the warrant the discretion over which items to take. It is void because it is not particular as to the person to be arrested or the property ot be seized (Vallejo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156413, April 14, 2004).

Answer 232

(ICH-BED-DE) 1. When caught In flagrante delicto - When person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (RULES OF COURT, Rule 113, Sec. 5 (a)); 2. In cases of Continuing offense - membership in organizations like NPA is a continuing offense, thus, a person guilty thereof can be arrested anytime under the ni flagrante delicto principle (Umil v. Ramos, G.R. No. 79731, July 9, 1990); 3. Doctrine of Hot Pursuit - When an offense has just been committed and the arrestor has probable cause to believe, based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has committed the crime offense (RULES OF COURT, Rule 113, Sec. 5 (b)); 4. Bondsmen may arrest the accused, or upon written authority endorsed on a certified copy of the undertaking, cause him to be arrested by a police officer or any other person of suitable age and discretion (RULES OF COURT, Rule 114, Sec. 23, par. (1)): 5. If a person lawfully arrested Escapes or is rescued, any person may immediately pursue or retake him without a warrant at any time and in any place within the 6. When a person to be arrested has escaped detention facility 7. If the accused released on bail attempts to Depart from the Philippines without permission of the court where the case is pending RULES OF COURT, Rule 114, Sec. 23, par. (2)); and 8. Doctrine of Exigent Circumstances - under such urgency and exigency of the moment where a search.be lawfully dispensed with (People v. De Gracia, G.R. Nos. 102009-10, July 6, 1994).

Answer 233

(SEMAM-CABS- САРЕ) 1. Property Subject of the offense; 2. Property stolen or Embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and 3. Property used or intended to be used as the Means of committing an offense (RULES OF COURT, Rule 126, Sec. 2). 4. A person lawfully Arrested may be searched for dangerous weaponsor anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant (RULES OF COURT, Rule 126, Sec. 13). 5. Searches of Moving vehicles - searches of vehicles, vessels, or aircraft for violation of fishery, immigration, and customs laws (People v. Go, G.R. No. 1144639, September 12, 2003). Searches and seizures without warrant of vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws have been a traditional exception to the constitutional requirement because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search must be sought before the warrant could be secured (Hizon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119619, December 13, 1996); 6. Customs search - allowed when persons exercising police authority under the customs law effect search and seizure in the enforcement of customs law. Note: Custom searches however are not available in dwelling places (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 209387 January 1, 2016); 7. Body checks in Airports - holders and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substance. Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft which shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and the air carrier (R.A. No. 6235, Sec. 9); 8. Inspection of Buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary, and building regulations (Valeroso v. CA, G.R. No. 164815, September ,3 2009); 9. When there is a genuine reason to "Stop-and-frisk" ni the light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions to warrant a belief that the person stopped has concealed weapons (Malacat .v Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123595, December 1, 1997); 10. Visual search at Checkpoints (Valmonte .v de Vila, G.R. No. 83988, September 29, 1989); 11. Conduct of "Aerial target zoning" and "saturation drive" ni the exercise of military powers of the President (Guazon v. de Villa, G.R. No. 80508, January 30, 1990); 12. Plain view doctrine - where prohibited articles are in Plain view (People v. Hua, G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012); and 13. Doctrine of Exigent Circumstances - enunciates the rule that under such urgency and exigency of the moment, search warrant should be lawfully dispensed with (People v. De Gracia, G.R. Nos. 102009-10, July 6, 1994).

Answer 234

1. The executing law enforcement officer has a prior Justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular order; 2. The officer must discover incriminating evidence Inadvertently without conducting a search, a n d 3. It must be immediately Apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure (United Laboratories, Inc., .v Isip, G.R. No, 163858, June 28, 2005).

Answer 235

(PLV) 1. It must be warranted by the exigencies of Public order; 2. It must be conducted in a way Least intrusive to motorists; and 3. The inspection of the vehicle is limited ot a Visual search (Abenes v. CA, G.R. No. 156320, February 14, 2007).

Answer 236

A Terry Search, or a stop and frisk search, is a warrantless search conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime. The term was derived from the American case of Terry v. Ohio (392 U.S. 1(1968)). This case served as basis for allowing "stop and frisk" searches ni this jurisdiction (People .v Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014).

Answer 237

Genuine reason. While probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," mere suspicion or a hunch will NOT validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him (People v. Cogaed, GR. . No. 200334, July 30, 2014, citing Tery v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, (1968)).

Answer 238

1.It must be random; and 2. It must be suspicionless (Laserna v. DDB, G.R. No. 158633, November 3, 2008). Note: The constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from their waiver of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntary submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities, (Laserna vi DB, GR., No. 15863, November 3, 2008). However, there is no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes punishable with at least six years and one day imprisonment as they are singled out and impleaded against their will. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." nI their case, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of R.A: No. 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a person's right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. IlI. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves (Laserna v. DDB, supra).

Answer 239

According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from ti is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence si obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" si at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule si based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used t o gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints a l l evidence subsequently obtained (People v. Briones, G.R. No. 117487, December 12, 1995).

Answer 240

A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law only insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making ti privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions (Zulueta v. CA, G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996).

Answer 241

A valid intrusion into a person's communications and correspondence may be allowed under the following cases: 1. Upon lawful order of the court; or 2. When public safety or order requires such intrusion as prescribed by law (CONST. Art. Ill, Sec. 3 (1)).

Answer 242

It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept or record the same, or to communicate the content thereof to any other person (R.A. 4200, Sec.1). The communication shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation (R.A. No. 4200, Sec. 4). Moreover, any person violating the provisions of R.A. No. 4200 shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than six months or more than six years and with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from public office fi the offender be a public official at the time of the commission of the offense, and, fi the offender is an alien he shall be subject to deportation proceedings (R.A. No. 4200, Sec. 2).

Answer 243

A police officer can secure a written order from the Court to commit any of the acts that would otherwise be considered wiretapping "in cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code, and violations of Commonwealth Act 616, punishing espionage and other offenses against national security" (R.A. No. 4200, Sec. 3).

Answer 244

(SAPRA) 1. Free Speech and free press; 2. Freedom of Assembly; 3. Freedom of Petition; 4. Freedom to Profess and Practice Religion; and 5. Right of Association or the right to form associations (Abrams .v U.S., 250 U.S. 616, November 10, 1919). Note: Speech, expression, and press include every form of expression, whether oral, written, tape or disc recorded. It also includes movies a s well a s symbolic speech such as the wearing of a n arm band as a symbol of protest, as well as peaceful picketing (BERNAS, Reviewer, supra at 62-63).

Answer 245

The Constitution does not cover unprotected speech or low-value expression, which refers to libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or misleading advertisement, insulting or "fighting words," i.e., those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression endangering national security (Soriano v. Languardia, G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2008).

Answer 246

In order to determine which kind of test ot apply, the nature of the restraint must be determined. The restraint may either be a (1) prior restraint or a (2) subsequent punishment (Chavez .v Gonzales, GR. No. 168338, February 15, 2008).

Answer 247

(MPFADS) 1. Movies, television, and radio broadcast censorship in view of its access to numerous people, including the young who must be insulated from the prejudicial effects of unprotected speech 2. Pornography 3. False or misleading commercial statements 4. Advocacy of imminent lawless action 5. Danger to national security 6. Subjudice rule - restriction of comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice

Answer 248

The overbreadth doctrine is a ground to declare a statute void when "it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms" (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 212140-41. January 21, 2015). Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the Overbreadth Doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights (White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, GR.. No. 122846, January 20, 2009). Decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms (Estrada .v Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001).

Answer 249

Broadcast and radio media are subject to dual regulation. First, by procuring a legislative franchise and second, by registering and being subject to the regulations set by the National Telecommunications Commission (Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc., G.R. No. 162272, April 7, 2009)

Answer 250

Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general, every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable; unless it be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on facts, then ti is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts (Id).

Answer 251

No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof (CONST. Art. III, Sec. 5). The non-establishment clause means that the State cannot set up a church, nor pass laws which aid one religion, aid al religions or prefer one religion over another, nor force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion, etc. (Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1946)).

Answer 252

The liberty of abode may be limited only upon lawful order of a court, whereas the right to travel may be impaired in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law (CONST. Art. Il, Sec. 6). Note: While the liberty of travel may be impaired even without court order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety or public health" and "as may be provided by law" (Silverio v. CA, G.R. No. 94284, April 8, 1991).

Answer 253

It is an order in writing issued by a court, commanding the Bureau of Immigration to prevent any attempt by a person suspected of a crime to depart from the Philippines which shall be issued ex-parte in cases involving crimes where the minimum of the penalty prescribed by law is at least sixyears and oneday or when the offender is a foreigner regardless of the imposable penalty (A.M. No. 18-07-05-SC, August 7, 2018).

Answer 254

No. The right to travel may only be impaired by a law that concerns national security, public safety or public health. There is no law particularly providing for the authority of the Secretary of Justice to curtail the exercise of the right to travel, in the interest of national security, public safety or public health. DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a law. It is a compulsory requirement that there be an existing law, complete and sufficient in itself, conferring the expressed authority to the concerned agency ot promulgate rules. On its own, the DOJ cannot make rules, its authority being confined to execution of laws (Genuino v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018).

Answer 255

The courts may issue an HDO against an accused in a criminal case so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. tI does NOT require legislative conferment or constitutional recognition; it co-exists with the grant of judicial power (Genuino v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018).

Answer 256

(EN-LPOPRO) 1. Information covered by Executive privilege; 2. Privileged information relating to National security, defense or international relations; and 3. protection of public and personal Information concerning Law enforcement 4. Information deemed confidential for the protection of the Privacy of persons and certain individuals such as minors, victims of crimes, or the accused; 5. Information, documents or records known by reason of Official capacity and are deemed as confidential, including those submitted, or disclosed by entities to government agencies, tribunals, board or officers; 6. Prejudicial premature disclosure; 7. Records of proceedings or information from proceedings which, pursuant to law or relevant rules and regulations, are treated as confidential or privileged; and 8. Other exceptions to the rights to information under laws, jurisprudence, rules and regulations (Inventory of Exceptions to Executive Order No. 2, s. 2016, Memorandum from the Executive Secretary, Nov. 24, 2016).

Answer 257

1. Liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and 2. Power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association (Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, G.R. No. -L 25246, September 12, 1974). Note: The right to associate also guarantees the right not to join an association (Sta. Clara Homeowners Association v. Gaston, G.R. No. 141961, January 23, 2002).

Answer 258

No. The right to strike is not included in the guarantee of association to government employees. While there si no question that the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes hte right ot strike (SSS Employees Association v. CA, G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989).

Answer 259

The non-impairment clause renders null and void a law which changes the terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its terms (Lepanto Consolidated Mining v. WMC Resources Int. Pty. Ltd., G.R. No. 162331, November 20, 2006).

Answer 260

The exceptions to the non-impairment clause are the valid exercise of the inherent powers of the state - police power, eminent domain, and taxation. In every contract, there is an implied reservation that ti is subject to the police power of the State (Ortigas &Co. V. Feati Bank and Trust Co., G.R. No. L-24670, December 14, 1979).

Answer 261

No. Franchises, privileges and licenses do not come within the context of the provision because police power cannot be bargained away through the medium of a contract (Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, May 10, 1880).

Answer 262

An indigent party is one who is authorized by the court to prosecute his action or defense as an indigent upon an ex parte application. and hearing showing that he has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family (RULES OF COURT, RULE 3, Sec. 21)

Answer 263

Only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. Acorporation being a juridical person has the power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil and criminal actions, ni conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization. As ajuridical person, therefore, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants (In Re: Query of M.r Roger Prioreschi, A.M. No. 09-6-9 SC, August 19, 2009).

Answer 264

1. For purposes of availing of the benefits and services under the Act, a lawyer or professional partnership shall secure a certification from the PAO, the DOJ or accredited association of the Supreme Court indicating that the legal services to be provided are within the services defined by the Supreme Court, and that the agencies cannot provide the legal services to be provided by the private counsel 2. For purposes of determining the number of hours actually provided by the lawyer and/or professional firm in the provision of legal services, the association and/or organization duly accredited by the Supreme Court shall issue the necessary certification that the legal services were actually undertaken 3. The certification issued by the PAO, the DOJ and other accredited association by the Supreme Court shall be submitted to the BIR for purposes of availing tax deductions and to the DOJ for purposes of monitoring (R.A. No. 9999, Sec. 4).

Answer 265

No. The actual free legal services shall be exclusive of the minimum 60-hour mandatory legal aid services rendered to indigent litigants as required under the Rule of Mandatory Legal Aid Service for Practicing Lawyers, under BAR Matter No. 2012 (ld).

Answer 266

Custodial investigation is questioning initiated by a law enforcement officer after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 1966). It shall include the practice of issuing an invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the inviting officer for any violation of law (R.A. No. 7438, Sec 2, Par. (2)).

Answer 267

Investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense (People v. Macam, G.R. Nos. L-91011-12, November 24, 1994).

Answer 268

(ISC2-TDCR-EWV) 1. Right to be Informed of his right to remain silent and right to independent and competent counsel; 2. Right to be Informed that if he waives his right to remain silent, anything he says can and will be used against him; 3. Right to remain Silent; 4. Right to have competent and independent Counsel preferably of his own choice; 5. Right to be provided with Counsel, if he cannot afford the services of one; 6. No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him; 7. Secret Detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited; 8. Confessions or admissions obtained in violation of these rights are inadmissible as evidence (CONST. Art. I, Sec. 12); 9. The custodial investigation Report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating officer and read and adequately explained to him by his counselor by the assisting counsel provided by the investigating officer in the language or dialect known to such arrested to detained person, before such report is signed or thumb marked, otherwise such investigation report shall be null and void; 10. Any Extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested detained or under custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel, or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, elder brother and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel chosen by him; otherwise such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding; 11. Any Waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provision of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel, otherwise the waiver shall be null and void; and 12. Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed Visits by or conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or any member of his immediate family of by his counsel, or by any NGO duly accredited by the CHR or by any international non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Office of the President (R.A. No. 7438, Sec 2).

Answer 269

1. Before the case is filed in court (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and 2. After the case is filed in court: a. To refuse to be a witness; b. Not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal; c. To testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution; and d. While testifying, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted (People v. Judge Ayson, G.R. No. 85215, July 7, 1989).

Answer 270

Like other constitutional rights, the right against self-incrimination, including the right of a person under investigation to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right, may be waived (People v. Nicandro, G.R. No. L-59378, February 11, 1986).

Answer 271

To be valid, a waiver of the right must not only be voluntary; it must be made knowingly and intelligently, which presupposes an awareness or understanding of what is being waived (People v. Nicandro, G.R. No. L-59378, February 11, 1986). Note: The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel (People v. Galit, G.R. No. L-51770 March 20, 1985).

Answer 272

Any information or admission given by a person while in custody which may appear harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent assistance of an independent counsel should be struck down as inadmissible. It has been held, however, that an admission made to news reporters or to a confidant of the accused is not covered by the exclusionary rule (People v. Bravo, G.R. No: 135562, November 22, 1999).

Answer 273

1. The right to due process; 2. The right to presumption of innocence; 3. The right to be heard; 4. The right to assistance of counsel; 5. The right to be informed of the cause and nature of accusation against him; 6. The right ot speedy, impartial, and public trial; 7. The right to confrontation; 8. The right to compulsory process; 9. The right against trial in absentia; and 10. The right to bail (CONST. Art. Il, Secs. 13-14).

Answer 274

Bail is the security given for the release of a person ni custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified (RULES OF COURT, Rule 114, Sec. 1). Bail may either be a matter of right or a matter of discretion (RULES OF COURT, Rule 114, Secs. 4 and 5).

Answer 275

1. All criminal cases within the competence of the MeTC, MTC, or MCTC because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; 2. Prior to conviction by the RTC for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment; and 3. Prior to conviction by the RTC for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong (CONST. Art. Il, Sec. 13; Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015).

Answer 276

1. Upon conviction by the RC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; and 2. If the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 14 is present, as follows: a. That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; b. That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; c. That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; d. That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight fi released on bail or e. That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015).

Answer 277

1. Prior to the conviction by the RTC of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment and the evidence of guilt is strong; 2. After conviction by the RTC of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment; and 3. After conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment and the presence of bail-denying circumstances (RULES OF COURT, Rule 114, Sec. 5).

Answer 278

For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. But such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty. Therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution. The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the court, should primarily determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015).

Answer 279

If inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and wil not justify a conviction (Amanquiton v. People, G.R. No. 186080, August 14, 2009).

Answer 280

Yes. The right to a speedy trial may be waived. But waiver is not to be inferred from mere failure of the accused to urge the trial of the case. Such waiver or abandonment may be presumed only when the postponement of the trial has been sought and obtained by the accused himself or by his attorney. The presumption is always against the waiver of constitutionally protected rights (Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 191411, July 15, 2013). The remedy in the event of a non-observance of this right is by habeas corpus if the accused were restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case (Acebedo yDalman v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. L-28025, December 16, 1970).

Answer 281

Yes. Right to cross-examination may be waived expressly or impliedly. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness wil be received or allowed to remain ni the record.

Answer 282

The right to compulsory process of an accused pertains to: 1. His right to secure the attendance of witnesses (subpoena ad testificandum); and 2. His right to the production of evidence in his behalf (subpoena duces tecum) (CONST. Art. III, Sec. 14 (2)).

Answer 283

Involuntary servitude is the condition where one is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment, and against his will, to labor for another, whether he is paid or not (Aclaracion v. Gatmaitan, G.R. No. L-39115, May 26, 1975).

Answer 284

(PAND-COW) 1. Posse comitatus - obligation of the individual to assist in the protection of the peace and good order of his community (United States v. Pompeya, G.R. No. 10255, August 6, 1915); 2. Appellate courts may compel a former court stenographer to transcribe stenographic notes. That prerogative is ancillary or incidental to its appellate jurisdiction and is part of its inherent powers which are necessary to the ordinary and efficient exercise of its jurisdiction and essential to the due administration of justice (In the Matter of the Petition For Habeas corpus of Segifredo Aclaracion, G.R. No. L-39115, May 26, 1975); 3. Naval enlistment (Robertson v. Baldwin, G.R. No. 334, January 25, 1897); 4. Service in Defense of the State (CONST. Art. I, Sec. 4); 5. As punishment for a Crime whereof one has been duly convicted (CONST. Art. I, Sec. 18, par. (2)); 6. Obligation of children to Obey their parents as long as they are under their parental authority (FAMILY CODE, Art. 211, Par. (2)). 7. Return to Work order in industries affected with public interest (Kaisahan ng Manggagawa sa Kahoy v. Gotamco Sawmills, G.R. No. L-1573, March 29, 1948).

Answer 285

For a penalty to be considered obnoxious to the Constitution, ti needs ot be more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe. To come under the prohibition, the penalty must be flagrantly and plainly oppressive or so disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable persons as to what is right and proper under the circumstances (Republic v. N. Dela Mercedes &Sons, Inc., G.R. No. 201501, January 22, 2018).

Answer 286

1.Debt - any civil obligation arising from a contract. tI includes even debts obtained through fraud since no distinction is made in the Constitution; and 2. Non-payment of Poll Tax - a specific sum levied upon any person belonging to a certain class without regard to property or occupation, e.g. Community Tax (CONST. Art. III, Sec. 20).

Answer 287

No. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. (Lozano v. Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986).

Answer 288

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution; 2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; 3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and 4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law (CONST. Art. IV, Sec. 1).

Answer 289

The election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within 3 years from reaching the age of majority. However, the three-year period is NOT an inflexible rule. Nevertheless, the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite (Re: Application for Admission to The Philippine Bar, B.M. No. 914, October 1, 1999).

Answer 290

The Caram provision pertains to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. The provision states that those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of the 1935 Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands, shall be citizens of the Philippines. The privilege of citizenship granted by the 1935 Constitution extends to the children of the grantee (Chiongbian v. De Leon, G.R. No. L-2007, January 31, 1949).

Answer 291

In our jurisdiction, the principle of jus sanguinis has become the primary basis of citizenship by birth (Tecson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004). Aperson whose father or mother are citizens of the Philippines shall follow the citizenship of his or her parents (CONST. Art. IV, Sec. 1).

Answer 292

(JADeL) 1. Judicial naturalization (C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as "The Revised Naturalization Law"); 2. Administrative naturalization (R.A. No. 9139, otherwise known as "The Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000"); 3. Derivative naturalization (C.A. No. 473, Sec, 15 and 16); or 4. Legislative naturalization (So v. Republic, G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007).

Answer 293

(NEOSCD) 1. By Naturalization in foreign countries 2. By Express renunciation of citizenship (expatriation); 3. By Subscribing to an Oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining 21 years of age except that a Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship ni any manner while the Republic of the Philippines is at war with any country; 4. By rendering Service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country; 5. By Cancellation of the certificate of naturalization; or 6. By having been declared by competent authority a Deserter of the Philippine army, navy or air corps in time of war, unless subsequently a plenary pardon or amnesty has ben granted (CA. , No. 63, Sec. 4).

Answer 294

1. By naturalization; 2. By repatriation; 3. By direct act of Congress (C.A. No. 63, Sec. 2); or 4. By the taking of oath of allegiance by natural-born citizens of the Philippines who had been naturalized in a foreign country prior to R.A. No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225, Sec. 3).

Answer 295

Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. On the other hand, repatriation, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: 1. Desertion of the armed forces; 2. Service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War I; 3. Service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time; 4. Marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and 5. Political and economic necessity (Bengson I v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001). A person who has undergone naturalization is a naturalized citizen. However, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, fi he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino (Bengson I v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001).

Answer 296

Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of concurrent application of thedifferent laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. On the other hand, dual allegiance refers to the situation ni which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states (Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999). Note: What is not allowed is dual allegiance. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law (CONST., Art. (V, Sec. 5).

Answer 297

1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus solis: 2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers' country such children a r e citizens of that country; and 3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship (Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999).

Answer 298

(QRO) 1. Meet the Qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; 2. Make a personal and sworn Renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy; and 3. Take the Oath of allegiance prescribed in Sec. 3 of RA. . No. 9225 (Cordora v. COMELEC, GR. . No. 176947, February 19, 2009).

Answer 299

1. Direct - Citizenship is acquired by: a. Individual, through judicial or administrative proceedings; b. Special act of legislature; c. Collective change of nationality, as a result of cession or subjugation; or d. In some cases, by adoption of orphan minors as nationals of the State where they are born. 2. Derivative - Citizenship is conferred on: a. Wife of naturalized husband; b. Minor children of naturalized person; or c. Alien woman upon marriage to a national (NACHURA, p. 238).

Answer 300

1. Not less than 21 years of age on the date of the hearing of the petition; 2. Resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than 10 years; may be reduced to 5 years if he honorably held office in Government, established a new industry or introduced a useful invention in the Philippines, married to a Filipino woman, been engaged as a teacher in the Philippines (in a public or private school not established for the exclusive instruction of persons of a particular nationality or race or in any of the branches of education or industry for a period of not less than two years, or born in the Philippines; 3. Good moral character; believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relations with the constituted government as well as the community in which he is living; 4. Own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than P5,000.00, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation; 5. Speak and write English or Spanish and any of the principal Philippine languages; and 6. Enrolled his minor children of school age in any of the public or private schools recognized by the Government where Philippine history, government and civics are taught as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization. (C.A. No. 473, Sec. 2):

Answer 301

1. Opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing al organized governments; 2. Defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas; 3. Polygamists or believers in polygamy; 4. Convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; 5. Suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious disease; 6. Who,during theperiod of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos; 7. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of such war; and 8. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof. (C.A. No. 473, Sec. 4).

Answer 302

Public office is a right, authority, and duty, created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the state to be exercised by him for the benefit of the body politic (Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 116418, March 7, 1995).

Answer 303

(PPHOC) 1. It is a Public trust; ti is merely entrusted to the public officer (CONST. Art. XI, Sec. 1); 2. It is not a Property; it is not protected or guaranteed by the due process clause (CONST. Art. III, Sec. 1); 3. It is not a Heritable possession (CONST. Art. I, Sec. 26); 4. It is Outside the commerce of man; and 5. It cannot be the subject of a valid Contract otherwise, the contract is void (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1409).

Answer 304

(V-PACQuA) 1. The position is Vacant; 2. The appointing authority must be vested with the Power to Appoint at the time appointment is made; 3. The appointment has been approved by the CSC (or Confirmed by Commission on Appointments); 4. The appointee should possess al the Qualifications including appropriate civil service eligibility and none of the disqualifications; 5. The appointee Accepts the appointment by taking the oath and entering into discharge of duty (Garces v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114795, July 17, 1996).

Answer 305

(HAOZ) 1. Heads of Executive Department; 2. Ambassadors, or other Public Ministers and Consuls; 3. Officers of the Armed Forces from the rank of Colonel or Naval Captain; and 4. Other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in the Constitution (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 16).

Answer 306

The disapproval is a final decision of the Commission on Appointments ni the exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the President. Since the Constitution does not provide for any appeal from such decision, the disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as wel as on the appointing power (Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002).

Answer 307

1. A person convicted in an impeachment proceeding may be disqualified from holding any office under the Republic of the Philippines (CONS. Art. X,I Sec. 3, Par. (7)); 2. One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office (Aratea v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012); 3. A defeated candidate may not be appointed or re-appointed to any office in the Government or any government-owned or controlled corporation or in any of its subsidiaries within one year from the date of the election 4. Dual citizens may not quality for election or appointment to public office without renouncing their foreign citizenships (R.A. 9225, Sec. 5); 5. Dual citizens are disqualified from running for any elective local position (Chua v. COMELEC,G.R. No. 216607, April 5, 2016); 6. No Senator or Member of the HOR may hold any other office in the government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government- owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat(CONST.Art. VI,Sec. 13). 7. No Senator or Member of the HOR shall be appointed ot any office which may have been created or the emolument thereof increased during the term for which he was elected (Id). 8. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistant shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 13). 9. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistant shall not, during their tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries (ld). 10. Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative function (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 12). 11. No candidate who has lost in any election, shall within 1year after such election, be appointed to any office in the Government or any Government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries

Answer 308

General Rule: Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores the eligibility for appointment to that office. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction (Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989). Exception: If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him a new man; as if he had not been found guilty of the offense charged. x The bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely obliterated the adverse effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation from the service. This can be inferred from the executive clemency itself exculpating petitioner from t h e administrative charge and thereby directing his reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency (Garcia v. COA, GR. . No. 75025, September 14, 1993).

Answer 309

All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who perform functions within their power of control or supervision, such as specific clerical or administrative tasks, or even limited exercises of discretion (Arias v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81563, December 19, 1989). The mere fact that a public officer is the head of an agency does not necessarily mean that he is the party ultimately liable for administrative acts or omissions of their subordinates (Albert v. Gangan, G.R. No. 126557, March 6, 2001). When infraction consists in the reliance in good faith, albeit misplaced, by a head of office on a subordinate upon whom the primary responsibility rests, absent a clear case of conspiracy, the Arias doctrine must be held ot prevail (Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-101545, January 3, 1995).

Answer 310

NO. The salary of a public oficer cannot be seized by garnishment, atachment, or order of execution. Public policy also prohibits the assignment of unearned salaries or fees (Director of the Bureau of Printing v. Francisco, G.R. No. L-31337, December 20, 1973).

Answer 311

While there are cases where heads of offices, whose actions involved the very function he had to discharge, cannot be swept into a conspiracy conviction. It cannot be applied in cases where the public officers were knowing participants in the conspiracy considering that despite the patent irregularities in the documents presented to them, they still affixed their signatures thereto (Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 98494, July 17, 2003). The application of the doctrine is subject to the qualification that the public official has no foreknowledge of any facts or circumstances that would prompt him or her to investigate or exercise a greater degree of care (Abubakar .v People, G.R. No. 202408, June 27, 2018).

Answer 312

Subordinate officers are liable for willful or negligent acts even fi he acted under orders fi such acts are contrary to law, morals, public policy and good customs (REV. ADM. CODE, Book 1, Chapter 9, Sec. 39).

Answer 313

Public officers generally have in their favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties. But where the wrong is committed without authority, with malice, or bad faith, he may be held personally liable. nI this case, he is suable ni his individual capacity and cannot invoke his official status to insulate himself from liability (CRUZ, supra at 434).

Answer 314

General Rule: The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance of theirduties.The suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff (Sanders v. Veridiano I, G.R. No. L-46930, June 10, 1988). Exceptions: 1. Where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others; 2. Where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity, but in his personal capacity, although t h e a c t s complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position: (Lansang .v CA, G.R. No. 102667, February 23, 2000); and 3. Suit to compel performance of official duty or restrain performance of an act (RULES OF COURT, Rule 65).

Answer 315

General Rule: The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure (Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871, February 18, 2010). The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved ni the present Constitution (Rubrico v, Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871, February 18, 2010). Exception: Impeachment complaint (CONST. Art. XI, Sec. 2). Note: While the President is immune from suit, she may not be prevented from instituting a suit (Soliven .v Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988).

Answer 316

An officer de facto is one who has the reputation or appearance of being the officer he assumed to be but who, in fact, under the law, has no right or title to the office he assumes to hold. He is distinguished from a mere usurper or intruder by the fact that the former holds by some color of right or title, while the latter intrudes upon the office and assumes to exercise its functions without either the legal title or color of right to such office (Codilla v. Martinez, G.R. No. L-14569, November 23, 1960).

Answer 317

A de jure public oficer si one who si deemed, ni al respects, legaly appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not expired (Topacio v. Ong, G.R. No. 179895, December 28, 2008).

Answer 318

A de jure officer has a title ot an office, although he may not yet be ni possession of the office. A de facto officer is one who has possession of the office under color of authority (CRUZ, Law on Public Officers, supra at 52). However, the de facto officer Is subject to the same liabilities imposed on the de jure officer in the discharge of official duties, in addition to whatever special damages that may be due from him because of his unlawful assumption of ofice (Codila V. Martinez, G.R. No. L-14569, November 23, 1960).

Answer 319

The lawful acts of a de facto officer, so far as the rights of third person are concerned are, if done within the scope and by the apparent authority of the office, considered valid and binding as if he were the officer legally elected and qualified for the office and in full possession thereof (Laud v. People, G.R. No. 199032, November 19, 2014).

Answer 320

The rightful incumbent may recover from a de facto officer the salary received by the latter during the time of wrongful tenure even though the latter is in good faith and under color of title (Monroy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-23258, July 1, 1967).

Answer 321

When there is no de jure officer, the de facto officer is entitled to salaries for the period when he actually discharged functions ni good faith (Civil Liberties Union v. Exec. Sec., G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991).

Answer 322

The civil service rules embrace the personnel of all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCC) with original charters (CONST. Art. IX-B, Sec. 2, par. (1)).

Answer 323

If a GOCC was created by special law, it si with original charter (e.g. DBP, Land Bank, PCSO, PAGCOR, and GSIS). If a GOCC was incorporated pursuant ot the general corporation law, ti is without original charter (Trade Unions of the Philippines v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. L-49677, May 4, 1989).

Answer 324

Personnel of government owned or controlled corporations with an original charter are subject to the Civil Service rules, while t h e personnel of those incorporated under the general corporation law are covered by the Labor Code (National Service Corporation v. NRC, G.R. No. L-69870, November 29, 1988).

Answer 325

It is hornbook doctrine in administrative law that administrative cases are independent from criminal actions for the same acts or omissions. Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not abar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa. Given the differences ni the quantum of, evidence required, the procedures actually observed, the sanctions imposed, as well as the objective of the two proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other, Hence, the exoneration in the administrative case is not a bar to a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the subject of the administrative complaint or vice versa (Flores v. People, G.R. No. 222861, April 23, 2018).

Answer 326

The rule is that a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor (Aguinaldo v. Santos, G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992).

Answer 327

Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fuly absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the grounds for discipline enumerated therein cannot anymore be invoked against an elective local official to hold him administratively liable once he is re-elected to office. In fact, Section 40 (b) of the LGC precludes condonation since in the first place, an elective local official who is meted with the penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an elective local position due to a direct disqualification from running for such post (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015).

Answer 328

Yes. An impeached public afficer whose civil, criminal, of administrative liability was not judicially established may be considered involuntarily retired from service. (Re: Leter Of Mrs. Ma. Cristina Roco Corona Requesting The Grant Of Retirement And Other Benefits To The Late Former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona And Her Claim For Survivorship Pension As Hsi Wfie Under Republic Act No. 946 AM. . No. 20-07-10-SC; January 12, 2021).

Answer 329

No. The impeachment proceedings are subject ot the one-year limit rule. Under the Constitution, no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year (CONST. Art. XI, Sec. 3, par, (5)).

Answer 330

(N40-RBC10) 1. Natural born citizens of the Philippines; 2. At least 40 years old; 3. Of Recognized probity and independence: 4. Members of the Philippine Bar, 5. Must not have been Candidates for any elective national or local office ni the immediately preceding election whether regular or special; and 6. The Ombudsman must have, for 10 years or more, been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines (R.A. No. 6670, Sec. 5).

Answer 331

Yes. Although the Senate has the sole power to try and decide al cases of impeachment, this does not bar judicial review. Under the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court may determine if there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (Francisco Jr. va House of Representatives, GR. No. 160261, November 10, 2003);

Answer 332

Yes. It can prosecute cases before the regular courts. The Ombudsman is so empowered under R.A. No. 6770 and is granted an active role in the enforcement of anti- graft and corruption laws (Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 105965-70, March 20, 2001).

Answer 333

1. On the basis of a complaint originally filed as a criminal action or a grievance complaint or request for assistance; 2. An administrative proceeding may also be ordered by the Ombudsman or the respective Deputy Ombudsman on his initiative; or 3. By a written complaint under oath accompanied by affidavits of witnesses and other evidence in support of the charge. Such complaint shall be accompanied by a Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping duly subscribed and sworn to by the complainant or his counsel (RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Rule Il, Sec. 3). Note: The Office of the Ombudsman can act on anonymous complaint. It shall receive complaints from any source in whatever form concerning an official act or omission (R.A. No. 6770, Sec. 26, par. (2).

Answer 334

The Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the Supreme Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties (Maceda .v Vaquez, GR. . No. 102781, April 2, 1993).

Answer 335

A governmental privilege against disclosures involving state secrets is outweighed by the need of the Ombudsman. The documents are necessary ni order to carry out the duty of the Ombudsman as the "protector of the people" (Almônte v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95637, May 23, 1995).

Answer 336

The proper mode is to file a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals within 15 days from notice of judgment (Enemecio v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 146731, January 13, 2004). Note: Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure, reprimand or suspension of not more than one month's salary shall be final and unappealable (R.A. No. 6770, Sec. 27, par. (3)).

Answer 337

An aggrieved party's remedy depends on whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. If the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause was tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the party may file a petition for certiorari. However, fi there was no grave abuse of discretion, then the aggrieved party has no remedy. R.A. No. 6770 is silent as to the remedy of an aggrieved party in case the Ombudsman found sufficient cause to indict him in criminal or non-administrative cases. The Supreme Court cannot supply such deficiency fi none has been provided in the law (Tirol v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 135913, November 4, 1999).

Answer 338

Administrative law is a branch of public law under which the executive department of the government, acting in quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial capacity, interferes with the conduct of the individual for the purpose of promoting the well-being of the community (NACHURA, supra at 493).

Answer 339

1. As an institution - the aggregate of individuals in whose hands the reins of government are entrusted for the time being; and 2. As a function - the actual running of the government by the executive authorities through the enforcement of laws and implementation of policies (CRUZ, Philippine Administrative Law (2016), p . 7-8 [hereinafter CRUZ, Administrative Law]). It is the execution, in non-judicial matters, of the law or the will of the State as expressed by competent authority (US v. Dorr, G.R. No. 1051, May 19, 1903).

Answer 340

It refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of the government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective ni the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government (REV. ADM. CODE, INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS, Sec. 2, par. (1))

Answer 341

An administrative agency is an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making (The Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83578, March 16, 1989).

Answer 342

A government agency refers to any of the various units of the Government, including departments, bureaus, offices, instrumentalities, government-owned or controlled corporations, and local government units or a distinct unit therein (REV. ADM. CODE, INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS, Sec, 2, par. (4).

Answer 343

1. Departments: A department refers to an executive department created by law. This shall include any instrumentality having or assigned the rank of a department, regardless of its name or designation (REV. ADM. CODE, INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS, Sec. 2, par. (7)). 2. Bureaus: A bureau is a principal subdivision or unit of any department. This shall also include any principal subdivision or unit of any instrumentality given or assigned the rank of a bureau, regardless of actual name or designation, as in the case of department-wide regional offices (REV. ADM. CODE, INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS, Sec. 2, par. (8)). 3. Offices: An office refers, within the framework of government organization, to any major functional unit of a department or bureau, including regional offices. tI may also refer to any position held or occupied by individual persons, whose functions are defined by law or regulation (REV. ADM. CODE, INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS, Sec. 2, par. 9)). 4. Instrumentalities: Instrumentalities are national agencies not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some fi not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy usually through a charter. The term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled corporations (REV. ADM. CODE, INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS, Sec. 2, par. (10)). a. Regulatory agencies: A regulatory agency is an instrumentality expressly vested with jurisdiction to regulate, administer or adjudicate matters affecting substantial rights and interest of private persons, the principal powers of which are exercised by a collective body, such as a commission, board, or council (REV. ADM. CODE, INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS, Sec. 2, par. (11)). b. Chartered institutions: A chartered institution is any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes state universities and colleges and the monetary authority of the State (REV. ADM. CODE, INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS, Sec. 2, par. (12)). C. Government owned and controlled corporations: A government-owned or controlled corporation is any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions related t o public needs, whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the government directly or through its instrumentalities, either wholly or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least 51% of its capital stock (REV. ADM. CODE, INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS, Sec. 2, par. (13)).

Answer 344

The distinction is important because the remedy that may be availed of by an aggrieved party is different ni each case. Acts of administrative agencies in the exercise of quasi judicial powers can be assailed by a petition for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, or a petition for prohibition under Sec. 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court by a higher court. In such cases, the aggrieved party is expected to exhaust available administrative remedies as a general rule. On the other hand, a petition for prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. The remedy is an ordinary action for nullification with the RTC. Also, in questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court (Holy Spirit Home Owners Association v. Defensor, G.R. No. 163980, August 3, 2006).

Answer 345

All powers necessary for the effective exercise of the express powers are deemed impliedly granted. A grant of express power to formulate implementing rules and regulations must necessarily include the power to amend, revise, alter, or repeal the same (Vazaki Torres Manufacturing v. CA, G.R. No. 130584, June 27, 2006).

Answer 346

1. Delegation to Local Governments- Local legislative power shall be exercised by the sangguniang panlalawigan for the province; the sangguniang panlungsod for the city; the sangguniang bayan for the municipality; and the sangguniang barangay for the barangay. (Sec. 48, RA. 7160). 2. Delegation of Emergency Powers to the President in Times of War and National Emergency - In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as ti may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof (CONST. Sec. 23(2), Art. VI). 3. Delegation of Tariff Powers to the President - The Congress may, by law, authorize t h e President to fix within specified limits, and subject ot such limitations and restrictions as ti may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. (CONST. Sec. 28(2), Art. VI).

Answer 347

1. The principle of res judicata may not be invoked in labor relations proceedings considering that Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code provides that such proceedings are "non- litigious and summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities obtaining in the courts of law" (Nasipit Lumber Company v. NLRC, G.R. No. 54424, August 31, 1989). 2. Another exception to this rule is in case of judgment rendered on a null contract. This is because there is no valid judgment which can be predicated on res judicata (B.F. Goodrich Philippines Inc., v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, G.R. No. L-38569, March 28, 1988).

Answer 348

An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also ni proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken and may require the attendance o f witnesses i n proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, to report findings to appropriate bodies, and make recommendations for actions (Evangelista v. Jarencio, G.R. No. L-29274, November 27, 1975).

Answer 349

The power ot punish contempt must be expressly granted to the administrative body. When it is so granted, it may be exercised only when the administrative body is actually performing quasi-judicial functions (Guevarra v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-12596, July 31, 1958).

Answer 350

As a rule, administrative agencies may not issue warrants of arrest because under Article IlI, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution, only judges may issue warrants of arrest and search (Salazar v. Achacoso, G.R. No. 81510, March 14, 1990).

Answer 351

The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation (Salazar v. Achacoso, G.R. No. 81510, March 14, 1990).

Answer 352

The doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction refers ot the competence of a court to take cognizance of a case at first instance. Under this doctrine, fi an administrative tribunal has jurisdiction over a controversy, courts should not resolve the issue even if it may be within its proper jurisdiction. This is especially true when the question involves its sound discretion requiring special knowledge, experience, and services to determine technical and intricate matters of fact (Republic .v Galo, G.R. No. 207074, January 17, 2018)

Answer 353

Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. The only effect of non-compliance with the rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can take cognizance of the case and try it (Soto v. Jareno, G.R. No. L-38962, September 15, 1986).

Answer 354

(CARD) 1. Citizenship - a Filipino citizen: 2. Age - at least 18 years of age; 3. Residence: a. A resident of the Philippines for at least 1 year; b. A resident of the place where he proposes to vote for at least 6 months; and 4. Not otherwise Disqualified by law (CONST. Art V, Sec. 1).

Answer 355

The age and residency requirements must be complied with on the day of election. Any person, who, on the day of registration may not have reached the required age or period of residence but, who, on the day of the election shall possess such qualifications, may register as a voter (R.A. No. 8189, otherwise known as the Voter's Registration Act of 1996, Sec. 9).

Answer 356

(IDNI) 1. Those convicted by final judgment to suffer Imprisonment for not less than 1 year, unless removed by plenary pardon or granted amnesty, but their rights are automatically reacquired upon expiration of 5 years after service of sentence; 2. Those adjudged by final judgment as having committed any crime involving Disloyalty to government or any crime against National security, but their rights are reacquired upon expiration of 5 years after service of sentence; and 3. Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority (B.P. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, Sec. 118; RA. . No. 8189, Sec. 11).

Answer 357

(1-DIVE-CV) 1. Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than 1 year, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty (R.A. No. 8189, Sec. 27, par. (a)); Note: The right to vote may be automatically reacquired upon expiration of 5 years after service of sentence as certified by the clerk of courts of the MTC / MCTC / MeTC, RTC and the Sandiganbayan. 2. Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by a competent court or tribunal of having caused/committed any crime involving Disloyalty to the duly constituted government such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the anti-subversion and firearms laws, or any crime against national security, unless restored ot his ful civil and political rights ni accordance with law (RA. . No. 8189, Sec. 27, par. (b)); Note: The right to vote may be regained automatically upon expiration of 5 years after service of sentence. 3. Any person declared by competent authority to be Insane or incompetent unless such disqualification has been subsequently removed by a declaration of a proper authority that such person is no longer insane or incompetent (R.A. No. 8189, Sec. 27, par. (c)); 4. Any person who did not Vote in the two successive preceding regular elections as shown by their voting records. For this purpose, regular elections do not include the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections (R.A. No. 8189, Sec. 27, par. (d)); 5. Any person whose registration has been ordered Excluded by the Court (R.A. No. 8189, Sec. 27, par. (e)); 6. Any person who has lost his Filipino Citizenship (R.A. No. 8189, Sec. 27, par. f)); and 7. Voters who fail to submit for Validation on or before the last day of filing of application for registration for purposes of the May 2016 elections (R.A. No. 10367, Sec. 7).

Answer 358

The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (R.A. No. 7941, Sec. 3(a)).

Answer 359

Party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total number of representatives ni the House of Representatives (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 5(2)).

Answer 360

A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office (R.A. No. 7941, Sec. 3(c).

Answer 361

No. In order to acquire juridical personality as a political party, ot entitle ti ot the benefits and privileges granted under the Constitution and the laws, and in order to participate inthe party-lists system, the group must register with the Commission on Elections by filing with the Comelec not later than 90 days before the election a verified petition stating its desire to participate in the party list system as a national, regional, sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations (R.A. No. 7941, Sec. 5).

Answer 362

No. The folowing groups cannot be registered as political parties: 1. Religious denominations or sects: 2. Those who seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means; 3. Those who refuse to uphold and adhere to the Constitution; and 4. Those supported by foreign governments. (CONST. Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(5)).

Answer 363

1. A natural-born citizen of the Philippines; 2. A registered voter; 3. A resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than 1 year immediately preceding the election day; 4. Able to read and write; 5. A bona fide member of the party he seeks to represent for at least 90 days preceding election day; and 6. At least 25 years of age on election day. (R.A. 7941, Sec. 9). Note: In case of the youth sector, he must be at least 25 but not more than 03 years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who reaches the age of 30 during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term (ld).

Answer 364

In the party-list system, no single party may hold more than 3party-list seats. Bigger parties which traditionally will dominate elections cannot corner all the seats and crowd out the smaller parties because of this maximum ceiling. Thissystem shall pave the way for smaller parties to also win seats ni the House of Representatives (R.A. 7941, Sec. 11(b)).

Answer 365

The citizenship qualification should be possessed when "the elective (or elected) official" begins to govern, le,, at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term (Frivaldo .v COMELEC, G,R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996). Note: In the case of Maquiling v. COMELEC, then-Commissioner Rene Sarmiento opined in the subject COMELEC En Banc ruling thati fa candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran for office or if he lost his citizenship after his election ot office, he i s disqualified to serve as such" (Maquiling v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013).

Answer 366

(I-SIRO18-MT) 1. Those who are declared as Insane or incompetent by competent authority; 2. Those who are convicted by final judgment for Subversion, Insurrection, Rebellion, or any Offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen 18 months imprisonment; or 3. Those who are convicted by final judgment for a crime involving Moral Turpitude (B.P. 881, Sec. 12). Note: These disqualifications shall be deemed removed: (1) upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or (2) after the expiration of a period of 5 years from his service of sentence (B.P. 881, Sec. 12). Note: The disqualifications under Sec. 12 are applicable to all candidates.

Answer 367

(M-ROD-FPI) 1. Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving Moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by 1 year or more of imprisonment, within 2 years after serving sentence; Note: The Omnibus Election Code prescribes a period of 5 years from service of sentence for the removal of such disqualification (B.P. 881, Sec. 12), while the LGC prescribes a period of only 2 years. This incompatibility was resolved by the SC in Magno v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 147904. October 4, 2002), where it ruled that the 2-year period applies to local positions, while the 5-year period applies to national positions. 2. Those Removed from office a s a result of an administrative case; 3. Those convicted by final judgment for violating the Oath of allegiance to the Republic; 4. Those with Dual citizenship; 5. Fugitives from justice in criminalor non-political cases here or abroad; 6. Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and 7. The Insane or feeble-minded (R.A. No. 7160, Sec. 40).

Answer 368

(MTAC-VF) 1. One who has given Money or other material consideration ot influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; 2. One who committed acts of Terrorism to enhance his candidacy; 3. One who spent ni his election campaign an Amount in excess of that allowed by the Code; 4. One who has solicited, received or made Contributions prohibited under Sec. 89 (transportation, food and drinks), Section 95 (public or private financial institutions, public utilities or exploitation of natural resources, contractors of public works or other government contracts; franchise holders or concessionaires; educational institutions receiving grants from the government, officials of the Civil Service or the AFP, foreigners or foreign corporations), Section 96 (foreign-sourced contributions), Section 97 (raising of funds through lotteries, cockfights, boxing bouts, bingo, beauty contests, etc.), and Section 104 (prohibited contributions to churches, school buildings, roads, bridges, medical clinics, etc.); 5. One who has Violated the provisions of Section 80 (campaign period), Section 83 (removal, destruction of lawful election propaganda), Sec. 85 (prohibited forms of propaganda), Section 86 (regulation of propaganda through mass media) and Section 261 (election offenses); or 6. One who is a permanent resident of or Immigrant to a Foreign country, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws (B.P. 881, Sec. 68).

Answer 369

(DWD) If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party Dies, Withdraws or si Disqualified for any cause (B.P. 881, Sec. 77).

Answer 370

Only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy ot replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified (B.P. 881, Sec. 77).

Answer 371

(VOW-SMQ) 1. There is a Valid certificate of candidacy (Talaga v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 196804, October 9, 2012); 2. The Original candidate has died, withdrawn, or has been disqualified for any cause (B.P. 881, Sec. 77); 3. There is a valid Withdrawal of the COC after the last day for the filing of COCs; 4. The substitute belongs to and is certified by the Same political party; 5. The substitute filed his COC not later than Mid-day of election day (Cerafica v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014); and 6. The substitute himself Qualifies for the position.

Answer 372

Substitution is not allowed: For independent candidates (Comelec Resolution No. 2977, Sec. 1 and Comelec Resolution No. 10430, Sec. 33); and If the certificate of candidacy of the candidate to be replaced had been denied due course to and/or cancelled prior to the attempted substitution, substitution is not allowed because considering that Section 7 of OEC requires that there be a candidate in order for substitution to take place, as well as the precept that a person without a valid certificate of candidacy is not considered as a candidate at all, ti necessarily follows that if a person's certificate of candidacy had been denied due course to and/or cancelled, he or she cannot be validly substituted in the electoral process. The existence of a valid certificate of candidacy is therefore a condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to be validly substituted (Tagolino v. HRET, G.R: No. 202202, March 19, 2013). Note: A person who is disqualified under Section 68 is prohibited to continue as a candidate, but a person whose certificate of candidacy is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not considered as a candidate at all because his status is that of a person who has not filed a certificate of candidacy (Talaga v. COMELEC, GR.. No. 196804, October 9, 2012).

Answer 373

The substitute of a candidate who has withdrawn his certificate of candidacy can still file based on the following: 1. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected not later than mid-day of the day of the election; and 2. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he si a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission (OEC, Sec. 77).

Answer 374

The substitute for a candidate who died or was disqualified by final judgment, may file a COC up to mid-day of Election Day; provided that, the substitute and the substituted have the same surnames. If the death or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid- day of Election Day, the substitute candidate may file a COC with any Board of Election Inspectors, Election Officers, Provincial Election Supervisor or Regional Election Director, as the case may be, in the political subdivision where such person is a candidate, or in the case of a candidate for Senator, with the Law Department; Provided that, the substitute and the substituted candidate have the same surnames (COMELEC Resolution 10430, Sec. 33).

Answer 375

No. The COMELEC may not, by itself, without proper proceedings, deny due course ot or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. Sec. 78 of OEC, which treats of a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation therein is false, requires that the candidate must be notified of the petition against him and he should be given the opportunity to present evidence in his behalf (Cipriano v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 158830, August 10, 2004). Absent any due proceedings under Section 68, 69, or 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC must rely on the truth as declared "on the face" of the certificates of candidacy thus submitted to them.

Answer 376

The instances where the COMELEC can go beyond the face of the certificate of candidacy are (NDDA): 1. In a proceeding to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of a Nuisance candidate under Sec. 69 of OEC; 2. Power to Deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Sec. 78 of OEC; 3. Filing of a Disqualification case on any of the grounds enumerated in Sec. 68 of OEC; or 4. In cases where the candidate is suffering from the Accessory penalty of disqualification to run for public office resulting from conviction for a crime (Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191970, 24 April 2012). Note: Even without a petition under either Section 78 of the OEC, or under Sec. 40 of the LGC, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public office and the COMELEC is duty bound to enforce al laws relative to the conduct of an election (Dimapilis v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 227158, April 18, 2017).

Answer 377

(MCI) Nuisance candidates are those whose certificates of candidacy are filed to put the election process in Mockery or disrepute, or to cause Confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates, or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide Intention to run for the office for which the COC has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true wil of the electorate (B.P. 881, Sec. 69).

Answer 378

A verified petition to declare a duly registered candidate as a nuisance candidate under Section 69 of B.P. 881 shall be filed personally or through duly authorized representative with the COMELEC by any registered candidate for the same office within 5 days from the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy (R.A. No. 6646, Sec. 5 (a).

Answer 379

(PR) 1.Personal filing; or 2.Through duly authorized Representative with the COMELEC. Note: Filing by mail is NOT alowed (RA. No. 6646, Sec, 5(a)):

Answer 380

No. A petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC on the ground that he is a nuisance candidate under Section 69 as i n Section 7 8 cannot be treated in the same manner as a petition to disqualify under Sec. 68. Hence, the legal effect of such cancellation on grounds provided in the Omnibus Election Code and LGC (Dela Cruz v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192221, November 13, 2012).

Answer 381

The votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such ni afinal judgment, shall be considered stray votes (Dela Cruz v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192221, November 13, 2012). Note: However, where such nuisance candidate, so declared by final judgement as such, has the same surname as that of a legitimate candidate, votes cast for the nuisance candidate are not stray but must be counted ni favor of the latter (Dela Cruz v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192221, November 13, 2012).

Answer 382

The exception does not apply fi there are two or more bona fide candidates with the same name and/or surname as the nuisance candidate. Thus, the votes cast for the nuisance candidate shall also be considered as stray votes (COMELEC Resolution No. 9599).

Answer 383

a. Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election: 90 days before election b. Members of the Congress election: 45 days before election c. Local election: 45 days before election d. Barangay election: 15 days before election e. Special election: 45 days before election

Answer 384

The law does not say that a candidate who commits premature campaigning can be disqualified or prosecuted only after the start of the campaign period. What the law says is "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period." The plain meaning of this provision is that the effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful (Penera v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 181613 (Resolution), November 25, 2009).

Answer 385

1. Where the candidate is a nuisance candidate (B.P. 881, Sec. 69); and 2. Where the certificate of candidacy contains false material representations (B.P. 881, Sec. 78).

Answer 386

Jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting ni division, not with the COMELEC en banc (Garvida v. Sales, G.R. No. 124893, April 18, 1997).

Answer 387

The wreath of victory cannot be transferred from na ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is, the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legaly cast balots (Topacio v. Raredes, GR. . No, 8069, October 7, 1912).

Answer 388

1. It does not apply when the effect of a decision is: that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections. We have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. 2. The rule applies in declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. No question as to the correctness of the returns or the manner of casting and counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and generally the only result can be that the election fails entirely. There is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots (Maquiling v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013).

Answer 389

In Maquiling v. Comelec, G.R. No 195649, April 16, 2013, the Supreme Court held that it does not even have a legal basis to stand on. It was a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with another and explaining the effects thereof. As an independent statement, ti si even illogical. nI the same case, the Court ruled that the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an election. When there are participants who turn out ot be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded ot the next ni rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set ni the rules ot be eligible as a candidate.

Answer 390

Postponement of elections may be declared for any serious cause such as: 1. Violence; 2. Terrorism; 3. Loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records; 4. Force majeure; or 5. Other analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political subdivision. (B.P. 881, Sec. 5).

Answer 391

The Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby al interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election (id)

Answer 392

The election shall be postponed to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than 30 days after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect (ld).

Answer 393

(FAS) 1. The election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of Force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; 2. After the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; and 3. The election in any polling place had been Suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes (Mutilan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 171248, April 2, 2007).

Answer 394

The COMELEC en banc has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for declaration of failure of election or for annulment of election results (R.A. No. 7166, Sec. 4).

Answer 395

The HRET, as the sole judge of al contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, may annul election results if in its determination, fraud, terrorism, or other electoral irregularities existed to warrant the annulment. Because in doing so, it is merely exercising its constitutional duty to ascertain who among the candidates received the majority of the valid votes cast (Abayon v. HRET, G.R. No. 222236, May 3, 2016).

Answer 396

The postponement, declaration of faiture of election and the calling of special elections as provided in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be decided by the COMELEC sitting en banc by a majority vöte of its members. The causes for the declaration of a failure of election may occur before or after the casting of votes or on the day of the election (R,A/ 7166, Sec. 4).

Answer 397

(1) In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansaeighteen months or more before a regular election, the Commission shall call a special election, to be held within sixty days after the vacancy occurs to elect the member to serve the unexpired term. (2) In case of dissolution of the Batasang Pambansa, the President shall call an election which shall not be held earlier than forty-five (45) nor later than sixty (60) days from the date of such dissolution. The Commission shall send sufficient copies of its resolution for the holding of the election to its provincial election supervisors and election registrars for dissemination, who shall post copies thereof in atleast three conspicuous places preferably where public meetings are held in each city or municipality affected (B.P. 881, Section 7).

Answer 398

In case a vacancy occurs for the Office of the President and Vice-President, the Batasang Pambansa shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven days enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five (45) days nor later than sixty (60) days from the time of such call (B.P. 881, Sec. 14).

Answer 399

In the case of House of Representative Electoral Tribunal, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. Stated in another manner, where the candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the remedy of the petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the HRET (Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 172131, April 2, 2007).

Answer 400

Prohibited acts under Sec. 261, B.P. 881: 1. Vote buying and vote selling (People v. Ferrer, 54 O.G. 1348); 2. Wagering upon the result of the election; 3. Threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms of coercion; 4. Appointment of new employee; 5. Carrying of deadly weapon within a radius of 100 meters from the precinct (Orceo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190779, March 26, 2010); 6. Transfer or detail of government official or employee with COMELEC approval (People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 115022 August 14, 1995).

Answer 401

The COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction to "investigateand where appropriate, prosecute violations of election laws and acts which constitute election fraud, offenses and malpractices. It may, however, validly delegate the power to the Provincial Prosecutor (Section 2(6), Art. IX-C, 1987 Constitution)

Answer 402

Yes. Cases must be filed five years from date of commission for the offenses enumerated in Sec. 261, B.P. 881.

Answer 403

The principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization." It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio." Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of government (Basco v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991).

Answer 404

The autonomous region is a corporate entity with jurisdiction over all matters devolved to it by the Constitution and the Organic Act (R.A. No. 9054, Sec. 2, Article IV). From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article X of the Constitution. Autonomous regions are established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of the said Article—the article wholly devoted to Local Government (Datu Michael Abas Kida .v Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011).

Answer 405

No. An elective local official who was removed from office as a result of an administrative case prior to January 1, 192 (the date of effectivity of the Local Government Code) is not disqualified from running for elective local office (Grego v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997).

Answer 406

Yes. In recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without performing any act and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another State, the Court explained that "dual citizenship", as a disqualification, must refer to citizens with "dual allegiance". Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under the disqualification Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999).

Answer 407

No. The constitutional prohibition on "midnight appointments", specifically those made 2 months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or to the Acting President. There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of their tenure absent fraud on their part, when such appointments are not tainted by irregularities or anomalies which breach laws and regulations governing appointments (De Rama v. CA, G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001).

Answer 408

No. The Provincial Governor is without authority to designate the Assistant Provincial Treasurer for Administration, because under Sec. 471 of the Local Government Code, ti is the Secretary of Finance who has the power to appoint Assistant Provincial Treasurers from a list of recommendees of the Provincial Governor (Dimaandal v. COA, G.R. No. 122197, June 26, 1998).

Answer 409

In case of permanent vacancy in the positions given below, the following shall succeed: (Vacancy: Successor) 1. Office of the Governor: Vice-governor; 2. Office of the Mayor: Vice-mayor; 3. Office of the Vice-governor or Vice-mayor: Highest ranking Sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking Sanggunian member; 4. Member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking Sanggunian member; 5. Office of the Punong Barangay: Highest ranking Sangguniang Barangay member, member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking Sanggunian member (LGC, Sec. 4).

Answer 410

A tie between and among the highest ranking Sanggunian members shall be resolved by the drawing of lots. For purposes of succession, ranking ni the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of the votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district ni the immediately preceding election (LGO, Sec, 44).

Answer 411

Permanent vacancies in the Sanggunian where automatic succession does not apply shall be filled by appointment by the following chief executives: 1. President, through the Executive Secretary, for vacancies ni the: a. Sangguniang Panlalawigan VIl b. Sangguniang Panlungsod of Highly Urbanized City (HUC) and Independent Component City (ICC) 2. Governor, for vacancies in the: a. Sangguniang Panlungsod of component cities b. Sangguniang Bayan 3. Municipal or City Mayor, upon recommendation of the Sangguniang Barangay concerned, for vacancies in the: a. Sangguniang Barangay (LGC, Sec. 45)

Answer 412

Except for the Sangguniang Barangay, the appointee must be nominated by the same political party as that of the Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy and shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant office. If the Sanggunian member does not belong to any political party, the local chief executive shall appoint a qualified person, upon recommendation of the Sanggunian concerned. In case of vacancy in the representation of the youth and the barangay in the Sanggunian, it shall be filled automatically by the official next ni rank of the organization concerned (LGC, Sec. 45).

Answer 413

1. A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an independent component city or component city shall be filed before the Office of the President; 2. A complaint against any elective official of a municipality shall be filed before the sangguniang panlalawigan whose decision may be appealed to the Office of the President; and 3. A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned whose decision shall be final and executory (LGC, Sec. 61)

Answer 414

The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be 3 years and no such official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered a s an interruption in the continuity of his service for the ful term for which he was elected (CONST. Art. X, Sec. 8). The term of office of Barangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elective officials shall be 3 years (R.A. No. 9164, Sec. 2, R.A. No. 10742, Sec. 11).

Answer 415

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers ot the next regular election for the same office folowing the end of the third consecutive term (Abundo, Sr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013).

Answer 416

Recall is the termination of official relationship for loss of confidence prior to the expiration of his term through the wil of the people (NACHURA, supra at 626).

Answer 417

The officials sought to be recalled shall automatically be considered as duly registered candidate or candidates to the pertinent positions and, like other candidates, shall be entitled to be voted upon (LGC, Sec. 71).

Answer 418

Recall shall be effective only upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election on recall. Should the official sought to be recalled receive the highest number of votes, confidence in him is thereby affirmed and he shall continue ni office (LGC, Sec. 72).

Answer 419

No. An elective local official sought to be recalled shall not be allowed to resign while the recall process is in progress (LGC, Sec. 73).

Answer 420

The Doctrine of Transformation is a method which requires that an international law principle be transformed into domestic law through a constitutional mechanism, such as local legislation (Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque, G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007). Note: In this jurisdiction, the Doctrine of Transformation is embodied in Art. Vil, Sec. 21 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that "No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of al the Members of the Senate."

Answer 421

The Doctrine of Incorporation is a method which applies, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law (Id). Note: In this jurisdiction, the Doctrine of Incorporation is embodied in the Incorporation Clause found in Art. Il, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that "The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with al nations."

Answer 422

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since ti is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause (Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000).

Answer 423

The Constitution. The Supreme Court has the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 5 (2)(a)).

Answer 424

It depends. If the conflict is between a law and an executive agreement, the law should prevail. The President cannot, by executive agreement, enter a transaction which is prohibited by laws enacted prior thereto. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws (Gonzales v. Hechanova, G.R. No. L-21897, October 22, 1963). If the conflict is between a law and a treaty, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail (Gonzales .v Hechanova, G.R. No. L-21897, October 2, 1963).

Answer 425

International law is superior to municipal law because international law provides the standard by which to determine the legality of a State's conduct (PARAS, International Law and World Politics, 1994, p. 23 (hereinafter PARAS,International Law]). Also, under Article 7 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [hereinafter VCLT], "a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."

Answer 426

International law and domestic law belong to only one system of law. However, there are two monist theories. One theoryholds that municipal law subsumes and is superior to international law, and a second theory holds that international law is superior to domestic law (BERNAS, Introduction to Public International Law p. 58).

Answer 427

International law and municipal law are essentially different from each other, with each nation ascertaining for itself as to the extent that international law is incorporated into its domestic legal system. Dualists hold that the status of international law in the domestic system is determined by domestic law (Government of the U.S.A v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, December 17, 2002).

Answer 428

In International Law, a State is defined as an entity that has a defined territory and permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage ni, formal relations with other such entities (Montevideo Convention of 1933 on Rights and Duties of States, Art. 1)

Answer 429

1. Permanent Population: 2. Defined Territory, 3. Government; and 4. Capacity ot enter into relations with other states (Montevideo Convention, Art. 1).

Answer 430

Yes. The Holy See has al the constituent elements of statehood. tI has al the rights of a state, including diplomatic intercourse, immunity from foreign jurisdiction, and others (NACHURA, Outline Reviewer Political Law, p. 650). The Vatican City represents an entity organized not for political but for ecclesiastical purposes and international objects. Despite its size and object, the Vatican City has an independent government of its own, with the Pope, who is also head of the Roman Catholic Church, as the Holy See or Head of State, ni conformity with its traditions, and the demands of its mission ni the world. Indeed, the world-wide interests and activities of the Vatican City are such as ot make it in a sense an "international state" (Holy See v. Rosario, G.R. No. 101949, December 1, 1994).

Answer 431

The United Nations is a universal organization charged with peacekeeping responsibilities, the development of friendly relations among nations, the achievement of international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural and humanitarian character, and the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedomsfor al human beings without discrimination (BERNAS, Public International Law, p. 93).

Answer 432

Persona non grata is a declaration that a diplomat specifically named is no longer welcome in the territory of the receiving State (International Law Reviewer, Saul Hofilena Jr., p. 34).

Answer 433

Although diplomats may not be arrested or prosecuted by the courts of the host State because the Convention has placed them outside the jurisdiction of the civil, administrative and criminal courts of the receiving State, if a diplomatic agent commits an offense of an odious character or in any way offends the receiving State, the latter may, without explaining its decision, declare that the head of the mission or any member of the mission, as persona non grata. The sending State shall then recall the person concerned or terminate his functions with the mission. Should the sending State refuse to recall the diplomatic agent who has been declared persona non grata, the receiving State "may refuse to recognize the person concerned as amember of the mission" (ld).

Answer 434

Diplomats may be declared persona non grata after they have been received and have entered upon their duties as diplomats in the receiving State or even before they have arrived in the territory of the receiving State (International Law Reviewer, Saul Hofilena Jr., p. 35).

Answer 435

Yes, diplomatic agents enjoy immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction, except: 1. A real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission; 2. An action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State; 3. An action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent ni the receiving State outside his official functions. (Article 31, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961):

Answer 436

Yes, a diplomatic agent is exempt from all dues and taxes, personal or real, national, regional or municipal except: 1. Inheritance taxes; 2. Dues and taxes on private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission; and 3. Indirect taxes of a kind which are normally incorporated in the price of goods or services. (Article 34, Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations, 1961).

Answer 437

It can be waived by the sending State and such waiver must be expressly made. fI the diplomatic agent initiates a legal proceeding within the State where there is immunity, one cannot invoke immunity from jurisdiction with respect to any counterclaim directly connected with the principal claim. fI there is a waiver of immunity of the diplomat executed by the sending state with respect to a civil, criminal or administrative proceeding, such waiver shall not be held to imply waiver or immunity with respect to the execution of a judgment, which wil require a separate waiver of the sending State (Article 32, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961).

Answer 438

(NeSiRa-ExReg) 1. Negotiation - Discussion of the provisions of the proposed treaty, undertaken by the representatives of the contracting parties who are provided with credentials known as full powers; 2. Signature - Primarily intended as means of authenticating the instrument and symbolizing the good faith of the contracting parties; Note: An alternate is an arrangement under which each negotiator is allowed to sign first on the copy of the treaty which he wil bring home to his own country, the purpose being to preserve the formal appearance of equality among the contracting states and to avoid delicate questions of precedence among the signatories (CRUZ, International Law Reviewer, supra at 214). 3. Ratification - Act by which the state formally accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative; 4. Exchange of instruments of ratification; and 5. Registration with the United Nations (Pimentel .v Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005). Note: The treaty may be submitted for registration and publication under the U.N. Charter, although this step is not essential to the validity of the agreement as between the parties.

Answer 439

1. Jus Cogens restrictions - A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, ti conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law (VCLT, Art. 53). 2. Principle of Charter Supremacy I n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the UN under the UN charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the UN Charter shall prevail (UN Charter, Art. 103).

Answer 440

No. It is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse ot ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed ni its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus (Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005).

Answer 441

A treaty not concurred by the Senate will not be valid and effective (CONST, Art. VI, Sec. 21).

Answer 442

A treaty enters into force ni such manner and upon such date as ti may provide or as the negotiating States may agree. In the absence of such provision or agreement, a treaty enters into force as soon as consent to be bound by the treaty has been established for al the negotiating States (VCLT, Art. 24).

Answer 443

Pacta sunt servanda (Latin for "pacts must be respected") is a basic principle of international law that is now codified ni the VCLT, which states that "every treaty in force si binding upon the parties ot ti and must be performed by them ni good faith" (VCLT, Art. 26)

Answer 444

Pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt is a Roman law maxim which means that a treaty creates neither obligations nor rights for a third State. Athird State is one that is not a party to the treaty (International Law Reviewer, Saul Hofilena Jr., p. 52).

Answer 445

It is the doctrine which constitutes an attempt to formulate a legal principle which would justify non-performance of a treaty obligation fi the conditions with relation to which the parties contracted have changed so materially and so unexpectedly as to create a situation in which the exaction of performance would be unreasonable. This doctrine is subject ot the following limitations: 1. It applies only to treaties of indefinite duration 2. The vital change must have been unforeseen or unforeseeable and should not have been caused by the party invoking the doctrine 3. The doctrine must be invoked within a reasonable time 4. It cannot operate retroactively upon the provisions of the treaty already executed prior to the change of circumstances (CRUZ, International Law 2003 [hereinafter CRUZ, International Law]).

Answer 446

Yes. The President can withdraw from a treaty as a matter of policy in keeping with our legal system, if a treaty is unconstitutional or contrary to provisions of an existing prior statute (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. No. 238875, March 16, 2021).

Answer 447

1. The Senate conditionally concurs, such that it requires concurrence also to withdraw; or 2. The withdrawal itself wil be contrary to a statute, or to a legislative authority to negotiate and enter into a treaty, or an existing law which implements a treaty (ld).

Answer 448

A Stateless person is a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law (1954 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF STATELESS PERSONS, Art. 1[hereinafter 1954 CONVENTION]).

Answer 449

Stateless persons are either de jure or de facto stateless. De Jure stateless persons are those who have lost their nationality, ti they had one, and have not acquired a new one. De Facto stateless persons are those who have a nationality but to whom protection is denied by their state when out of the state. This is the situation of many refugees (BERNAS, Public International Law, supra at 151).

Answer 450

A Stateless person shall be accorded the same treatment granted to a national of the country of his habitual residence with respect to the rights to artistic rights and industrial property, free access ot courts, rationing, elementary education, and public relief and assistance. He shall also be accorded the same treatment which shall be as favorable as possible and, ni any event, not less favorable than that accorded ot aliens (1954 CONVENTION, Arts. 14-24).

Answer 451

In addition to not returning the refugee to his own state, he must not be sent to a third state if his life or freedom would there be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (1954 CONVENTION, Art. 33).

Answer 452

1. There are reasonable grounds for regarding the refugee as a danger to the security of the state; and 2. Having been convicted of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the state Id).

Answer 453

It postulates that a state exercises exclusive jurisdiction (executive, legislative, and judicial) with respect to all persons, things, transactions, or happenings within its territorial limits. The extent to which a State exercises jurisdiction over persons or acts done outside its territory is narrower and depends on the kind of jurisdiction it seeks to invoke (SUAREZ, Political Law, supra at 1229).

Answer 454

The effects doctrine provides that a state also has jurisdiction over acts occurring outside its territory but having effects within it. It may further be divided into the two principles:Subjective Territoriality and Objective Territoriality (BERNAS, Public International Law, supra at 133).

Answer 455

Under the English Rule, the coastal State shall have jurisdiction over al offenses committed on board the vessel except those which do not compromise the peace of the port. On the other hand, the French Rule states that the flag State shall have jurisdiction over al offenses committed on board the vessel except those which compromise the peace of the port (NACHURA, Outline Reviewer Political Law, p. 671).

Answer 456

The State exercises jurisdiction over everything found in internal waters since internal waters are deemed assimilated ni the land mass (ld).

Answer 457

The State exercises jurisdiction over everything found ni archipelagic waters, except for innocent passage of merchant vessels through archipelagic sea lanes (UNCLOS, Arts. 52-53).

Answer 458

Criminal jurisdiction over foreign merchant vessels shall be determined by the application of either the English Rule or the French Rule. Innocent passage and involuntary entrance are recognized exceptions, provided that ni case of involuntary entrance, the distress on the vessel must be real (NACHURA, Outline Reviewer Political Law, p. 672).

Answer 459

The coastal State may exercise the control necessary to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary regulations, and punish the said infringement (UNCLOS, Art. 33).

Answer 460

The coastal State has sovereign rights over the exclusive economic zone for purposes of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the sea-bed, the sub-soil and the superjacent waters, as wel as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds. Other States shall have the freedom of navigation and over-flight, to lay submarine cables and pipes, and other lawful uses (UNCLOS, Art. 56).

Answer 461

The coastal State enjoys the right of exploitation of oil deposits and other resources in the continental shelf. In case the continental shelf extends to the shores of another State, or is shared with another State, the boundary shall be determined ni accordance with equitable principles (UNCLOS, Art, 77),

Answer 462

Jurisdiction may be exercised by the State on the high seas over the following: 1. Its vessels 2. Pirates 3. Those engaged in illicit traffic in drugs and slave trade 4. In the exercise of the right to visit and search 5. In hot pursuit (UNCLOS, Part VI).

Answer 463

1. Foreign merchant vessels exercising the right of innocent passage or arival under stress 2. Foreign armies passing through or stationed ni the territory with the permission of the State 3. Warships and other public vessels of another State operated for non- commercial purposes (NACHURA, Outline Reviewer Political Law, p. 671).

Answer 464

Innocent passage is navigation through hte territorial sea of aState for hte purpose of traversing that sea without entering internal waters, or of proceeding ot internal waters, or making for the high seas from internal waters, as long as ti si not prejudicial ot the peace, good order or security of the coastal State (Id).

Answer 465

Arrival under stress is an involuntary entrance which may be due ot lack of provisions, unseaworthiness of the vessel, inclement weather, or other case of force majeure, such as pursuit by pirates (ld).

Answer 466

They are generally immune from local jurisdiction under the fiction that they are "floating territory" of the Flag State (Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 1 U.S. 116, March 2, 1812).

Answer 467

No. Their crew members are immune from local jurisdiction when on shore duty, but this immunity will not apply fi the crew members violate local laws while on furlough or off-duty (NACHURA, Outline Reviewer Political Law, p. 671).

Answer 468

Under the Protective Principle, a state may exercise jurisdiction over conduct outside its territorytory that threatens its security , as long as that conduct is generally recognized as criminal by statesin the international community (BERNAS, Public International Law, 2009, supra at 156, citing Restatement 402(3]). Examples: 1.Treason 2. Forging a government's currency 3. Plot to break a government's immigration regulations

Answer 469

Since this principle gives states wide latitude in defining the parameters of their jurisdiction, the international community has strictly construed the reach of this doctrine to those offenses posing adirect and specific threat ot national security (United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (1988)).

Answer 470

Under the Universality Principle, the State has jurisdiction over offenses considered as universal crimes regardless of where these crimes were committed and who committed them. Universal crimes are those which threaten the international community as a whole and are considered criminal offenses in al countries (NACHURA, Outline Reviewer Political Law, p. 668). Examples: 1.Piracy 2.Genocide 3. War crimes

Answer 471

Under the Passive Personality Principle, States have, in limited cases, claimed jurisdiction ot try a foreign national for ofenses commited abroad that afect its own citizens. (S.S. Lotus Case [France V. Turkey]. (CJ Reports, 1927). Examples: 1. Terrorism 2. Organized attacks on a State's nationals by reason of their nationality 3. Assassination of a State's diplomatic representatives or other officials

Answer 472

1. Balancing Test 2. International Comity 3. Forum non conveniens (BERNAS, Public International Law, supra at 173).

Answer 473

The Balancing Test is a mode of resolving conflicts of jurisdiction where fi the answer to al the following questions is ni the affirmative, then the court wil assume jurisdiction: 1. Was there an actual or intended effect on a State's foreign commerce? 2. Is the effect sufficiently large to present a cognizable injury ot the plaintiffs, and therefore, a violation of the anti-trust law? 3. Are the interests of the State sufficiently strong, vis-à-vis those of other nations, to justify an assertion of extraordinary authority? (Id).

Answer 474

International Comity is a mode of resolving conflicts of jurisdiction where the State will refrain from exercising its jurisdiction fi ti is unreasonable (ld).

Answer 475

If in the whole circumstances of the case ti be discovered that there is real unfairness to one of the suitors in permitting the choice of a forum which is not the natural or proper forum, either on the ground of convenience of trial or the residence or domicile of parties or of its being the locus contractus or locus solutionis, then the doctrine of forum non conveniens is properly applied (Id).

Answer 476

Extradition is the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of the foreign authorities to enable the requesting State or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting State or government (P.D. 1069, otherwise known as the "Philippine Extradition law," Art. 2(a)).

Answer 477

1. Based on the consent of the State expressed in a bilateral treaty; 2. Principle of Specialty - a fugitive who is extradited may be tried only for the crime specified in the request for extradition and included in the list of offenses in the extradition treaty, 3. Double Criminality - the act for which the extradition is sought must be punishable ni both States (SHAW, International Law), 4. Any person may be extradited, whether he be a national of the requesting State, of the State of refuge or of another State. He need not be a citizen of the requesting State; 5. The offense must have been committed within the territory of the requesting State or against its interest; 6. Political or religious offenders are generally not subject ot extradition, as wel as military offenses (BERNAS, Public Intemational Law, supra at 174); 7. Prohibition on Discrimination - extradition may not be granted fi it would subject the fugitive to prosecutions based on race, nationality, or political opinion; 8. Lack of probable cause clause the request for extradition must include sufficient prima facie evidence of guilt attributable to the person requested to be extradited

Answer 478

A provision in an extradition treaty which states that the murder or assassination of the head of a state or any member of his family wil not be considered as a political offense and therefore extraditable (SARMIENTO, PIL Reviewer, supra at 142).

Answer 479

(1) as to its nature E: surrender by force of a wanted person by the requested state to the requesting state D: expulsion of an unwanted or undesirable alien (2) as to its exercise E: may only be made pursuant to a treaty between the requesting state and the requested state D: a pure unilateral act and an exercise of sovereignty (3) as to its basis E: based on offenses generally committed in the state of origin D: based on causes arising in the local state (4) as to place of transfer E: it calls for the return of the fugitive to the state of origin D: an undesirable alien may be deported to a state other than his or her own or the state of origin (5) as to which state is benefitted E: for the benefit of the requesting state D: takes place in the interest of the country of residence

Answer 480

1. That all human beings are born free and equal in dignity 2. Everyone has the right ot life, liberty and the security of person 3. No one shall be held in slavery 4. No one shall be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 5. All are equal before the law 6. Everyone is entitled ot equal protection of the law 7. No one shall be arbitrarily arrested, detained or exiled 8. Those charged with a penal offense have the right to the presumption of innocence 9. Everyone has the right to a nationality 10. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property 11. Everyone has the right ot freedom of thought, conscience and religion 12. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly 13. Everyone has the right to work 14. Everyone has the right to an education (Id).

Answer 481

Yes. In the exercise of these rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare ni a democratic society. Rights and freedoms may not be exercised contrary ot the purposes and principles of the United Nations (UDHR, Art. 29).

Answer 482

Armed conflict means any use of force or armed violence between States or a protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within that State: Provided, That such force or armed violence gives rise, or may give rise, to a situation to which the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, including their common Article 3, apply (R.A. 9851, Sec. 3(c)).

Answer 483

Armed conflict may be international, that is, between 2 or more States, including belligerent occupation; or non-international, that is, between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a state. It does not cover internal disturbances or tensions such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature.

Answer 484

These are defined as conflicts restricted ot the ferritory of a single State, involving either regular armed forces fighting groups of armed dissidents, or armed groups fighting each other. They a r e governed by the common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions as well as by the Additional Protocol I| (SARMIENTO, PIL Reviewer, supra at 266).

Answer 485

(KS-DITI) Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial religious, social or any other similar stable and permanent group such as: 1. Killing members of the group; 2. Causing Serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 3. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction ni whole or in part; 4. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 5. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group; 6. Directly and publicly Inciting other to commit genocide (R.A. 9851, Sec. 5).

Answer 486

(WEED-ITS-PEAS) Other crimes against humanity means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systemic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: 1. Willful killing; 2. Extermination; 3. Enslavement; 4. Arbitrary Deportation or forcible transfer of population; 5. Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law: 6. Torture; 7. Rape, Sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; 8. Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, sexual orientation or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime defined in this 9. Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons; 10. Apartheid; and 11. Other inhumane acts of a Similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health (R.A. 9851, Sec. 6).

Answer 487

In the interest of justice, the relevant Philippine authorities may dispense with the investigation or prosecution of a crime punishable under this Act if another court or international tribunal is already conducting the investigation or undertaking the prosecution of such crime. Instead, the authorities may surrender or extradite suspected or accused persons in the Philippines to the appropriate international court, fi any, or to another State pursuant to the applicable extradition laws and treaties (ld).

Answer 488

No. The crimes defined and penalized under this Act, their prosecution, and the execution of sentences imposed on their account, shall not be subject to any prescription (R.A. 9851, Sec. 11).

Answer 489

The contention of Atty. Juana should be given merit, as the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s Petition for Review should have been filed under the representation of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Under the law, the OSG was constituted as the law office of the Government and shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer as such. The OSG, however, may be excused from representing the Government, its agencies, and instrumentalities when there is an express authorization by the OSG, naming therein the legal officers who are being deputized in cases involving their respective offices, subject to its supervision and control, or when the OSG takes a position different from that of the agency it is duty bound to represent. Here, there was no express authorization by the OSG naming the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of the HRET as its deputized legal officers in filing this petition. There was also no proof, let alone an allegation, that the OSG took a position different from the HRET in this case. (See House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal v. Panga-Vega, G.R. No. 228236 (Resolution), [January 27, 2021])

Answer 490

There was no violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases, as sheer length of time, without allegation and proof of prejudice to the party invoking the right, does not equate to an inordinate delay to justify the nullification of the Commission on Audit (COA) Proper issuances. The constitutional guarantee of speedy disposition of cases is a basic tenet of procedural due process which articulates that any party to a case may demand expeditious action from all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice. Jurisprudence, however, teaches us that not every delay in the disposition of matters before any justice administering body is arbitrary and constitutive of a violation of the constitutional guarantee of speedy disposition of cases. Certain factors must be taken into account, depending on the circumstances obtaining in every case. Here, the length of time alone, however, is not proof of delay that violates the right to speedy disposition of cases. The consolidated appeals cover numerous disallowances, which means that the COA sifted through and reviewed numerous sets of records. Moreover, petitioners failed to seasonably question the violation of their right to speedy disposition, as it was only in the Petition for Certiorari that they invoked – for the first time – the right to speedy disposition of cases. (See Abella v. Commission on Audit Proper, G.R. No. 238940, [April 19, 2022])

Answer 491

The plain view doctrine is applicable in the case. During the conduct of the checkpoint, PSI Dalisay saw in plain view a firearm protruding from Quiapo's belt bag. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have the view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence. The doctrine requires that: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. These requisites are present in this case. The police officers of the Malay Police Station, after receiving a report that a person was in possession of a gun, conducted a checkpoint in coordination with the municipal election officer. On board the bus, PSI Dalisay saw in plain view the firearm which was protruding from Arturo's half open belt bag. Thus, the police officers had the duty to arrest him and confiscate the contraband in his possession. (See Sullano y Santia v. People, G.R. No. 232147, [June 8, 2020])

Answer 492

No, the out-of-court identification by Charles and Maloi are to be afforded credibility. It is a jurisprudential pronouncement that one mode of out-of-court identification is the police lineup where the witness selects a suspect from a group of persons. In determining the admissibility and reliability of their out-of-court identification, the Court must look at the totality of the circumstances and consider the following factors, namely: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the length of time between the crime and the identification; (5) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. Here, the out-of-court identification of Robin by Charles and Maloi, satisfied the totality of the circumstances test. The rules assure fairness as well as compliance with the constitutional requirements of due process in regard to out-of-court identification, and prevent the contamination of the integrity of in-court identification. (See People v. Campos, G.R. No. 252212, [July 14, 2021])

Answer 493

The contention of Jenny and Leslie is incorrect. The, non-inclusion of the municipal accountant and budget officer in the indictment is not violative of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them. The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation is not violated if the complaint or information sufficiently alleges the facts and circumstances constituting the offense. Further, in one case, it was held that an information alleging conspiracy can stand even if only one person is charged except that the court cannot pass verdict on the co-conspirators who were not charged in the information. Here, the Informations against Jenny and Leslie clearly and sufficiently stated that they were being charged for their failure to perform their duties as mayor and treasurer to ensure full and timely remittance of the municipality's GSIS contributions. The indictment of the purported conspirators, as well as a statement of their part in the alleged conspiracy, is not necessary to sustain the sufficiency of the Informations. (See Ismael v. People, G.R. Nos. 234435-36, [February 6, 2023])

Answer 494

Yes, the operative fact doctrine is applicable. It is well-settled that the operative fact doctrine recognizes the effects of the law or executive issuance prior to its invalidation when relied upon by the public in good faith. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination of unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. Here, the candidates and political parties that submitted their Statement of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCEs) following the extended deadline acted in good faith. They honestly believed in the resolution that was issued pursuant to the COMELEC's rule-making authority as the COMELEC even previously extended the deadlines for the filing of SOCEs in the 2010, 2013, and 2016 national and local elections. Accordingly, the effects of accomplished acts prior to the invalidation of COMELEC Resolution No. 4321 should stand. (See PDB-Laban v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 225152, October 5, 2021, J. Lopez)

Answer 495

No, the argument is not tenable. In one case, the Supreme Court distinguished the department secretaries' functions as cabinet members and those performed in ex officio capacity, in relation to the doctrine of qualified political agency. According to the Supreme Court, the doctrine of qualified political agency could not be extended to the acts of the Board of Directors performing in ex officio capacity despite some of its members being themselves the appointees of the President to the Cabinet. In this case, when the cabinet secretaries approved Board Resolution No. 2023-01, they did not act as alter egos of the President, but as members of the Board of Directors of ABC in their ex officio capacity under the law. Hence, the assent to the grant of the Performance Incentive Benefits by the cabinet secretaries cannot be deemed as the required approval of the President of the Philippines. (See National Power Corporation Board of Directors v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 218052, January 26, 2021, J. Lopez)

Answer 496

The petition is moot and academic. Jurisprudence instructs that the existence of an actual case or controversy is a necessary condition precedent to the court's exercise of its power of adjudication. The issue ceases to be justiciable when a controversy becomes moot and academic; otherwise, the court would engage in rendering an advisory opinion on what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. In this case, Mr. AV alleged that the Senate Committee unlawfully exercised its power of contempt and that his detention was invalid. Subsequently, however, the Committee terminated its legislative inquiry upon the approval of the Committee Report by the Senate. As the legislative inquiry ends, the basis for the detention of Mr. AV also ends, which led to his release. There is no more justiciable controversy regarding the Committee’s exercise of its constitutional power to conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation, its power of contempt, and the validity of the detention. (See Balag v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018)

Answer 497

The following are the rules on succession if the President and Vice-President are both incapacitated to assume office: 1) Where both President and Vice-President shall have been incapacitated, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall act as President until a President or a Vice President shall have been chosen and qualified. (Section 7, Article VII, Constitution) 2) Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately. (Section 9, Article VII, Constitution) 3) The Congress shall, at 10 o'clock in the morning of the 3rd day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within 7 days, enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than 45 days nor later than 60 days from the time of such call. No special election shall be called if a vacancy occurs within 18 months before the date of the next presidential election. (Section 10, Article VII, Constitution)

Answer 498

No, HB No. 1234 is not void. Jurisprudence provides that the President’s determination of the existence of an “emergency” or “public calamity” is fundamentally dependent on the exigencies of each circumstance. As such, the Court must refrain from intruding into such matter through the exercise of its judicial power in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, considering that the passage of laws is essentially an affair that falls within the purview of the political branches of government. In this case, the House of Representatives and the Senate gave full recognition to the President’s certification and promptly enacted RA No. 4321. There is no fact or circumstance which would impugn the judgment of the President, concurred in by no less than a co equal and coordinate branch of government, that there was an emergency that required the immediate enactment of HB No. 1234. Consequently, the certification justified the immediate enactment of HB No. 1234. (See Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 252578, December 7, 2021)

Answer 499

No, the Supreme Court should not revoke the grant of Philippine citizenship in favor of Karbasi. Under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the Philippines was a signatory, the country is bound to safeguard the rights and well-being of the refugees and to ensure the facility of their local integration including naturalization. Further, Article 7 of the said Convention expressly provides exemptions from reciprocity. As applied to this case, Karbasi's status as a refugee has to end with the attainment of Filipino citizenship, in consonance with Philippine statutory requirements and international obligations under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.

Answer 500

I do not agree with Representative Harry’s objection. As ruled in the case of Magallona v. Ermita (G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011), there is no reduction or divestment of territory, or Philippine waters, or internal seas under the proposed Baselines Law. It is merely enacted to comply with conventional requirements under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt servanda or that treaties must be complied with in good faith as the country is a signatory. These baseline requirements merely ensure that the country is observing the guidelines laid out by the UNCLOS much like all its other signatories. Thus, the objections are unfounded.

Answer 501

The argument of Marliz is tenable. As held in the case of Carait v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 257453, August 09, 2022), R.A. No. 9225 only applies to natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized foreign citizens personally and voluntarily. It does not cover dual citizenships that arise out of one’s birth, or the circumstances surrounding one’s birth. Here, Marliz was a natural-born Filipino who acquired dual citizenship due to her father’s act of applying for naturalization under the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Act, thus, it cannot be said that she personally or voluntarily renounced her Philippine citizenship. Consequently, Marliz is not required to comply with the requirements under R.A. No. 9225.

Answer 502

Mamerto’s argument is not tenable. In the case of Austria v. People (G.R. No. 205275. June 28, 2022), it was held that double jeopardy does not arise when there is a void judgment of acquittal since the case is technically not terminated. Here, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion given that the decision issued by the new judge merely recited the contents of Mamerto’s motion for reconsideration without stating any factual and legal basis. This violates Section 14 of Article VIII of the Constitution which prohibits the courts from rendering decisions without expressing therein clearly the factual and legal basis. Such a decision acquitting Mamerto is therefore void, and the case is not terminated, thus not giving rise to double jeopardy. In sum, a void decision cannot give rise to any legal right.

Answer 503

Yes, Reyes is entitled to the writ of habeas corpus, because her right to speedy trial has been violated. As can be gleaned from the case of Reyes v. Director of Camp of Bagong Diwa (G.R. 243411, August 19, 2022), the writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of arbitrary confinement and illegal detention, and is anchored on the right to a speedy trial. Moreover, even if the writ of habeas corpus, as a general rule, is unavailable to individuals who are under the custody of an officer under a legal process that was issued by a court or judge, the writ may be availed of provisionally if it is shown that the detention has become oppressive to the detainee, thus amounting to a violation of the right to a speedy trial. Here, the reason for prolonged detention is rooted in the errors of the prosecution. Even though there are matters filed by Reyes, herself, which remains pending before the Supreme Court, this does not discount the postponements caused by the prosecution.

Answer 504

No, the COMELEC is not correct. In one case, the Supreme Court ruled that the candidate's bona fide intention to run for public office is neither subject to any property qualifications nor dependent upon membership in a political party, popularity, or degree of success in the elections. Also, the COMELEC's motu proprio authority under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code must not result in the denial of opportunity to be heard. Here, it is incumbent upon the COMELEC to identify the circumstances that would clearly show Atty. XA’s lack of bona fide intention to run for senator, as the financial capacity and membership in a political party cannot be equated to the absence of the bona fide intention to run. However, the COMELEC did not adduce supporting substantial evidence and instead shifted the burden of evidence to Atty. XA to convince why his Certificate of Candidacy should be given due course. Thus, the COMELEC is not correct in declaring Atty. XA a nuisance candidate.

Answer 505

Yes, Teacher B’s contention is meritorious. The rule on payment of back salaries during the period of suspension of a member of civil service who is subsequently ordered reinstated is settled in our jurisdiction. Such payment of salaries corresponding to the period when an employee is not allowed to work may be decreed not only if he is found innocent of the charges which caused his suspension but also when the suspension is unjustified. Here, despite the pendency of Teacher B's appeal with the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the decision of the CSC Regional Office dismissing her from the service was still implemented. Evidently, the execution of the decision was premature and thus unjustified since the same had not yet attained finality as it was still subject to review by the CSC. Thus, Teacher B is entitled to receive back salaries. (See Republic v. Maneja, G.R. No. 209052, June 23, 2021, J. Lopez)

Answer 506

The City of Mandaluyong is correct. The ordinance is neither illegal nor unconstitutional. Jurisprudence provides that local governments possess delegated legislative power to regulate traffic under Section 458 of the Local Government Code, which anchors itself on the delegated police power provided in the general welfare clause embodied in Section 16. It is settled that restrictions brought about by regulations of local governments addressing traffic congestion are valid exercises of police power, unless exercised whimsically, arbitrarily, or despotically. Here, considering that traffic congestion was already retarding the growth and progress in the economic centers of the city, the plain objective of the ordinance is to serve the public interest and advance the general welfare in the City of Mandaluyong. Its adoption aims to fulfill the compelling government purpose of immediately addressing the burgeoning traffic congestion, and, therefore, the exercise of police power was not done whimsically, arbitrarily, or despotically. (See Bagong Repormang Samahan ng mga Tsuper at Operator sa Rotang Pasig Quiapo v. City of Mandaluyong, G.R. No. 218593, June 15, 2020, citing Legaspi v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 159110, December 10, 2013)

Answer 507

No, LG’s argument is untenable. Jurisprudence instructs that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) can be validly substituted pursuant to Section 77 of the OEC because he remains a candidate until disqualified. However, a person whose CoC has been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 of the OEC cannot be substituted because he is not considered a candidate. Here, RG was disqualified for lack of residency requirement. The confusion stemmed from the use of the word "disqualified" by the COMELEC First Division, which was adopted by the COMELEC En Banc in granting LG’s substitution. Yet the fact that the COMELEC First Division did not decree the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of RG’s CoC should not have obviated the COMELEC En Banc from declaring the invalidity of LG’s substitution since lack of residency requirement is a ground for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of CoC. (See Tagolino v. HRET, G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013)

Answer 508

As a Justice of the Court of Appeals, I would dismiss the petition. The Supreme Court has held in one case that primary administrative jurisdiction does not necessarily denote exclusive jurisdiction. It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative body. In this case, while A, B, C, and D alleged the same set of facts and the same affidavits were submitted before the LA and the POEA, the complaints raised different causes of action. The Labor Arbiter complaint involved the issue of illegal dismissal and various money claims, while the POEA complaint involved administrative disciplinary liability for violation of the POEA Rules on Recruitment and Employment of Land-Based Overseas Workers. Hence, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction does not apply. (See U R Employed International Corporation v. Pinmiliw, G.R. No. 225263, March 16, 2022, J. Lopez)