regime change Flashcards
readings:
albrecht & ohl (2016) principal agent framework in yemen, syria, bahrain
Grewel (2018) Tunisian oil valve protests
Lee (2009) “soft liners” in philippines and indonesia
albrecht & ohl (2016)
Uses principal agent framework to analyse how individual interests, constraints, hierarchy influence military cohesion and responses to unrest
Disaggregation in military
Commanding officers often tied to political elites, influenced by expectations of regime survival
Rank and file officers see it as employment, constrained by hierarchical control but could defect
Principal agent framework:
Individual interests/motivations vs structural constraints
Autocrat (principal) contracts commander (agent) to suppress uprisings
→ moral hazard → choose loyalty, resistance or exit based on risks/rewards
Factors influencing commanders:
Unstable regime
Coordination among commanders facilitates collective action
Subordinates are more likely to defect if punishment mechanisms are weak
Yemen:
relatively peaceful uprising due to economic dependency of soldiers on commanders and tribal ties
Regime collapse
Syria
Minimal defection among senior officers
Low ranking forming opposition groups ee.g. Free syrian army
Civil war
Bahrain
Corporate loyalty among military elites reinforced by ethnic/sectarian ties
Ensured regime survival
Solutions to principal agent problem are costly due to asymmetric info
Increase monitoring
Increase punishments
grewel (2018)
Protest at an oil facility in tunisia
Negotiations fail, president deploys army to stop the protest
Army deflects, allowed the protestors to shut off the oil valve as the wanted to
Government conceded → create 4500 jobs and invest 80 million dinars as requested
Why did the military disobey: (Grewel)
Sympathy → soldiers recruited from marginalised regions
Reecent undermining of military intereests reduced support for president
Broader implications: (Grewel)
Challenges assumptions that militaries will suppress small localised protests
economic/political costs of protests
Military behaviour in small protests can shape future civil military relations
protest reasoning tataouine
unemployment (~30%) and economic neglect
Demands for 20% profit reinvested in local area and jobs
why did the military in tunisia defect
felt insuperior to internal security, used a low risk method of defection to signal this
Due to: limited budgets, outdated equipment, little influence in decision making
Lee (2009)
Why and under what circumstances militaries support political liberalisation
“Hard liner” “soft liner” framework
Soft liner
self serving, political/economic benefits post transition, not simply liberal motivations
E.g.
Marco’s regime in philippines 1986
Suharto’s regime in Indonesia in 1998
→ military inaction in popular protest led to the end of authoritarianism
Pact formation:
Agreements between opposition elites and military soft liners enable regime change
when there are visible splits in military and popular mobilisation and help from a third party
Measure of military support for transition:
refusal to suppress mass protest (proxy for withdrawl of support)
Divide and rule
Prevent officers uniting
Leads to competition for power → winners and losers → division
Makes them more likely to defect, ‘swingmen’ who can accelerate regime collapse
May align with opposition for their own political/economic futures
Philippines 1986
Defense minister and lt. General defect and join protests
Troops refuse to obey Marcos (90%)
UN backed LT.General as leader over fears of communism and election fraud
Indonesia 1998
Mass student protest demand democratic reform against asian financial crisis
General refused to suppress, held open dialogue
Internal factionalism weakened support for Suharto
Facing leadership threat, General formed an alliancee with students and islamist organisation NU
Vice president backed him to secure his presidency
When militaries are united under a strong leader
maintain status quo
Tiananmen Square and Kwangju
