democracy Flashcards
readings
beliakova (2021) competition, deference, insubordination Russia 1990s
Brooks et al. (2021) Huntington framework
Feaver (2011) surge decision in Iraq
beliakova (2021)
How intrastate conflict affects civilian control → erosion of control in ways others than coups
E.g. competition, deference, insubordination due to lowere likelihood of coups in democracies
Erosion by insubordination:
Refusal to comply with orders from ciivilian authorities
Military resignation/defection
Failure to report significant events
Erosion by deferense:
Appointment of military personnel to key political positions
Delegate policymaking to military
Erosion by competition:
Military in electoral politics
Military publicly endorse candidates/run for office
Challenge government through public statements
Russia 1990s
Transition from autocracy, coup inducing conditions, coup averse military
Erosion by deference during first chechen war : yeltsin delegated decision making too military attempt to shield himself from political fallout
Couopled with erosion by insubordination when 500 military generals, officers, troops resigned due to government disillusionment → refused to drive tanks through ccivilian protests
brooks et al. (2021)
Huntington introduced framework of objective control, strict separation between military and politics
This study investigates how this is internalised in miltary officers
(west point)
Professionalism
normative framework defining acceptable military behaviour/identity
requires political neutrality and to avoid partisan activism and speech
Intellectual disinterest in politics affecting strategy
Reinforced in US military training and leadership
Socialisation to instill apolitical values:
Replace existing civilian norms with military group norms
Curricular emphasis, however might only be a single class/low enrollment
May be seen as a bureaucratic label
Patterns in adherence to norms results:
26% orthodox norms: fully embrace framework
10% unorthodox norms: reject framework
24% inconsistent norms: partially endorse, only nonpartisanship
17% non committal norms: avoid taking a stance
24% motivated norms: selectively endorse norms, only division of labour due to partisan preferences
republican vs democrat cadets
Republican cadets (31%) are more likely than democrat cadets (14%) to fall into motivated category
More prone to partisan bias
More likely to agree that one party makes better national security decisions
More likely to believe that most of the military share their political beliefs
Morre elikely to support retired military entering government
problems with republican views in cadets for the future
Raises concerns about future officers executing directives from opposing political administrations
solutions to republican views in cadets
Reinforcing norms
Expanding conceptions of professionalism
Early intervention
fever (2011)
Studies the surge decision by US administration in Iraq when Bush overrides military leaders
surge decision
blend of both, civilian leader ensure strategy aligned with national policy, military provided operational expertise
Found a pragmatic middle ground which challenges this binary framework, shows the need for them to be integrated
background of why surge was needed
Initial stand up/stand down strategy in Iraq began to fall in 2006, escalating violence/political paralysis → decision to implement the surge despite military objections
Military concerns with the surge
strains on US ground troops in Iraq
solution to militarys concerns with the surge
The american entereprise institute’s proposal provided a credible military backeed alternative to counter objections, this helped avoid alienating military leadership
If they followed the biinary framework, war wouldve failed
democracies as pacifists
win 80% of wars theyre involved in due to wealth
form overwhelming alliances
Making better choices about who to fight –> higher costs for leaders if they lose
guardianship dilemma
military be strong enough to protect. from external threats
but not strong enough to overthrow
why do democracies lose small wars
outcome is rarely essential to national security
cost sensitivity
sensitive to casualties
weak opposition implement guerilla tactics
leaders are vulnerable to public opinion
