autocracy Flashcards
readings
bove & brauner (2016) Studies the differences in military spendiinig in autocratic regime types
Geddes eet al. (2014) types of military rule
Talmadge (2016) internal vs external threats - Vietnam
differences in military spendiinig in autocratic regime types expectations
Military regimes expeccted to spend more
Personalist use of expenditure to ensure loyalty and suppression
Single party use military expenditure to consolidate power
why do democracies spend less
accountability and social spending
Tullocks assumption:
dictators face constant threat from hugh ranking individuals espically the military
Selectorate theory:
dictators rely on key insiders for survival
Staying in power:
Repression: use military
Co-option: offering benefits to loyal elites
Single party states spending
Party structure monitors society
Military are party members, career advancement through loyalty
Soldiers indoctrinated with party ideology
Lower military spending due to existing control
Personalist regimes spending
Weak institutions to prevent rise of opposition
Military is weak and ill equipped, has the lowest military spending
Uses a paramilitary made of loyal groups
Limitations of the study bove and brauner
Correlation between regime type and military spending could be reverse causality
Ee.g. coups influenced by expectations of future spending
Military rule:
Fragile, experience moree regime breakdown
Highly discliplined doesnt mean the prevention of rebellion
Do not usually represent interests of wealthy/powerful in society
More likely to abuse human rights and escalate conflicts
More likely to transition to democracy peacefully or be overthrown and replaced with another autocratic regime
e.g. Idi Amin in Uganda
Officers backgrounds (military rule)
Middle and lower class, rural/small towns
Their policy interests vary, some favour redistribution and change, some individual ideologies
Bring their military career to politics for higher pay, promotions, resentment over political interference
Limitations of military rule
Struggle to govern → cant negotiate with political groups
Rely on civilians and technocrats to run the state
Collegial rule
power distributed among officers, must negotiate among each other to maintain control, less stable due to internal rivalries
Military led autocracy
single officers and group of officers, leaders have military background, regardless of power distribution
Military regimes
group of officers, group decision-making
Military strongmen rule
power of a single officer, marginalised other officers and eliminated competition
Military strongmen assumptions
Assumed to be more violent, more likely to use brute force
More likely to suppress civil liberties
Use internal security forces
More likely to be in a civil war
Fear of being ousted → initiate conflict to rally support
How miiltary rule ends:
Negotiated transitions (only 43% from 1946-2010 fell through insurgency, uprising, invasion, 64% of single party, 90% of personalist regimes)
Most democratise
Limited role in civilian societies
Internal military division
Talmadge (2016)
Military regimes fear internal threats (coups) over external threats
Challenges huntingtons “objective control” instead proposing “subjective control”
coup fears make regimes implement
Restrictive training
Prevent informatiion sharing
Centralised command
Coup threats are prioritised because theyre immediate, external threats develop slowly
north vietnam
North developed more professional military due to its political stability and focus on external threats
Utilised merit based promotions, high state surveillance, professional training, integration of political strategy
Aim of reunification with the south, this nationalism secured regime stability
south vietnam
had internal instability, fear of coups but had help from a third party (USA)
‘Loyalty over competence’ in military
Sophisticated chain of command to protect against coups, but not to fight the north
Prevented coups by frequent shifting of command roles
Some conventional military practice near the border
