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World Politics > Realism > Flashcards

Realism Flashcards

1
Q

Waltz Theory of International Politics Structure of International System

A

Elements of the Structure of the International System:

  1. Anarchy is Constant
  2. Unit Functional homogeneity is constant (All states provide security, economic system, etc…)
  3. Distribution of Power and Capabilities is variable
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2
Q

Mearscheimer on Institutions

A

Institutions have minimal influence on state behavior because the powerful states are the ones who created them. Security concerns/ interests account for cooperative behavior; Institutions are EPIPHENOMINAL

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3
Q

Effects of Anarchy on Self-Help

A
  1. All states must self-help
  2. All states must provide for their physical security
  3. Short term relative advantage supersedes long term collective good
  4. States in anarchy are in a condition of strategic interdependence (stag hunt)
  5. States cannot afford to be moral
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4
Q

Walt - Factors affecting Threat

A
  1. Aggregate Power
  2. Proximity
  3. Offensive Capability
  4. Offensive Intentions
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5
Q

Organski and Kugler

A

The War Ledger
Power Transition Theory: Peace is likely to characterize periods in which the powerful and satisfied states are much stronger than the dissatisfied. War i smore likely when dissatisfied great powers begin to approximate the capability of the dominant state.

War is predicated on unequal economic growth

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6
Q

Blainey - The Causes of War

A

Leaders decide based on BoP if they have more to gain by fighting.
*Optimistic of self-power; dismissive of enemy power
Wars are more likely when -
1. Economy is strong
2. Balance of Power is unclear

War is the mechanism for determining relative power
CRITIQUE - Bro is a historian and selects on the DV

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7
Q

Gilpin - War & Change in World Politics

A

Hegemonic Decline Theory:
Cycle of Change -> equilibrium -> dominant power grows -> growth costs too high + different growth rate -> disequilibrium -> hegemonic war
BIPOLAR STABILITY
- rational actors
- states will seek change until marginal costs >= marginal benefits
- cost of maintaining status quo rises faster than capacity to support status quo
- if disequilibrium is not resolved, system will change

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8
Q

Critiques of Huntington

A
  1. Classification of civilizations is non-scientific
  2. Many of SH’s events can be accounted for by BoP
  3. Over-emphasis of ideology (vs BoP)
  4. conflict is based on power, not culture (NORK nukes due to fear of US, not culture)
  5. Terrorists are supported by state actors
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9
Q

BdM - The War Trap

A

Rational Analysis of Expected Utility by a leader
Eu(war init) = (Pwin x Vwin) + (Plose X Vlose)

Eu is necessary (but not sufficient) condition for war initiation; applies to major and minor actors
Assumptions:
-decision makers are unitary / rational
- risk taking orientation influences decision
- uncertainty of 3rd party actors influence decision
- Pwin is a function of military capability and alliances
- National strength decays over distance
- Alliances are a function of congruence of policy goals

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10
Q

Blainey and the Warmongers

A
  1. War as accident - idea is unsupported by evidence; misleading concept
  2. Ambition and Motive (Morg/1st wave) - Lenin disproves ambitions as he used power reasoning to sue for peace, not ambition
  3. One nation is guilty - no (Japan in ww2)
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11
Q

Richardson’s Immunity

A

A long and severt bout of fighting confers immunity on most of those who experienced it

  • only lasts a generation; along with Toynbee’s similar assertion, war weariness is not empirically supported
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12
Q

Blainey’s Causes of Peace

A
  1. Richardson/Toynbee - War weariness (cycles don’t exist before 1800
  2. Harsh Treaty / Decisive Victory - except WW!
  3. Paradise is a Bazaar (Manchester Creed) - mercantilism / closer ties engenders peace (umm, nope)

Summary: No one knows why peace occurs; but Powers don’t fight when they agree on the relative distribution of power

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13
Q

Geoffrey Blainey

A 
The Causes of War (historian)
Many study way; Blainey seeks causes of peace (no conclusions
Causes of war:
  Overestimation of own ability
  Waterbirds (opportunism)
  Death Watch (maybe) Scapegoat (no)
  War Chests - Inconclusive
  Calendar - Yes, but that's tactics not causal

BoP - Perception of Power more causal than actual BoP

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14
Q

Geller - Power Transition and Conflict Initiation

A

Under Unequal power conditions, stronger nations initiate fewer disputes than their weaker counterparts.

As capabilities converge, pressure to exploit transient power advantages make the stronger state the more probable conflict initiator

*A shifting power balance is of critical significance among the causes of war and peace

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15
Q

Morgenthau’s Six Principles (5th Ed) PaN

A
  1. Politics is governed by objective laws w/ roots in human nature
  2. Interest is defined in terms of power
  3. The idea of interest and power is universal, but not fixed; content and manner of power is determined by political and cultural environment.
  4. Realism is aware of morality and the ineluctable tension between moral command and successful political action
  5. God isn’t on anyone’s side
  6. Realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere
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16
Q

Morgenthau

A 
Politics Among Nations (1948)
Classical Realism
Politics is a struggle for Power
Elements of Power
 - Geography / Resources
 - Industrial Capability / Resources
 - Military Capability / Preparedness

Balance of Power - countries WILL balance

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17
Q

Long Cycle of Global Leadership Stages

A

George Modelski -

  1. Global War
  2. Emergence of World Power
  3. De-legitimization of Power
  4. De-Concentration

*Naval Power is leading indicator

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18
Q

Long Cycle Theory

A

George Modelski - Long Cycles in World Politics (1987)
Long cycles/waves permit careful exploration of the ways in which world wars have recurred and leading states such as UK and US have succeeded each other in an orderly manner.
5 long cycles since 1500, correlating to Kondratieff Waves

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19
Q

World Hegemons of the Long Cycle

A 
Portugal 1500-1600
Netherlands 1600-1700
UK 1700- 1800
UK 1800 - 1900
US 1900- pres
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20
Q

Offensive Realism

A

Mearscheimer - The Tragedy of Great Power Politics

The anarchic system creates power hungry states who will each attempt to install themselves as regional and global hegemons

Great powers are power-maximizing revisionists who privilege buck passing and self promotion over balancing in struggle to dominate international system.

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21
Q

Theories of Nuclear Deterrence

A
  1. Risk Manipulation / Escalation / Limited War
  2. Flexible Response
  3. Nuclear Revolution
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22
Q

Risk Manipulation / Escalation / Limited War

A

Proponents are Kissinger, Nitze, Schelling

Operational use of nuclear weapons + deterrence. Victory is achieved if one side is better off after a nuclear exchange. Belief that nuclear war is winnable

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23
Q

Flexible Response

A

Proponents are Kissinger Snyder, JFK

Escalation dominance - must win at every level from conventional to strategic

Counterforce doctrine: pre-emptive strike to destroy second strike capability

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24
Q

Nuclear Revolution Theory

A

Proponents: Jervis, Waltz, Brodie

THE essential deterrent is second strike capability

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25
Q

Neo-Liberal Critique of Structural Realism

A
  1. Democratic Peace Theory shows that 2nd image is valid
  2. Rise in importance of non-state actors (NGOs, Transnational terror/crime)
  3. Increase in Institutional International Cooperation
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26
Q

Problems with BdM and the War Trap

A

BdM says the truth is in the results - NOPE: The logical structure has to link; you need both internal and external validity.

Hempel: The model has no theoretical content when providing predictive and no empirical power, needs validity

Provides necessary but NOT sufficient causes

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27
Q

Ideas of Polarity and War

A

Pole War Author
Unipolar less AFK, Gilpin, Waller, Model
Bipolar less Waltz
Multipolar less Morgenthau

Evidence: Polarity unrelated to incedence of war, BUT:
magnitude, duration, severity of war are positively associated with alliances

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28
Q

Geoffrey Blainey

A

Causes of War
Leaders decide to engage in conflict based on their conception of the BoP; They believe they have more to gain by fighting
War is the result of a decision by two nations; Leaders often miscalculate their own capability

Power Parity -> higher Pwar
Power Preponderence -> lower Pwar

*selective use of historical examples (selects on DV)

29
Q

Modelski 3 Structures of World System

A

Global Political System (Institutions and Informal arrangements)

World Economy

World Cultural Subsystem

30
Q

George Modelski

A

3 Structures in world system

  1. Global Political Systsm
  2. World Economy
  3. World Cultural Subsystem

Long Cycles

  1. Global War
  2. Emergence of World Power
  3. De-legitimization
  4. De-concentration
31
Q

Robert Powell

A
  1. Rational Leaders may be unable to arrive at a mutually acceptable negotiated settlement due to private information and incentives about relative capabilities and resolve
  2. Rational leaders may be unable to arrange a settlement that both states prefer to war due to commitment problems because 1 or more states would have an incentive to renege on settlement
    * War is ex-post inefficient
32
Q

Powell - Bargaining Theory

A

War is ALWAYS ex-post inefficient, there is always an option preferable to war for both sides

Why can’t states compromise:

  1. combination of private info and incentive to misrepresent
  2. States inability to credibly commit to abide by a deal under anarchy

Bargaining Theory explains how rational states choose to fight despite the existence of peaceful alternatives that both sides would prefer

33
Q

Power Transition Theory

A

AFK Organski and Kugler
An even distribution of political, economic, and military capabilities between contenders is likely to increase the probability of war. Peace is preserved best when the imbalance of capabilities between satisfied and dissatisfied. Aggression will come from a small group of dissatisfied strong countries, the weaker side is more likely to be the aggressor.

34
Q

Kondratieffs

A

40 to 60 year cycles of economic growth and slowing

Cycle of expansion, stagnation, regression

Applied to IR by Modelski

35
Q

Kenneth Waltz

A

Man, the State and War / Theory of International Politics

1st Image: Human Nature (individual characteristics)
2nd Image: State Level Characteristics (regime type)
3rd Image: International system level Characteristics

War occurs because there is nothing to prevent it

36
Q

Challenges to Realism

A
  1. Growth in International Institutions
  2. Decline of states due to globalization
  3. Futility of offence (war is no longer an effective policy tool)
  4. Certainty of Intentions (democracies)
  5. Social constructivism 0 discourse shapes politics
  6. Economic interdependence
  7. Non traditional military threats -> climate, plague
37
Q

Huntington - Why Inter-civilizational Conflict

A
  1. Civilizations are most basic grouping of people
  2. Increasing interconnection highlights differences
  3. Modernization disrupts traditional society -> religion/culture/nationalism fill the gaps
  4. West as leader / power increase relative to non-west
  5. Cultural differences less mutable than political and economic differences
  6. Economic regionalism expanding
38
Q

Balance of Power Theory

A 
Waltz
Assumptions:
1. Nations are Unitary Actors
2. States seek security through hegemony
3. Leaders rationally use means to achieve ends

Requires: at least two states in an anarchic system
Patterns: multipolar - stable lots of war between GPs
bipolar - unstable, no war between GPs
unipolar - Waltz says nothing

39
Q

Stability / Instability Paradox

A

Because of the Balance of Power for an all-out nuclear war, if one side has an advantage at lower levels it can exploit the fact that no one wants total war to win conventionally

Result - continuing conventional arms races, probability of conventional war is increased while Pnuke is decreased

40
Q

Organski and Kugler

A

Power Transition Theory- Challenge to BoP

describes between economic growth, military power, and war

War is more likely when rising powers approach/achieve parity
Power disparity can be a source of stability

41
Q

Example of Bargaining Theory (Powell)

A

1904 Russia and Japan disagreed on their relative power. Combined estimate of likelihood of victory exceeded possibility (Pwin > 1.0)

Russia refused to compromise due to a misperception of the power balance

42
Q

Tragedy of Great Power Poliitics

A

Mearscheimer
Offensive Neorealism
States seek hegemony for security because the anarchic nature of the international system creates strong incentives for states to seek to gain power at the expense of competitors.

Best path to security is hegemony

43
Q

Bruce BdM

A

The War Trap
A leader will fight if the net gain of fighting > the net gain of peace

Postulates necessary but not sufficient conditions for war

44
Q

Mearscheimer False Promise of International Institutions

A

Institutions have minimal influence on state behavior and thus hold little promise for promoting stability in post Cold War world because institutions are shaped by the great powers to facilitate the status quo system.

45
Q

Layne The Unipolar Illusion

A
  1. Because of structural factors, an American strategy of preponderance or perpetuation of unipolarity will fail
  2. unipolarity will stimulate the emergence of eligible states as great powers
  3. unipolarity will cause other states to balance against US
  4. in a multipolar system, traditional GPC will reemerge
  5. If (1993) differential growth rates continue - US/Japan is competitive (right but for china)
46
Q

Hegemonic Stability Theory

A

Gilpin - Stability of Global Economy requires the existence of a single dominant state who bears the cost of the world order. The more decisive the victor in a hegemonic war is, the more stable the system will be. As the costs to maintain the status quo increase, a new power will rise and, approaching the power of the hegemon, create potential for another hegemonic war

47
Q

Hegemonic Decline Theory

A

Gilpin - When the hegemon is no longer able to bear the costs of supporting the international system another power will rise and hegemonic war will result

48
Q

Gilpin’s hegemonic cycle

A

Assumptions:

  1. State Centric
  2. States pursue power and act rationally

International system is stable if no state believes it is profitable to change. A state will attempt to change if Ebene > Ecosts; A state will seek to change through territorial/political/economic expansion until Mc >= Mb. Once equibrium is reached, the cost to keep the status quo rises faster than economic capacity o support the status quo. If disequilibrium is not resolved, system will change under a new equilibrium as result of hegemonic turnover

49
Q

Huntington on civilizations and conflict

A

A cultural entity, the highest level cultural grouping of people which can include one or more nation states. civilizations rise and fall and are dynamic.

Conflict occurs at fault lines where civilizations meet and overlap

50
Q

Brodie

A

1946 0 anticipated massive retaliation policy

  1. International status quo will be harder to maintain
  2. Political outcomes will not be closely related to conventional or nuclear balance
  3. there will be more proliferation

Thus far the chief purpose of our own military was to win wars, now it is to avert them

Deterrence via 2nd strike capability

51
Q

Nuclear irrelivance

A

Mueller: Nuclear weapons have had little impact on world affairs since the end of ww2. A bipolar world ensured stability, nukes just reinforced a system evolving away from great power wars.

52
Q

Mearschiemer on Institutions

A

International institutions have minimal influence on state behavior because powerful states shape institutions to serve their purposes

53
Q

War and Change in World Politics Pillars and Generalizations

A

Pillars:
- Decision theoretic of rationality
- Dynamics of international social system
Generalizations:
1. Equilibrium if all states accept status quo
2. States will seek to change until marginal cost - marginal benefit
3. Once at equilibrium costs of status quo increase
4. If disequilibrium is not resolved, the system will change and a new power distribution / hierarchy of power will be established

54
Q

Long Cycle Theory

A

70 - 100 years divided into four phases:

  1. Global War / International Chaos
  2. Dominant State Rises/ Undisputed World Leader
  3. Deligitimization of World Leader Status
  4. Deconcentration of Dominance (overlaps with phase 1 of next cycle)
55
Q

Walt on Alliances

A

Bandwagoning is contrary to boP theory, Walt states that states will ally against the most threatining power (either balance or bandwagon)

Few historical examples of bandwagoning, states tend to balance against external threats

56
Q

MacNamara

A

Introduced MAD
Flexible Rseponse
- Offensive policy: counter Force and Counter Value

Second Strike Capability - Destroy 50% of industry and 25 % of population

57
Q

Important Realists

A 
Classical:
   Thucydides, Morgenthau, Herz
Structural:
   Waltz, Walt
PTT:
   Gilpin (HST); Organski and Kugler;
Offensive:
    Mearscheimer
58
Q

Huntington Conflict Phases

A

Phase I: Conflict between monarchs 1648 - 1918
Phase II: Conflict of Ideologies 1918 - 1991
Phase III: Conflict of Civilizations 1991- pres

59
Q

John Foster Dulles

A

Policy of massive retaliation based on a conventional imbalance and a desire to shrink military

60
Q

Herz

A

Political Realism and Political Idealism
Classical Realism : man struggles for power out of fear of others while feeling empathy to seek peace. This dichotomy results in realism vs idealism

61
Q

David Lake

A

Within the anarchical system there are hierarchies
A hierarchy is a variation in authority exerted by a dominant state over a subordinate party.
Hierarchies exist in both security and economic relationships

62
Q

Nuclear Revolution Theory

A

Brodie, Waltz, Jervis

Second strike capabiliity prominent; deterrence by threat of punishment

63
Q

Flexible Response Conflict Levels

A
  1. Small scale conventional
  2. Large scale conventional
  3. Large scale conventional + tactical nukes
  4. Limited Strategic nuclear war
  5. All out nuclear war (GTNW)
64
Q

Geller on Nukes

A

The possession of nuclear weapons has no apparent inhibiting effect on the escalatory propensities of non-nuclear opponents; thus nukes cannot be relied upon to impede escalation by nuclear of non-nuclear antagonists

  1. Wars among nuclear states remain improbable
  2. Crisis among nuclear states higher probability of escalation short of war
  3. Possession of nukes does not inhibit aggressive behavior by a non-possessor
65
Q

Assumptions of Classical Realism

A
  1. State Centric (relevant actors have a territorial base)
  2. Rational behavior
  3. States seek power and calculate their interests in terms of power..
66
Q

Man, the State, and War

A

Kenneth Waltz 1959
States don’t seek power due to human nature, they seek power due to the structure of the international system – War exists because there is nothing to stop it in an anarchical system

67
Q

Theory of International Politics

A

Kenneth Waltz 1979 - Core work of structural realism. System is anarchic.
Shifts in the distribution of capabilities (power within the international system) is the cause of war.

68
Q

Effects of Anarchy on Foreign Policy (structural )

A
  1. All states must self-help
  2. All states must provide for their physical security
  3. Short term relative advantage supersedes long term collective good
  4. States in anarchy are in a state of strategic interdependence
  5. States cannot afford to be moral
  6. Realists refer to IR as a condition of war (must always be prepared to resort to force)
  7. In anarchy, force and politics are intertwined. Force is the dominant tool of IR

World Politics (3 decks)

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