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Theory of Politics > Rawls' Theory of Justice > Flashcards

Rawls' Theory of Justice Flashcards

1
Q

what is Rawls’ view of human nature?

A

unlike his predecessors like Hobbes, Rawls does not view human nature to be as competitive or beast-like; he instead views citizens as being reasonable, capable of genuine toleration & mutual respect

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2
Q

what is the fact of reasonable pluralism?

A

“profound and irreconcilable differences in citizens’ reasonable comprehensive religious and philosophical conceptions of the world, and in their view of the moral and aesthetic values to be sought in life” (Rawls, JF, 2001)

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3
Q

how does Rawls understand / characterise society?

A

Rawls characterises society to be an embodiment of reasonable pluralism

his understanding of human nature as being reasonable also grounds his doctrine of public reason

  • Rawls’ idea of public reasons: “citizens engaged in certain political activities have a duty of civility to be able to justify their decisions on fundamental political issues by reference only to public values and public standards” (Wenar, 2021)

public justification: principles must be justifiable to them

  • “exercise of political power over others must be such that they themselves can have reasons from within their own reasonable worldview, to accept it” (Rawls, JF, 2001)

importance to the idea of publicity

  • in a well-ordered society, not only do all citizens accept the principles of justice, they also know that their fellow citizens do so too
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4
Q

what is Rawls’ idea of public reason?

A

“citizens engaged in certain political activities have a duty of civility to be able to justify their decisions on fundamental political issues by reference only to public values and public standards” (Wenar, 2021)

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5
Q

what is Rawls’ idea of public justification?

A

principles must be justifiable to them

“exercise of political power over others must be such that they themselves can have reasons from within their own reasonable worldview, to accept it” (Rawls, JF, 2001)

citizens have to be able to justify their political activities using public values. They have a legal duty to act in a way that their actions can be justified by the principles of justice

scope of this duty only extends to the constitutional essentials; on less politically fundamental issues, the doctrine of public reason still applies but only weakly

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6
Q

what is Rawls’ idea of publicity?

A

in a well-ordered society, not only do all citizens accept the principles of justice, they also know that their fellow citizens do so too

with all citizens accepting that basic structure is just, any free persons would be coerced to do so too by public scrutiny

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7
Q

what is the problem with Rawls’ understanding of reasonable pluralism?

A

Rawls has a very specific idea of reasonableness in mind: someone is reasonable if they recognise the freedom & equality of others AND is willing to propose fair terms of cooperation on them

the problem with understanding reasonableness in this way is that it makes one’s acceptance of some principles of justice a prerequisite to one being reasonable

  • yet, agents being reasonable is supposed to be one of the building blocks towards the principle of justice, since public reason is defined as engaging with one another in terms that other reasonable people could accept
  • thus, anyone who accepts Rawls’ argument would have to have had the same idea of reasonableness he has in mind
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8
Q

what are Rawls’ four goals for his political philosophy, according to Wenar (2021)?

A
  1. to propose grounds for reasoned agreement in the face of sharp political divisions
  2. to help citizens orient themselves within society
  3. to describe workable political arrangements that are as close to the ideal social order as possible
  4. to reconcile how the imperfect present political structures have formed
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9
Q

which of Rawls’ four goals for his political philosophy do his principles of justice focus on?

A

his principles of justice focus on (1) and (3)

aims to outline a system which is legitimate, compatible with the context of reasonable pluralism (1)

his principles must be able to achieve distributive justice - a fair distribution of goods within the social order (3)

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10
Q

what is the basic structure?

A

Rawls’ description of a just arrangement begins with the basic structure - major social & political institutions & how they determine the most basic benefits citizens get whether it be in the form of protection of rights, opportunities for employment, social recognition or distribution of wealth

“the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social co-operation” (Rawls, TJ, 1999)

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11
Q

what is the original position?

A

thought experiment / hypothetical choice situation

designed to be a fair & impartial point of view that is to be adopted in our reasoning about fundamental principles of justice

  • persons in the OP tasked with agreeing principles of justice to govern the basic structure of society

OP is a selection device

  • principles of justice agreed to are not deduced from the conditions of the OP, they are selected from a given list

OP models two things:

  • what we regard as fair conditions under which the representatives of citizens, viewed solely as free & equal persons, are to agree to the fair terms of cooperation whereby the basic structure is to be regulated
  • what we regard as acceptable restrictions on the reasons on the basis of which the parties, situated in fair conditions, may properly put forward certain principles of political justice & reject others
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12
Q

what two things does the original position model?

A
  1. what we regard as fair conditions under which the representatives of citizens, viewed solely as free & equal persons, are to agree to the fair terms of cooperation whereby the basic structure is to be regulated
  2. what we regard as acceptable restrictions on the reasons on the basis of which the parties, situated in fair conditions, may properly put forward certain principles of political justice & reject others
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13
Q

what is the main distinguishing feature of the original position

A

the “veil of ignorance” which ensures the impartiality of judgement by limiting the parties to the same information & removing the differences in bargaining advantages

prevents arbitrary facts about citizens from influencing the agreement among their representative

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14
Q

what information / knowledge does the veil of ignorance remove?

A

to ensure impartiality of judgement, lack of knowledge of:

  • social circumstances & natural talents
  • conceptions of the good

social circumstances & natural talents:

  • modelling equality of persons
  • like many luck egalitarians, Rawls believes we should not be favoured or unfavoured in life based on personal circumstances that arise from brute luck
  • distributive shares decided by a natural lottery; and this outcome is arbitrary from a moral perspective (Rawls, 1999)
  • sheer chance if I’m born with value talents/social advantages

conceptions of the good:

  • modelling freedom of persons
  • views the conceptions of the good as only derivative, or as having secondary importance, to the principles of justice to be assessed
  • principle of the good should have a shared basis

people do know of certain fundamental interests they all have, plus general facts about psychology, economics, biology & other social & natural sciences

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15
Q

other than the veil of ignorance, what other conditions are imposed under the veil of ignorance?

A

circumstances of justice

publicity & other formal constraints of right

stability requirement

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16
Q

what are the circumstances of justice in the original position?

A

among the general facts the parties know are the “circumstances of justice” - these are “conditions under which human cooperation is both possible and necessary” (Rawls, TJ, 1999)

two circumstantial prerequisites needed for justice to arise: justice can only arise in times of moderate scarcity & justice arises only when citizens have limited beneficence

moderate scarcity: between extreme abundance (no need for justice) & extreme scarcity (justice impossible / misplaced)

limited beneficence: between pure altruism (justice constraints superfluous) & excessive selfishness (justice lacks traction)

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17
Q

what are the two circumstantial prerequisites needed for justice to arise?

A

justice can only arise in times of moderate scarcity & justice arises only when citizens have limited beneficence

moderate scarcity: between extreme abundance (no need for justice) & extreme scarcity (justice impossible / misplaced)

limited beneficence: between pure altruism (justice constraints superfluous) & excessive selfishness (justice lacks traction)

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18
Q

what are the two problems with the circumstances of justice?

A
  1. legitimacy problems: need for common rule in the context of reasonable pluralism

2.distributive justice problem: need for principles of fair distribution of social product in systems of social cooperation

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19
Q

what are the five “formal constraints” associated with the concept of right that parties must take into account in the original position?

A

generality; universality in application; ordering of conflicting claims (completeness); publicity & finality

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20
Q

what is the publicity condition of the original position?

A

publicity condition: parties are to assume that the principles of justice they choose will be publicly known to members of society & recognised by them as the bases for their social cooperation

  • implies that people will not be uninformed, manipulated, or otherwise have false beliefs about the bases of their social & political relations
  • ultimately publicity is, for Rawls, a condition of respect for persons as free & equal moral persons
21
Q

what is the universal in application constraint in the original position?

A

universal in application: implies not simply that “they hold for everyone in virtue of their being moral persons” (Rawls, TJ, 1999). It also means that everyone can understand the principles of justice & use them in their deliberations about justice & its requirements

  • limits how complex principles of justice can be
22
Q

what is the stability requirement of the original position?

A

“an important feature of a conception of justice is that it should generate its own support. Its principles should be such that when they are embodied in the basic structure of society, people tend to acquire the corresponding sense of justice and develop a desire to act in accordance with its principles” (Rawls, TJ, 1999)

to be stable, principles of justice should be realisable in a feasible & enduring social world, the ideal of which Rawls calls a “well-ordered society”

  • practicably possible given the limitations of the human condition
  • people should knowingly want to uphold & maintain society’s just institutions not just because they benefit from them, but on grounds of their sense of justice

the correct principles of justice should be compatible with & even integral to realising the human good

  • shouldn’t require reasonable people to change their conscientious philosophical or religious convictions or abandon their pursuit of important interests
23
Q

what are Rawls’ two principles of justice?

A

agents in the OP would accept the following two principles of justice:

  1. each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all
  2. social & economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions:

a. they are to be attached to offices & positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity

b. they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society (difference principle)

24
Q

do the principles of justice have lexical priority?

A

yes, lexical priority between the two principles & within the second

  • can’t trade first for more of second
25
Q

what is the 1st principle of justice?

A

each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all

26
Q

what are basic liberties?

A

“political liberty and freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person, which includes freedom from psychological oppression and physical assault and dismemberment; the right to hold personal property and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law” (Rawls, TJ, 1999)

27
Q

what does the 1st principle of justice cover? why is it distinctive?

A

the first covers the constitutional elements by guaranteeing the equal basic rights & liberties needed to secure the fundamental interests of free & equal citizens

principle is distinctive because it requires fair value of the political liberties, which is a subset of the basic liberties

this requirement means that it is insufficient for all citizens to be able to vote (formal equality) but they also have to be able to exercise a similar amount of influence over the political sphere (substantive equality), which does not immediately follow from having the right to vote, as demonstrated in real life examples of the rich having disproportionate political influence through exercising “quiet politics” (Culpepper, 2011)

28
Q

what is the 2nd principle of justice?

A

social & economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions:

a. they are to be attached to offices & positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity

b. they are to be the greatest benefit to the least advantaged members of society (difference principle)

29
Q

what is the difference principle?

A

a kind of ‘maximin’ principle where inequalities are justified through mechanism of incentive inequality

regulates the distribution of wealth & income & is a key defining feature of Rawls’ political philosophy

  • allows for some social inequalities on the grounds that those inequalities help improve the total welfare & specifically the welfare of the least well-off

can be interpreted as expressing the positive ideal of social unity where everybody contributes in order to further the social good

30
Q

what are the arguments for the principles of justice from the original position?

A

maximin strategy

‘strains of commitment’

publicity, self-respect & the stability requirement

31
Q

how does the maximin strategy support the principles of justice from the original position?

A

describing the parties’ choice as a rational choice subject to the reasonable constraints imposed by the OP allows Rawls to invoke the theory of rational choice & decision under conditions of uncertainty

in rational choice theory there are a number of potential “strategies”

“maximin”:

  • directs that we play it as safe as possible by choosing the alternative whose worst outcome leaves us better off than the worst outcome of all other alternatives
  • to follow this strategy, Rawls says you should choose as if your enemy were to assign your social position in whatever kind of society you end up in

under conditions of complete uncertainty of probabilities, as in the OP, Rawls argues that given the gravity of the choice & the fact that it’s not repeatable, it’s rational for parties to choose the principles of justice over other principles of average or aggregate utility by using the maximin strategy

  • because even if the worst transpires, justice as fairness, unlike utilitarianism, guarantees an adequate share of primary goods, equal basic liberties & fair equal opportunities

3 conditions must be met to make it rational to follow the maximin strategy in the OP

  1. there must be no basis upon which to make estimates of probabilities
  2. the choice elected by the maximin strategy is acceptable & people can live with it
  3. all other alternatives have worse outcomes that would be unacceptable to live under
32
Q

what three conditions must be met to make it rational to follow the maximin strategy in the original position?

A
  1. there must be no basis upon which to make estimates of probabilities
  2. the choice elected by the maximin strategy is acceptable & people can live with it
  3. all other alternatives have worse outcomes that would be unacceptable to live under
33
Q

what is the objection to the maximin strategy?

A

Rawls’ parties are “risk-averse”, otherwise they would consider taking a chance on the riskier but potentially more rewarding outcomes provided by the principle of utility (Harsanyi, 1975)

Rawls denies that the parties are inherently risk-averse; rather he admits that it is rational for them to choose as if they were risk-averse under the highly exceptional circumstances of the OP

  • it is rational in some circumstances, the OP being one such circumstance, to choose conservatively to protect certain fundamental interests against loss or compromise

Rawls himself admits that “it is not, in general, a suitable guide for choices under uncertainty” (Rawls, 1999)

  • maximin is an irrational strategy under most circumstances of choice uncertainty, particularly under circumstances where we will have future opportunities to recoup our losses & choose again. But these are not the circumstances of the OP
34
Q

how do ‘strains of commitment’ support the principles of justice from the original position?

A

choice in the OP is an agreement & involves certain ‘strains of commitment,’ assumed by all to comply with the principles they agree to

this argument depends on the concept of a ‘well-ordered society’ which is a society in which everyone willingly accepts & knows that everyone else accepts the same conception of justice

these principles are (1) known about & willingly accepted by all, (2) successfully realised in political & social institutions & are generally complied with by citizens & (3) citizens are morally motivated to comply by their sense of justice (Rawls, TJ, 1999)

the requirement for parties to choose principles for a well-ordered society means they must choose principles that they sincerely believe they will be able to accept, endorse & willingly comply with under conditions where these principles are generally enforced

  • Rawls contends that these ‘strains of commitment’, created by the parties’ agreement, strongly favour the principles of justice over other principles such as utility
35
Q

how do publicity, self-respect & the stability requirement support the principles of justice from the original position?

A

principles of justice justified because they are chosen in the OP framework with publicity & self-respect, both of which invoke the stability requirement

stability requirement states that for the hypothetical parties in the OP to agree on principles of justice, there must be a high likelihood that real persons, given human nature & general facts about social & economic co-operation, can also agree & act on the same principles & that a society structured by these principles is feasible & can endure

Rawls contends that utilitarianism & other conceptions are not likely to be freely accepted by many citizens when made fully public under the conditions of a well-ordered society

under the publicity condition, justice as fairness generally engages citizens’ sense of justice & remains more stable than other alternatives

  • the principles of justice are designed to advance every citizen’s position reciprocally; those who are better off do not achieve their gains at the expense of the less advantaged
  • “since everyone’s good is affirmed, all acquire inclinations to uphold the scheme” (Rawls, 1999)

publicity condition also crucial from the social bases of self-respect

  • these principles, when publicly known, give greater support to citizens’ sense of self-respect than utilitarian principles
  • being regarded by others as a free & independent person of equal status with others is crucial to the self-respect of persons who regard themselves as free & equal members of a democratic society
  • justice as fairness, by affording & protecting the priority of equal basic liberties & fair equal opportunities for all, secures the status of each as free & equal citizens
36
Q

what criticisms are there of the second principle?

A

difference principle allows for too little inequality

difference principle allows for too much inequality

neglects sources of injustice

involves unacceptable infringements on liberty

37
Q

how is the second principle criticised for allowing too little inequality?

A

people choose to spend their time differently so they should be entitled to the consequences of their choices

tennis player vs gardener example (Kymlicka)

38
Q

how could Rawls reply to the ‘allows too little inequality’ critique & Kymlicka’s tennis player vs gardener example?

A

make leisure a primary social good; since the just distribution is assessed with respect to primary social goods, we would find TP, who enjoys a lot of leisure, no longer in the worst-off group

39
Q

how could one respond to Rawls’ reply to the tennis vs gardener example of making leisure a primary social good?

A

but wasteful leisure activities e.g. gambling could compromise the agent’s overall endowment of primary social goods

e.g. Avid Gambler (AG) but always loses on his gambles. He is impoverished as a result. While he has lots of leisure, his endowment of other primary social goods is very low & as a result of his behaviour, G would be required by the difference principle to support his welfare. This is an undesirable situation

40
Q

how is the second principle criticised for allowing too much inequality?

A

two versions:

  1. second principle itself permits too much inequality
  2. Difference Principle wrongly interpreted to permit more inequality than it does

‘formal Equality of Opportunity’ - non-discrimination on the basis of gender, race, disability

Rawlsian ‘Fair Equality of Opportunity’ (Fair EO) - equally talented & equally motivated have equal chances. Social class shouldn’t influence chances

  1. tension within Fair EO - social class influences development of talent & motivation
  2. tension with the ‘moral arbitrariness’ argument that set up the OP? Talents affect chances even though their distribution is morally arbitrary

Fair EO is too weak a requirement

  • one’s level of motivation or talent can be affected by one’s social class

Dworkin (1981): the difference principle is insufficient for achieving equality

  • some people are extremely unlucky (e.g. severely ill or disabled) such that they need a considerably greater share of of primary goods to achieve a reasonable life
  • Rawls’ difference principle addresses natural inequality only insofar as it mitigates the worst of its effects by ensuring that the worst-off group, measured in primary social goods, are as well off as possible
  • it still means that there may be some people who are very badly off in virtue of natural disadvantages who do not get any extra help in view of this
41
Q

what are the two versions of the ‘allows too much inequality’ objection to the second principle?

A
  1. second principle itself permits too much inequality
  2. Difference Principle wrongly interpreted to permit more inequality than it does
42
Q

how is the second principle criticised for neglecting the sources of injustice?

A

justice is socio-political so coming up with principles based on the political sphere alone is inexhaustive

‘personal is political’ - justice involves more than rules of socio-political institutions; relevant questions for the ‘private’ sphere, including the family

“[the principles] do not apply directly to [the family’s] internal life but they do impose essential constraints on the family as an institution and guarantee the basic rights and liberties and fair opportunities of all its members” (Rawls, 2001)

  • constrain but do not directly regulate family structure
43
Q

how can Rawls reply to the ‘neglects sources of injustice’ objection to the second principle?

A

principles of justice are only meant to regulate the basic structure, not personal conduct

function of the principles are: (1) to provide a basis for shared agreement (2) to give space to citizens to pursue their own conceptions of good (‘moral division of labour’) (3) to provide a background of justice

44
Q

how can critics respond to Rawls’ reply to the ‘neglects sources of injustice’ objection that PoJ are only meant to regulate the basic structure, not personal conduct?

A

if principles of justice only apply to the basic structure, Rawlsian justice provides no room for regulating interpersonal relationships e.g. interpersonal acts of racism

Rawlsian justice allows for a market system but market systems, by construction, seek inequality

  • Mills’ racial critique
  • Matsuda’s feminist critique
45
Q

how is the second principle criticised for involving unacceptable infringements on liberty?

A

libertarians object that the Difference Principle involves unacceptable infringements on liberty

e.g. may require redistributive taxation to the poor, and Libertarians commonly object that such taxation involves the immoral taking of just holdings

46
Q

what are some critiques of Rawls’ wider theory of justice?

A

Nagel’s critique of ideal theory

Mills’ racial critique (2009)

Matsuda’s feminist critique (1986)

47
Q

what is Nagel’s critique of ideal theory as a criticism of Rawls’ theory of justice?

A

“ideal theory enables you to say when a society is unjust, because it falls short of the ideal. But it does not tell you what to do if, as is almost always the case, you find yourself in an unjust society, and want to correct that injustice” (Nagel, 2003)

implausibility of the OP to produce an unanimous choice due to unavoidable bias

Nagel argues that Rawls’ does not just eliminate morally irrelevant features like sex, race & class position from the original position, but he also rules out morally relevant knowledge like one’s conception of the good

  • by restricting the basis of the hypothetical agreements in this way, one may lose some of its justifying power
  • Nagel’s argues that “the suppression of knowledge required to achieve unanimity is not equally fair to all the parties, because the primary goods are not equally valuable in pursuit of all conceptions of the good” (Nagel, 1973)
48
Q

what is Mills’ racial critique (2009) of Rawls’ theory of justice?

A

Rawls’ framework is largely silent on matters of racial equality & doesn’t produce a rectificatory outcome as it can’t provide us a tool to justify a ‘non-ideal theory’ & model our real life society

Rawls’ ignorance of racial injustice in his work in focusing on an ideal theory suggests that these principles are pre-emptive, not rectificatory

  • pre-emptive precautions to prevent injustices entering the “basic structure” of a society are not the same as rectificatory measures aimed at correcting them once they have already entered

Eurocentrism of Rawls’ work:

  • not merely that he focuses on Europe, but that he also focuses on Europeans & the problems that affect the white population & not - in his native United States - the problems of blacks & Native Americans
  • limited in use when it comes to remediating racial injustice

contemporary inclusion of non-white & formerly colonised in the original construct is only nominal & legacies of colonialism & slavery are not taken into account in an ideal theory’s conceptualisation of the crucial issues

distinction between ideal ideal theory (ideal theory in ideally just circumstances) & rectificatory ideal (what is ideally required to remedy past injustices)

49
Q

what is Matsuda’s feminist critique (1986) of Rawls’ theory of justice?

A

Rawls’ “theory of justice” fails because of its central choice of abstraction as a method of inquiry

  • abstraction as a methodology encompasses the belief that visions of social life can be constructed without reference to the concrete realities of social life
  • abstraction as a methodology is criticised by feminist scholars because abstraction is the first step down the road of androcentric ignorance

use of veil imagery is itself interesting

  • in much of veil imagery - the bridal veil, the Muslim veil - it is women-as-object behind the veil
  • behind Rawls’ veil, woman-thinking, the terrifying Other, is abstracted out

feminism suggests a methodology - consciousness raising - for derivation of first principles

  • through the shared experience of women’s lives & through concrete struggle against patriarchy, feminists are deriving a conception of the good

Theory of Politics (5 decks)

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