Neutrality & Perfectionism

Question 1

what is the conception of the good life?

Answer 1

broadly, it denotes some moral conviction of how we should lead our lives - can include religious beliefs, judgements of value & other moral guidelines (Barry, 1991)

it is what gives value or meaning to one’s life. It is a standard by which one can evaluate the quality and direction of one’s life. It guides actions, beliefs and ideas about moral imperatives / commitments (Dworkin, 1985)

Question 2

what four kinds of judgements are involved in “the good life”?

Answer 2

i. specific judgements on agency goods, e.g. reason, courage, integrity, honesty… (dispositions which constitute the good life)

ii. specific judgements on prudential goods, e.g. aesthetic experience, friendship, amusement and play, knowledge… (values which contribute to a person’s good life)

iii. local comparative judgements on particular ways of life, i.e. a person’s pattern of living which embodies a particular ranking of agency and prudential goods

iv. comprehensive doctrines that involve comprehensive ranking of goods & ways of life (most controversial)

Question 3

can individuals’ conceptions of ‘the good life’ change?

Answer 3

individuals’ conceptions are seen as capable of being revised & changed on reasonable grounds

Question 4

what is state neutrality?

Answer 4

holds that it is morally wrong to use state power to advance some controversial conception of human good & morally wrong to impose on people in the form of laws and public policies that could be justified, if at all, only by appeal to controversial conceptions of the good

can split the claim up in two ways:

• an objection to the state promoting, curtailing or denying a particular conception of the good (neutrality in action)
• an objection to the reasons which justify state action (irrespective of whether the action appears neutral or not, though you might think that neutral state action justified by comprehensive reasons would be less troubling) (neutrality in justification)

Question 5

who said, “political decisions must be, so far as is possible, independent of any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value to life”?

Answer 5

Dworkin, 1985

Question 6

what is meant by Rawls’ “reasonable pluralism”?

Answer 6

rational people can reasonably differ in their conceptions of the good, and should not try to impose their ideas on anyone else (and neither should the state)

Question 7

what is the distinction between neutrality of effect, neutrality of aim, and neutrality of justification according to Arneson, Merrill & Weinstock (2014)?

Answer 7

neutrality of effect: requires that the policies pursued by the state should not bring it about that any controversial way of life or conception of the good is advantaged over others

neutrality of aim: requires that no actions or policies pursued by the state should aim at promoting one controversial way of life or conception of the good over others

neutrality of justification: requires that any policies pursued by the state should be justified independently of any appeal to the supposed superiority of any way of life or conception of the good over others

Question 8

which scholars provided the distinction between neutrality of effect, neutrality of aim, and neutrality of justification?

Answer 8

Arneson, Merrill & Weinstock, 2014

Question 9

how can state neutrality be broken down?

Answer 9

neutrality in action

neutrality in justification

Question 10

what is neutrality of justification?

Answer 10

neutrality of justification requires that any policies pursued by the state should be justified independently of any appeal to the supposed superiority of one way of life or conception of the good over another (Arneson, Merrill & Weinstock, 2014)

to do so would be to invoke controversial or objectionable claims about the good, that is, claims that some citizens may reasonably reject (Larmore, 1987)

Question 11

what is a neutral reason?

Answer 11

a neutral reason may amount to one where no reasonable rejection obtains, or where there is unanimous support for the advantaged conception of the good

Question 12

can the state promote one conception of the good over another under neutrality of justification?

Answer 12

yes

under the neutrality of justification, it may be permissible for the state to advantage one conception of the good over another, provided that a neutral reason for doing so is established

Question 13

what is a difficulty faced by neutrality of justification?

Answer 13

difficulty: issues with equating reasonableness to neutrality

how can we constrain the validity of certain reasons without using some notion of the good to do so?

Question 14

how does Rawls define a ‘comprehensive doctrine’?

Answer 14

Rawls defines a ‘comprehensive doctrine’ as a theory of value which applies to a wide range of subjects, such as ‘what is of value in human life, …ideals of personal character, as well as ideals of friendship and of familial and associational relationships’

Question 15

how does political liberalism diverge from comprehensive liberalism?

Answer 15

political liberalism diverges from comprehensive liberalism when the strong claim is made that the only way to successfully justify liberal principles is via reference to some particular liberal view regarding human flourishing

Question 16

what is neutrality of action / of treatment?

Answer 16

the state is neutral between rival conceptions of the good when its institutions and policies are equally accommodating of those conceptions (Patten, 2012)

• i.e. state maintains neutrality only when it extends equivalent levels of assistance or hindrance to competing conceptions of the good

accommodation is measured by the inputs to political decisions, rather than the output

Question 17

what is Patten’s example to demonstrate the conceptual difference between neutrality of action vs neutrality of effect?

Answer 17

Patten gives the example of a philanthropist allocating resources between two causes

• she could allocate each an amount that is expected to bring about equal levels of success, or simply allocate each an equal amount
• the former equalises outputs (neutrality in effect), whereas the latter equalises inputs (neutrality in action)

Question 18

what is the distinction between perfectionism & antiperfectionism?

Answer 18

antiperfectionism: belief that the liberal state must remain neutral between competing conceptions of the good life or comprehensive doctrines (substantive state neutrality) (Quong, 2011)

perfectionism: view that one of the legitimate functions of the state is to directly promote or encourage people to live more worthwhile lives, or discourage citizens from pursuing disvaluable activities or ways of life (Quong, 2011)

Question 19

what are three general strategies that a state might adopt if it’s committed to neutrality of treatment?

Answer 19

privatisation, generic entanglement & even-handedness

Question 20

what is the privatisation strategy for state neutrality?

Answer 20

the idea of privatisation strategy is to detach the state as far as possible from the regulation or provision of the goods & activities that figure in the pursuit of conceptions of the good

the state is equally accommodating of all conceptions of the good because it restricts itself to making a set of general rules that apply evenly to all conceptions of the good, and otherwise does not interfere with any goods or activities that might be involved in such conceptions

Question 21

what are the limitations to the privatisation strategy?

Answer 21

plausibility of privatisation is restricted by the extent to which the state can realistically remove its assistance to, or hindrance to, any conception of the good especially where it is unintended

hard to imagine us being able to disentangle the state from the good entirely in this way

consider whether the state would sometimes need to be involved in order to equally accommodate all conceptions of the good

• where inequality exists, some will be more able to pursue their conception of the good than others & so a strategy of privatisation might benefit these groups more than others
• e.g. native groups in Australia & North America

Question 22

what is the general entanglement strategy for state neutrality?

Answer 22

general entanglement strategy recognises that some forms of state intervention are directed at goods & activities that play a role in all, or at least almost all, conceptions of the good

the entanglement of the state in the regulation or provision of these goods & activities is compatible with equal accommodation since no special form of assistance or hindrance is being extended to or imposed on some conceptions of the good but not others

Question 23

what examples of state provision fall under the idea of general entanglement?

Answer 23

Patten’s example of the state provision of police & fire services

• these services are extended to different facilities associated with a range of different conceptions of the good

-by providing fire department services to a local synagogue, a city government extends a form of assistance

• but since it provides the same service to facilities associated with all other conceptions of the good, and they are all presumed to value it, there is no departure from neutral treatment

general entanglement can map onto what we consider public services & it’s a necessary condition of them being public that they are available for any conception of the good thus the state can be both involved & neutral

Question 24

what are the limitations to the general entanglement strategy?

Answer 24

scope of this strategy is limited for there are services or provisions that could be advantageous to the pursuit of all conceptions of the good

Patten only provides two other examples here, education & healthcare, which he rightly points out are “less pure examples of the same logic” (Patten, 2012), because they unavoidably encounter debates about the good

Question 25

what is the even-handedness strategy for state neutrality?

Answer 25

state should remain actively involved in providing and/or regulating certain goods & activities that are particularly relevant to some conceptions of the good and not others, but to do so in a pluralistic fashion such that an equivalent form of regulation or provision is applied to other rival conceptions of the good

Question 26

what are the limitations of the even-handedness strategy?

Answer 26

since even-handedness entails the positive distribution of advantages to conceptions of the good, the strategy is naturally more burdensome than if the state were to provide no advantages whatsoever

crucially, however, to maintain neutrality we must understand the even-handedness strategy as extending to all conceptions of the good regardless of whether they are recreational or not

• this makes the strategy implausible as it would be extremely difficult to provide facilities for all the different recreational goods valued by citizens, let alone all goods in general

also because providing some goods to some conceptions is to disadvantage other conceptions, since some conception might depend on the absence of other conceptions being practised

• e.g. see religious arguments of this kind about homosexuality or other ways of life being practised near them and how this curtails their ability to lead ‘good Christian lives’

Question 27

how can a state be neutral between different conceptions of the good through anti-perfectionism?

Answer 27

as long as anti-perfectionism is understood as concerning the state promotion of first-order values, then the state can promote second-order values & still be considered neutral

• second-order values are those which contain a second-order variable which refers de dicto to other specifications of value
• first-order values are those which either attach value to states of affairs de re & so contain no variables at all, or refer to states of affairs de dicto and contain only first-order variables

Question 28

what is the intuitive appeal of neutrality?

Answer 28

a perfectionist view, one on which it would be permissible for the state to implement restrictive laws etc is not compatible with a vision of politics where citizens are free & equal & owe each other justifications for the regulation of their public life.

• non-neutral view implies a patronising state & a view on people claiming that “they don’t know what is best for them”

Question 29

what arguments are there for neutrality?

Answer 29

the fact of reasonable pluralism

respecting persons

consent & preventing coercion

argument from autonomy

argument from intolerance

Question 30

what is the fact of reasonable pluralism (Rawls)?

Answer 30

whenever freedom obtains & individuals are at liberty to think & believe what they wish, this results in deep, permanent & intractable disagreements about central philosophical, moral & religious issues

Question 31

why does the fact of reasonable pluralism support arguing for neutrality?

Answer 31

given the fact, any attempt by the state to impose a single comprehensive doctrine upon its citizens would be unreasonable & unjust

Question 32

what is the ‘respecting persons’ argument for neutrality?

Answer 32

Kantian interpretation

• Kantian interpretation of respect, i.e. treating people as ends in themselves
• distinctive feature of persons is “that they are beings capable of thinking and acting on the basis of reasons” (Larmore, 1996) & to respect another person one must engage his capacity to respond to reasons

contractualist view of state legitimacy

• if we were to force people to serve ends with which they may reasonably disagree, then we would give them no respect as people as ends (Nagel, 1995)

Question 33

how can one object to the contractualist view of state legitimacy argument for respecting persons?

Answer 33

questionable whether forcing people to serve ends they disagree with is to disrespect them

e.g. court decisions - as long as trial procedures are fair & observed, the court can convict criminals & they can disagree with the decision - but this does not entail that the court treats the criminal as a means

Question 34

what is the consent & preventing coercion argument for neutrality?

Answer 34

morality requires “taking up a point of view that addresses reasons to all” (Gaus, 2003)

governments ought never to act without impartial justification, where impartial justification is understood in terms of providing reasons that would be acknowledged as justificatory by every fully rational citizen who is coerced by the state’s action

Question 35

what is the argument from autonomy for neutrality?

Answer 35

personal autonomy: an agent has personal autonomy when she is “determining her conduct by her own most highly cherished values” (Darwall, 2006)

why should the value of autonomy lead to neutrality?

• Mill’s Harm Principle: the only reason for which we could legitimately interfere with the liberty of individuals against their will is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant

Question 36

how can one object to the argument from autonomy (for neutrality)?

Answer 36

perfectionists could say that harm would be imposed on people if they did not follow the certain conception of the good

• e.g. climate change

Question 37

what is the argument from intolerance & instability for neutrality?

Answer 37

prem 1: a permanent feature of modern liberal-democratic societies is the diversity of conceptions of the good life

prem 2: in these societies a single conception of the good life can be maintained only by the oppressive use of state power

prem 3: this not only goes against the spirit of tolerance but would also endanger the social unity & stability of these societies

conc: therefore, state should be neutral between different conceptions of the good life

Question 38

how can one object to the argument from intolerance & instability (for neutrality)?

Answer 38

perfectionists need not be radicals

• the pursuit of the good life may be tempered by other values, e.g. peace & harmony of the state
• Aristotle writes that the state should not pursue perfectionist goals at the expense of stability, public acceptability, social harmony
• perfectionism only says that the pursuit of the good life is one important, legitimate function of the state

Question 39

what is political liberalism’s aims according to Rawls?

Answer 39

to provide a political framework that is neutral (& anti-perfectionist) between controversial comprehensive doctrines

requires that fundamental political matters should not be decided by reference to any controversial moral, religious or philosophical doctrines over which reasonable people disagree (Quong, 2011)

• basic structure only (political not comprehensive)

Question 40

what is political liberalism?

Answer 40

reasonable pluralism: each reasonable citizen has her own “comprehensive doctrine”, a view about right and wrong, good and bad… - but reasonable citizens also understand that deep issues about religion, philosophy & morality are ones on which people of good will can disagree & so they will be unwilling to impose their own worldviews on those who have reached conclusions different than their own

requires that fundamental political matters should not be decided by reference to any controversial moral, religious or philosophical doctrines over which reasonable people disagree (Quong, 2011)

Question 41

in what sense is political liberalism neutral?

Answer 41

political liberalism seeks common ground & is neutral in aim, meaning that institutions & policies are neutral in the sense that they can be endorsed by citizens generally

however, political liberalism is not neutral in justification or procedure, which means it cannot be legitimated or justified without appealing to some values at all

Question 42

is political liberalism a comprehensive or political doctine?

Answer 42

not comprehensive, but narrowly political (only applies to the basic structures of society)

Question 43

what is the radical feminist critique of political liberalism?

Answer 43

the distinction between comprehensive doctrines & the political implicitly excludes feminist considerations from justice as fairness (MacKinnon, 1989)

according to MacKinnon’s view, the supposedly objective, neutral state is in fact “male”

• not only that law-makers & justices apply supposedly gender-neutral laws in sexist ways, but also that those supposedly gender-neutral laws are themselves subtly, but powerfully, discriminatory
• best example of this (historically) is the family: the area which liberalism has protected as private has been precisely the site of women’s oppression

Question 44

how can one respond to the radical feminist critique of political liberalism?

Answer 44

Brake (2004) argues that Rawls’s liberalism is compatible with feminist goals & that neutrality itself indeed will require substantive feminist reform

Rawls’s defence of reasonableness in political justification coincides with feminist values by excluding sexist beliefs & hierarchical political systems

Question 45

what is the critique of political liberalism that it appeals to a value premise itself?

Answer 45

the charge at PL takes the following two forms:

1. PL appeals to a value, which is at best plausible (but not universal), and not grounded any more foundationally than any other less popular value claim, e.g. pursuing a certain religion
2. PL makes a metaphysical claim that is as problematic as the value claim. Worry is that Rawls starts from a not universally accepted foundational premise, while criticising perfectionists for starting with a controversial foundational premise. Those two don’t seem that different, so Rawls seems guilty of the same foundationalism Larmore argues here that Rawls should state this explicitly as a foundational metaphysical premise of his theory

Question 46

how can a political liberal reply to the ‘political liberalism itself appeals to a value premise’ critique?

Answer 46

to 1, PL can appeal to the distinction between the right & the good

• theory of the good is about what makes states of affairs valuable (e.g. utility content, aesthetic content…)
• theory of the right is a claim about how we should treat each other
• PL is not really making a value claim about the good - it’s not saying that “peace & harmony are valuable states of affairs” or that “a diverse society is better than a homogenous one”
• rather, it’s saying we owe it to each other (it is right) that we treat each other equally, as free & equal citizens (or as Rawls would put it, as people possessing the two moral capacities)
• this can be seen in light of Parfit’s distinction between telic & deontic

to 2, the response would be to appeal to Rawls’s distinction between a metaphysical & conception of justice

• the justification of Rawls’s fundamental premise (that we should treat people as free & equal citizens) is not metaphysical, but rather a political premise (already shared by a vast majority in society)
• thus, Rawls would say we don’t really need to justify this premise, but rather assume it as a prerequisite for asking questions of justice
• question then becomes: “given that we want to treat each other as equals, what principles should we use to govern our society?”

Question 47

what is the difference between conceptions of the good & conceptions of justice?

Answer 47

conceptions of good are theories about what is a good life for human beings

conceptions of justice, or the right, are about how society should be ordered

perfectionists see a fairly straightforward link between those two concepts but neutralists think the two need not be connected

example: a deeply religious person (who thinks the good life = worshipping God properly) can still be reasonable & have liberal conceptions of justice. Maybe they think God wants people to reach their own conclusions

example: a jury member can confidently believe the person on trial is guilty, but also see why other jury members are concluding the opposite, & respects the jury process (as metaphor for having a conception of justice) (Quong)

Question 48

under what conditions is state neutrality possible?

Answer 48

state neutrality possible if it is a minimal state adopting a negative strategy towards advancing conceptions of the good life

under the theory of anti-perfectionism, the state can promote second-order values while remaining neutral over promotion of first-order values

• 2nd order: “content-neutral”, ineliminable incompleteness

Restricted Neutrality principle restricts scope of state neutrality to ideals of the good that are fully reasonable & so the state can be considered neutral between competing conceptions of the good life

Question 49

under what conditions is state neutrality not possible?

Answer 49

Barry (1991) argues that it’s not really possible in practice: neutrality principle itself is not neutral between different belief systems & conceptions of the good – one necessarily has to have an outlook that is broadly liberal. Thus, the arguments available are not convincing to those who haven’t already got a broadly liberal viewpoint in the first place

• for someone to be prepared to say: “homosexuality is wrong but that’s just my private opinion”, someone must already have swallowed a large dose of liberalism

the problem with neutrality is that it asks people with moral convictions to treat them as external preferences or matters of personal opinion. A dogmatist is consistent by holding his beliefs dogmatically

thus, there is little chance to sell neutrality to non-liberals, so it is a better strategy to discredit their beliefs instead of making them try to hold their beliefs but also respect others

Question 50

can a liberal, neutral state still support art?

Answer 50

Dworkin (1986) argues that state support should only be designed to protect structure rather than to promote any particular content for that structure

this would mean it can provide infrastructure (museums, facilities, etc.) but does not decide upon what particular art should be provided

this is not subject to the objections of paternalism because the structural frame which makes aesthetic values possible in the first place is benefitting everyone

Question 51

what is MacKinnon’s (1989) feminist argument against state neutrality?

Answer 51

the distinction between comprehensive doctrines & the political implicitly excludes feminist considerations from justice as fairness (MacKinnon, 1989)

according to MacKinnon’s view, the supposedly objective, neutral state is in fact “male”

• not only that law-makers & justices apply supposedly gender-neutral laws in sexist ways, but also that those supposedly gender-neutral laws are themselves subtly, but powerfully, discriminatory
• best example of this (historically) is the family: the area which liberalism has protected as private has been precisely the site of women’s oppression

Question 52

how does Brake (2004) respond to MacKinnon’s feminist argument against state neutrality?

Answer 52

Brake argues that Rawls’s liberalism is compatible with feminist goals & that neutrality itself indeed will require substantive feminist reform

if we accept MacKinnon’s view that standing practices often have a deeply patriarchal element, then neutrality in practice will require radical change (Brake, 2004)

• prem 1: certain apparently private social structures arguably impede women’s equality
• prem 2: these structures are not purely private - it is mistaken to conceptualise civil society as a distinct sphere from the state & as free from state interference
• conc: state neutrality will require substantive change in state policies regulating these apparently private spheres, when standing regulation is premised on or promotes a certain conception of the good

Question 53

which spheres does Brake (2004) envisage need substantive change to achieve state neutrality for feminists?

Answer 53

working environment: (Brake, 2004)

• state directly maintains the working environment predicated on this conception in a host of ways (sets minimum wage & overtime laws, places constraints on working hours, & regulates employee rights through labor law, provision of services such as public transport (which affects access to employment))

marriage: (Brake, 2004)

• although the family has been seen as private, it is a major determinant in the distribution of social goods & thus family arrangements must meet the demands of justice
• simply by recognising marriage, the state fails to be neutral - & even if marriage were extended to same-sex partnerships, this would be the case. For by recognizing marriage, the state picks out a certain type of relationship - monogamous, permanent, between two persons - as worthy of recognition

neutrality will require substantial change

Question 54

can a liberal neutral state support environmental conservatism?

Answer 54

a liberal state is not permitted to support conservation on the grounds that it is part of “a superior conception of what a truly worthwhile life is” (Dworkin, 1978)

but it may be permitted & even required to do so on the basis that non-intervention “is not neutral amongst competing ideas of the good life, but in fact destructive of the very possibility of some of these” (Dworkin, 1978)

Question 55

what is perfectionism?

Answer 55

“the view that one of the legitimate functions of the state is to directly promote or encourage people to live more worthwhile lives, or discourage citizens from pursuing disvaluable activities or ways of life” (Quong, 2011)

on the perfectionist view, it should be the state’s task to advance a certain conception of the good life that it deems beneficial to citizens even if they do not recognise so

• this can be achieved by making activities illegal, by subsidising an activity or by making an activity more costly than its alternatives

Question 56

what is political perfectionism?

Answer 56

the thesis that liberalism is not grounded in any particular conception of the good, but that the liberal state can nevertheless justify laws & policies by reference to beliefs about the good life (Quong, 2011)

Question 57

what is the liberal perfectionist thesis (LPT)?

Answer 57

it is at least sometimes permissible for a liberal state to promote or discourage particular activities, ideals, or ways of life on grounds relating to their inherent or intrinsic value, or on the basis of other metaphysical claims (Quong, 2011)

Question 58

which scholar defines perfectionism & the liberal perfectionist thesis?

Answer 58

Quong, 2011

Question 59

what two types can state perfectionism be classified into, according to Chan (2000)? what does the distinction rest on?

Answer 59

extreme perfectionism & moderate perfectionism

distinction rests on the fact that there are different kinds of judgement in the term “conceptions of the good life”

Question 60

what is extreme perfectionism?

Answer 60

holds that the state may adopt a comprehensive doctrine as the basis of state policy & promote the good life in accordance with the requirement of that doctrine

it is coercive in its means of pursuit, pure in its exclusive concern for the good life & state-centered in its principled preference for the state as the direct & primary agent of the promotion of the good life

Question 61

what is moderate perfectionism?

Answer 61

promotes valuable goods such as the arts, family life, basic human virtues, & discourages people from leading ways of life that are highly deficient in these goods

it is local, noncoercive, & multi-centered

Question 62

what subsidiary claims must hold for the perfectionist claim to be sound & practically relevant, according to Quong (2011)?

Answer 62

1. there must be ways of life that can, at least in principle, be known to be more valuable than others
2. it must be true that, at least sometimes, states have the effective ability to act on this knowledge in ways that will enable its citizens to live more valuable lives
3. it must be true that there are no decisive considerations that prohibit the state from acting on judgements relating to human flourishing
4. the unique challenge for liberal perfectionism is to show that there are no considerations deemed essential to liberal political theory that would prohibit or discourage the state from acting on perfectionist judgements

Question 63

what are the arguments for perfectionism?

Answer 63

support for valuable forms of life requires political action

any arguments against state neutrality

Question 64

how does the idea that support for valuable forms of life requires political action support perfectionism?

Answer 64

some things are worth preserving, & without state interference this would not be possible

people care about leading a good life, so state should assist citizens to promote valuable conceptions of the good life (Chan, 2000)

strict adherence to state neutrality “would undermine the chances of survival of many cherished aspects of our culture” (Raz, 1986)

Question 65

which scholar says strict adherence to state neutrality “would undermine the chances of survival of many cherished aspects of our culture”?

Answer 65

Raz, 1986

Question 66

which scholar argues that proponents of state neutrality overvalue goods associated with agreement & undervalue other goods?

Answer 66

Wall, 1998

Question 67

why can arguments against state neutrality not necessarily be used to support perfectionism?

Answer 67

presupposes mutually incompatible relationship between neutrality & perfectionism

Question 68

what are the objections to perfectionism?

Answer 68

elitist / inegalitarian charge

incompatible with value pluralism

pragmatic objections

Question 69

what is the elitist / inegalitarian charge against perfectionism?

Answer 69

perfectionism is compatible with assigning different weights to the perfection of different human beings - some humans will lead more worthwhile lives - this entails judgement & hierarchies

Question 70

how can a perfectionist respond to the elitist / inegalitarian charge?

Answer 70

critique based on two faulty assumptions (Quong, 2011)

1. it assumes perfectionism must be a teleological doctrine where justice is defined entirely in terms of perfectionist judgements (need not take this form)
2. it assumes that perfectionism is a maximizing doctrine (need not be construed this way, may be combined with any principle of distribution e.g. maximin, sufficientarian, etc)

one can hold a less extreme view, a prioritarian version of perfectionism

• holds that we should value the perfection of each human being, but count the greater perfections more
• but this might have inegalitarian implications for the distribution of resources: when a society wants to foster the creation & preservation of what is best, then it can only pursue it by recognizing & exploiting natural inequalities between persons (Nagel, 1991)

Question 71

how can perfectionists respond to critique that perfectionism is incompatible with value pluralism?

Answer 71

objection assumes that perfectionism will favour the political imposition of a single conception of the good or comprehensive doctrine (need not take this form, can accept that there are a plurality of incompatible yet equally valuable forms of life)

Question 72

what are the pragmatic objections to perfectionism?

Answer 72

have no reason to believe that the governments in our societies will be better equipped than individuals to know what account of human flourishing is correct, or is best-suited to any given person (individuals are the best judge of what is good for them & so decisions about human flourishing are best left in the hands of individuals)

we should not allow the state to base policies on perfectionist grounds because this represents a dangerous increase in the scope of state power

based on assumptions about the fallibility of government institutions & officials

Question 73

how are neutrality & perfectionism incompatible?

Answer 73

if the conception of a good life is controversial, perfectionism affirms exactly what neutrality denies

the component of the neutrality norm that conflicts with perfectionism is the neutrality of justification

Question 74

what component of the neutrality norm conflicts with perfectionism?

Answer 74

component of the neutrality norm that conflicts with perfectionism is the neutrality of justification

Question 75

is there possible compatibility between neutrality & perfectionism?

Answer 75

state neutrality & perfectionism are not strictly incompatible: there can be nuances between them & perfectionism does not have to reject all forms of state neutrality

value pluralism

restricted neutrality principle (Wall, 2010)

first vs second-order value (Colburn, 2010)

Question 76

how does value pluralism suggest possible compatibility between neutrality & perfectionism?

Answer 76

view that there is a plurality of good, but incompatible forms of life fully worthy of respect

could explain how reasonable people can adopt & pursue different ideals of the good

intuition behind this is that there is not just one worthy way of life

Question 77

how does Wall’s (2010) restricted neutrality principle suggest possible compatibility between neutrality & perfectionism?

Answer 77

if more than two ideals of the good are conceivable for those living in a political society & if these ideals cannot be ranked by reason, then the state, to the extent that it aims to promote the good in this political society, should be neutral between these ideals (Wall, 2010)

RNP restricts the scope of state neutrality to ideals of the good that are fully reasonable

since RNP does not rule out state action that promotes reasonable over unreasonable conceptions of the good, a proponent of this principle can accept it while affirming the perfectionist claim that “certain conceptions of the good are worthless and demeaning, and that political action may and should be taken to eradicate or at least curtail them” (Raz, 1986)

this principle is reconciling political liberalism & a political perfectionist

Question 78

which scholar promotes the restricted neutrality principle as reconciling political liberalism & political perfectionism?

Answer 78

Wall, 2010