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Theory of Politics > Liberty > Flashcards

Liberty Flashcards

1
Q

what are the three explanations for unfreedom?

A

external constraints: factors outside the self which prevent / hinder the agent from doing / becoming something

e.g. fences, walls, chains

internal constraints: factors inside the self which prevent / hinder the agent from doing / becoming something

  • e.g. phobias, addictions

something other than constraints

  • e.g. lack of self-realisation, failure of collective self-governance, domination
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2
Q

what are external constraints?

A

factors outside the self which prevent / hinder the agent from doing / becoming something

e.g. fences, walls, chains

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3
Q

what are internal constraints?

A

factors within the self which prevent an agent from doing / becoming something

e.g. addiction, phobias

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4
Q

what are Mill’s three regions of liberty?

A

liberty of conscience

liberty of tastes & pursuits

freedom of association

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5
Q

do Mill’s 3 regions of liberty entail 3 types of liberty?

A

no

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6
Q

define autonomy using Dworkin (1988).

A

“a second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth, and the capacity to accept or attempt to change these in light of higher-order preferences” (Dworkin, 1988)

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7
Q

which scholar defined autonomy as “a second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth, and the capacity to accept or attempt to change these in light of higher-order preferences”?

A

Dworkin, 1988

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8
Q

what four questions must be asked of constraints on freedom?

A

(1) location - internal vs external)

(2) source - nature / other people etc

(3) type - things we desire to do / things we might desire to do

(4) character - increasingly difficult / rendering less desirable

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9
Q

what is the argument against internal constraints? how could one respond?

A

agents can’t constrain themselves; very notion of ‘constraint’ presupposes something ‘external’ doing the constraining

response: agents are internally complex, some parts divided against others

  • e.g. drug addict with desire to stop taking drugs
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10
Q

how does the source of the constraint matter?

A

public footpath example:

  • fence designed to stop ramblers vs brambles growing prevents ramblers

freedom is social ideal related to other agents’ actions - constraint must be connected in certain ways to others’ actions

  • natural constraints are constraints on freedom but on ability
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11
Q

how does the type of constraint matter?

A

freedom as non-interference: constraints on freedom prevent actions, whether or not agent desires to perform that action

freedom as non-frustration: constraints on freedom frustrate agents’ desires

monastery example:

  • self-sustaining monastery encircled by insurmountable wall
  • is this restriction of freedom of the monks, who, by stipulation, don’t wish to leave?
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12
Q

which example is used to demonstrate distinction between freedom as non-interference & freedom as non-frustration?

A

monastery example:

  • self-sustaining monastery encircled by insurmountable wall
  • is this restriction of freedom of the monks, who, by stipulation, don’t wish to leave?
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13
Q

how does the character of the constraint matter?

A

how much difficulty must a constraint involve?

  • can increased ‘cost’ of an option render one less free?
  • must a constraint render something impossible?

distinction: being free with respect to something vs doing something freely

  • former a matter of whether any given option is available
  • latter a matter of the range & quality of options one faces & why one chooses what one does
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14
Q

what is the distinction between being free with respect to something & doing something freely?

A

being free with respect to something is a matter of whether any given option is available

doing something freely is a matter of the range & quality of options one faces & why one chooses what one does

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15
Q

which scholar introduced the distinction between negative & positive liberty?

A

Berlin, 2003

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16
Q

what is positive liberty?

A

self-mastery (‘freedom to’) (Berlin, 2003)

  • identified with ‘dominant’ self, with higher nature & true reason

idealist liberty: person is free when he is autonomous, following his own authentic desires; certain political conditions are necessary (Miller, 2017)

positive liberty develops with 3 particular doctrines: (Miller, 2017)

  1. freedom as the power / capacity to act in certain ways
  2. freedom as rational self-direction (idealist)
  3. freedom as collective self-determination (republican)

positive liberty is an exercise concept (Taylor, 2016)

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17
Q

define idealist freedom using Miller, 2017.

A

a person is free when he is autonomous, following his own authentic desires; certain political conditions are necessary

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18
Q

is positive liberty an exercise or opportunity concept?

A

exercise concept (Taylor, 2016)

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19
Q

what 3 doctrines does positive liberty isolate according to Miller, 2017?

A
  1. freedom as the power / capacity to act in certain ways
  2. freedom as rational self-direction (idealist)
  3. freedom as collective self-determination (republican)
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20
Q

what are some objections to the positive conception of liberty?

A

tied to a certain conception of the good

justifies coercion for the good of another person’s higher self

freedom as ‘self-mastery’ works on an individual level but on a political level can slip into totalitarianism / state paternalism when government tries to control too much for a ‘good life’

positive liberty contains too large a group

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21
Q

what is the danger of positive liberty as ‘self-mastery’ on a political level?

A

on a political level can slip into totalitarianism / state paternalism when government tries to control too much for a ‘good life’

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22
Q

what is negative liberty?

A

area of non-interference (‘freedom from’) (Berlin, 2003)

  • free to the degree to which no man interferes with my activity (Berlin, 2003)

Locke, Constant & Tocqueville conceive of an area of personal freedom that must not be violated

liberal conception of freedom: property of individuals & consists in the absence of constraint or interference by others (Miller, 2017)

negative freedom can rely on an opportunity concept (Taylor, 2016)

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23
Q

define the liberal conception of freedom using Miller, 2017.

A

it is the property of individuals & consists in the absence of interference or constraint by others (Miller, 2017)

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24
Q

is negative liberty an exercise or opportunity concept?

A

negative freedom can rely on an opportunity concept (Taylor, 2016)

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25
Q

what is the physicalist approach to negative liberty?

A

B only infringes on A’s freedom when he renders one or more of A’s actions impossible by controlling the physical space in which it could occur (Steiner, 1974)

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26
Q

which scholar wrote of negative liberty “free to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my activity”?

A

Berlin, 2003

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27
Q

what are some objections to negative liberty?

A

must involve agents imposing the interference (intentional, external forces)

  • if interference is internal, NL has nothing to say

normalisation of restrictions of liberty

  • adopt certain norms that are socialised into us so we don’t consider them restrictions e.g. gender norms

pure opportunity concept (Taylor, 2016)

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28
Q

what is MacCallum’s triadic relation?

A

there is only one concept of liberty, embodied in the formula, “X (an agent) is free from Y (preventing condition) to do or become Z” (MacCallum, 1968)

freedom which emphasises a difference in conceptions simply emphasises different terms under the triadic relation (MacCallum, 1968)

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29
Q

how does the example of the smoker driving the the tobacconist exemplify MacCallum’s triadic relation?

A

if we say the driver is free, we mean he is free from external (physical or legal) obstacles to do whatever he might want

if we say the driver is unfree, we mean that he, consisting of a higher, rational self, is made unfree by internal, psychological constraints

in both claims there is a negative & positive element (assumes both that freedom is freedom from something & that is freedom to do or become something)

dichotomy between ‘freedom from’ & ‘freedom to’ is false & misleading

30
Q

what are the arguments for supporting MacCallum’s triadic relation conception of liberty?

A

only reason we care about freedom from is so we are free to do otherwise (Taylor, 2016)

opportunity framework but more space to consider it as an exercise concept than in other frameworks

widely understood & makes it easier to construct claims in terms of freedom

31
Q

what are the arguments against supporting MacCallum’s triadic relation conception of liberty?

A

linguistic approach: creates false equivocacy

  • rolls all freedom into one but freedoms can interfere & conflict with each other - triadic relation can deal with that

less than wholly inclusive of various possible conceptions of freedom

  • concept of self-mastery / self-direction implies presence of control not captured by MacCallum’s relation
32
Q

what is freedom as non-frustration (or Hobbesian freedom)?

A

not frustrated (not unfree) if an option you do not desire is blocked

33
Q

what is Berlin’s objection to freedom as non-frustration?

A
  1. suppose with Hobbes that you enjoy freedom in a choice between A & B just in case you avoid interference in the option that you actually choose; you avoid frustration
  2. by supposition, you do not enjoy freedom of choice in the case where A attracts my interference, B does not, and you choose A
  3. but, by supposition, you would enjoy freedom of choice in that case, were you to choose B
  4. if you know the situation, therefore, it appears that you can ensure your freedom of choice, without constraining my interference, by adapting your preferences & choosing B
  5. but this is absurd. You cannot make yourself free just by accommodating yourself to my disposition to interfere
  6. thus, the original supposition that non-frustration is enough for freedom must be false
34
Q

what is the objection to freedom as non-frustration?

A

can promote your own freedom of choice as between A & B, by adapting preference so as to select the option that has the lesser chance of triggering interference (Pettit, 2011)

‘Return to the Inner Citadel’

  • if we reduce our wants & desires, we cannot be frustrated by the failure to realise them, feel more free
  • i.e. equating a desire eradicated with a desire fulfilled
35
Q

how does ‘return to the inner citadel’ prove an objection to freedom as non-frustration?

A

if we reduce our wants & desires, we cannot be frustrated by the failure to realise them, feel more free

i.e. equating a desire eradicated with a desire fulfilled

36
Q

what is freedom as non-interference (liberal conception of freedom)?

A

“the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others” (Berlin, 2003)

absence of constraint or interference (Miller, 2017)

37
Q

what are the objections to freedom as non-interference?

A

has no implications for who should rule & how one should make use of the protected sphere of personal choice

“belief in negative freedom is compatible with generating lasting social evils… the bloodstained story of economic individualism and unrestrained capitalist competition” (Berlin, 2003)

to characterise freedom strictly as an ‘opportunity concept’ as opposed to an ‘exercise concept’ is problematic once the non-sovereignty of human agency is understood

38
Q

which scholar said “belief in negative freedom is compatible with generating lasting social evils… the bloodstained story of economic individualism and unrestrained capitalist competition” as an objection to freedom from interference?

A

Berlin, 2003

39
Q

what is freedom as non-domination (republican freedom)?

A

defines freedom by reference to a certain set of political arrangements; a free person is a citizen of a free political community which is defined as self-governing (Miller, 2017)

liberty is not merely the enjoyment of a sphere of non-interference but the enjoyment of certain conditions in which such non-interference is guaranteed (Pettit, 1997)

  • e.g. presence of democratic constitution, separation of powers etc

has been applied not only to relations of domination between governments & citizens, but also to relations of domination between employers & workers (Breen & McBride, 2015), between husbands & wives (Lovett), and between able-bodied & disabled people (De Wispelaere & Casassas, 2014)

40
Q

how is non-domination distinct from negative freedom?

A

Pettit, 1997

  1. one can enjoy non-interference without enjoying non-domination
  2. one can enjoy non-domination while nevertheless being interfered with, just as long as the interference in question is constrained to track one’s avowed interests thanks to republican power structures: only arbitrary power is inimical to freedom, not power as such
41
Q

how is non-domination distinct from positive freedom?

A
  1. republican freedom does not consist in the activity of virtuous political participation; rather, that participation is seen as instrumentally related to freedom as non-domination
  2. the republican concept of freedom cannot lead to anything like the oppressive consequences feared by Berlin, because it has a commitment to non-domination & to liberal-democratic institutions already built into it
42
Q

what relations has freedom as non-domination been applied to?

A

has been applied not only to relations of domination between governments & citizens, but also to relations of domination between employers & workers (Breen & McBride, 2015), between husbands & wives (Lovett), and between able-bodied & disabled people (De Wispelaere & Casassas, 2014)

43
Q

define domination using Pettit, 1997.

A

any relationship in which one person has “1. the capacity to interfere, 2. on an arbitrary basis, 3. in certain choices that the other is in a position to make” (Pettit, 1997)

44
Q

which scholar said in relation to freedom as non-domination that we should understand the “anatomy of racial inequality” in the US today as a function of “racial stigma” instead of racial discrimination?

A

Glenn Loury

45
Q

how does the benevolent dictator support the idea of freedom as non-domination?

A

dictator maximises citizens’ negative liberty, but retains capacity to interfere on an arbitrary basis

citizens are less free because they are dominated by the dictator…their fate depends on the will of someone else

46
Q

what are the two dimensions of non-domination?

A

(i) absence of interference is insufficient for freedom; the absence of relations of domination is also required

(ii) presence of interference doesn’t necessarily violate freedom, it depends on whether it is ‘mastering’ interference or not

47
Q

what is the objection to freedom as non-domination?

A

non-interference & non-domination are both incomplete, but both are crucial enabling conditions of agency & important forms of freedom

the dangers of excluding impersonal, unconscious social factors from the category of domination is that we fail to recognise the serious threats they pose

48
Q

what is freedom as non-oppression?

A

oppression refers to the impersonal social & political connections that systematically & unjustly impede agency on the part of certain people

rests on impersonal, systematic patterns of privilege, on dynamics that many people never see - relates to structural asymmetries in power

often coexists with domination; implicitly leans on justice

49
Q

why is non-oppression a more complex ideal than non-interference or non-domination?

A

more complex ideal than non-interference or non-domination because there is no easy divide between the intrapersonal & the interpersonal aspects of freedom as non-oppression

50
Q

what does oppression refer to?

A

the impersonal social & political connections that systematically & unjustly impede agency on the part of certain people

51
Q

what is freedom as collective world-making?

A

“participation in public affairs” with the activity of “calling something into being which did not exist before, which was not given” (Arendt)

without “a politically guaranteed public realm, freedom lacks the worldly space to make its appearance” (Arendt)

52
Q

which scholar said of freedom as collective world-making, without “a politically guaranteed public realm, freedom lacks the worldly space to make its appearance”?

A

Arendt

53
Q

what is the objection to Arendt’s freedom as collective world-making?

A

strict dichotomy between freedom & necessity that underlies Arendt’s understanding of freedom simply does not hold

54
Q

why do capitalists think capitalism provides a greater level of individual liberty than a socialist one?

A

everyone owns something (be it only his own labour power)

rests upon private property: you can sell & buy only what you respectively own & come to own

55
Q

what is the Marxist charge against capitalism?

A

while liberals & libertarians see the freedom which is intrinsic to capitalism, they overlook the unfreedom which necessarily accompanies capitalist freedom (Cohen, 2006)

in capitalist society the great majority of people are forced to sell their labour power, because they do not own any means of production (Cohen, 2006)

  • ‘private ownership by one person presupposes non-ownership on the part of other persons’ (Marx)

although most proletarians are free to escape the proletariat, and, indeed, even if every one is, the proletariat is collectively unfree, an imprisoned class (Cohen, 2006)

  • each is free only on condition that the others do not exercise their similarly conditional freedom
56
Q

how can capitalists reply to the Marxist critique of capitalist freedom?

A

if Marxists are right, then workers, being forced to sell their labour power, are, in an important way, unfree. But it must remain true that (unlike chattel slaves) they are free to sell their labour power (Cohen, 2006)

unfreedom asserted by Marxists is compatible with the freedom asserted by bourgeois thinkers

57
Q

is there a connection between negative liberty and any particular form of government?

A

Millian liberty is based, says Berlin, on a much-disputed conception of human nature, and is compatible with autocracy (at least logically)

there is no necessary connection between negative liberty & any particular form of government

  • is it not counterintuitive to say that I can in theory be free even if I live in a dictatorship, or that a slave can enjoy considerable liberty as long as the slave-owner is compassionate & generous?
  • benevolent dictator (fails freedom as non-domination)
58
Q

why do economic circumstances affect liberty?

A

economic circumstances determine what one can own, the extent to which one is free to do as they wish with their property & the ability one has to fulfil their aspirations

59
Q

what aspects of economic circumstances should be considered when looking at liberty?

A

when analysing economic circumstances, consider both the access to material resources someone has & the economic system itself

  • latter has impact on freedom both it very nature through defining the relations of production & because it has profound implications on the material wealth of the citizens too
60
Q

how is poverty relevant to liberty, according to Cohen (2011)?

A

Cohen argues that lack of money, poverty, carries with it lack of freedom & regards this an an overwhelmingly obvious truth (Cohen, 2011)

distribution of resources is always going to be relevant to the distribution of negative liberty in a society (Steiner & Cohen)

money provides freedom because it extinguishes interference with access to goods & services: it functions as an entry ticket to them (Cohen, 2011)

61
Q

what is the debate between right-wing & left-wing over poverty’s relation to liberty?

A

Right-wing celebrate the freedom enjoyed by all in liberal capitalist society

Left-wing respond that the freedom which the Right celebrate is merely formal

  • while the poor are formally free to do all kinds of things that the state does not forbid anyone to do, their situation means that they are not really free to do very many of them, since they cannot afford to do them, & they are, therefore, in the end, prevented from doing them

Right’s response: to lack money is to suffer lack of means / ability - poverty doesn’t carry with it lack of freedom

  • the poor are free to do anything & no one interferes with this right. The fact that they can’t afford to do something does not reflect a lack of freedom, but just a lack of means to exercise the freedom they have
  • money is not an object & a low economic status is not simply a lack of physical resources, but rather the lack of power to act according to one’s desires without any interference
  • not that they lack freedom, but that they lack ability to exercise the freedom that they undoubtedly have
  • inabilities are not equal to unfreedom e.g. being able to jump 20ft

Right-wing position: 2 movements: one conceptual, one normative

  • prem1: freedom is compromised by (liability to) interference (by other people), but not by lack of means
  • prem2: to lack money is to suffer not (liability to) interference, but lack of means
  • conc1: poverty (lack of money) does not carry with it lack of freedom (conceptual claim)
  • prem3: the primary task of government is to protect freedom
  • conc2: relief of poverty is not part of the primary task of government (normative claim)

three ways of resisting this argument

  • challenge (1): how can a person reasonably be said to be free to do what she is unable to do?
  • reject (2) (Cohen’s approach)
  • deny (3): even if lack of money is just lack of means, lack of means is just as confining as lack of freedom, and, therefore, just as important a thing for the state to rectify

key is that, if you are poor, you are pro tanto less free than if you are rich (Cohen, 2011)

  • when a person’s economic security is enhanced, there typically are fewer “obstacles to possible choices and activities” for him, & he therefore typically has more individual liberty, on Berlin’s own liberty-equals-no-obstacles-posed-or-left-by-others conception of liberty
62
Q

what is the right-wing argument regarding poverty & liberty?

A

2 movements: one conceptual, one normative

Prem1: freedom is compromised by (liability to) interference (by other people), but not by lack of means

Prem2: to lack money is to suffer not (liability to) interference, but lack of means

Conc1: poverty (lack of money) does not carry with it lack of freedom (conceptual claim)

Prem3: the primary task of government is to protect freedom

Conc2: relief of poverty is not part of the primary task of government (normative claim)

63
Q

what is Waldron’s (1991) argument about homelessness & liberty?

A

“contemptible mockery” to suggest to the homeless person that their economic status does not compromise upon their personal liberty (Waldron, 1991)

homeless people have no private space in which to do as they please, in public places excluded by someone else’s say-so (Waldron, 1991)

homeless freedom depends on common property (Waldron, 1991)

  • common property: under collective control to allow anyone in the society to make use of it without having to secure the permission of anybody else
  • limits the basic freedom of homeless people

society allows homelessness, but does not permit the homeless basic freedoms

each particular aspect of a homeless person’s unfreedom involves an intentional restraint, but the cumulation is not in itself the product of intention

lack positive freedom - at the mercy of their poverty (controls & dictates every decision)

64
Q

which scholar says it is “contemptible mockery” to suggest to the homeless person that their economic status does not compromise upon their personal liberty?

A

Waldron, 1991

65
Q

which scholar argues for the abandonment of pure opportunity concept of freedom?

A

Taylor, 2016

66
Q

which scholar makes the distinction between liberty as an exercise vs opportunity concept?

A

Taylor, 2016

67
Q

is positive freedom an exercise or opportunity concept?

A

positive freedom is an exercise concept, freedom to shape one’s own life (Taylor, 2016)

concepts of self-realisation cannot be an opportunity concept as having the opportunity to be free requires that I already be exercising freedom

68
Q

what does it mean for liberty to be an exercise concept?

A

in an exercise-concept, the person himself cannot be the final authority on whether he is free (Taylor, 2016)

freedom is a matter of exercising control over the shape of one’s life - people not truly free if they do not act upon desires (positive freedom)

if interpreted as an exercise concept, freedom consists not merely in the possibility of doing certain things, but in actually doing certain things in certain ways

requires us to discriminate among motivations - you are not free if you are motivated by false consciousness & internalised standards

69
Q

what does it mean for liberty to be an opportunity concept?

A

negative freedom can rely on an opportunity concept (Taylor, 2016)

places the focus on what is within our ability, and what is open to us, rather than what we actually do

70
Q

is MacCallum’s liberty an exercise or opportunity concept?

A

MacCallum argument is an opportunity concept; it does not account for freedom understood as an exercise concept; it refers to the constraints

71
Q

what is the distinction between formal vs effective freedom?

A

formal (Berlin): negative freedom

effective (Hobbes): need both negative freedom & resources to exercise it

formal freedom guarantees absence of certain kinds of interference in a given arena, effective freedom guarantees that one can in fact achieve the freedom’s object

72
Q

which scholars are associated with formal & effective freedom, respectively?

A

formal (Berlin): negative freedom

effective (Hobbes): need both negative freedom & resources to exercise it

Theory of Politics (5 decks)

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