R1: Alan Turing (1950) 'Computing Machinery And Intelligence' Flashcards
This question begins Alan Turing’s paper ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ (1950).
Why is it unhelpful?
Can Machines Think?
- Even the process of defining ‘machines’ and ‘think’ in common terms would be dangerous - it could lead one to think the answer can be obtained from a statistical survey.
Alternative to question
The question of the ‘The Imitation Game’:
- two rooms. room 1: man (A) and woman (B). room 2: interrogator (C) who must determine which of the other two is the man and which is the woman through a series of typewritten communication.
objectives of A and B
A’s objective: cause C to make the incorrect identification
B’s objective: help C to make the correct identification.
- best strategy for (B) is to give truthful answers (“I am the woman, don’t listen to him!”). however, man (A) can make similar remarks.
reframed orignal question
‘What happens when a machine takes the role of A?’ Will the interrogator still decide incorrectly as many times if the role is performed by a machine?
machines allowed in the experiment?
digital computers
(3) features of digital computers
store - of infomation for calculations and rules the computer must follow.
executive unit - which carries out the individual operations.
control - ensures that instructions are performed according to rules and in the correct order
Objection 1: Theological Objection
Argument: Thinking is a function of man’s immortal soul. God has given an immortal soul to every man and woman, but not to any other animal or to machines. Hence no animal or machine can think.
Response: Turing could not accept any part of this argument and rejected the idea that thinking machines would usurp God’s power of creating souls any more than humans do so in the procreation of children.
Objection 2: Head in the Sand Objection
Argument: The consequences of machines thinking would be too dreadful. Let us hope and believe that they cannot do so.
Response: He claimed this argument would likely be quite strong in intellectual people, since they value the power of thinking more highly than others, and are more inclined to base their belief in the superiority of Man on this power. Turing did not feel the argument is sufficiently substantial to require refutation.
Objection 3: Mathematical Objection
Argument: mathematical logic reveals limitations to the powers of discrete-state machines. Godel’s theorem (1931): in any sufficiently powerful logical system, statements can be formulated which can neither be proved nor disproved within the system.
Response: He acknowledged that there are limits to the powers of any machine but saw no proof that these limits do not also apply to human intellect and expected that those holding the mathematical argument would be willing to accept ‘The Imitation Game’ as a basis for discussion, unlike the previous two arguments.
Objection 4: Argument from Consciousness
Argument: A machine cannot match a brain until it is conscious, moved to act by it’s own thoughts and emotions.
Response: According to this view, the only way to know that a man thinks is to be that particular man. He noted it may be the most logical view to hold but it makes communication of ideas difficult. A is liable to believe “A thinks but B does not” whilst B believes “B thinks but A does not.” instead of arguing continually over this point it is usual to have the polite convention that everyone thinks. He accepted a certain mystery about the nature of consciousness but did not see it having an impact on his question.
Objection 5: Arguments from Various Disabilities
Argument: Machines may do all the things you have mentioned but you will never be able to make one to do X.” (Insert: fall in love, have a sense of humour etc.)
Response: He argued that no support is usually offered for these statements and they are mostly founded on the basis of scientific induction. From the thousands of machines people have seen before them - they are all ugly, each designed for a very limited purpose, when required for a minutely different purpose they are useless etc. Naturally they conclude this is true of all machines. Turing believed that diversity in behaviour would directly increase with storage capacity which was growing exponentially.
Objection 6: Lady Lovelace’s Objection
Argument: Lady Lovelace’s memoir stated that Babbage’s Analytical Engine had no pretensions to originate any behaviour of it’s own.
Response: Turing agreed with Hartree’s (1949) analysis that despite the fact machines constructed or projected at the time did not seem to have this property, it does not imply the impossibility of constructing electronic equipment that will ‘think for itself’.
Objection 7: Argument from Continuity in the Nervous System
Argument: The nervous system is certainly not a discrete-state machine. A small error in the information about the size of a nervous impulse impinging on a neuron, may make a large difference to the size of the outgoing impulse, [therefore] one cannot expect to be able to mimic the behaviour of the nervous system with a discrete-state system.”
Response: He agreed that a discrete-state machine must be different from a continuous machine. But in adhering to the conditions of ‘The Imitation Game’, the interrogator will not be able to take any advantage of this difference, that it would be possible to sufficiently mimic continous outputs where required.
Objection 8: The Argument from Informality of Behaviour
Argument: It is not possible to produce a set of rules purporting to describe what a man should do in every conceivable set of circumstances. One might for instance have a rule that one is to stop when one sees a red traffic light, and to go if one sees a green one, but what if by some fault both appear together? One may perhaps decide that it is safest to stop. But some further difficulty may well arise from this decision later. To attempt to provide rules of conduct to cover every eventuality, even those arising from traffic lights, appears to be impossible.
Response: Turing reformed this argument as ‘if men acted based on rules they would be no better than machines but there are no such rules, so men cannot be machines’. He then argues that men are clearly governed by laws of behaviour, the laws of nature that are applied to men (‘if you pinch a man, he will squeak’). Rules of conduct a man follows are harder to ascertain, they are only found through scientific observation but there are no circumstances under which one could say, “We have searched enough. There are no such laws.”
Objection 9: The Argument from Extrasensory Perception
Argument: Unlike machines, humans possess ESP (viz., telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition and psychokinesis).
