PW Botha: response to resistance, 1978-90 Flashcards
Botha’s ‘Total Strategy Response’
From 1978: Repression and Reform
Reform elements
Black trade unions legalized (1979) - led to establishment of COSATU (Congress of SA Trade Unions), became important in organizing strikes and anti-apartheid demonstrations
Plans to improve quality of black housing in townships
New voting system giving limited voting rights in national elections to Coloured and Indian people
Establishment of elected black councils to run townships (some political voice, but very limited)
Self-government granted to several homelands including Kwa-Zulu (Buthelezi)
Repression elements
Increasing strength of military and security forces in SA:
5x increase in military spending
Enlarged military size - 2 year compulsory conscription for white South African men
Bureau of State Security (BOSS) conducted ‘dirty war’ against ANC and SACP leaders in exile
Raids against MK bases in Angola and Mozambique
Why was Total Strategy unsuccessful in ending violence/winning support in South Africa
REFORM
Dissatisfaction with extent of reforms - didn’t do enough for Blacks/Coloured, no real political voice
New protest group (1983) - United Democratic Front (UDF) organised boycotts against new voting system, boycotts against black council elections and organised other demonstrations
No significant improvement in living/working conditions nor change to apartheid structures and laws
Mandela still imprisoned, increasing sanctions and condemnation - ‘Free Nelson Mandela’ campaign
Why was Total Strategy unsuccessful in ending violence/winning support in South Africa
REPRESSION
Resentment towards regime - repression strong, but not sufficient
Increasing number of strikes (now effectively organised by COSATU)
Vocal opposition from CHURCH LEADERS (significant respect and voice) e.g. Desmond Tutu
Religious leaders accused apartheid of being unchristian - religious communities strong in SA
MK sabotage attacks increased against railways, government buildings and infrastructure
Increasing number of deaths due to political violence (200 in 1984 to 1300 in 1986), including escalating township violence, attacks on black policemen and town councillors seen as traitors encouraged by ANC
All this was costly to government, disrupted production and transport and discouraged foreign investment
Increasing economic problems
Increasing strikes and violence undermined productivity and discouraged foreign investment
Costly for government to maintain security/armed forces
Blacks poor, no purchasing power to fuel economic growth; lack of skilled labourers
White resistance to government reforms
Afrikaner resistance movement (AWB) established 1979 by Eugene Terre’Blanche - violent, white supremacist organisation committed to apartheid
Opposition to reforms from newly established Conservative Party (1982), began gaining votes
Opposition to declining economy and government spending and military conscription amongst more moderate whites who wanted more reforms
Key effects of Botha’s Total Strategy
Increase of government repression and some limited reform
Increase in civil unrest and economic problems due to the unrest
Increase in international condemnation of NP policies
Growth of white extremist resistance groups dissatisfied with government
Key effects of the growth of civil unrest in South Africa during Botha’s Presidency (1978-89)
Declining economy in South Africa - unstable for investment, economic sanctions increase, strikes
Increased government repression policies (not very effective)
Increased international criticism of NP regime
State of Emergency
1985: Declared by Botha to try and stabilize the violence in South Africa
Intensified repression:
Greater numbers of police to township (more black police from Bantustans), and army sent in (more numbers due to conscription)
Greater powers e.g. arrests without charge, searches without warrants. Tens of thousands arrested
Censorship increased, more bannings e.g. UDF banned
Lifted by de Klerk in 1990
‘Reforms’ of apartheid during the state of emergency
End of Mixed Marriage Act
Allowing (not requiring) local authorities to de-segregate public facilities
Abolition of Pass laws
(Still limited)
Consequence of state of emergency and limited reforms
Neither policy worked and township violence continued to escalate
Economy continued to suffer due to strikes and demonstrations, decline of foreign investment
Black policemen and town councillors attacked, seen as collaborators with regime
1985: Major banks and companies pulled out of SA - no loans/investment to SA
1986: US Congress imposed mandatory economic sanctions against SA
50% fall in US investment in SA
Church Street bombing
1983: One of most devastating MK operations
Targeted South African Air Force HQ on Church Street, retaliation for 1981 raid on ANC homes
19 killed (including civilians and military personnel), over 200 injured
Botha used attack to justify further militarization, portrayed MK as “terrorists” to discredit ANC
Rubicon Speech
1985: Botha, rather than announce apartheid reforms, doubled down on repression:
Refused to release Mandela or unban the ANC
Rejected “one person, one vote”
After the speech, Rand crashed 35% overnight, foreign banks recalled loans
Nicknamed ‘Rubicon’ after Julius Caesar’s point of no return
Key effects of Botha’s State of Emergency (1985-1990)
Increase in government repression
Escalation of township violence
Increase in international criticism/sanctions and economic decline in SA
Key effects of growth of international sanctions against South Africa in the 1980s
Declining economy in South Africa
Political pressure to end Apartheid state
Key effects of growth of internal unrest in South Africa in 1980s
Decline in economic growth/international investment
Increased political pressures to reform/end apartheid
