proximate determinants of cooperation

Question 1

types of proximate causes: structrual causes

Answer 1

• changes to the structure of the situation/social interaction itself that directyl affect the conflict between self interest and collective interests
• aligning group/self interests
• incentives, leadership, time horizon (causing people to have more time interaction w the things they should care about, so their interest and its interest align more), group size (your impact matters more)

Question 2

types of proximate causes: motivational causes

Answer 2

• affect the cognitive, affective, and motivational processes of individuals in the social dilemma (getting people to care more about the group they’re a part of)
• social identity, collective goals, communication, self-efficacy (to what extent i believe my actions actually make a diff)

Question 3

the leviathan and cooperation (hobbes)

Answer 3

discusses need to create appropriate incentives to make people act in accordance w the groups’s needs and cooperate

Question 4

Structural causes: incentives

Answer 4

• Any adjustment to the direct outcomes of a social interaction may be considered a structural change to the dilemma
• punishment/rewards (good social rep, bad social rep, going to jail for not paying taxes)
• make cooperation more aligned with self-interest

Question 5

sanctioning system problems

Answer 5

SS is a second order social dilemma
-requires resources and people to invest in (something needs to be able to provide for the punishments and rewards)
Yamagishi found that people were willing to support a sanctioning system, which increased cooperation
—-why? Ppl ay think others are unwilling to contribute on their own and percieve need for sanction system. Large temptation to defect=more support for sanction system

Question 6

Punishments vs rewards effects

Answer 6

• EQUALLY EFFECTIVE

- why equally? each reward and punishment reduce the conflict of interest (k value)

Question 7

are incentives EFFICIENT even if theyre effective?

Answer 7

• is the investment worth the benefits provided?
• Cost effort, time, and resources
• in short term, theyre ineffiecnet, but in LONG TERM they become efficient (lasting benefits)

Question 8

what makes incentives more efficient

Answer 8

• situation can effect efficiency
• —Choose sanctioning system (allowing people some voice/choice in terms of having a sanctioning system)
• — coordinate sanctions (allow ppl to coordinate their actions to be more effective; 2 ppl punishing instead of 1 [regardless of whether total punishment is equal, more ppl punishing is more effective])
• — reputation monitoring

Question 9

can we understand the effectiveness of incentives by only learning principle (operant conditioning)?

Answer 9

• dominant thinking for a long time was that ppl learn whats appropriate/not based on outcomes of their actions (increased prob of actions leading to reward, decreased prob of actions leading to punishment)
• punishments and rewards are more effective the more an individual is encoutnering the action many times over time
• —one shot dilemmas (d=.32, small but meaningful change), versus decision made repeatadly over time (.62 with strangers, .92 with partners)
• ——–something more than JUST operant conditioning; something to do with social context (remaining w same ppl over time)

Question 10

negative effects of incentives

Answer 10

what happens when incentives are removed (if govts cant afford to continue the system etc)
– reduced trsut in others, reduced cooperation
– basically, there’s a dependence on the system- doesn’t produce Good Citizens, jsut people who follow the rules to avoid punishment/get reward
what about when others punish cooperators?
– antisocial punishment reduces cooperation in group

Question 11

impact of communication on coop

Answer 11

-perhaps the most effective immediate cause of cooperation is communication

Question 12

communication- why does it work

Answer 12

• does comm. evoke social or personal norms that effect behavior?
• -social norms: we must have the possibiilty of being monitered and punished by others for these to affect behavior
• • personal norms: we will sanction ourselves (e.g. feeling guilt) if we violate these norms, so they don’t require that our behavior is observed by others

Question 13

impact of anonymity on effect of communiction on cooperation

Answer 13

-kerr: social dilemma with manipulated communication and anonymity
three conditions: no discussion and anonymous (made in a cubicle), discussion but anonymous choices, discussion and with non-anoymous choices
-communication increased cooperation

Question 14

communication and trust

Answer 14

-enhaves trust and expectations of others cooperation; this leads to higher levels of cooperation

Question 15

best method for commnication and cooperatoin

Answer 15

• face to dace is gold standard, huge effect size

- -f2f (d=1.21), versus written messages (d=.46)

Question 16

many other proximate causes exist

Answer 16

framing (business context vs community context)
partner behavior
group size
is there a provision point for public good? (if i make the
sequential choice (if we both make the decision at the same time, less cooperative compared to making a decision after they’ve done it- telling people they’re the 1st ppl to make a choice, they act like they have more influence over what the other ppl do)
power/status
personality (social motives & trust)