Intro Class, chapts. 1 and 2 Flashcards

1
Q

Eusocial insects

A

some of the most successful species on the planet (bees, ants, or non insects like humans are also eusocial, etc)
creatures that cooperate to create things that are beneficial to all

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2
Q

direct reciprocity

A

“if you groomed me yesterday, i’m more likely to be the one to do it to you today”

exhibited by monkeys (our closest cousins), eg with grooming

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3
Q

Hobbes, leviathan; Rousseau

A

Hobbes believed ppl are naturally bad, wrote the liviathan- about need for contract to control who ppl are inherently. “My gain is your loss”
Rousseau; discussed how ppl have always come together to acheive things they couldn’t have done alone (eg, hunting- incredibly hard to bring down big game alone but relatively easy w/ others)

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4
Q

Kurt Lewin, on interdependence

A

interdependence is the greatest challenge to the maturity of indiv. and group functioning

  • we exp. a lot of diff. types of interdependence, not always a zero sum gain like poker; could be benefitting both self and others
  • how we confront these diff types of interdependence is key to growing as a group and individually
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5
Q

what are Social dilemmas

A

motivational dilemmas; do i do something thats best for me or best for some collective (relationship or group)? Can’t satisfy both mutually
Always one behavior that provides best outcome to oneself, and another that provides best outcome to the collective but reduced outcome to the self
-BUT if everyone chooses the selfish option, then EVERYONE is worse off than if everyone chose to do the best-for-collective option
“Individual rationality leads to collective irrationality”

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6
Q

social dilemmas between countries

A

example: nuclear weapons, decision whetehr to keep them (best for self) or all to destroy them (best for collective)

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7
Q

social dilemmas between citizens and society

A
  • paying your taxes (which are a public good; but maybe i want to keep my money to myself while driving on nice roads w nice public education)
  • voting in an election; your voting voice is so small so what does it matter if i stay home? But if everyone stayed home, no democracy
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8
Q

social dilemmas between individual and group

A

example of indigenous group who travels out to catch whales w two ppl risking their lives so many can get the benefits

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9
Q

dilemmas between partners in a relationship

A

eg, cooking and cleaning (i benefit from doing no work w them doing all work)

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10
Q

prisoners dilemma

A

player A and player B; to get the most out of the situation, you defect while the other cooperates; or you both cooperate and get a slightly worse outcome, or both defect and you get a worse outcome. WORST is when you cooperate and they dont. So, do you cooperate?

  • Temptation outcome (best for ME)-4
  • Reward for cooperation- 3
  • Punishment for defection- 2
  • Sucker outcome- 1
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11
Q

When a behavior yields two conflicting outcomes; social trap, which is a Public Goods dilemma

A

-people decide to make contributions to a dyad or group
-always temptation to freeride on other’s contributions; ie, public radio
-small immediate pos. outcome
-large delayed negative outcome
IE, overfishing (like whale)

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12
Q

Social fence, which is a resource dilemma

A

still a motivational conflict, but compared to the social trap (which is small imed. pos outcome and large delayed neg) - this involves a short term neg. outcome
occurs when theres a short term indiv. negative outcome and long term pos collective outcome

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13
Q

issues with public goods dilemmas

A
  • jointness of supply: no matter how many ppl use the public good it can never be completely consumed
  • impossibiliy of exclusion: ppl can’t be excluded from using the good even if they dont contrib to it
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14
Q

Types of public goods

A
  • Steplevel: contribitions must reach a certain amount before the good is provided (like a bridge)
    - sometimes it is ibest interest for individuals to cooperate, depending on what the others choose (can be viewed as coordination game, can increase levels of cooperation- can we change continuous to step level so as to increase cooperation?)
  • continuous: any amount added contribs to the quality and provision of the public good (eg donating to a homeless food shelter)
    - An individ’s best strategy is always defect regardless of what others choose (this game always involves a conflict of interests)
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15
Q

Resource dilemmas

A
  • people decide how much to TAKE from a common resource pool, rather than how much to contribute to a public good
  • temptation to take as much for self as possible
  • EG, should companies be able to harvest as many trees as possible? Should rich ppl be able to drive/fly everywhere?
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16
Q

Issues with resource dilemmas

A

-how much can ppl harvest?
-At what rate is the resource replenishable?
-When does it become depleted
-Optimal Harvest Level: if everyone consumes the resorruces at this rate, then the resource is sustainable
-Optimal=(IPS)(r)/(N)(r+1)
IPS; initial resource size
r; replenishment rate
N; group size
-according to studies, ppl tend to take more than is sustainable from the groups pool when there’s no communication, but not always the case for all natural groups

17
Q

The cooperation index

A

-not all of the dilemmas (or even w/in certain types of dilemmas) involve same degree of conflicts of interests
-that is, sometimes self interest might be more aligned w cooperation than in other contexts (my win is our win vs my win is your loss -zero sum game)
-can be repped by the cooperation index- K=(R)-(P)/(T)-(S)
r- reward, p-punishment for defection, t-temptation level, s-sucker result

18
Q

Structural Solutions to social dilemmas

A
  • how to reduce freeriding and encouraging cooperation?
  • how to get individuals to use optimal harvesting strategies?
  • Structural: change how ppl make their decisions- change the situation to enc. cooperation; leadership, incentives (subsidizing etc)
    - Partition the resources; divide resources into discrete units
19
Q

Motivational solutions

A

altering individuals decisions and behavior

-enhancing: communication, trust, self-efficacy, social identity

20
Q

Normative approaches

A

what SHOULD ppl do in these situations

  • economics and hame theory
  • nash equilibrium
  • identifies optimal strategies
21
Q

Descriptive approaches

A

-What do ppl actually do in these situations?
-psychology and interdependence theory
-studies how ppl make decisions
-identifies key variables that affect individual choice
-

22
Q

dominant theoretical perspectives

A
  • early research (60s 70s) atheoretical and data driven
  • currently, no single dominant theoretical perspective on human cooperation
  • multidisciplinary appraoch has prevented this development
  • 3 broad theories: evolutionary, rational choice, interdependence