property dualism

Question 1

define property dualism

Answer 1

the mind and body aren’t separate substances, but there are separate physical and non-physical properties.

non-physical qualia is irreducible to and doesn’t supervene on, but emergent from physical qualities

Question 2

define qualia

Answer 2

intrinsic

non-intentional

phenomenal

properties that are

introspectively accessible

Question 3

define supervenience

Answer 3

relationship between two things where if X is supervenient on Y, you can know about changes in X by looking at changes in Y.

X depends on Y

Question 4

define interactionism

Answer 4

the non-physical mind can interact with the physical body and vice versa

Question 5

define epiphenomenalism

Answer 5

the physical can have causal impact on the non-physical, but the non-physical can’t impact anything physical

i.e. causal interaction is ONE WAY

Question 6

arguments for property dualism

Answer 6

Chalmers: Zombie argument 🧟

Jackson: Mary’s Room 📕📍🖍

Question 7

outline Chalmer’s Zombie argument 🧟

Answer 7

1. (philosophical) zombies are conceivable
2. so, zombies are metaphysically possible
3. so, physical properties do not determine all mental properties (as physical properties of humans can exist without qualia/mental properties)
4. physicalism claims that physical properties determine all mental properties
5. therefore physicalism is false, and property dualism is true

Question 8

name 3 responses to the zombie argument

Answer 8

1. zombie world isn’t conceivable
2. conceivability doesn’t mean metaphysical possibility
3. metaphysical possibility doesn’t mean reality

Question 9

explain the critique against zombie argument that zombies aren’t conceivable

Answer 9

Dennett: removing qualia from a brain is like removing health from a body, you can’t

we mistakenly believe qualia is a mysterious, unknown force, which causes the illusion that we can remove it from the body. but they are just part of the physical body so we can’t conceive of zombies

Question 10

explain the critique against zombie argument that conceivability doesn’t mean metaphysical possibility (and response)

Answer 10

Kripke: we can conceive that water is called PN3 in another universe as its not obviously contradictory. But, water cannot metaphysically possibly be PN3 as it is necessarily and analytically H2O, so conceivability doesn’t mean metaphysical possibility

RESPONSE: you can’t actually imagine water as PN3, as then you wouldn’t be imagining water.

Question 11

explain the critique against zombie arg that logical possibility doesn’t mean reality (And response)

Answer 11

just because it is true in another possible world doesn’t mean its true in this world

RESPONSE: if phenomenal properties are physical, then in a world where they are supposedly not, then they aren’t phenomenal properties (Leibniz’s law)
Saying that phenomenal properties are physical in this world but not physical in another world is like saying I am me in this world but I am not me in another possible world

Question 12

outline the mary argument for property dualism (Frank Jackson)

Answer 12

1. physicalism argues that to know every physical fact is to know every fact
2. if this is true, Mary (as she has learnt every physical fact about the colour red) shouldn’t learn anything new upon seeing red for the first time
3. Mary does learn something new: the subjective, qualitative, non physical, phenomenal qualia of how it feels to see red
4. so, to know every physical fact is not to know every fact (as qualia remains unknown)
5. so physicalism is false and property dualism is true

Question 13

name 4 responses to Jackson’s Mary argument

Answer 13

ability hypothesis

acquaintance hypothesis

new knowledge, old fact

mary would already know

Question 14

explain the ability/acquaintance hypotheses responses (CHURCHLAND) to Jackson’s Mary arg (And responses)

Answer 14

Mary does learn new acquaintance/ability knowledge, but all PROPOSITIONAL knowledge is still physical, so physicalism is still true

RESPONSE: the ability/acquaintance knowledge she learns leads to new propositional knowledge e.g. what people mean by saying that red reminds them of love

Question 15

explain the new knowledge, old fact response to Jackson’s Mary argument

Answer 15

there is more than one way to know the same fact

she didn’t gain knowledge of a new fact, just a new way of looking at the same old fact

SO all facts are still physical, even if you can know these facts in different ways, so physicalism is true

Question 16

explain the Mary would already know critique against Jackson’s Mary argument

Answer 16

Mary doesn’t actually learn anything new. If she really did know all physical facts then she’d know what it’s like to see red. So, physicalism is true as she knew every fact and every fact was physical.

RESPONSE: goes against intuition that you have to see red to know what it’s like to see red

COUNTER: mere intuition does not provide grounds for a solid argument

Question 17

name 3 problems with epiphenominalist property dualism

Answer 17

argument from introspective self-knowledge

phenomenology of our mental life

natural selection

Question 18

explain the argument from introspection against epiphenominalist property dualism (and 2 responses)

Answer 18

if mental states don’t have causal powers then how can we have mental states about mental states? (in other words introspection/self reflection)

RESPONSE 1: the physical state causing my mental state also causes the other mental state that SEEMS like its about the mental state.
COUNTER: if this were true, I’d always have the same mental states about my mental states, even if the mental states were different (as long as the physical state was the same)

RESPONSE 2: CHALMERS — knowledge about my mental states is acquaintance knowledge. I have knowledge ABOUT my mental states but this is not a causal relationship
COUNTER: this doesn’t explain what causes the knowledge about my mental states

Question 19

explain the argument from phenomenology against epiphenomenalism (and 2 responses)

Answer 19

epiphenomenalism is counter-intuitive because it’s an inherent part of our experience of having mental states that these mental states lead to other states

RESPONSE 1: while beliefs and desires can have causal powers (as they can be analysed in terms of physical processes), actual phenomenal qualia can’t have causal powers

RESPONSE 2: it only SEEMS counter intuitive because mental states are associated with each other which makes it seem like there’s a causal relationship even though there’s not

Question 20

explain the argument from natural selection against property dualism (and response)

Answer 20

certain traits get naturally selected to be widespread across the species as their causal effect on the survival of that species is positive.
as every human has qualia, it must have a positive effect on our chances of survival, meaning it must have a causal effect.

RESPONSE 1: Jackson — qualia is a mere BY-PRODUCT of the physical processes that keep us alive. Polar bears all have heavy coats not because heavy coats are beneficial but because heaviness is a by-product of thickness which IS beneficial
COUNTER: gives us a divided view of natural world with qualia sitting outside of natural world, but Jackson accepts this

Question 21

property dualism 25 marker

Answer 21

while property dualism provides an initially more convincing account of the mind than substance dualism, arguments for it fail to fully prove that mental properties are non physical. While it has not been entirely disproven, arguments for it have been refuted, so we can use this and Ockham’s razor to conclude that physicalist responses are more successful.

1. Mary’s room
   — acquaintance/ability (BUT it leads to new propositions
   — even more powerful: new knowledge old fact (BUT even if all facts are physical, not all knowledge is physical, which counters physicalism and supports property dualism. BUT knowledge is not a thing, but a method of attaining a thing (facts). As it is not a thing, it cannot be physical. Physicalism can still be true even if the methods used to gain facts are not physical things, because a ‘method’ can not be a physical thing.
2. Zombies argument
   — conceivable doesn’t mean possible Kripke PN3, BUT you can’t actually conceive water = PN3 so weak counter prop dual still stands)
   — possibility in another world doesn’t mean possibility in this world
3. physicalism is better: IT theory
   — property dualism explains qualia better like pain
   — pain is a c-fibre
   — spacial location fibre
   — pain is where the c-fibre is