mind-brain identity theory

Question 1

define mind-brain type identity theory (J J C Smart)

Answer 1

mental states are brain states, they are just used differently. Mental states are ontologically reducible to physical states, but not analtyically (like water = H2O but they are used with different meanings)

Question 2

how does Ockham’s razor support type identity theory (and physicalism in general)?

Answer 2

“do not multiply entities beyond necessity”. Simplest explanation is best
As type identity theory is the simplest, it likely is the most accurate

Question 3

name 3 problems for type identity theory

Answer 3

1. spatial location problem
2. zombies
3. multiple realisability

Question 4

explain the spacial location problem for type identity theory

Answer 4

1. if pain and c-fibres are identical they must share all the same properties
2. c-fibres have a precise physical location
3. pain does not have a precise physical location
4. so, pain and c-fibres are not identical
5. so, type identity theory is incorrect

RESPONSE:
pain is locatable: the location of the c-fibres is the location of the pain

Question 5

explain the multiple realisability argument for type identity theory (Hilary Putnam) and responses

Answer 5

Hillary Putnam:
mental states can’t be reduced to brain states because mental states are multiply realisable.

e.g. certain reptiles don’t have c-fibres but still have pain, meaning that pain can’t be ontologically reducible to c-fibres

RESPONSE 1: reptiles don’t feel pain

RESPONSE 2: there are different types of pain
COUNTER: but this makes the word ‘pain’ meaningless

Question 6

difference between types and tokens

Answer 6

types: abstract concept of an item; general sort of thing

token: the particular instances of a certain concept

Question 7

define type-token identity theory

Answer 7

certain types of mental states are ontologically reducible to different tokens of brain states e.g. pain (a type) can be reduced to the tokens of c-fibres in humans or ‘r-fibres’ in reptiles

gets around problem of multiple realisability

Question 8

define token-token identity theory

Answer 8

different tokens of mental states (e.g. localised, general pain) are ontologically reducible to different tokens of brain states (e.g. delta A, c-fibres)

Question 9

problems with token identity theory

Answer 9

Benchmark argument:
there is no benchmark for brains, if everything is this complex and varied for every individual it is impossible to compare and find correlations bc tokens are too specific

Question 10

identity theory 25 marker

Answer 10

Type identity theory is relatively strong as it successfully defends arguments against it e.g. zombie argument and spatial location problem. It is weakened when critiqued with the issue of multiple realisability, but can be developed into token identity theory to solve this, showing that token identity theory is a successful explanation of mental states.

1. solves problem of circularity faced by other theories like beh.
   — BUT zombie argument suggests dualism is true, not id theory
   — but even if zombies are conceivable, doesn’t mean they’re possible. Saul Kripke H2O —> PN3 example
2. supported by Ockham’s razor
   — BUT spatial location problem
   — the location of mental states is easily explained: location of pain = location of c-fibres
3. simplifies definition and location of mental state
   — BUT not all beings that experience pain have c-fibres. Problem of multiple realisability
   — reptiles don’t feel pain
   BUT this doesn’t make sense as why do they act like they do, Ockham’s razor says best hyp is they do feel pain.
   — BUT this makes the concept of ‘pain’ meaningless and not defined clearly
   — we can solve multiple realisability using token-token ID theory
   — BUT benchmark problem: makes brain states and mental states a hugely complex network of different overly-specific tokens that is too complex for us to understand
   — but this is acceptable, as we don’t have to 100% understand every detail of the brain. We can accept token id theory as providing a basic model for how the brain works, and leave the specifics of to neuroscientists.