Property Dualism Flashcards
What is Mary’s knowledge argument? (Argument for property dualism, against physicalism)
P1)M ary is a colour scientist that knows all the physical info about colour experience
P2)She lives in a black and white room and has access to the world via black and white media
P3)When she sees the colour red, she learns something new (what it’s like to experience colour)
C1)Therefore not all facts are physical facts, phenomenal properties are not physical making physicalism false
Objection to Knowledge argument( She gains acquaintance knowledge instead of new propositional knowledge)
Acquaintance knowledge: knowledge gained through perceptual/sensational experience
-She gains a different kind of knowledge, acquaintance (Direct awareness of something in experience)
-For example suppose seeing red is a physical property of the visual experience
-Mary can be aware of this physical property, but she isn’t actually acquainted with it (She doesn’t have direct knowledge as she hasn’t experienced it herself
-When she sees red, then it becomes acquainted in her mind
-She gains new knowledge, but she hasn’t learned any new facts as she knows about it before leaving the room
Objection to knowledge argument (She gains ability knowledge, instead of new propositional knowledge)
Ability knowledge: knowing how
-This response claims the knowledge argument equivocates on the word knowledge but between propositional and ability
-Instead of gaining new propositional knowledge, she gains ability (know-how)
Eg- After leaving the room, she now knows how to and has gained the ability to see red
This new ability doesn’t mean she has learned any new facts, as she has the factual knowledge before leaving the room
Objection to knowledge argument (She doesn’t gain new propositional knowledge, but this is knowledge of physical facts she knows but in a different way)
Phenomenal concept: When you recognize something when it’s experienced
-Before leaving the room, mary has a physical concept of red: she knows what it’s like to see red in physical terms (not phenomenally)
-When she is out of the room for the first time, she acquires a phenomenal concept of red as she experiences it for the first time which allows her to see and think of it in a different way
-Although she gains new propositional knowledge about seeing red (a new concept) her new knowledge is about a property she knows about already
-This means that she doesn’t learn any new facts upon leaving room, making the knowledge argument false
What is Property Dualism?
The view that there is one type of substance (physical) but this includes two distinct properties (mental and physical)
mental states- properties of a functioning brain that emerge when brain is developed.
Mental properties (Thoughts, sensation, desires) are different from physical properties (structure, temperature) so mental cant be explained in terms of physical. They are also irreducible, but are dependent on the brain.
What is a philosophical zombie?
An exact duplicate of a person, which is functionally identical but doesn’t possess any conscious subjective quality of experience (phenomenal consciousness/Qualia)
What is Chalmers Zombie argument
Not the Ps and Cs
-Aims to argue for property dualism/disproving physicalism using an idea of a concieveable zombie world
-Argues zombies seem concievable, and we can imagine a world that is physically identical to ours, but without phenomenal consciousness
Argues that if zombies are metaphyiscally possible, consciousness doesn’t supervene on physical properties, but different phenomenal properties
-Would make property dualism true as phenomenal properties aren’t supervenient on the physical
What is the outline of Chalmer’s Zombie argument?
In terms of Ps and Cs
P1: Its concievable that there are zombies
P2: If its concievable that there are zombies, its metaphysically possible that ther are zombies
C1: therefore,it is metaphyiscally possible that there are zombies
P3 If its mentphysically possible that there are zombies then phenomenal properties of consciousness are neither physical properties nor supervene on physical properties
C2: therefore phenomenal properties of consciousness are neither physical properites nor supervene on physical properties
C3: therefore physicalism is fallse and property dualism is true
What is the A zombie world is not concievable objection?
Not Ps and Cs
Aims to disprove chalmers argument, defending physicalism
Disagrees with P1 of his argument, questioning whether its concievable of a being to exist that has the same physical properties as us but without consciousness
What is the Outline for the zombie world not concievable objection
Ps and Cs
P1- A zombie is a physical duplicate of a person with phenomenal consciousness, but without phenomenal consciousness
P2- (If physicalism is true) A physical duplicate is a functional duplicate
C1- Therefore, a zombie is a physical and functional duplicate of a person but without pheno consciousness
P3- (If phys true) pheno properties are physical properties fufilling functional roles
C2- Therefore a physical and functional duplicate of a person with consciousness has phenomenal consciousness
P4- a physical and functional duplicate of a person cant both have and lack pheno consciousness
C3- Therefore if physicalism is true zombies are inconcievable
What is the “What may be concievable may not be metaphysically possible argument”
Targets P2 of zombie argument.
Argues that although we can concieve of zombies, they aren’t metaphysically possible
What we can concieve isn’t reliable enough to determine whats possible
If phenomenal properties are just certain physical/functional properties, it isn’t possible for zombies to exist because they have no capability of expressing phenomenal properties
If physicalism is true, it isn;t possible for a being with the same physical properties to not have a consciousness
When we think of phenomenal consciousness, we think of one and same property in different ways
What is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the real world?
Targets C3
Argues Z argument shows property dualism is possible but Not true
For example it misunderstands identity
-Suggest phenomenal properties could be physical in actual world but not in another possible world
That isn’t possible as nothing cant be something else (eg. water can’t be something other than water since water is h20, it cant be something else in any world )
If pheno properties are physical properties in this world, they should be the same in every other possible world
If they aren’t, then they aren’t physically possible in another which makes the argument false
