Political Economy of New Authoritarians

Question 1

give a statistic that shows that authoritarianism is on the rise.

Answer 1

the number of authoritarian regimes increased from 51 to 54 between 2016 and 2019 with 22% of these being in sub-Saharan Africa (EIU, 2020)

Question 2

is authoritarianism on the rise or declining?

Answer 2

authoritarianism is on the rise

the number of authoritarian regimes increased from 51 to 54 between 2016 and 2019 with 22% of these being in sub-Saharan Africa (EIU, 2020)

Question 3

what are some common features of authoritarian regimes?

Answer 3

share some common features such as the rejection of political plurality, the centralisation of state power, and deterrence against the rule of law, power sharing and democratic voting

can have long-term planning horizons (don’t have elections every 4 years so no electoral pressure that prevents planning)

Question 4

why can authoritarian regimes have long-term planning horizons?

Answer 4

can have long-term planning horizons because don’t have elections every 4 years so no electoral pressure that prevents planning

Question 5

what are the qualities of Africa’s illiberal state-builders?

Answer 5

all four regimes stress their liberalising credentials to international interlocutors

• they highlight their commitment to further integration into the global economic system
• adopted modern public finance techniques and are banking on attracting billions in foreign investment in irrigated agriculture (Ethiopia, Sudan), industrialisation (Angola) and IT and other services)

on the other hand, their economies continue to be labyrinths of oligopolies, subsidies and licences in which powerful political actors collude with business interests

Question 6

what factors play into authoritarian states’ long-term strategy?

Answer 6

competition

• ‘crowding in’ rather than ‘crowding out’ of other local firms
• Tri-Star/CVL firms do not seem to have either the overweening market power - after foreign competitors are factored in - or the ability to mobilize political leverage that is often attributed to them (Booth & GM, 2012)

constrained yet inclusive political system (Clapham, 2017)

• one of the four prerequisites for the long-horizon rent centralisation that must form the basis for a developmental state is a ‘constrained yet inclusive political system’, on the grounds that the unconstrained political environment created by multiparty democracy makes it virtually impossible to prevent the diversion of rents into political patronage

new political economy & substantial minority (J, SdO, V, 2013)

• regimes have prioritised reconfiguring state-society relations
• simultaneously about hard, material power but also about identity and regime legitimacy, domestically and externally
• the notion of advancing substantial minorities is smart politics, which strategically broadens the support for movements often accused of having a narrow ethnic base

Question 7

why is it necessary for developmental states to have a ‘constrained yet inclusive political system’?

Answer 7

the unconstrained political environment created by multiparty democracy makes it virtually impossible to prevent the diversion of rents into political patronage

Question 8

which countries do Jones, Soares de Oliveira & Verhoeven, 2013 use in their study of Africa’s illiberal state builders?

Answer 8

Rwanda, Sudan, Angola and Ethiopia

Question 9

what are Rwanda, Sudan, Angola and Ethiopia doing that demonstrate their prioritisation of reconfiguring state-society relations?

Answer 9

new Rwanda, Sudan, Angola and Ethiopia are being created

1. through crafting a (not so) new political geography;
2. navigating the trade-offs between structural-historical factors (including the nature of the state and geography),
3. movement ideology and pragmatic short-term coalition-building;
4. capturing constituencies identified as key to regime survival, while ruthlessly excluding others

Question 10

why is advancing substantial minorities smart politics?

Answer 10

the notion of advancing substantial minorities is smart politics because it strategically broadens the support for movements often accused of having a narrow ethnic base (e.g. the alleged dominance of Tigrayans in Ethiopia), and also is a function of the ideological worldview of the rulers

Question 11

what are the two main economic strategies which Africa’s illiberal state-builders rely on to bring about ‘transformative’ change through the ‘new’ political economy?

Answer 11

1. the creation of rents through limiting access, selective regulation of the economy, political appointments, etc

• classic patronage mechanisms ensure that there are clear incentives to cooperate with the ruling party and represent a direct push to improve the position of those identified as the substantial minority

2. a series of audacious government initiatives, typically led by mass investment in large-scale infrastructure development and ‘strategic sectors’, to create new wealth and simultaneously ensure it benefits the right constituencies

• e.g. Angola’s massive infrastructure programme (government invested $4.3billion, 14% of GDP, every year in ports, railways, roads, and power generation)
• e.g. Sudan’s Dam Programme & Agricultural Revival ($10billion invested into construction of dams on the Nile)

Question 12

give a few examples of the audacious government initiatives established by Africa’s illiberal state-builders to create new wealth while ensuring it benefits the right constituencies.

Answer 12

1. Angola’s massive infrastructure programme (gov invested $4.3billion, 14% of GDP, every year in ports, railways, roads, and power generation)
2. Sudan’s Dam Programme & Agricultural Revival ($10billion invested into construction of dams on the Nile)

Question 13

how are regimes stabilised under autocracies?

Answer 13

personalism & the mitigation of personalism’s negative costs (Hassan, 2022)

Question 14

how do leaders use personalism to ensure regime stabilisation under autocracies?

Answer 14

combination of neo-patrimonialism & formal institutions

leaders undermined the independence of formal institutions, co-opting these institutions for personal gain

African autocrats excelled at infusing various formal institutions with informal norms to simultaneously provide elites with somewhat stable, predictable, and clear streams of resources while continuing to wed elites to themselves

Question 15

how do leaders mitigate personalism’s negative costs to ensure regime stabilisation under autocracies?

Answer 15

autocrats able to navigate the loyalty-competence trade-off for their benefit

• e.g. in Kenya presidents managed the Provincial Administrations so that the agency’s most loyal bureaucrats were disproportionately sent to govern the parts of the country that were most important for regime stability, whereas those considered disloyal were kept away from these vital areas

constantly shuffle subordinates across positions to prevent them from amassing sufficient clout & resources within their post to challenge the autocrat

• detrimental as reduces subordinate’s level of tacit knowledge within a given position
• can shuffle according to level of support for leader e.g. need not worry about appointees’ local embeddedness in core support region
• or can shuffle according to transferable skills

-e.g. Emperor Selassie: elites who were shuffled out of the Ministry of Defense were more likely to be placed in the military; elites who were shuffled from the Ministry of Justice would often find themselves in the courts (Woldense, 2018)

Question 16

give an example of an autocrat navigating the loyalty-competency trade-off for their benefit.

Answer 16

in Kenya presidents managed the Provincial Administrations so that the agency’s most loyal bureaucrats were disproportionately sent to govern the parts of the country that were most important for regime stability, whereas those considered disloyal were kept away from these vital areas

Question 17

give an example of an autocrat shuffling subordinates across positions to prevent them gaining too much traction or resources.

Answer 17

Emperor Selassie: elites who were shuffled out of the Ministry of Defense were more likely to be placed in the military; elites who were shuffled from the Ministry of Justice would often find themselves in the courts (Woldense, 2018)

Question 18

define a developmental state.

Answer 18

state whose “ideological underpinnings are developmental and one that seriously attempts to deploy its administrative and political resources to the task of economic development” (Mkandawire, 2015)

Question 19

give the 4 characteristics Zenawi finds common to all developmental states.

Answer 19

1. their motive and source of legitimacy is the pursuit of accelerated development
2. the development project is broadly shared in the country
3. they are autonomous from the private sector and have the incentive and the means to reward and punish the private sector to promote desired behaviour and activity
4. they can be either democratic or undemocratic

Question 20

what is key to the definition and operation of developmental states?

Answer 20

centralisation key to definition

they require centralised bureaucracies and therefore require the institutional set up required to centralise

Question 21

what is the ideological commitment of developmental states?

Answer 21

ideological commitment to fast-paced development, usually rooted in marxist, leninist, socialist ideology (Mkandawire)

Question 22

why do Jones, Soares de Oliveira & Verhoeven argue developmental states operate mixed strategies?

Answer 22

these regimes simultaneously operate mixed strategies: institutions and networks, juridical and illegal means, patrimonialism and bureaucratic rule (J, SdO & V, 2013)

formal institutions are real, but melt into each other and into the more fluid mechanisms of power

Question 23

define rent.

Answer 23

rent is “payment over and above the opportunity cost of an asset” (Zenawi, 2011, p141)

Question 24

which scholar defines rent as “payment over and above the opportunity cost of an asset”?

Answer 24

Zenawi, 2011, p141

Question 25

why are rents essential to developmental / autocratic states?

Answer 25

the generation and sharing out of rents is not only the key to social order and political stability but is also an essential means of financing the learning costs involved in the acquisition of technological capabilities by domestically-owned firms (Khan, 2000)

Question 26

why do the elite not wish to stop rent extraction?

Answer 26

rent extraction is often a major source of personal enrichment for the political class as a whole and political leadership is either unwilling or unable to deny access to rent-taking opportunities by its major supporters because it is largely by distributing such opportunities that it remains in power (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012)

“not going to liberalise our commanding heights” - Ethiopian PM

Question 27

how does Rwanda differ from other SSA states in its management of rents?

Answer 27

the Tri-Star/CVL profits accrue to the RPF corporately meaning as the firm became profitable, there was no evidence of direct profit taking by individual politicians or military leaders (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012)

Question 28

what is the theory of rents?

Answer 28

the theory goes that after a successful innovation, a firm receives high profits as demand explodes

these profits invite competition into a market until a new method of doing things better or cheaper is discovered and the process repeats itself promoting more efficient resource allocation and accelerated growth

Question 29

what is the distinction between rent creation and rent seeking?

Answer 29

rent creation: occurs as a result of innovation and value-added activities

• dissipates by competitive process, promoting more efficient resource allocation

rent seeking: refers to the non-productive pursuit of rent without contributing to wealth creation

• tends to persist indefinitely, not dissipated through competition, and is socially wasteful as people are encouraged to spend resources and time in unproductive ways

Question 30

outline rent creation.

Answer 30

rent creation: occurs as a result of innovation and value-added activities

dissipates by competitive process, promoting more efficient resource allocation

Question 31

outline rent seeking.

Answer 31

rent seeking: refers to the non-productive pursuit of rent without contributing to wealth creation

tends to persist indefinitely, not dissipated through competition, and is socially wasteful as people are encouraged to spend resources and time in unproductive ways

Question 32

what is the modal pattern in Africa regarding rent creation vs rent seeking?

Answer 32

in the modal pattern in Africa, rent-seeking is widespread and uncontrolled and is often associated with both political and administrative corruption

Question 33

how important is state intervention in the development process?

Answer 33

historical practice has shown that state intervention has been critical in the development process (Zenawi, 2011)

economic theory has shown that developing countries are riddled with vicious circles and poverty traps that can only be removed by state action

Question 34

how does leadership / elite interests influence development outcomes?

Answer 34

how they use rents

the quality of leadership

the threat of strong leadership

Question 35

how can how leaders / elites use rents influence development outcomes?

Answer 35

rent can be harnessed for developmental purposes but equally, it can also lead to corruption and the misuse of resources

leadership’s effectiveness in imposing necessary disciplines within the political elite and the broader bureaucracy significantly impacts the feasibility of development plans

Question 36

how can the quality of leadership influence development outcomes?

Answer 36

the quality of leadership is pivotal in preventing corruption and ensuring that rents are channelled for productive purposes as demonstrated by Zenawi in Ethiopia as well as Kagame in Rwanda

Rwanda: (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012)

• what the Tri-Star/CVL experience illustrated is that in undeveloped economies, a growing private sector may benefit from being led from the front and not just facilitated with the provision of a business-friendly environment
• this is because, in the end, development is both a political process and a socioeconomic process
• key to Rwanda’s success was the moderately large ‘selectorate’ and Kagame’s choice of the ‘expensive’ option of building support on a broad base by demonstrating an ability to provide more and better public goods

Zenawi’s Ethiopia Example: (Clapham, 2017)

• Meles Zenawi, the ex-leader of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), was more intelligent than all of his predecessors, able to articulate an ideology of development that drew heavily on the East Asian model but was adapted to fit the Ethiopian circumstances
• his ideas were shaped by Marxism-Leninism but he was creative and open-minded in applying it to different conditions and flexible in changing policies when required

Question 37

how does the threat of strong leadership influence development outcomes?

Answer 37

Jones, Soares de Oliveira & Verhoeven’s study includes Angola, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Sudan as examples of authoritarian and illiberal states

the leaders of all four regimes stress their commitment to liberalisation and further integration into the global economic system while at the same time continuing to maintain collusion operations and elements of corruption in their economies

political leadership can also undermine the independence of formal institutions by infusing them with neo-patrimonial norms and co-opting them for personal gain (Hassan)

Question 38

how does market environment impact development outcomes?

Answer 38

the innovation of rent-creation cannot exist without learning and both are dependent on the structure of the economy (Zenawi, 2011)

• the technological infrastructure, encompassing the system of education and training, public and private research facilities and the network of scientific and technological associations, plays a central role in any national innovation system

as a result of development being a dynamic process, it is the evolution of the imitative and innovative capabilities of a country rather than factor endowments that shape the trend in relative and absolute growth of tradeables of each economy

in authoritarian regimes, the market environment plays a crucial role in determining whether resources are harnessed for productive, rent-creating purposes or diverted into rent-seeking activities

Question 39

how does the international system impact development outcomes?

Answer 39

state-building goes beyond elite politics, centralising resources and projecting power into the peripheries, it also engages with the international system

the reliance of states on outside resource flows has been critical in stabilising politics at the centre and managing core-periphery relations, although it does limit the capacities of what development projects can achieve

despite deep distrust of the international community, many of Africa’s illiberal state-builders are today known as close allies - even ‘donor darlings’ - of the West

• nearly half of Rwanda’s budget consists of foreign development assistance
• Ethiopia receives about $3 billion annually in outside aid

rhetorical convergence to Western tropes – good governance (TPLF, RPF), transparency (MPLA), combating climate change (TPLF), women’s rights (RPF) – and realpolitik alliances with Washington, London and Brussels have helped shield Africa’s illiberal state-builders from stinging external criticism and provided ample resources to fund long-term strategies

Question 40

which scholars argue the importance of the international system in impacting development outcomes?

Answer 40

Jones, Soares de Oliveira & Verhoeven, 2013

Question 41

give evidence of Africa’s illiberal state-builders being ‘donor darlings’ of the West.

Answer 41

nearly half of Rwanda’s budget consists of foreign development assistance

Ethiopia receives about $3 billion annually in outside aid

Question 42

give an example of where external relations have impacted development outcomes.

Answer 42

Ethiopia Example (Clapham, 2017)

in fractured Somalia, Ethiopia has maintained good relations with Somaliland and the autonomous Puntland administration while also helping to support the feeble regime in Mogadishu

it has also worked hard to stabilise and to some extent resolve the conflict in South Sudan, while contributing to key peacekeeping forces in the contested Abyei zone between South Sudan and Sudan

these efforts offer an explanation and an insight into the absence of any reaction, especially from Western states, to its very poor democratic and human rights record

Question 43

which country does Clapham, 2017 offer as evidence of the impact of external relations on development outcomes.

Answer 43

Ethiopia and its work in maintaining good relation with Somaliland and Mogadishu as well as its work to stabilise the conflict in South Sudan

Question 44

how do linkages with socialism & capitalism impact development outcomes?

Answer 44

prime example is the influence of the East Asian model in Africa and the shift from socialist origins to a system closer to capitalism by putting industrial development in the hands of private entrepreneurs

the growing influence of rising powers on both sides of the political spectrum enables Africa’s illiberal state-builders to engage with alternative investors, aid donors and trade partners which increases their leverage in negotiations and reduces pressures to conform to the liberal agenda

• e.g. China’s impact is not limited to material benefits such as the expansion and improvement of the road network and the century-old railway line to the port at Djibouti, it is increasingly exerting an ideological impact on the political-economic imagination of African elites

Question 45

are authoritarian states better suited to deal with Africa’s developmental challenges?

Answer 45

on the one hand, longer planning horizons and centralised bureaucratic structures and party systems help these regimes in channeling and managing rents effectively

on the other hand, while GDP growth rates might have gone up, the authoritarian clamp down on populations meant that grievances and frustrations festered, and in the case of Ethiopia and Sudan exploded (recent civil wars)

short term economic benefits are undermined by instability of political system (cannot remain benevolent dictator for 30+ years)

Question 46

define developmental patrimonialism.

Answer 46

“when the ruling elite acquires an interest in, and a capability for, managing economic rents in a centralised way with a view to enhancing their own and others’ incomes in the long run rather than maximising them in the short run” (Booth & GM, 2012, p381)

Question 47

which scholars define developmental patrimonialism as “when the ruling elite acquires an interest in, and a capability for, managing economic rents in a centralised way with a view to enhancing their own and others’ incomes in the long run rather than maximising them in the short run”?

Answer 47

Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012, p381

Question 48

why is developmental patrimonialism more sustainable than the previous regimes?

Answer 48

found balance between corruption (embedded) and national development efforts so that both are more sustainable

sustainable because less obviously corrupt (targeted means), productive use of corruption

• closer resembles Western ‘corruption’
• clientelistic relations are evident everywhere

patrimonialism necessary to uphold these systems, its ‘oiling the machine’ offering incentives to political actors

Question 49

define neopatrimonialism.

Answer 49

“a form of organisation in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines. Officials hold positions in bureaucratic organisations with powers which are formally defined, but exercise those powers . . . as a form of private property.” (Clapham, 1985)

Question 50

is it helpful to attribute all of Africa’s problems to neopatrimonialism?

Answer 50

no

the attribution of all African problems to neopatrimonialism undermines internally driven change by occluding the real problems: corruption, vertical and horizontal inequality, ethnic and gender discrimination, weak state capacity, wrong ideas, political chicanery, and the machinations of the many external actors who seek to exploit Africa in some form or other (Mkandawire, 2015)

Question 51

is neopatrimonialism different in Africa vs other countries?

Answer 51

African strain of neopatrimonialism is particularly virulent or pathological (Bayart, 2000)

African neopatrimonialism said to be characterised by 3 features: (Mkandawire, 2015)

1. economy of affection (moral economy of corruption), which lends normalcy to corruption

• limited evidence to support, e.g. the few African publics included in the World Values Survey show that corruption permissiveness at the citizen level is lower in Africa than in other regions

2. untoward deference to authority

• results in big man syndrome, but also in subordinated people who are inextricably attached to clientelistic relationships, quiescent, and complicit in their own exploitation

3. nature of the African big man himself

• his distinct characteristics are insatiable greed and gluttony

Question 52

what are neopatrimonialism’s limitations?

Answer 52

bad governance

low savings (although there is no evidence of this)

obstructed capital class (not necessarily true)

fiscal matters

social policy (evidence shows against this)

Question 53

which scholar outlines the limitations of neopatrimonialism?

Answer 53

Mkandawire, 2015

Question 54

outline the ‘bad governance’ limitation of neopatrimonialism.

Answer 54

with respect to new measures of good governance, neopatrimonialism should reduce voice and accountability, weaken government effectiveness and regulatory control, undermine the control of corruption, dilute the rule of law, and compromise political stability

Question 55

outline the ‘low savings’ limitation of neopatrimonialism.

Answer 55

while the implication is that private savings in Africa tend to be lower than would be expected according to the level of development, no evidence of that is provided

Question 56

outline the ‘obstructed capital class’ limitation of neopatrimonialism.

Answer 56

3 anticapitalist neopatrimonialist arguments:

1. authoritarian regimes’ fear of the emergence of any alternative sources of power
2. redistributive bias of neopatrimonialism undermines the social differentiation essential to capitalist development and the neopatrimonialist system would collapse if the full force of capitalism was allowed break up the moral ties and networks that nourish it
3. neopatrimonialism does not provide an institutional framework within which capitalism can flourish

however, neopatrimonialism of the bourgeoisie can be quite compatible with capitalist accumulation

• e.g. East Asia & many instances in Africa

Question 57

outline the ‘fiscal matters’ limitation of neopatrimonialism.

Answer 57

neopatrimonial regimes are said to have “a structural tendency for fiscal crisis” (Van de Walle, 1994)

Question 58

outline the ‘social policy’ limitation of neopatrimonialism.

Answer 58

redistributive nature & capacity to provide social services

claim is that African governments won’t spend much on education & health

• data from 79 developing countries from 1995-2012 finds African countries spend more on education & health than would be expected given their levels of income & structural characteristics