Forms of Autocracy Flashcards

1
Q

what are coups?

A

there is some disagreement over the exact definition but all agree that they involve the illegal seizure of power, in which the level of the deposed leader must be the highest, and the operation should be sudden, covert or conspiratorial and thus not involve many

must be some linkage to military (threat of or actual violence), as violence is the ultimate determinant of coups

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2
Q

where do definitions of military coups differ?

A

they disagree on the identity of the perpetrator

  • ‘military officers’ (Thomson, 1973)
  • ‘organised factions’ (Janowitz, 1977)
  • ‘any elite who is part of the state apparatus’ (Powell & Thyme, 2011)
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3
Q

give McGowan’s 2003 definition of a coup d’etat.

A

a coup d’etat involves the sudden, often violent overthrow of an existing government by a small group (McGowan, 2003)

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4
Q

give First’s, 1970 definition of a coup.

A

a “coup is a lightning action at the top, in which violence is the ultimate determinant, even if it is not used” (First, 1970)

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5
Q

give Souare’s, 2014 definition of a coup.

A

three definitions imply:

  1. unanimous on the illegality of the seizure of power
  2. the level of power of the deposed leader has to be the highest
  3. the operation should be sudden and covert, or conspiratorial, which entails that the number of those involved should be very limited

(Souare, 2014)

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6
Q

give Powell & Thyme’s, 2011 definition of a successful coup.

A

“a successful coup is an illegal and covert act by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive, in which the perpetrators seize and hold power for at least seven days” (Powell & Thyme, 2011)

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7
Q

how many SSA states have experienced at least one successful coup and how many have suffered multiple coups?

A

30 SSA states (62. 5%) have experienced at least one successful coup and 18 (37. 5%) have suffered multiple coups

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8
Q

what percentage of SSA states have experienced at least one successful coup and what percentage have suffered multiple coups?

A

30 SSA states (62. 5%) have experienced at least one successful coup and 18 (37. 5%) have suffered multiple coups

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9
Q

how many SSA states have had either coups or failed coups attempts?

A

41/ 48 SSA states (85%) have had either coups or failed coup attempts (McGowan, 2003)

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10
Q

what percentage of SSA states have had either coups or failed coup attempts?

A

41/ 48 SSA states (85%) have had either coups or failed coup attempts

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11
Q

which region is most prone to political instability?

A

West Africa is region most prone to political instability (nearly 1/2 of all failed & successful coups, yet only ⅓ of independent states) (McGowan, 2003)

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12
Q

prior to which year were military coups the main mode of leadership change in the majority of African states?

A

prior to 1990, military coups were the main mode of leadership change in the majority of African states (First, 1970)

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13
Q

what was the main mode of leadership change in the majority of African states prior to 1990, according to First, 1970?

A

prior to 1990, military coups were the main mode of leadership change in the majority of African states (First, 1970)

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14
Q

what dimensions play into why coups occur?

A

structural dimension

  • military rule

ethnic dimension (Harkness, 2018)

class dimension (Kandeh, 2004)

idiosyncratic features & personal ambitions of coup leaders (Decalo)

ideological dimension (Tendi, 2020)

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15
Q

how does the structural dimension of military rule play into why coups occur?

A

government failure

military rule is by definition authoritarian and is often very corrupt (McGowan, 2003)

  • Major-General Ibrahim Babangida, Nigeria (1985 - 1993)

because African militaries in power often fail to create political order, they are part of the problem

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16
Q

how does the ethnic dimension of military rule play into why coups occur?

A

ethnic structures of militaries

  • ethnic makeup of militaries: most militaries have an ethnic group in charge
  • coups most likely when change in government try to change ethnic makeup of military generals

result of existing tensions boiling over

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17
Q

give Harkness’s (2018) example of ethnicity playing into coup motivation.

A

Kenya example (Harkness, 2018)

Kenya has a long history of ethnically stacking both security and civil service institutions

Kenyatta created a new air force and paramilitary units recruited from coethnic Kikuyus to act as counterweights to the regular army

he reconstructed the army’s officer corps, recruiting its ranks almost entirely from the Kikuyu community, whilst also ethnically stacking the powerful provincial administration

same processes occurred under Presidents Daniel arap Moi and Mwai Kibaki who replaced police, military and provincial administration with coethnic Kalenjins and Kikuyus, respectively

these practices contributed substantially to ethnic violence (only coup attempt in Kenya was during the transition from Kenyatta to Moi)

  • as Moi attempted to dismantle his predecessor’s ethnically stacked military institutions, initially purging the high command, Luo and Kikuyu junior officers rose up and seized Nairobi airport, the Voice of Kenya radio station, and other public buildings
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18
Q

which country does Harkness offer as an example of ethnicity playing a role in coup motivation?

A

Kenya & the actions of Presidents Kenyatta, arap Moi and Kibaki

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19
Q

what are the traditional schools of thought on why ethnic groups rebel?

A

three schools of thought: institutionalisation of ethnic cleavages, horizontal inequalities, and ethnic political exclusion

  1. the mere institutionalisation of ethnic categories, boundary drawing between groups by the state, generates emotional dynamics that lead to increased risk of violent conflict
  2. horizontal inequalities generate grievances that motivate the relatively deprived to rebel
  3. exclusion of ethnic groups from political power constitutes a grave risk for organised rebellion
20
Q

explain why the institutionalisation of ethnic cleavages may cause ethnic rebellion.

A

the mere institutionalisation of ethnic categories, boundary drawing between groups by the state, generates emotional dynamics that lead to increased risk of violent conflict

deep institutionalisation of ethnic categories thus increases the risk of conflict by raising the probability that prejudice and discrimination will be practised and perceived while simultaneously making ethnic mobilisation easier

primes individuals to understand and interpret their world in ethnic terms

21
Q

explain why horizontal inequalities may cause ethnic rebellion.

A

horizontal inequalities generate grievances that motivate the relatively deprived to rebel

visible socioeconomic disparities between groups increase the salience of ethnic identity as well as enhance group cohesion and loyalty

group-based inequalities in education, wealth, and life expectancy significantly predict political violence, including insurgency, terrorism, coups, and democratic breakdown

22
Q

explain why ethnic political exclusion may cause ethnic rebellion.

A

exclusion of ethnic groups from political power constitutes a grave risk for organised rebellion

political exclusion entails both symbolic and material sacrifices

23
Q

what problems does Harkness find with the traditional arguments for why ethnic groups rebel?

A

they highlight fairly static and slow moving variables which do a poor job of explaining the rarity and timing of resistance

they assume that it is the relatively deprived, politically excluded, or discriminated against who rebel

  • misses much of the ethnic violence initiated by powerful and advantaged groups
24
Q

what explanation does Harkness offer as to why ethnic groups rebel?

A

the processes of creating and dismantling ethnically exclusionary state institutions engenders organised and violent political resistance

  • when leaders attempt to build ethnic armies, or dismantle those created by their predecessors, they provoke violent resistance from military officers

ethnic groups currently included but facing future exclusion possess both the strongest motives to rebel and the greatest capabilities to do so

ethnic groups often rebel to preserve that status quo

  • helps us understand both the timing and relative rarity of group rebellion
25
Q

which scholar promotes the ethnic dimension of coup motivations?

A

Harkness, 2018

26
Q

which scholar promotes the class dimension of coup motivations?

A

Kandeh, 2004

27
Q

how do the idiosyncratic features & personal ambitions of coups leaders play into why coups occur?

A

personalistic stems from structural, individualistic and historic conditions

Decalo emphasises the importance of coup leaders’ idiosyncrasies and personal motivations in their decision to launch military coups

28
Q

give an example of idiosyncratic features & personal ambitions of coup leaders playing into starting a coup.

A

Zimbabwe 2017 coup

Defence Forces (ZDF) Commander, General Chiwenga, and his impact on the trajectory of the 2017 Zimbabwean military coup

Chiwenga regarded Mugabe as an obstacle to the achievement of his personal aims to govern Zimbabwe and therefore stood to lose the most amongst other military officers

Chiwenga also had a sense of destiny about ruling, from his grandfather’s deathbed prophecy of leadership and paired with his ruthless political scheming, his decision to lead the coup made sense

Tendi thinks this is just one of several important motivations, however, as it overlapped with more general issues such as Mugabe’s rising disregard for the liberation struggle ethos and actors and the erosion of Mugabe’s once-unwavering authority over generals

  • thinks it’s more about the ideological commitments to the liberation struggle in the case of Zimbabwe
29
Q

what reservations does Tendi have regarding the personal ambitions dimension of coup motivation?

A

in response to the Zimbabwe 2017 case Tendi thinks it is only one of several important motivations

it overlapped with more general issues such as Mugabe’s rising disregard for the liberation struggle ethos and actors and the erosion of Mugabe’s once-unwavering authority over generals

Tendi thinks it’s more about the ideological commitments to the liberation struggle in the case of Zimbabwe

30
Q

which scholar supports the idiosyncratic features and personal ambitions motivation of coups argument?

A

Decalo

31
Q

how does the ideological dimension play into why coups occur?

A

Tendi uses the Zimbabwe 2017 coup and outlines its four main motivations

  1. military generals’ disgruntlement with Mugabe’s downgrading of 1970s liberation struggle actors and ethos in ZANU PF;
  2. Mugabe’s weakening authority
  3. the political aspirations of some generals;
  4. insecurity in the military’s upper ranks caused by conditions of precarious tenure and fear of criminal prosecution

Tendi argues that the coup wouldn’t have happen without ideological conflict & the fact that Mugabe betrayed the liberation generation

32
Q
A
33
Q

what is the African Union?

A

AU is a continental union consisting of 55 member states located on the African continent

34
Q

what is a norm entrepreneur?

A

norm entrepreneur: an individual or an organisation that takes up a cause, and employs the necessary skills and resources to convince members of the group about the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the cause, with or without explicit incentives or enforcement mechanisms for conformers or deviators (Souare, 2014)

35
Q

what are the three main policy instruments of the African Union?

A

three main policy instruments: (Souare, 2014)

  1. Lomé ‘Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government’ (2000)
  2. Constitutive Act of the AU (2002)
  3. African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007)
36
Q

what is the AU’s response to military coups?

A

in the context of a military coup, the AU publicly condemns it and calls for an immediate return to constitutional order as well as suspending the country concerned from all decision-making organs in the AU until the new authorities restore constitutional order (Souare, 2014)

if this policy were perfect, the majority, if not all, military coups would be resolved quickly and the idea is that we would soon see a reduction in attempt coup numbers

37
Q

which scholar discusses the AU and its responses to military coups?

A

Souare, 2014

38
Q

discuss some of the AU’s successes as a norm entrepreneur.

A

Lomé Declaration might have had a deterrent effect on military coups, particularly in the first 4 years of its adoption, as there were only 2 successful cases (Souare, 2014)

at least 4 differences point to a possible positive impact of the norm on the occurrence of military coups on the continent: (Souare, 2014)

  1. since the adoption of the Lomé Declaration, all coup-born regimes have hastened to state their commitment to restore constitutional order as soon as possible
  2. the 15 coup-born regimes between 1990 and July 2000 spent a total of 306 months in power before handing over office to either a transitional or an elected government
  3. only 1 coup-born regime (Sierra Leone) was forced out of power prior to Lomé, whereas 5 regimes since Lomé were pressured to give up power either to the overthrown leader, the constitutional successor or to a consensual caretaker president within a month or less
  4. since Lomé, unconstitutional regimes are required to restore constitutional order while suspended from the OAU/AU, which was never the case before
39
Q

discuss some of the limitations to the AU’s power as a norm entrepreneur.

A

AU fails to provide an explicit definition of what exactly constitutes the successful restoration of constitutional order

AU good at flexing its muscles over small countries (e.g. Sierra Leone) but not so much over bigger countries (e.g. Nigeria, Ethiopia, etc) so sanctions unevenly applied

AU actions are contradictory (between a rock and a hard place)

  • how can it say need to reinstate dictator (Ali Bongo) who has broken UCG by being in power for 40 years but also needs to condemn military coup

weakness of AU’s stick and carrot powers, which is important in giving teeth to the policy injunctions (Souare, 2014)

  • AU sanctions aren’t really a deterrent (poor, toothless) therefore EU sanctions more impactful (have more teeth)
  • AU’s over-reliance on international partners in this regard is a challenge to the success of its policy (difficult to enforce without powerful international actors)
40
Q

what role do international forces play in responding to coups?

A

as a result of the weaknesses of the AU enforcement powers, a space opens up for the reliance and importance of international partners in affecting the outcome of military coups

the EU, individual European countries and the US are the main partners of the AU in enforcing its norms on governance and security

EU measures happened within the framework of the AU’s International Contact Group (ICG) as a way to complement and strengthen its own efforts by enlisting more international partners

  • e.g. Western sanctions imposed on the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe since the mid-2000s
41
Q

give an example of the influence of an international response to a military coup compared to the AU.

A

Mauritania Example (Engel, 2010)

when the 2008 military coup in Mauritania overthrew the democratically elected government of Sidi Ould Cheick Abdallahi, it faced AU-imposed targeted sanctions and the leader of the coup, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, stepped down in July 2009 to be replaced by a caretaker president and elections.

seemingly, this shows the strength of the AU sanctions but Engel argued that the Mauritanian authorities felt more threatened by the sanctions of the Eu than those of the EU thus showing the importance of powerful international actors in the success of the AU’s policies

42
Q

what is the significance of the anti-French sentiment and movement toward Russia?

A

vacuum created by France being driven out due to anti-French sentiment is being filled by growing support for Russia

  • Franco-African relationship is one rooted in the history of exploitation and has continued in new ways and different layers
  • e.g. French companies still heavily involved in the natural resource industry, operating Niger’s uranium mines and extracting uranium for French nuclear power plants

anti-French sentiment also stems from perceived failure of French intervention in the Sahel region

  • Sahel region is a belt under the Sahara desert stretching from Senegal and Mauritania in the West to Sudan and Eritrea in the East and is stronghold for armed groups linked to Al-Qaeda and ISIL
  • 43% of global terrorism deaths occurred in Sahel region
  • local people have not seen the benefit of French intervention that focuses on anti-terrorism and those on the ground have seen an increase in strength of the jihadi groups

coup leaders have placed themselves against France to gain popular support and bolster their own credibility

43
Q

where does the anti-French sentiment stem from?

A

Franco-African relationship is one rooted in the history of exploitation and has continued in new ways and different layers

  • e.g. French companies still heavily involved in the natural resource industry, operating Niger’s uranium mines and extracting uranium for French nuclear power plants

also stems from perceived failure of French intervention in the Sahel region

  • Sahel region is a belt under the Sahara desert stretching from Senegal and Mauritania in the West to Sudan and Eritrea in the East and is stronghold for armed groups linked to Al-Qaeda and ISIL
  • 43% of global terrorism deaths occurred in Sahel region
  • local people have not seen the benefit of French intervention that focuses on anti-terrorism and those on the ground have seen an increase in strength of the jihadi groups
44
Q

do domestic forces and international norms work independently?

A

no

domestic forces entwined with workings of international norms

international norms must always work their influence through the filter of domestic structures and domestic norms

domestic norm entrepreneurs often use international norms to strengthen their position in domestic debates, even if their position is a minority one at home

45
Q

what factors contribute to the individuality of coups?

A

coup leaders’ idiosyncrasies and personal motivations

concept of masculinity and the role of women in perpetuating military power

46
Q

how is the concept of masculinity linked with military coups?

A

experiences of security are heavily gendered at all levels and security means different things to men and women (Mama, 1998)

  • feminine security centres around womanhood (marriage, motherhood, and service)
  • masculine security is displayed as sexual and monetary prowess and their command over other men, women and material resources

military men exemplify the masculine ideal and from this, military coups and military regimes are a masculine thing

47
Q

what is the role of women in perpetuating military power?

A

comparison between Mrs. Babangida and Mrs. Abacha, the wives of two military heads of state highlight the individual character differences and differences in actions and goals and yet the two regimes were still remarkably similar in that both wives treated women as a single homogenous category of people who benefit from military rule