Physicalist theories Flashcards
what does physicalism say about the world. including mind
According to physicalism, everything that exists – including the mind and mental states – is either a physical thing or supervenes on physical things. This means that two physically identical things must be mentally identical.
what are the 4 physicalist theories
behaviourism, MBIT, functionalism and eliminativism
what does behavourism say about words used to describe mental states
says the meaning of words used to describe mental states – such as ‘pain’, ‘sad’, ‘happy’, ‘think’ etc. – is all about what is externally observable, i.e. behaviour and behavioural dispositions.
what does a behaviourist say the meaning of ‘pain’ is
the meaning of ‘pain’ is to wince, say “ouch!”, try to get away from the source of the pain, have an elevated heart rate, and so on. Notions of private inner sensations (e.g. qualia) are irrelevant to what ‘pain’ means – it’s all about the external and observable (i.e. behavioural) manifestations.
what are the two types of behaviouism
- hard behaviourism
- soft behaviourism
what is hard behaviourism (and who)
(e.g. Carl Hempel): All propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to propositions about behaviours and bodily states using the language of physic
- says you can give a complete account of the mind purely in terms of actual behaviours and bodily states. If you completely describe a person’s physical state and behaviours, you have described their mind – there’s nothing left over. In the language of philosophy, hard behaviourism says mental states analytically reduce to behaviours
what is soft behaviourism (and who)
(e.g. Gilbert Ryle): Propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioural dispositions
what is a disposition
is how something will or is likely to behave in certain circumstances. For example, a wine glass has a disposition to break when dropped on a hard surface. The wine glass has this disposition even when it hasn’t been dropped and is in perfect condition because – hypothetically – if you dropped the glass, it would break.
compare hard to soft determinism in relation to behavioual dispositiona
Hard behaviourism says mental states reduce to behaviours. But an obvious problem for this is that you can have a mental state but not have the associated behaviour. For example, you can be in pain but stop yourself from saying “ouch!” – perhaps because you don’t want to look like a wimp. Similarly, you can pretend to be in pain (i.e. display the behaviour) when you’re not actually feeling anything, like when a player dives in football. This is why soft behaviourism analyses mental states in terms of behavioural dispositions, not just actual behaviours.
give an example of a disposition in relation to a mental state
pain!
someone in the mental state of pain will have a disposition to say “ouch!” – even if they don’t actually do so in every instance. Or, hypothetically, if you were to ask someone who just stubbed their toe “did that hurt?”, they would answer “yes”. The person in pain has this disposition (to say “yes”) even if you never actually ask them the question, just like the glass has a disposition to break even if you never actually drop it.
what is Ryle’s overall arg against dualism
gives a new argument against dualism: that if dualism were true, mental concepts would be impossible to use.
Consider this: if dualism were true and mental states such as** pain referred only to a private and non-physical mental state, how could we ever talk about them?** I can’t literally show you what is going on in my mind when I am in pain. You can’t point to a mental state such as pain, you can only point to the behaviour.
definition of a category mistake and an example
it confuses one type of concept with another. For example, to ask “how much does the number 7 weigh?” confuses the concept of number with the concept of things that have weight.
what does ryle say about mental states and category mistakes
Ryle argues that to think mental states are distinct from their associated behaviours (as dualism claims) is to make a category mistake
what example does ryle use to show that dualism makes a category mistake
- Suppose someone were to visit Oxford to see the university. The visitor is shown the library, the lecture theatres, the teachers, and so on. After the tour is complete, he says: “but where is the university?”
- The visitor has made a category mistake in thinking that the university is something other than the things he’s been shown already. The visitor thinks the university is in the category of objects you can isolate and point to, but instead it’s more of an abstraction.
Ryle argues that dualists make the same sort of category mistake when talking about mental states.
In just the same way Oxford University is nothing more than the buildings, teachers, and so on, Ryle is arguing that the mental state of pain is nothing more than the various behavioural dispositions associated with pain. There is nothing you can show the alien over and above these behavioural dispositions.
what are the probs faced by behaviourism
five
- ASYMMETRY BETWEEN SELF AND OTHER KNOWLEDGE
- SUPER SPARTANS
- ZOMBIES arg
4.MULTIPLE REALISABILITY
5.CIRCULARITY
explain ASYMMETRY BETWEEN SELF AND OTHER KNOWLEDGE
probs faced by behaviourism
- when I feel pain, there’s no way I could be mistaken as to what I’m feeling. However, if I see someone else scream “ouch!”, I might mistakenly believe they’re in pain when they’re only acting. When it comes to other people’s mental states, I can be mistaken.
- It’s clear there’s a big difference between how you experience your own mental states and other people’s. But if behaviourism were true, this shouldn’t be the case.
- If someone were to ask how I know I’m in pain it wouldn’t make sense to answer “because I winced” or “because I said ‘ouch!’” or give some other behavioural explanation. I just feel the pain and know I’m in pain from the unpleasant feeling
- there’s no room for this ‘unpleasant feeling’ with behaviourism. Behaviourism analyses mental states solely in terms of behaviour.
response to ASYMMETRY BETWEEN SELF AND OTHER KNOWLEDGE
Ryle’s reply to this problem is to reject the asymmetry between self knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states. He argues that this apparent asymmetry is an illusion as a result of having far more evidence in the case of self-knowledge.
explain the super spartan crit
- Super Spartans are an imagined community of people who completely suppress any outward demonstration of pain.
- They don’t wince, flinch, say “ouch!”, or anything like that. They have no dispositions toward pain behaviour – their heart rate doesn’t even increase.
- Nevertheless, we can imagine the super Spartans do feel pain internally.
- this provides an example of pain without the associated behavioural disposition
- so pain and behavioural dispositiona are seperate things
- So, if super Spartans are possible, then behaviourism is false: it’s possible to have the mental state without the behavioural disposition.
response to super spartans
The behaviourist could reply that without any sort of outward display it would be impossible to form the concept of pain. Without the concept of pain it impossible to distinguish which behaviour they were supposed to be suppressing in the first place. So Putnam’s example is incoherent.
OR
the neuroscientfifc stuff would still be the same .g elevated heart rate
explain how the zombie arg is used to crit behaviourism
If zombies *[has behaviour but no qualia] *are possible, then it’s possible to have the behavioural dispositions associated with pain without actually being in pain. Therefore, the behavioural disposition of pain is separate from the feeling of pain. Therefore, behaviourism is false.
explain multiple realisability
the same mental state can be realised through multiple different behaviours depending on a person’s other mental state. And these other mental states also need to be analysed in terms of behaviours, which again might vary depending on a person’s other mental states. This can go on forever.
it seems impossible for behaviourism to explain mental state as behaviours without assuming various other mental states. But these other mental states need a behavioural explanation too!
example of multiple realisability
his mental state of being thirsty would probably cause you to behave by drinking a drink if it was in front of you. But I might not drink the drink – despite having the same mental state of being thirsty – if I also have the mental state of believing that the drink is poisoned.
So, in order to explain why the mental state of me being thirsty leads to this particular behavioural disposition (i.e. not drinking), we need to appeal to another mental state. But this additional mental state also needs to be analysed in terms of behaviour.
The mental state of believing that a drink is poisoned would probably cause you to behave by avoiding the drink or pouring it away. But someone else might drink the drink – despite also believing that the drink is poisoned – if they also have the mental state of being suicidal.
And the mental state of being suicidal can also be realised in multiple different behaviours depending on a person’s other mental states, and so on and so on.
expalin circulairty as a crit of behaviorism
We can further press the multiple realisability objection above to argue that this process of analysing mental states in terms of behaviour is circular. Behaviourism must assume other mental states in order to give an analysis of mental states in terms of behavioural dispositions.
And further, If you try to define those other mental states in terms of behavioural dispositions, you will end up back where it started.
- To be in pain is to be disposed to say “ouch”
- But you won’t say “ouch” if you have a belief that the people you are with will think you are a wimp
- To have a belief that the people you are with will think you are a wimp is to be disposed to hide when you are in pain
