Mind-brain type identity theory

Question 1

what is MBIT

Answer 1

It says that mental states reduce to brain states. Put simply, mental states are brain states.

Question 2

how does MBIT show brain states

Answer 2

to illustrate brain states is c-fibres. To say someone’s c-fibres are firing is just technical shorthand for the brain state associated with pain. And so, a type identity theorist would say that pain is identical to c-fibres firing, in the same way that lightning is identical to electrical discharge.

Question 3

What does JCC Smart say about mental and brain states

Answer 3

JJC Smart claims that mental states and brain states are contingently identical. Another way of saying this is that mental states ontologically reduce to brain states

Question 4

examples of ontological reductions/contingently identical things

Answer 4

1. Lightning is electrical discharge
2. Water is H2O
3. This table is an old suitcase
   These relationships are not merely correlations, theyre the same thing

Question 5

what does MBIT say about pain and c-fibres

Answer 5

• they’re contingently identical
• ‘pain’ ontologically reduces to ‘c-fibres firing’, but it doesn’t analytically reduce to it.

Question 6

difference between ontological reductions and analytic reductions

Answer 6

ontological reductions like this are not analytic reductions, such as “a bachelor is an unmarried man”. “A bachelor is an unmarried man” is an analytic reduction because the opposite idea (i.e. a married bachelor) is a contradiction. In contrast, even though “lightning is electrical discharge” is true, there is no logical contradiction in saying “lightning is not electrical discharge”.

Question 7

how does ockams razor apply to MBIT

Answer 7

JJC Smart has a similar idea in mind when arguing against dualism: He argues that type identity theory can predict everything that dualism can, but type identity theory does so with one entity (the brain) rather than two (mind and brain).
* If there are no overwhelming arguments or proof of dualism, Smart argues, we shouldn’t posit extra entities to explain the mind. We can explain just as much about mental states by referring to the brain as we can by referring to a non-physical mind. For example, when I feel pain, brain scans show that my c-fibres get activated. And when my c-fibres get activated, I feel pain. This suggests they are the same thing. We don’t need to posit an additional substance here.

Question 8

probs faced by MBIT

Answer 8

1. location prob
2. zombies
3. multiple relisability

Question 9

location prob

probs faced by MBIT

Answer 9

If pain and c-fibres firing are identical then they must share all the same properties
C-fibres have a precise physical location
Pain does not have a precise physical location
Therefore, pain and c-fibres firing are not identical

Question 10

zombies

probs faced by MBIT

Answer 10

Remember, type identity theory says pain is identical to c-fibres firing. But we can imagine a zombie with the brain state (c-fibres firing) but not the mental state (pain).

Question 11

mulltiple realisability

probs faced by MBIT

Answer 11

1. If type identity theory is true, you cannot have the same mental state without having the same brain state
2. An octopus and a human do not have the same brains or brain states
3. But an octopus and a human can both experience the mental state of pain
4. Therefore, type identity theory is false