Dualist theories Flashcards

Question

prob of other minds

Answer 1

* even though you might never literally experience my thoughts, you’d still assume I have them. You don’t seriously doubt whether your friends, family, and random people on the street have minds. You infer from their behaviour that they have a mind that causes their behaviouR * But if substance dualism is true, what grounds do you have to make this assumption? **Minds and bodies are two completely separate and independent substances.** How do you know there is a mind ‘attached’ to a body? ***It’s completely possible, on the dualist view, to have physical behaviour without a physical mind***. In such a case, what evidence could you possibly find which proves other minds exist at all?

Answer 2

sceptisim about the existence of other people's minds

Answer 3

1. I have a mind 2. My mind causes my behaviour 3. Other people have bodies and behave similarly to me in similar situations 4. By analogy, their behaviour has the same type of cause as my behaviour: a mind 5. Therefore, other people have minds

Answer 4

It’s a debateable inference to **go from one instance of a relationship **(I have a mind that causes my behaviour)** to the claim that this relationship holds in all instances** (everyone has a mind that causes their behaviour). | would be like saying that dog has 3 legs, therefore all dogs have 3 legs

Answer 5

you could argue other minds are the best explanation is their explanatory and predictive power: **If other people have minds, it explains why they behave in the ways they do**. For example, if someone spends a few minutes before moving a chess piece in a chess match, the best explanation of their behaviour is that they have a mind and were using it to think through their move before making it ## Footnote ***accepts that we can’t observe or prove the existence of minds***, but says we should believe in their existence anyway since they are the best explanation

Answer 6

how mental things can causally interact with physical things when they are supposed to be two completely separate substances * Our mental states affect how we behave. If I’m feeling hungry (mental state), it might cause me to move my body (physical thing) to the fridge to get some food.

Answer 7

1. physical things only move if they are pushed 2. only something that is physical and can touch the thing that is moved can exert such a force 3. but the mind is not physical, so it cant touch the body 4. Therefore the mind can't move the body **we know 4 is false, so theres a prob in the arg** * (3) seems easiest to dispute. It follows from this that the mind is, in fact, physical. And if the mind is physical then substance dualism is wrong. | created by Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia

Answer 8

1. The law of conservation of energy says that: In a closed system, energy cannot be added or removed – it can only be transferred 2. Our universe is such a closed system 3. If substance dualism is true, it would mean energy is constantly being added into the closed system of our universe every time the mental interacts with the physical 4. So, if substance dualism is true, the law of conservation of energy is false 5. But there is a lot of evidence (e.g. Noether’s theorem) to suggest that the law of conservation of energy is true 6. So, substance dualism must be wrong

Answer 9

go as far as substance dualism in claiming that the **mind is completely non-physical**, but it differs from physicalism in that **property dualists believe a complete description of the physical universe would not be a complete description of the entire universe**. Instead, property dualists believe that a complete physical description of the universe*** would miss out qualia.***

Answer 10

Qualia is **intrinsic** (and non-intentional) **phenomenal properties t**hat are **introspectively accessible**

Answer 11

* The redness I experience when I look at a ripe tomato * The taste of beer when I have a drink * The rough feeling when I run my hand over some sandpaper | not properties of object BUT **properties of experince of those objects*

Answer 12

phenomenal knowledge

Answer 13

a relationship between two kinds of thing. If something supervenes on something else, then it is dependent on that thing.

Answer 14

In metaphysics of mind, ***physicalism*** says that everything – including the mind and mental states – is either physical or supervenes on the physical. In other words, physicalism says that** two physically identical things must be the same in every way: it’s impossible for two physically identical things to be mentally different.** **Property dualism** denies this claim, however. According to property dualism, it’s **possible for two physically identical things to be different in some way**. More specifically, property dualism says it’s possible that **two physically identical things could have different mental properties – *different qualia*.** So, **according to property dualism, qualia are neither physical nor supervene on the physical.**

Answer 15

the mind can interact with the physical world and the physical world can interact with the mind. In other words, the mental and physical can interact in both directions.

Answer 16

1. Mental -> physical: The mental state of hunger causes you to go and get food 2. Physical -> mental: Getting hit in the head causes the mental state of pain

Answer 17

the physical world can cause mental states but mental states cannot cause changes in the physical world – i.e. the causal interaction is one way.

Answer 18

1. Physical -> mental: Getting hit in the head causes the mental state of pain 2. But mental states (i.e. qualia) themselves don’t cause anything: My going to get food is explained by my (physical) brain state, rather than my mental state

Answer 19

they believe that qualia are caused by physical things but that qualia doesn’t cause anything itself. Epiphenomenalism thus avoids some of the causal interaction issues facing substance dualism because it does not have to explain how the mental can cause changes in the physical.

Answer 20

1. the zombie arg 2. the knowledge arg (mary)

Answer 21

A philosophical zombie is a person who is physically and functionally identical to an ordinary human – except they **don’t have any qualia.** zombie will say “ouch!” when it gets stabbed and its physical brain will even fire in the same way as a normal brain – but there isn’t any pain qualia internally. Such zombies seem conceivable. We can imagine a possible world that is physically identical to this one, with the same people, but without qualia. In this world, you would behave and act in exactly the same way as in the actual world except you’d have no phenomenal experience.

Answer 22

* Philosophical zombies are conceivable * If philosophical zombies are conceivable then philosophical zombies are metaphysically possible * If philosophical zombies are metaphysically possible then qualia are non-physical * If qualia are non-physical then property dualism is true * Therefore, property dualism is true

Answer 23

1. zombies aren't conceivable 2. Zombies are not (metaphysically) possible 3. even if zombies are metaphysically possible, it doesn't prove anything about our world

Answer 24

Physicalists can respond that if we had enough physical knowledge we would be able to understand what we currently call ‘qualia’ in purely physical terms. In other words, the **only reason zombies seem conceivable is because we are confused or missing some important information.** The conceivability of a*** physical duplicate without qualia is just an illusion *** The reason zombies seem conceivable is because we’re labouring under a false illusion that qualia are these spooky non-physical things. **Once we understand that qualia are, in fact, just physical things, then it becomes inconceivable to imagine a physically identical being that lacks these physical features.** Imagining a philosophical zombie would be like saying “imagine something that is physically identical but that isn’t physically identical” – it would be a contradiction, and contradictions aren’t conceivable. It would be like trying to imagine a married bachelor or a triangle with 4 sides. Once we understand that*** qualia = a physical thing, it becomes inconceivable for two physically identical beings not to have identical qualia,*** and so the zombie argument fails to prove property dualism.

Answer 25

**respond to the zombie argument by arguing that conceivability does not guarantee metaphysical possibility** It seems conceivable, that water could be something other than H2O because a statement like “water is H3O” is not obviously contradictory in the same way “a triangle has 4-sides” is contradictory. “Water is H2O” is not an analytic truth and so it seems that we can imagine water without imagining something with the chemical structure H2O. In contrast, we cannot imagine a triangle without imagining a 3-sided shape because “triangles have 3 sides” is an analytic truth. The conceivability of “water is H3O” suggests such a thing is somehow possible. However, some philosophers would reject that “water is H3O” is possible because H2O is an essential property of what water is. Sure, you can imagine a possible world where the clear liquid in lakes and rivers is H3O, but then what you’d be imagining wouldn’t be water! It would be something else. “Water is H3O” is thus metaphysically impossible. Similarly, if phenomenal properties (qualia) are essential properties of some physical things, then it’s not metaphysically possible for the same physical thing to have different phenomenal properties. **In other words, a physical duplicate without qualia (i.e. a philosophical zombie) is metaphysically impossible in the same way water without H2O is metaphysically impossible.**

Answer 26

1. Mary is confined to a black-and-white room, is educated through black-and-white books and lectures relayed on a black-and-white television 2. She learns everything there is to know about the physical nature of the world. 3. Mary knows all the physical facts about colour 4. Mary does not know what it feels like to see colour 5. Therefore, what it feels like to see colour is not a physical fact 6. Physicalism says that all facts are physical facts 7. Therefore, physicalism is false

Answer 27

Physicalism is taken to be false due to the supposed existence of non-physical facts. These non-physical facts are facts about non-physical properties, i.e. qualia. If such non-physical properties exist, then property dualism is true.

Answer 28

1. ability hypothesis 2. acquaintance hypothesis 3. new knowledge, old fact 4. mary would already know

Answer 29

knowledge of HOW | i know how to ride a bike

Answer 30

knowledge of OF | i know fred well

Answer 31

We can accept that Mary learns something new when she leaves the black and white room but reject Jackson’s claim that this new knowledge is non-physical. Instead, we might argue, Mary gains new ability knowledge. There is nothing spooky or non-physical about knowing how to ride a bike. The fact that people are able to ride bicycles is not used as an argument against physicalism. And we can imagine a similar case to the Mary example. However, this time, Mary learns all the physical facts about riding a bicycle (and all the related causal and relational facts) from books and videos, etc. without ever actually touching a bike for herself. When Mary is given a bicycle for the first time she probably won’t be able to ride it – even though she knows all the physical facts about riding bicycles. This is because knowledge of how to ride a bike isn’t the kind of knowledge you can learn from facts in books. It’s ability knowledge. And ability knowledge is a kind of physical knowledge. **Applied to the original Mary case, some argue when Mary sees red for the first time all she does is gain new abilities. She gains the ability to imagine red, for example. She also gains the ability to distinguish red sensory experiences from green sensory experiences.**

Answer 32

we can claim that although Mary learns something new, her new knowledge is still a kind of physical knowledge: knowledge by acquaintance. Chances are you don’t know King Charles III personally – even if you know a load of facts about him. Even if you learned every physical fact about King Charles III you still couldn’t say you know him if you’d never met him. But King Charles III’s acquaintances and friends do know him personally. But there’s nothing spooky or non-physical about their knowledge. You can make a (sort of) similar argument for Mary’s experience of seeing the colour red. She can know all the physical facts about red – what it is, when people see it, how they react to it, etc. – without being acquainted with redness itself. Mary is not acquainted with redness because her own brain has never had this property itself. But when she sees red for the first time the property occurs in her brain and she becomes acquainted with redness. Mary gains new knowledge from being acquainted with redness in this way.

Answer 33

*more than one way to know the same fact. e.g “I know there is water in that glass” expresses knowledge of the same underlying physical fact that “I know there is H2O in that glass” does. ALSO it’s possible to know the former and not know the latter. For example, back before the chemical structure of water was discovered, it is perfectly imaginable that someone could know “there is water in the glass” but not know “there is H2O in the glass”.* argue it’s a similar case with Mary’s knowledge of what it’s like to see red. Before she left the black and white room, Mary only knew about redness in theoretical terms. But when she leaves and sees red she gains a new concept: the phenomenal concept. And it’s impossible to know what it’s like to see red without this concept. We can argue that this phenomenal concept just provides a different way of understanding the same underlying fact. **So, Mary doesn’t learn any new, non-physical fact. She just learns a different way of understanding the same fact.**

Answer 34

ould argue that, if Mary really did know all the physical facts about what it’s like to see red (as the thought experiment claims), then this would include knowledge of what it’s like to see red. In other words, Mary would already know what it’s like to see red before she left the black and white room. This claim goes against an intuition most people have. We can’t imagine how Mary could know what it’s like to see red without having seen it herself. But how can we know that all physical knowledge about seeing red wouldn’t also include knowledge of what it’s like to see red? How can we even imagine what it would be like to have all physical knowledge about something like this? The intuition that Mary wouldn’t know what it’s like to see red is just that – an intuition. What solid argument is there that all physical knowledge would not also include knowledge of what it’s like to see red?

Answer 35

1. intospective self-knowledge 2. the phenomenology of mental life 3. evolution

Answer 36

***1. If epiphenomenalism is true, qualia have no causal effects 2. If qualia have no causal effects, then knowledge of mental states is impossible 3. But knowledge of mental states is possible (e.g. I can know “I am in pain”) 4. So, epiphenomenalism must be false*** Epiphenomenalism usually explains away the apparent causal effects of qualia by saying that it’s the brain that causes both qualia and behaviour. For example, when I burn my hand on a hot stove, my brain state causes me to pull my hand away and also causes the unpleasant qualia/mental state raises a problem in the case of self-knowledge: If qualia/mental states have no causal powers, then knowledge of qualia/mental states is impossible

Answer 37

For example, if someone is in constant chronic pain, this may cause them to feel sad. It seems plausible that the unpleasant feeling of being in pain (i.e. the qualia) caused the mental state of sadness – this explanation is perfectly reasonable. But, if epiphenomenalism is correct, qualia have no causal powers. So this explanation can’t be correct – it wouldn’t be possible for pain qualia to cause sadness (or any other mental state). But this conclusion seems false: It seems obvious that qualia do cause other mental states, and so epiphenomenalism must be false. | qualia also seem to cause other mental states.

Answer 38

Evolution says that genetic mutations occur randomly. Over millions of years, the environment selects for genes that give some benefit – either in terms of survival or reproduction. For example, having long neck genes enables a giraffe to reach food and survive. Or, to put it another way, having a long neck causes the giraffe not to die of starvation. The causal effects of long neck genes clearly explain why giraffes have long necks: They are beneficial for survival in the physical world. But, if epiphenomenalism is true, there would be no evolutionary benefit to having qualia because epiphenomenal qualia doesn’t have any causal effect. It makes sense why animals would evolve brain states – for example, the brain state of pain would cause the animal to get away from things that might damage its body or kill it. But, if epiphenomenalism is true, the brain state alone would cause the animal to move away from whatever is damaging its body – the brain state alone would cause it to behave in exactly the same way whether it had qualia or not. So, there would be no evolutionary benefit of having epiphenomenal qualia in addition to the brain state. And so, if minds are the product of evolution, it would suggest that epiphenomenalism is false: Qualia does have some useful causal role, otherwise we wouldn’t have evolved it.

Answer 39

property D says there’s ONE substance but two properties substance D says there’s TWO substances (substances can exist independently but properties depend on substance— So SD says the mind can exist without the body)

Answer 40

the felt experince of your mind, the 'what it's like' feeling

Answer 41

i can conceive of it without contradiction | type of possibility is less restrictive than metaphysical possibility

Answer 42

metaphysical possibility is constrained by the real nature or identity of things. *** it could be possible in at least one possible world**

Answer 43

what is possible given the laws of nature as they are in the actual world.

Answer 44

**P1.** It is conceivable that there are zombies. **P2. **If it is conceivable that there are zombies, it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies. **C1. **Therefore, it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies. **P3. **If it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies, then phenomenal properties of consciousness are neither physical properties nor supervene on physical properties. **C2.** Therefore, phenomenal properties of consciousness are neither physical properties nor supervene on physical properties. **C3.** Therefore, physicalism is false and property dualism is true.

Answer 45

A ‘zombie’, in the philosophical sense, is an exact physical duplicate of a person – you, for instance – but** without any conscious subjective quality of experience**. It therefore has identical physical properties to you, but different mental properties – it has no phenomenal consciousness.

Answer 46

property X supervenes on Y if X cannot change without Y changing if X supervenes on Y then X is fixed in place by Y | relationship of dependency

Answer 47

property X supervenes on Y if X cannot change without Y changing **i.e X = mental states, Y= brain states** my mental states supervene on my brain states if and only if my mental states cannot vary without my brain states changing

Answer 48

* the arg only works if mental properties supervene * its a circular arg

Answer 49

pain does not supervene

Answer 50

* we might think we can conceive of something when in reality we cant * perhaps i can imagine a zombie in a weak sense but not clearly * so you **might think you're imagining a physical duplicate but you're not** * a physicalist can push the point by saying that **if you imagine a physically identical replica of you then you are *imagining someone who has consciousness***

Answer 51

* if physicalism is true then the scenario is inconceivable * it uses the same idea of physicallism that the scenario attacks

Answer 52

* you can conceiev of water NOT BEING H20 - its not a self contradiction * given that water IS H2O its not metaphysically possible i.e. possible in any possible universe * **THEREFORE zombies may be conceivable but that doesn't mean that they could actually exist in any possible world if consciousness is a collection of physical propertuies**

Answer 53

* its only metaphysically impossible if consciousness is physical

Answer 54

* tells us nothing about the world we're currently in BECAUSE in this world consciousness is fixed by physical properties

Answer 55

* if we're talking about a relation of identity, then this response makes no sense bc identities are the same in every possible world * if its just contingent that in this world consciousness is fixed by physical properties then its not a relation of identity, and so in some possible wolrd, conscioussness is distinct from physical properties

Answer 56

1. Dualism (of some form) is true 2. Mental events are caused by physical events 3. Mental events are causally impotent: they are epiphenomena - **mental events do not have any effects: they cause neither mental nor physical events **

Answer 57

* since zombies are possible we can imagine a world where consciousness [A] varies without variation in brain states [B] * shows that mental states don't supervience on brain states

Answer 58

* if knowledge arg is correct then qualia posesses the following properties: 1. **irreducible** [cant be explained by physics] -- BECAUSE before she leaves the room she is taught all the physical facts about red; so when she see's red she is learning something new that cant be a physical fact; -- **knowing all the physical facts about red cant give me the qualia of redness ** a physicalist explanation of qualia would be incomplete 2. **intrinsic**-- the qualia of redness can only belong to mental states of my perception of red -- because **no account of physical facts about red will give me experince of redness**

Answer 59

we call X epiphenomenal if it is caused by something but has no causal power of its own

Answer 60

* qualia exist and they are inducible and they are epiphenomenal * BECAUSE; physics is causally complete [meaning that every event has a physical cause, so qualia cause anything]

Answer 61

1. **the qualia of dark blue **-- can't cause me to choose dark blue paint for my room 2.** the qualia of chocolate** -- can't cause me to have another bite 3. **the qualia of the smell of sick **-- cant cause me to open a window

Answer 62

that at least some mental properties, eg phenomenal properties of consciousness, are fundamentally distinct from physical properties. * they dont supervene or depend on physical properties * BUT allow there can be fundamental laws of nature that corrlelate mental properies with physical and/or functional properties

Answer 63

* distinct mental props. causally affect both other mental states and physical states * SO the mental has causal power

Answer 64

i experince a mental property and this causes a bodily movement * i experience pain and this causes me to move from the source

Answer 65

mental properties are properties of physical objects

Answer 66

How can PD explain how mental properties cause physical effects E.G how can the conscious experience of ‘feeling pain’ cause a bodily movement ?

Answer 67

* Chambers says **we can’t explain** how mental props have physical effects but this is not an issue **BECAUSE** * We can’t explain how basic properties have physical effects, including physical props * E.G. the causal power of heat can **only be explained in terms if more basic properties** [kinetic energy] — when we get to the *most basic physical props* we **can’t explain any further, we just know they do have causal powers ** * This is what consciousness is like

Answer 68

* for years, physicists had no account of how gravity works * then Einstein suggested that it was the result of mass bending space, BUT we have no account of how mass bends space * but this is no objection to accepting the claim that mass does bend space * PD claims that mental properties are fundamental in the same sense as fundamental physical properties

Answer 69

1. Every physical event is caused by other physical events alone, these events are sufficient causes — therefore every event in the brain/body has a physical cause 2. Therefore at the very best non-physical mental props are unnecessary to explain our actions 3. THEREFORE property dualism is false 4. **OCKHAM’S RAZOR — physicalism is simpler and just as effective as an explanation ** | an inductive arg- so only proves that PD is likely to be false

Answer 70

* quantum mechanics suggests some laws of nature are not deterministic, so physics is causally indeterminate in some cases- making it not causasally complete-- Penrose suggests that quantum physics shows us that consciousness has an effcet on physical propcesses, but this is a biy controversdial

Answer 71

* striking a match causes the match to light. but the match being lit requries other things too e.g oxygen * **by the same token our actions are* caused by physical brain activity AND mental properties* including beliefs/intentions**

Answer 72

the theory that mental states and events are epiphenomena, by-products, the effects of some physical process, but with no causal influence of their own. often combines with PD

Answer 73

1. occassionalism 2. parallelism

Answer 74

* brain state 1: stubs toes CAUSES 1. mental states 1: feeling of pain 2. Brain state 2: rubs toe THEN BRAIN STATE 2 CAUSES 1. mental state 2: feeling of relief | mental state 1 and brain state 2 are coreelational but no causation ## Footnote feeling of pain is correlated with pain-behaviour BUT the cause of pain behaviour is the brain state that causes pain

Answer 75

* it is only some mental properties -qualia- that are epiphenomenal, whereas my beliefs and desires are causal because theese are not irreducibly non-physical

Answer 76

1. SIMPLIER- if epiphenomenalism is true, then we don't need to explain how mental properties have physical effects 2.

Answer 77

irreducible eg qualia -- pain, redness, taste of coffee

Answer 78

if A causally affects B, then A changes B in some way or brings B about

Answer 79

**1. empirical = causal completeness of physics, mental states are unnecessary** *2. conceptual = how can mental probs cause physical effecst*

Answer 80

epiphemoalist PD

Answer 81

mental props are effects of physical events but not causes of physical OR mental evenst

Answer 82

1. the challenge from the phrenology of our mental lives 2. the challenge from natural selection 3. the challenge from introspective self-knowledge

Answer 83

**epiphenomalist** PD claims mental props are effects of physical events but **not causes of physical OR mental evenst** whereas ***interactionist*** PD says distinct mental props. causally affect both other mental states and physical states ***SO the mental has causal power***

Answer 84

if epiphenomenalism is true, then we don't need to explain how mental properties have physical effects

Answer 85

* epiphenomalism is counter-intuitive * its part of our experience of having mental states that our mental states, [E.G feeling pain], cause other mental and physicals states and events * mental states can cause our behaviour, such as wincing, and they can be part of a causal mental process

Answer 86

* according to Darwin's theory of evolution, millions of genetic alterations randomly take place, most disappear without a trace * but some that coincidentally help a creature to survive and reproduce slowly spread -- the creature and its descendants reproduce more than others without those traits, so more and more creatures end up with them * so according to theory of evolution, the traits that evolve over time are ones that causally contribute to the survival of the creature * **we can assume that mental properties, including qualia evolved. *but how, if they make no difference to what creatures do and so whether they survive and reproduce ?***

Answer 87

* how do I know that i am in pain when i am? * the obvious answer is that my belief that i am in pain is caused by my pain itself * but if epiphenomalism is true, pain doesn't cause anything, even my belief that i am in pain * if my thoughts/feelings don't cause my beliefs about my mind, then i could have those beliefs whatever my mental states, just as long as the cause of my beliefs operate in the same way * so i could believe i am in pain when im not in pain * so my beliefs about my mind are unjustified and unreliable. * so i cant know my own mind

Answer 88

* if phenomenal properties of consciousness are distinct from physical and functional properties, how can we know from how other people behave and how they are physically constituted, whether they have any consciousness at all? *** if phenomenal properties of consciousness are distinct from physical and functional properties, how do we know that other people aren't zombies?

Answer 89

1. arg from analogy 2. best hypothesis

Answer 90

1. i have a mind 2. i know from experince that my mental states cause my behaviour 3. other people have bodies similair to mine and behave similairly 4. by analogy their behaviour is caused by the same thing as mine, mental states 5. therefore other people have minds

Answer 91

* an interactionst PD claims that consciousness causes behaviour and other physical effecst * such causal relations dont provide a complete analysis of what phenomenal properties are but consciousness does have effects * best explantion for why people behave the way they do is that people *are* conscious

Answer 92

* PD claims taht mental properties/at least phenomenal properties of consciousness are part of the same metaphysical framework as physical and functional properties, only not physical 1. Ryle says the concept of phenomenal properties misunderstands our talk of sensations, feelings, images and so on. -- they aren't each a 'something' that has peculair properties of 'what it is like' 2. to say 'what it is like' to see red is simply to describe what we see when attending to the colour of a red object 3. the redness we experince is the redness of the rose, not a property of our experince of it 4.we can express the difference between what experinces 'are like' in terms of what the experince 'is of' [red roses look different from yellow roses], so e.g we enjoy one and find another boring 5.

Answer 93

best hypothesis is the best because arg from analogy faces problme of -- i may be a special case,m perhaps i am the only being that is conscious, while everyone else has no qualia

Answer 94

zombie arg