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philosophy paper 2 > Dualist theories > Flashcards

Dualist theories Flashcards

1
Q

what are the two dualist theories

A

substance and property dualism

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2
Q

what is substance dualism

A

the viwe that The mental and the physical are two completely different kinds of substance

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3
Q

what are args for sub. dualism

A

conceivability arg
divisibility arg

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4
Q

what are args against sub. dualism

A

interation prob
prob of other minds

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5
Q

what is prop dualism

A

the view that Some mental properties (qualia) are non-physical and do not follow on from the physical

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6
Q

what are args for prop. dualism

A

zombie arg
knowledge arg

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7
Q

what are args against prop. dualism

A

knowledge of qualia
evolution

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8
Q

what are physical substances

sub. dual

A

things like trees, cars, houses. your body, your arms, legs etc

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9
Q

dualist view on brain AND the mind

A
  • brain is part of body so is physical
  • but deny that mind is same as brain
  • mind is non-physical
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10
Q

who made the conceivability arg

A

descartes

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11
Q

what is descartes conceivability arg

A
  1. I have a clear and distinct idea of my mind as a thinking thing that is not extended in space
  2. I have a clear and distinct idea of my body as a non-thinking thing that is extended in space
  3. Anything I can conceive of clearly and distinctly is something that God could create
  4. So, God could create my mind as a thinking thing that is not extended in space and my body as a non-thinking thing that is extended in space
  5. So, it is possible for mind and body to exist independent of each other
    C. So, mind and body are two separate substances
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12
Q

what is the conceivalility arg reliant on

A

descartes notion of clear and distinct ideas

Clear and distinct ideas are trustworthy, complete, and true rather than just random thoughts that may or may not be accurate.

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13
Q

list teh responses to conceivabilty arg

3

A
  1. mind without body is inconceivable
  2. what is conceivable may not be physically possible
  3. masked man fallacy
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14
Q

response to conceivability arg

mind without body is inconceivable

A
  1. Behaviourism says that to have mental states is to have behavioural dispositions
  2. To have behavioural dispositions is to be disposed to move your body in certain ways
  3. It is inconceivable to be disposed to move your body in certain ways if you don’t have a body
  4. So, it is inconceivable to have mental states if you don’t have a body
  5. So, mind without body is inconceivable
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15
Q

response to conceivability arg

what is conceivable may not be physically possible

A
  • just because we can imagine the mind floating around independently of a body, this doesn’t mean it is physically possible.
  • e.g not logically possible for a triangle to have 4 sides because it involves a logical contradiction.
  • e.g logically possible for me to jump on to the moon from earth. It might be physically impossible, but there is no logical contradiction in this idea!
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16
Q

response to conceivability arg

masked man fallacy

A
  1. I conceive of Batman as a caped crusader
  2. I conceive of Bruce Wayne as a billionaire who is not a caped crusader
  3. Therefore, Batman is not Bruce Wayne
    * BUT batman is bruce wayne so the conc. is false
    * even though it may be conceivable that Batman is someone else, this tells us nothing about how things are in reality. To think otherwise is to fall for the masked man fallacy
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17
Q

why is the masked man fallacy fallacious (based on a false belief)

A

because it switches from talking about ideas to talking about things themselves
1. Just because you have an idea of Batman and Bruce Wayne as separate people, this doesn’t mean they are separate people
2. Similarly, just because you have an idea that the mind and body are separate things, this doesn’t necessarily mean they are separate things

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18
Q

who craeted the divisibility arg

A

descartes

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19
Q

what is descartes divisibility arg

A
  • my body is divisible
  • my mind is NOT divisible
  • therefoere my mind and body are seperate things

this arg uses Leibniz’s law of identicals

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20
Q

what is Leibniz’s law of identicals

A

says that for A and B to be the same thing, A and B must have all the same properties. If two things have different properties, they cannot be the same thinG

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21
Q

what are the response to the divisibility arg

A
  1. the mind is divisible
  2. not everything that is physical is divisible
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22
Q

response to divisibility arg

mind is divisible

A
  • cases of mental illness in which the mind does seem literally divided. eg multiple personality disorder could be said to have a divided mind
  • people who have literally had their brain cut in half. A corpus callosotomy is a surgical procedure for epilepsy where the main connection between the left and right hemispheres of the brain is severed.

suggests second premise of arg is FALSE

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23
Q

response to divisibility arg

not everything that is physical is divisible

A
  • If it’s possible to reach a point where physical matter becomes indivisible, then not everything that is indivisible is non-physical
  • And so, even if Descartes successfully shows that the mind is indivisible, this doesn’t prove that the mind is non-physical
  • It’s possible that the mind is the same kind of substance as the body (i.e. a physical substance) – it’s just an indivisible form of that same substance.
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24
Q

what are the over-arching probs for substance dualism

A
  1. prob of other minds
  2. causal interation
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25
Q

prob of other minds

A
  • even though you might never literally experience my thoughts, you’d still assume I have them. You don’t seriously doubt whether your friends, family, and random people on the street have minds. You infer from their behaviour that they have a mind that causes their behaviouR
  • But if substance dualism is true, what grounds do you have to make this assumption? Minds and bodies are two completely separate and independent substances. How do you know there is a mind ‘attached’ to a body? It’s completely possible, on the dualist view, to have physical behaviour without a physical mind. In such a case, what evidence could you possibly find which proves other minds exist at all?
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26
Q

what does prob of other minds lead to

A

sceptisim about the existence of other people’s minds

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27
Q

response to prob of other minds

Mill’s analogy

A
  1. I have a mind
  2. My mind causes my behaviour
  3. Other people have bodies and behave similarly to me in similar situations
  4. By analogy, their behaviour has the same type of cause as my behaviour: a mind
  5. Therefore, other people have minds
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28
Q

response to Mill’s anaology regarding prob of other minds

A

It’s a debateable inference to go from one instance of a relationship (I have a mind that causes my behaviour) to the claim that this relationship holds in all instances (everyone has a mind that causes their behaviour).

would be like saying that dog has 3 legs, therefore all dogs have 3 legs

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29
Q

response to prob of other minds

best explanation

A

you could argue other minds are the best explanation is their explanatory and predictive power: If other people have minds, it explains why they behave in the ways they do. For example, if someone spends a few minutes before moving a chess piece in a chess match, the best explanation of their behaviour is that they have a mind and were using it to think through their move before making it

accepts that we can’t observe or prove the existence of minds, but says we should believe in their existence anyway since they are the best explanation

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30
Q

causal interation

prob. for sub dual

A

how mental things can causally interact with physical things when they are supposed to be two completely separate substances
* Our mental states affect how we behave. If I’m feeling hungry (mental state), it might cause me to move my body (physical thing) to the fridge to get some food.

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31
Q

what is the conceptual interation prob

and who created it

A
  1. physical things only move if they are pushed
  2. only something that is physical and can touch the thing that is moved can exert such a force
  3. but the mind is not physical, so it cant touch the body
  4. Therefore the mind can’t move the body
    we know 4 is false, so theres a prob in the arg
    * (3) seems easiest to dispute. It follows from this that the mind is, in fact, physical. And if the mind is physical then substance dualism is wrong.

created by Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia

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32
Q

what is the empirical interation prob

for substance dualism

A
  1. The law of conservation of energy says that: In a closed system, energy cannot be added or removed – it can only be transferred
  2. Our universe is such a closed system
  3. If substance dualism is true, it would mean energy is constantly being added into the closed system of our universe every time the mental interacts with the physical
  4. So, if substance dualism is true, the law of conservation of energy is false
  5. But there is a lot of evidence (e.g. Noether’s theorem) to suggest that the law of conservation of energy is true
  6. So, substance dualism must be wrong
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33
Q

what is property dualism

(detailed)

A

go as far as substance dualism in claiming that the mind is completely non-physical, but it differs from physicalism in that property dualists believe a complete description of the physical universe would not be a complete description of the entire universe. Instead, property dualists believe that a complete physical description of the universe* would miss out qualia.*

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34
Q

what is qualia

A

Qualia is intrinsic (and non-intentional) phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible

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35
Q

examples of qualia

A
  • The redness I experience when I look at a ripe tomato
  • The taste of beer when I have a drink
  • The rough feeling when I run my hand over some sandpaper

not properties of object BUT **properties of experince of those objects*

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36
Q

what is the other name for qualia

A

phenomenal knowledge

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37
Q

what is supervenience

A

a relationship between two kinds of thing. If something supervenes on something else, then it is dependent on that thing.

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38
Q

how is supervenience used in metaphysics of mind

A

In metaphysics of mind, physicalism says that everything – including the mind and mental states – is either physical or supervenes on the physical. In other words, physicalism says that** two physically identical things must be the same in every way: it’s impossible for two physically identical things to be mentally different.**

Property dualism denies this claim, however. According to property dualism, it’s possible for two physically identical things to be different in some way. More specifically, property dualism says it’s possible that two physically identical things could have different mental properties – different qualia.

So, according to property dualism, qualia are neither physical nor supervene on the physical.

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39
Q

what is interactionist dualism

A

the mind can interact with the physical world and the physical world can interact with the mind. In other words, the mental and physical can interact in both directions.

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40
Q

examples of how both the mental and physical can interact in interactionaist dualism

A
  1. Mental -> physical: The mental state of hunger causes you to go and get food
  2. Physical -> mental: Getting hit in the head causes the mental state of pain
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41
Q

what is Epiphenomenalist dualism

A

the physical world can cause mental states but mental states cannot cause changes in the physical world – i.e. the causal interaction is one way.

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42
Q

give example of one-way causual interaction in Epiphenomenalist dualism

A
  1. Physical -> mental: Getting hit in the head causes the mental state of pain
  2. But mental states (i.e. qualia) themselves don’t cause anything: My going to get food is explained by my (physical) brain state, rather than my mental state
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43
Q

what do epiphenomenalists believe

A

they believe that qualia are caused by physical things but that qualia doesn’t cause anything itself. Epiphenomenalism thus avoids some of the causal interaction issues facing substance dualism because it does not have to explain how the mental can cause changes in the physical.

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44
Q

knowledge experiments that support property dualism

A
  1. the zombie arg
  2. the knowledge arg (mary)
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45
Q

what is the zombie arg

A

A philosophical zombie is a person who is physically and functionally identical to an ordinary human – except they don’t have any qualia.
zombie will say “ouch!” when it gets stabbed and its physical brain will even fire in the same way as a normal brain – but there isn’t any pain qualia internally.

Such zombies seem conceivable. We can imagine a possible world that is physically identical to this one, with the same people, but without qualia. In this world, you would behave and act in exactly the same way as in the actual world except you’d have no phenomenal experience.

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46
Q

how can you use the zombie arg to support prop. dualism

A
  • Philosophical zombies are conceivable
  • If philosophical zombies are conceivable then philosophical zombies are metaphysically possible
  • If philosophical zombies are metaphysically possible then qualia are non-physical
  • If qualia are non-physical then property dualism is true
  • Therefore, property dualism is true
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47
Q

what are the responses to the zombie arg.

A
  1. zombies aren’t conceivable
  2. Zombies are not (metaphysically) possible
  3. even if zombies are metaphysically possible, it doesn’t prove anything about our world
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48
Q

criticism of the zombie arg

not conceivable

A

Physicalists can respond that if we had enough physical knowledge we would be able to understand what we currently call ‘qualia’ in purely physical terms. In other words, the only reason zombies seem conceivable is because we are confused or missing some important information. The conceivability of a** physical duplicate without qualia is just an illusion **

The reason zombies seem conceivable is because we’re labouring under a false illusion that qualia are these spooky non-physical things. Once we understand that qualia are, in fact, just physical things, then it becomes inconceivable to imagine a physically identical being that lacks these physical features. Imagining a philosophical zombie would be like saying “imagine something that is physically identical but that isn’t physically identical” – it would be a contradiction, and contradictions aren’t conceivable. It would be like trying to imagine a married bachelor or a triangle with 4 sides.

Once we understand that* qualia = a physical thing, it becomes inconceivable for two physically identical beings not to have identical qualia,* and so the zombie argument fails to prove property dualism.

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49
Q

criticism of the zombie arg

Zombies are not (metaphysically) possible

A

respond to the zombie argument by arguing that conceivability does not guarantee metaphysical possibility
It seems conceivable, that water could be something other than H2O because a statement like “water is H3O” is not obviously contradictory in the same way “a triangle has 4-sides” is contradictory.

“Water is H2O” is not an analytic truth and so it seems that we can imagine water without imagining something with the chemical structure H2O. In contrast, we cannot imagine a triangle without imagining a 3-sided shape because “triangles have 3 sides” is an analytic truth. The conceivability of “water is H3O” suggests such a thing is somehow possible.

However, some philosophers would reject that “water is H3O” is possible because H2O is an essential property of what water is. Sure, you can imagine a possible world where the clear liquid in lakes and rivers is H3O, but then what you’d be imagining wouldn’t be water! It would be something else. “Water is H3O” is thus metaphysically impossible.

Similarly, if phenomenal properties (qualia) are essential properties of some physical things, then it’s not metaphysically possible for the same physical thing to have different phenomenal properties. In other words, a physical duplicate without qualia (i.e. a philosophical zombie) is metaphysically impossible in the same way water without H2O is metaphysically impossible.

50
Q

explain the knowledge arguemnet (mary)

in arg form

A
  1. Mary is confined to a black-and-white room, is educated through black-and-white books and lectures relayed on a black-and-white television
  2. She learns everything there is to know about the physical nature of the world.
  3. Mary knows all the physical facts about colour
  4. Mary does not know what it feels like to see colour
  5. Therefore, what it feels like to see colour is not a physical fact
  6. Physicalism says that all facts are physical facts
  7. Therefore, physicalism is false
51
Q

how does the knowledge arg disprove physicalism and prove prop. dualism

A

Physicalism is taken to be false due to the supposed existence of non-physical facts. These non-physical facts are facts about non-physical properties, i.e. qualia. If such non-physical properties exist, then property dualism is true.

52
Q

what are the responses to the knowledge arg.

A
  1. ability hypothesis
  2. acquaintance hypothesis
  3. new knowledge, old fact
  4. mary would already know
53
Q

what is ability knowledge

A

knowledge of HOW

i know how to ride a bike

54
Q

what is acquintance knowledge

A

knowledge of OF

i know fred well

55
Q

what is the ability hypothesis

applied to mary

A

We can accept that Mary learns something new when she leaves the black and white room but reject Jackson’s claim that this new knowledge is non-physical.

Instead, we might argue, Mary gains new ability knowledge.

There is nothing spooky or non-physical about knowing how to ride a bike. The fact that people are able to ride bicycles is not used as an argument against physicalism.

And we can imagine a similar case to the Mary example. However, this time, Mary learns all the physical facts about riding a bicycle (and all the related causal and relational facts) from books and videos, etc. without ever actually touching a bike for herself.

When Mary is given a bicycle for the first time she probably won’t be able to ride it – even though she knows all the physical facts about riding bicycles. This is because knowledge of how to ride a bike isn’t the kind of knowledge you can learn from facts in books. It’s ability knowledge. And ability knowledge is a kind of physical knowledge.

Applied to the original Mary case, some argue when Mary sees red for the first time all she does is gain new abilities. She gains the ability to imagine red, for example. She also gains the ability to distinguish red sensory experiences from green sensory experiences.

56
Q

explain the acquaintance hypothesis

A

we can claim that although Mary learns something new, her new knowledge is still a kind of physical knowledge: knowledge by acquaintance.

Chances are you don’t know King Charles III personally – even if you know a load of facts about him. Even if you learned every physical fact about King Charles III you still couldn’t say you know him if you’d never met him.

But King Charles III’s acquaintances and friends do know him personally. But there’s nothing spooky or non-physical about their knowledge.

You can make a (sort of) similar argument for Mary’s experience of seeing the colour red.

She can know all the physical facts about red – what it is, when people see it, how they react to it, etc. – without being acquainted with redness itself.

Mary is not acquainted with redness because her own brain has never had this property itself. But when she sees red for the first time the property occurs in her brain and she becomes acquainted with redness. Mary gains new knowledge from being acquainted with redness in this way.

57
Q

explain the ‘new knowledge, old fact’ response

A

more than one way to know the same fact. e.g “I know there is water in that glass” expresses knowledge of the same underlying physical fact that “I know there is H2O in that glass” does. ALSO it’s possible to know the former and not know the latter. For example, back before the chemical structure of water was discovered, it is perfectly imaginable that someone could know “there is water in the glass” but not know “there is H2O in the glass”.
argue it’s a similar case with Mary’s knowledge of what it’s like to see red.

Before she left the black and white room, Mary only knew about redness in theoretical terms. But when she leaves and sees red she gains a new concept: the phenomenal concept. And it’s impossible to know what it’s like to see red without this concept.

We can argue that this phenomenal concept just provides a different way of understanding the same underlying fact.

So, Mary doesn’t learn any new, non-physical fact. She just learns a different way of understanding the same fact.

58
Q

explain the ‘mary would already know’ response

A

ould argue that, if Mary really did know all the physical facts about what it’s like to see red (as the thought experiment claims), then this would include knowledge of what it’s like to see red.

In other words, Mary would already know what it’s like to see red before she left the black and white room.

This claim goes against an intuition most people have. We can’t imagine how Mary could know what it’s like to see red without having seen it herself.

But how can we know that all physical knowledge about seeing red wouldn’t also include knowledge of what it’s like to see red? How can we even imagine what it would be like to have all physical knowledge about something like this?

The intuition that Mary wouldn’t know what it’s like to see red is just that – an intuition. What solid argument is there that all physical knowledge would not also include knowledge of what it’s like to see red?

59
Q

what are criticisms of prop. dualism

A
  1. intospective self-knowledge
  2. the phenomenology of mental life
  3. evolution
60
Q

explain introspective self-knowledge

criticism of prop. dualism

A

1. If epiphenomenalism is true, qualia have no causal effects
2. If qualia have no causal effects, then knowledge of mental states is impossible
3. But knowledge of mental states is possible (e.g. I can know “I am in pain”)
4. So, epiphenomenalism must be false
Epiphenomenalism usually explains away the apparent causal effects of qualia by saying that it’s the brain that causes both qualia and behaviour. For example, when I burn my hand on a hot stove, my brain state causes me to pull my hand away and also causes the unpleasant qualia/mental state
raises a problem in the case of self-knowledge: If qualia/mental states have no causal powers, then knowledge of qualia/mental states is impossible

61
Q

explain ‘the phenomenology of mental life’

criticisms of prop. dualism

A

For example, if someone is in constant chronic pain, this may cause them to feel sad. It seems plausible that the unpleasant feeling of being in pain (i.e. the qualia) caused the mental state of sadness – this explanation is perfectly reasonable.

But, if epiphenomenalism is correct, qualia have no causal powers. So this explanation can’t be correct – it wouldn’t be possible for pain qualia to cause sadness (or any other mental state). But this conclusion seems false: It seems obvious that qualia do cause other mental states, and so epiphenomenalism must be false.

qualia also seem to cause other mental states.

62
Q

explain evolution

criticisms of prop. dualism

A

Evolution says that genetic mutations occur randomly. Over millions of years, the environment selects for genes that give some benefit – either in terms of survival or reproduction. For example, having long neck genes enables a giraffe to reach food and survive. Or, to put it another way, having a long neck causes the giraffe not to die of starvation. The causal effects of long neck genes clearly explain why giraffes have long necks: They are beneficial for survival in the physical world.

But, if epiphenomenalism is true, there would be no evolutionary benefit to having qualia because epiphenomenal qualia doesn’t have any causal effect.

It makes sense why animals would evolve brain states – for example, the brain state of pain would cause the animal to get away from things that might damage its body or kill it. But, if epiphenomenalism is true, the brain state alone would cause the animal to move away from whatever is damaging its body – the brain state alone would cause it to behave in exactly the same way whether it had qualia or not. So, there would be no evolutionary benefit of having epiphenomenal qualia in addition to the brain state.

And so, if minds are the product of evolution, it would suggest that epiphenomenalism is false: Qualia does have some useful causal role, otherwise we wouldn’t have evolved it.

63
Q

difference between property and substance dualism

A

property D says there’s ONE substance but two properties
substance D says there’s TWO substances
(substances can exist independently but properties depend on substance— So SD says the mind can exist without the body)

64
Q

what is consciousness

A

the felt experince of your mind, the ‘what it’s like’ feeling

65
Q

whta is logical possibility

A

i can conceive of it without contradiction

type of possibility is less restrictive than metaphysical possibility

66
Q

what is metaphysical possibility

A

metaphysical possibility is constrained by the real nature or identity of things.
* it could be possible in at least one possible world

67
Q

what is physical possibility

A

what is possible given the laws of nature as they are in the actual world.

68
Q

**

zombie arg

to suppot PD

A

P1. It is conceivable that there are zombies.
**P2. **If it is conceivable that there are zombies, it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies.
**C1. **Therefore, it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies.
**P3. **If it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies, then phenomenal properties of consciousness are neither physical properties nor supervene on physical properties.
C2. Therefore, phenomenal properties of consciousness are neither physical properties nor supervene on physical properties.
C3. Therefore, physicalism is false and property dualism is true.

69
Q

what is a philosophical zombie

A

A ‘zombie’, in the philosophical sense, is an exact physical duplicate of a person – you, for instance – but** without any conscious subjective quality of experience**. It therefore has identical physical properties to you, but different mental properties – it has no phenomenal consciousness.

70
Q

what does it mean for a property to be a supervient property

A

property X supervenes on Y if X cannot change without Y changing

if X supervenes on Y then X is fixed in place by Y

relationship of dependency

71
Q

supervient properties applied to metaphysic on mind

A

property X supervenes on Y if X cannot change without Y changing
i.e X = mental states, Y= brain states
my mental states supervene on my brain states if and only if my mental states cannot vary without my brain states changing

72
Q

response to zombie arg; circle

prop dual

A
  • the arg only works if mental properties supervene
  • its a circular arg
73
Q

what does the zombie arg prove if its true

prop dual

A

pain does not supervene

74
Q

zombies are inconceivable

response to zombie arg

A
  • we might think we can conceive of something when in reality we cant
  • perhaps i can imagine a zombie in a weak sense but not clearly
  • so you might think you’re imagining a physical duplicate but you’re not
  • a physicalist can push the point by saying that if you imagine a physically identical replica of you then you are imagining someone who has consciousness
75
Q

reply to zombies are inconceivale

A
  • if physicalism is true then the scenario is inconceivable
  • it uses the same idea of physicallism that the scenario attacks
76
Q

what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible

response to zombie arg

A
  • you can conceiev of water NOT BEING H20 - its not a self contradiction
  • given that water IS H2O its not metaphysically possible i.e. possible in any possible universe
  • THEREFORE zombies may be conceivable but that doesn’t mean that they could actually exist in any possible world if consciousness is a collection of physical propertuies
77
Q

reply to ‘what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible’

response to zombie arg

A
  • its only metaphysically impossible if consciousness is physical
78
Q

whta is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world

response to zombie arg

A
  • tells us nothing about the world we’re currently in BECAUSE in this world consciousness is fixed by physical properties
79
Q

response to ‘whta is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world’

A
  • if we’re talking about a relation of identity, then this response makes no sense bc identities are the same in every possible world
  • if its just contingent that in this world consciousness is fixed by physical properties then its not a relation of identity, and so in some possible wolrd, conscioussness is distinct from physical properties
80
Q

what does Epiphenomenalist dualism claim

A
  1. Dualism (of some form) is true
  2. Mental events are caused by physical events
  3. Mental events are causally impotent: they are epiphenomena - **mental events do not have any effects: they cause neither mental nor physical events
    **
81
Q

relation of supervience in the zombie arg

A
  • since zombies are possible we can imagine a world where consciousness [A] varies without variation in brain states [B]
  • shows that mental states don’t supervience on brain states
82
Q

how does the knowledge disprove that qualia doesnt supervience on the physical

A
  • if knowledge arg is correct then qualia posesses the following properties:
    1. irreducible [cant be explained by physics] – BECAUSE before she leaves the room she is taught all the physical facts about red; so when she see’s red she is learning something new that cant be a physical fact; – **knowing all the physical facts about red cant give me the qualia of redness ** a physicalist explanation of qualia would be incomplete
    2. intrinsic– the qualia of redness can only belong to mental states of my perception of red – because no account of physical facts about red will give me experince of redness
83
Q

when do we call X epiphenomenal

A

we call X epiphenomenal if it is caused by something but has no causal power of its own

84
Q

what does jackson say about qualia

property dualism

A
  • qualia exist and they are inducible and they are epiphenomenal
  • BECAUSE; physics is causally complete [meaning that every event has a physical cause, so qualia cause anything]
85
Q

problem of epiphenomenal qualia

examples

A
  1. the qualia of dark blue – can’t cause me to choose dark blue paint for my room
    2.     the qualia of chocolate     – can’t cause me to have another bite
  2. **the qualia of the smell of sick **– cant cause me to open a window
86
Q

what is the key claim of property dualism

A

that at least some mental properties, eg phenomenal properties of consciousness, are fundamentally distinct from physical properties.
* they dont supervene or depend on physical properties
* BUT allow there can be fundamental laws of nature that corrlelate mental properies with physical and/or functional properties

87
Q

what does interactionist property dualism claim

A
  • distinct mental props. causally affect both other mental states and physical states
  • SO the mental has causal power
88
Q

example to show what interactionist property dualism claims

A

i experince a mental property and this causes a bodily movement

  • i experience pain and this causes me to move from the source
89
Q

Prob for interactionist SD was ‘how could a mental prop not in space cause physical effects in space?’ why does interactionist PD not face this problem

A

mental properties are properties of physical objects

90
Q

conceptual prob of interaction for property dualism

A

How can PD explain how mental properties cause physical effects E.G how can the conscious experience of ‘feeling pain’ cause a bodily movement ?

91
Q

Chamber’s response to conceptual prob of interaction for property dualism

A
  • Chambers says we can’t explain how mental props have physical effects but this is not an issue
    BECAUSE
  • We can’t explain how basic properties have physical effects, including physical props
  • E.G. the causal power of heat can only be explained in terms if more basic properties [kinetic energy] — when we get to the most basic physical props we **can’t explain any further, we just know they do have causal powers **
  • This is what consciousness is like
92
Q

further example to aid Chamber’s response

A
  • for years, physicists had no account of how gravity works
  • then Einstein suggested that it was the result of mass bending space, BUT we have no account of how mass bends space
  • but this is no objection to accepting the claim that mass does bend space
  • PD claims that mental properties are fundamental in the same sense as fundamental physical properties
93
Q

response to chamber’s response to conceptual prob of interaction for property dualism

the EMPIRICAL interaction problom

A
  1. Every physical event is caused by other physical events alone, these events are sufficient causes — therefore every event in the brain/body has a physical cause
  2. Therefore at the very best non-physical mental props are unnecessary to explain our actions
  3. THEREFORE property dualism is false
  4. **OCKHAM’S RAZOR — physicalism is simpler and just as effective as an explanation **

an inductive arg- so only proves that PD is likely to be false

94
Q

response to ockham’s razor response

deny completeness of physics

A
  • quantum mechanics suggests some laws of nature are not deterministic, so physics is causally indeterminate in some cases- making it not causasally complete– Penrose suggests that quantum physics shows us that consciousness has an effcet on physical propcesses, but this is a biy controversdial
95
Q

response to ockham’s razor response

causal over-determination

A
  • striking a match causes the match to light. but the match being lit requries other things too e.g oxygen
  • by the same token our actions are* caused by physical brain activity AND mental properties* including beliefs/intentions
96
Q

what is epiphenomenalism

A

the theory that mental states and events are epiphenomena, by-products, the effects of some physical process, but with no causal influence of their own. often combines with PD

97
Q

the non-interactionist versions of SD

A
  1. occassionalism
  2. parallelism
98
Q

flow chat example of epiphenomenalism PD

A
  • brain state 1: stubs toes
    CAUSES
    1. mental states 1: feeling of pain
    2. Brain state 2: rubs toe
    THEN BRAIN STATE 2 CAUSES
    1. mental state 2: feeling of relief

mental state 1 and brain state 2 are coreelational but no causation

feeling of pain is correlated with pain-behaviour BUT the cause of pain behaviour is the brain state that causes pain

99
Q

flow chat example of interactionist PD

A

…

100
Q

response to objection that epiphenomalism is counter-intuitive

only some

A
  • it is only some mental properties -qualia- that are epiphenomenal, whereas my beliefs and desires are causal because theese are not irreducibly non-physical
101
Q

response to objection that epiphenomalism is counter-intuitive

correlational

A

…

102
Q

why should i be an epiphenomenalist

A
  1. SIMPLIER- if epiphenomenalism is true, then we don’t need to explain how mental properties have physical effects
    2.
103
Q

distinct mental properties meaning

A

irreducible eg qualia – pain, redness, taste of coffee

104
Q

what does causally effect mean

A

if A causally affects B, then A changes B in some way or brings B about

105
Q

difference between conceptual and empirical problem of interaction

A

1. empirical = causal completeness of physics, mental states are unnecessary
2. conceptual = how can mental probs cause physical effecst

106
Q

what does failure of interactionalist PD lead to

A

epiphemoalist PD

107
Q

what is epiphenomalism

A

mental props are effects of physical events but not causes of physical OR mental evenst

108
Q

what are the 3 problems facing epiphenomalism

A
  1. the challenge from the phrenology of our mental lives
  2. the challenge from natural selection
  3. the challenge from introspective self-knowledge
109
Q

explain epiphenomalist PD and how it differs from interactionist PD

A

epiphenomalist PD claims mental props are effects of physical events but not causes of physical OR mental evenst
whereas interactionist PD says distinct mental props. causally affect both other mental states and physical states SO the mental has causal power

110
Q

one reason to believe mental states are epiphenomenal

A

if epiphenomenalism is true, then we don’t need to explain how mental properties have physical effects

111
Q

the challenge from the phrenology of our mental lives

problem facing epiphenomalism

A
  • epiphenomalism is counter-intuitive
  • its part of our experience of having mental states that our mental states, [E.G feeling pain], cause other mental and physicals states and events
  • mental states can cause our behaviour, such as wincing, and they can be part of a causal mental process
112
Q

the challenge from natural selection

problem facing epiphenomalism

A
  • according to Darwin’s theory of evolution, millions of genetic alterations randomly take place, most disappear without a trace
  • but some that coincidentally help a creature to survive and reproduce slowly spread – the creature and its descendants reproduce more than others without those traits, so more and more creatures end up with them
  • so according to theory of evolution, the traits that evolve over time are ones that causally contribute to the survival of the creature
  • we can assume that mental properties, including qualia evolved. but how, if they make no difference to what creatures do and so whether they survive and reproduce ?
113
Q

the challenge from introspective self-knowledge

problem facing epiphenomalism

A
  • how do I know that i am in pain when i am?
  • the obvious answer is that my belief that i am in pain is caused by my pain itself
  • but if epiphenomalism is true, pain doesn’t cause anything, even my belief that i am in pain
  • if my thoughts/feelings don’t cause my beliefs about my mind, then i could have those beliefs whatever my mental states, just as long as the cause of my beliefs operate in the same way
  • so i could believe i am in pain when im not in pain
  • so my beliefs about my mind are unjustified and unreliable.
  • so i cant know my own mind
114
Q

the problem of other minds regarding PD

A
  • if phenomenal properties of consciousness are distinct from physical and functional properties, how can we know from how other people behave and how they are physically constituted, whether they have any consciousness at all?
    *** if phenomenal properties of consciousness are distinct from physical and functional properties, how do we know that other people aren’t zombies?
115
Q

what are the two PD responses to the prob of other minds

A
  1. arg from analogy
  2. best hypothesis
116
Q

arg from analogy

PD responses to the prob of other minds

A
  1. i have a mind
  2. i know from experince that my mental states cause my behaviour
  3. other people have bodies similair to mine and behave similairly
  4. by analogy their behaviour is caused by the same thing as mine, mental states
  5. therefore other people have minds
117
Q

best hypothesis

PD responses to the prob of other minds

A
  • an interactionst PD claims that consciousness causes behaviour and other physical effecst
  • such causal relations dont provide a complete analysis of what phenomenal properties are but consciousness does have effects
  • best explantion for why people behave the way they do is that people are conscious
118
Q

category error

probs for PD

A
  • PD claims taht mental properties/at least phenomenal properties of consciousness are part of the same metaphysical framework as physical and functional properties, only not physical
    1. Ryle says the concept of phenomenal properties misunderstands our talk of sensations, feelings, images and so on. – they aren’t each a ‘something’ that has peculair properties of ‘what it is like’
    2. to say ‘what it is like’ to see red is simply to describe what we see when attending to the colour of a red object
    3. the redness we experince is the redness of the rose, not a property of our experince of it
    4.we can express the difference between what experinces ‘are like’ in terms of what the experince ‘is of’ [red roses look different from yellow roses], so e.g we enjoy one and find another boring
    5.
119
Q

which PD response to the prob of other minds is the best and why

A

best hypothesis is the best because arg from analogy faces problme of – i may be a special case,m perhaps i am the only being that is conscious, while everyone else has no qualia

120
Q

how to reply ti category error applied to property dualims

A

zombie arg

philosophy paper 2 (11 decks)

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