PHYSICALISM arguments + responses Flashcards
1
Q
Behaviourism issues summary:
A
- Applied dualist arguments
- Hilary Putnams ‘Super Spartans’
- Circularity
- Multiple Realisability
- Asymmetry
2
Q
Folk psychology issues summary
A
- explanatory failures
- Stagnant and unproductive
- Not coherent with other scientific knowledge
3
Q
Eliminative materialism issues summary:
A
- Counter intuitive
- Folk psychology has good explanatory and predictive power
- Eliminative Materialism is self-refuting
4
Q
Functionalism issues summary:
A
- Inverted Qualia
- The China Brain
- The Knowledge argument
5
Q
Machine State functionalism issues summary:
A
- Searle’s Chinese room
2. ^ Syntax not semantics
6
Q
BEHAVIOURISM
PROBLEM: Philosophical zombies + Mary’s room
A
ISSUE FOR PHYSICALISM
ZOMBIES: The mind cannot be entirely physical / down to behaviour if its metaphysically possible for the body and mind to be different things
MARY’s ROOM: The mind cannot be entirely physical / down to behaviour is Mary gains new knowledge when experiencing red for the first time.
7
Q
BEHAVIOURISM
PROBLEM: PUTNAM super spartans
A
- Imagine a community of ‘super-spartans’
- People who disapprove greatly of showing pain = all pain behaviour has been suppressed
- Yet they could still be in pain. Pain is conceivable without any associated pain behaviour.
- So pain can’t be understood just in terms of pain behaviour.
8
Q
BEHAVIOURISM -
RYLE RESPONSE to: super spartans
A
RYLE can solve this issue by arguing Soft behaviourism fixes this as they still have a disposition to pain behaviour they just don’t display it
9
Q
BEHAVIOURISM -
PUTNAM RESPONSE to RYEL: super super spartans
A
Super super spartans: are so used to suppressing pain related behaviour that they do not even say they’re in pain or have dispositions to do so.
10
Q
BEHAVIOURISM -
POSSIBLE RESPONSE to: super super spartans
A
- Impossible to recognise the concept of pain, without the concept of pain.
- SO, it would be Impossible to distinguish which behaviour they were supposed to be suppressing in the first place, UNLESS they did have the behavioural disposition to pain.
11
Q
BEHAVIOURISM
PROBLEM: Circularity
A
- When you ask why someone is behaving a certain way you would refer back to mental states - that which you are saying you can replace by behaviours.
- E.G. fear = run away from the snake. But to explain why you re running away you would say ‘because I believe the snake will attack me’ Thus referring back to mental states.
12
Q
BEHAVIOURISM
PROBLEM: Multiple realisability
A
- Multiple different mental states displayed in one way: crying behaviour could mean you’re happy, excited, overwhelmed, sad etc.
- One mental state displayed in different ways: Grief can be shown through angry (screaming), sad (crying), numb (lack of behaviour) behaviours
- Some could be experiencing one mental state and only display one through behaviour: e.g. they are thirsty, but believe the drinks poisoned and so only show the behaviour of avoidance (we wouldn’t see through this that they were thirsty)
13
Q
BEHAVIOURISM
PROBLEM: Asymmetry
A
- If behaviourism was true it would follow that it would be easier to understand other peoples mental status than our own
- This is because its easier to observe other peoples behaviour than our own
- Yet it seems we understand our mental states the most = there’s an asymmetry here
14
Q
BEHAVIOURISM -
RYLE RESPONSE to: Asymmetry
A
- What about when we are “thinking quietly to ourselves” - Internalised speaking?
- Ryle argues this is a behaviour
15
Q
BEHAVIOURISM -
RESPONSE TO RYLE’s: thinking quietly
A
- This isn’t always shown through behaviours like internal monologues.
- This can be done in other ways that aren’t behavioural like visualisation, feelings, sensations?
16
Q
FOLK PSYCHOLOGY
PROBLEM: Explanatory failures
A
- Folk psychology fails to provide any explanations for many mind processes
- For example, folk psychology can’t explain mental illness, sleep or learning.
17
Q
FOLK PSYCHOLOGY - explanatory failures
RESPONSE Folk-psychology has good predictive and explanatory power
A
- Folk psychology does explain and make fairly accurate predictions about how people behave,
- E.G. When he feels nervous he talks really fast
- In contrast, neuroscience is pretty bad at predicting behaviour – at least at present.
- Brain = highly complex making it incredibly difficult for neuroscience to model and predict even the simple behaviours
- Unlikely even the best neuroscientists with the most advanced equipment, could more accurately predict a typical human’s behaviour than folk psychology.
- Therefore folk psychology is the best hypothesis
18
Q
FOLK PSYCHOLOGY
PROBLEM: Stagnant and unproductive
A
- There has been no progress made in Folk psychology since ancient Greek times
- Folk psychology is still the same as it was thousands of years ago.
19
Q
FOLK PSYCHOLOGY - stagnant and unproductive
CRANE’s RESPONSE
A
- The reason that Folk Psychology seems stagnant is because it is a fine theory of the mind and how it works.
- Evidence has not come along to refute it so it has not needed to change.
20
Q
FOLK PSYCHOLOGY - stagnant and unproductive
KIM STERENLY’s RESPONSE
A
- We now commonly discuss why people do things in terms of subconscious desires (FP term for this is freudian slips).
- We can also see how subconscious desires occur in neuronal activity.
- Therefore, FP is in line with new scientific theories such as neuroscience.
21
Q
FOLK PSYCHOLOGY
PROBLEM: Not Coherent with other scientific theories
A
- Other disciplines support each other (biology, chemistry, physics) FP is isolated
22
Q
FOLK PSYCHOLOGY - Not Coherent with other scientific theories
RESPONSE CRANE:
A
- Why should the mind be reduced to the same physics as neuroscience, biology etc?
- Though our actions can be explained through causes in neurobiology, we do not need to remove our original terms
23
Q
FOLK PSYCHOLOGY
RESPONSE to CRANE: why should we remove our original terms
A
- This misunderstands eliminative materialism.
- Churchland is not denying the existence of the mental phenomena we refer to as ‘beliefs’, ‘pain’, ‘thought’, etc.,
- He’s just saying this folk psychology isn’t the technically correct theory as to their nature.
24
Q
ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM
PROBLEM: Counter intuitive
A
- Intuitive certainty of the existence of my mind should takes priority over other considerations.
- It is counter-intuitive to say that mental states don’t exist – they are the most obvious thing in the world to us.
- Think about Descartes; the minds existence was the most definite thing to him (cogito)
25
ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM
| PROBLEM: Self refuting
- Eliminative materialism claims that beliefs don’t exist, only a mistaken folk psychology concept.
- But, in arguing for eliminative materialism, Churchland is expressing his belief in the truth of this theory: Churchland has proved that beliefs exist.
26
ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM - Self refuting
| RESPONSE: fallacy of begging the question
- This commits the fallacy of begging the question
- It assumes the very thing it’s trying to prove: that beliefs exist.
- Churchland could just reply that what his opponent is calling a belief is actually something else (some neuroscience explanation).
27
ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM
| RESPONSE to: fallacy of begging the question
- To even be able to talk about eliminative materialism requires intentionality, which is a folk psychology concept.
- To even make sense of statements like “eliminative materialism is true” or “folk psychology is false” we must presuppose intentionality (understanding what these statements are about).
- It’s not clear how neuroscience could ever offer an alternative account of intentionality, and so folk psychology cannot ever be fully eliminated.
28
FUNCTIONALISM
| PROBLEM: Inverted Qualia
- What if my experience of green was like your experience of blue and vice versa?
- My qualia when I look at the sea could be similar to your qualia when you look at grass.
- The two mental states are functionally the same, but phenomenally different.
- Since our mental states are functionally identical, functionalism must say they are the same mental state. But they’re clearly not the same. My qualia are different from yours.
29
FUNCTIONALISM
| PROBLEM: NED BLOCK - China Brain (Mind)
- The population of China is roughly equal to the number of neurons in a brain
- If each member of the Chinese nation were asked to simulate the action of one neuron in the brain, using telephones or walkie-talkies to simulate the axons and dendrites that connect neurons.
- So, the input leads to exactly the same output, & everything in between is functionally identical
- Would this arrangement have a mind or consciousness in the same way that brains do?
- According to functionalism, the China brain would actually be in pain, with the right inputs.
- This is obviously false
- Just because the example of the China brain is functionally identical to human pain, doesn’t mean the China brain really is in pain.
- So functionalism is false. There’s clearly more to mental states than their function.
30
FUNCTIONALISM
| RESPONSE TO: China Brain
Only feels unnatural as its a concept were not used to
- A neurone is responsible for receiving sensory input from the external world, transforming and relaying electrical signals. and thus sending motor commands to our muscles.
- All these forms of functions could be achieved through the China Mind.
31
FUNCTIONALISM
| RESPONSE TO: Only feels unnatural as its a concept were not used to
- Average speed of a neurone is 50m/s within a 15cm long brain. Radio waves travel at 300,000,000m/s and china is approximately 3,400miles wide.
- Meaning per second a neurone could pass by the brain approximately 333 times and a radio wave could pass by china about 88235 times.
- The speed of communication isn’t even comparable.
32
FUNCTIONALISM
| RESPONSE TO: Only feels unnatural as its a concept were not used to + response to that
Brians are all unique
What about people with processing issues? Neurological makeups can vary and therefore we cannot conclusively say it isn’t the same. There is significant variation from brain to brain.
RESPONSE: Exactly - CM could never replicate that complexity. It would have one speed and one way of functioning, it couldn't accurately replicate the significant variation between people. Thus we cannot ascribe it a mind and so functionalism definition is too liberal
33
SUPPORT FOR MACHINE STATE FUNCTIONALISM
| Turing test
- If functionalism is how we define mental states then two systems performing the same function have to have the same mental state. - If not, then you’re not abiding by functionalism.
- Alan Turing asks us to imagine there’s a screen between person C (the interrogator) and person A (a computer) and B (a human)
- Person C then asks A and B purely written questions
- Based off of these answers person C must decide which one of them is the computer
- If the interrogator cannot tell the difference between the human and the machine then you have to attribute mind to both or neither, as there’s no functional differences.
34
MACHINE STATE - Turing test
| PROBLEM: Searle's Chinese room
- Imagine a person in a room with a basket of Chinese symbols + a manual on how to use them
- Someone outside the room passes Chinese symbols into the room
- The person inside then takes them and matches them to symbols in the manual. And then responds with the correct symbols
- Unbeknownst to them, these are questions and they actually put answers out.
- If you’re a Chinese speaker on the outside, you’d assume the person knows Chinese as you’re asking questions and getting answers.
THE PROBLEM HERE IS:
- Far too general in what it considers to be a ‘mind’ or have the ability to experience mental states.
- It ignores the clear distinctions between humans and computers; the process of “understanding/knowing” and “consciousness” is a vital part of our human minds.
35
MACHINE STATE - Searle's Chinese room
| RESPONSE:
- The system as a whole understands
| - The room with all its constituents, including the person understands Chinese.
36
MACHINE STATE - system as whole understands
| RESPONSE:
Syntax not semantics
- its simulating understanding, not genuine understanding
Its syntax but not semantics
- Searle argues the fundamental idea of machine state functionalism that hardware isn’t important, IS WRONG as consciousness is a feature of biological systems and you only get consciousness in biological systems
- We simulate consciousness with AI, they don’t have it. It will never duplicate it.
