DUALISM arguments + responses Flashcards
PROBLEM WITH PHILOSOPHICAL ZOMBIES:
A ‘philosophical zombie world is not conceivable.
DANIEL DENNET
- We cannot conceive of a fully functioning body without health - consciousness is the same
- Zombies seem conceivable because we talking about qualia as if they’re non-physical
- Once we understand that qualia = a physical thing, it becomes inconceivable for two physically identical beings not to have identical qualia
RESPONSE TO: A ‘philosophical zombie world is not conceivable.
Chalmers claims he can conceive of them and that anyone who can’t is simply “not thinking hard enough”.
PROBLEM WITH PHILOSOPHICAL ZOMBIES:
What is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible
- Conceivable that water could be something other than H2O (e.g. H30)
- This is because “water is H3O” is not obviously contradictory (contradictory ex. “a triangle has 4-sides”)
- “Water is H2O” is not an analytic truth, we can imagine water without imagining the chemical structure (analytic truth ex. = “a triangle has 3 sides” can’t conceive a triangle without 3 sides)
- Therefore Water is H30 is conceivable as its not obviously contradictory or an analytic truth
KRIPKE: however, that doesn’t make it possible
- His definition of identity relations: if A and B are the same thing, then there’s no possible world in which they are different.
- SO whilst, we could conceive of a world where water could be H30, this substance isn’t possible as wouldn’t be water it would be something else.
- H20 = inseparable part of what water is.
- Water = H20 in all possible universes.
PROBLEM WITH PHILOSOPHICAL ZOMBIES:
What is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world
- Cannot move from a priori reasoning to empirical facts
- Property dualism could be true in a different possible world, but physicalism is true in reality.
- The zombie argument only shows that property dualism is possible; it doesn’t show that property dualism is true
- EG. CLARK KENT EX. Its metaphysically possible that Clark Kent and Superman aren’t the same person, however this isn’t the case in reality.
PROBLEM WITH MARY’s ROOM (KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT):
CHURCHLAND: The ‘acquaintance knowledge’ response
- The knowledge she had before is ‘knowledge by description’ not ‘Knowledge by acquaintance’
- Therefore its acquaintance knowledge she gains when leaving the room.
- Acquainted with red in a new way (via direct experience)
- She does know all physical facts (propositional) she just learns a new way of knowing them
PROBLEM WITH MARY’s ROOM (KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT):
CHURCHLAND: The ‘ability knowledge’ response
- She doesn’t ‘learn that’ qualia exists: she could know this already.
- She instead ‘learned how’ to experience qualia.
- She therefore doesn’t gain any new propositional knowledge, just ability knowledge.
- e.g. she could know all the physical facts of riding a bike (proportional) but have never actually ridden one and therefore wouldn’t yet have ability knowledge.
RESPONSE TO: The ‘ability knowledge’ response
- Jackson agrees BUT argues that new propositional knowledge ALSO comes with this new ability.
- When she learns how to experience red (ability knowledge) she also learns propositional knowledge of what that experience is like in others that she didn’t know before.
PROBLEM WITH MARY’s ROOM (KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT):
CHURCHLAND: The ‘New Knowledge/old fact’ response
- this is the argument that there is more than one way of knowing the same physical fact.
- For example, you can know what water is and you can know what H20 is. These are different things
- However, in the real world, when pointing at a glass with liquid in it. They are the same thing. It’s the same fact.
- In the same way Mary could know all the physical facts, and then experience this fact, subjectively they may feel different however in reality its knowledge of the same thing, red
- A physical fact
PROBLEM FOR EPIPHENOMENALISM:
DARWIN: Natural selection/evolution
- Darwins theory of evolution by natural sections
- If mental states, really have no impact on what creatures do and so whether they survive and reproduce. How did they evolve?
RESPONSE to: Natural selection/evolution
- Frank Jackson: There are lots of traits that have evolved that don’t contribute to survival or reproduction, but are by-products of traits that do contribute.
- E.G. Polar bears have thick warm coats (to survive) but by consequence these are also heavy, despite that particular property not contributing to their survival.
