Dualism content Flashcards
Property dualism
Mental properties emerge from physical states but that are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon physical properties.
Property dualists believe a complete description of the physical universe would not…
- be a complete description of the entire universe.
- It would miss out qualia.
What are qualia + example
Intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal properties that are our private conscious experiences of sensation and perception. These are introspectively accessible
e.g. when I see red, I not only register a colour but there is a way that colour seems to me. It invokes a certain subjective feel that I experience when seeing it.
Phenomenal properties
subjective sensory experience
Commonly known as qualia:
Intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal properties that are our private conscious experiences of sensation and perception. These are introspectively accessible
Intentional properties
Beliefs and desires:
- Properties of mental states that are directed towards things in the world (‘of’ or ‘about’ objects).
- These beliefs and desires are not in the object, they are in my mind.
2 Arguments for Qualia
Mary's room (Jackson) Hard Problem (Chalmers)
Supervenience
A relation between properties at different levels in which there can be no change in a higher-level property without a corresponding change in a lower-level property
Qualia’s relationship with supervenience
Qualia are neither physical nor supervene on the physical.
> These are the (at least some type of mental properties) in the definition of PD.
Property dualism denies Leibniz law arguing
- It’s possible for two physically identical things to be different in some way.
- Therefore, It’s possible that two physically identical things could have different mental properties - different qualia.
Epiphenomenalism + example
Mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but mental states have no effects upon any physical events e.g. property dualism.
- Physical -> mental: Getting hit in the head causes the mental state of pain
- But qualia (mental states) themselves don’t cause anything in the physical
What are philosophical zombies + ex?
Someone physically and functionally identical to an ordinary human - except they don’t have any qualia / conscious experience.
E.g. A normal person and a PZ would both say ‘ow!’ and bleed, their brain would even send the same signals when stabbed but PZ would have no mental state of pain.
Who came up with the philosophical zombies argument?
David Chalmers
The Philosophical Zombies argument
- We can conceive of a a possible world that is physically identical to this one, with the same people, but without qualia (PZ)
- In this world, you would behave and act in exactly the same way as in the actual world except you’d have no phenomenal experience. (Intuition)
- If we can conceive of this world, then it’s metaphysically possible.
- If its metaphysically possible then qualia must be non-physical.
- Therefore property dualism is true.
Who came up with the knowledge argument?
Frank Jackson
The Knowledge argument
- Mary knows all the physical facts about colour
- However, when she leaves the room she gains a new experience as she didn’t know what it feels (phenomenal property) like to see colour
- Therefore, what it feels like to see colour (qualia) is not a physical fact
- Physicalism says that all facts are physical facts
- Therefore, physicalism is false
