Philosophy of Mind Practice Questions Flashcards

1
Q

Do the problems with substance dualism (non-reductive) outweigh the reasons for accepting it?

A

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2
Q

Do the problems with logical behaviorism (analytically (and ontologically) reductive) outweigh the reasons for accepting it?

A

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3
Q

Do the problems with identity theory (ontologically reductive but not analytically reductive) outweigh the reasons for accepting it?

A

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4
Q

Do the problems with machine functionalism (mental states are reducible to a causal role) outweigh the reasons for accepting it?

A

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5
Q

Do the problems with eliminative materialism (“there’s nothing to reduce”) outweigh the reasons for accepting it?

A

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6
Q

Does the existence of consciousness (mental states with qualia and intentionality) disprove reductive materialist/physicalist theories (i.e. is it irreducible (ontologically))?

A

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7
Q

Are zombies possible? What are the implications of the answer?

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8
Q

Does the ‘knowledge/Mary argument’ disprove reductive materialist/physicalist theories?

A

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9
Q

Could artificial intelligence/computers/robots be truly intelligent (where this will depend on what is meant by intelligent)?

A

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10
Q

Is non-reductive materialism (biological naturalism - consciousness is supervenient upon the brain) a consistent theory? Is it just reductive materialist or non-reductive dualist (and so suffers from their respective problems)?

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11
Q

Can any non-reductive theory successfully explain mental causation (substance or property versions of interactionist / epiphenomenalist / overdeterminist dualism)?

A

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12
Q

Can all forms of materialism successfully explain mental causation (specifically do behaviourism and eliminative materialism give a satisfactory explanation)?

A

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13
Q

If dualism is true, can we be sure that others have minds (and if so that they have minds like our own)?

A

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14
Q

If materialism is true can we be sure that others have minds (and if so that they have minds like our own)?

A

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15
Q

Overall: do you think that the reasons to place the mind as part of the physical world (e.g. interaction issues) outweigh the reasons for saying it is non-physical (i.e. the alleged differences between the mind and the physical - the indivisible/zombie/Mary/qualia/intentionality issues)?

A

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