Functionalist Theories Flashcards
What does it mean to say that functionalism reduces mental states to a causal role?
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How is functionalism different to and better than the analytic reduction of behaviourism?
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How is functionalism different to and better than the ontological reduction of identity theory?
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What is machine functionalism?
Functionalism is less chauvinistic and not so anthropocentric. This means that Functionalism talks about other entities processing minds and not just brains. It doesn’t just focus on human beings like identity theory does. This is called machine functionalism. This view states that the human mind is similar to a machine as it is functional and it acts as a mediator between inputs and outputs. Machines are able to implement complex processes as a result; The human body is also complex and varied. This argument suggests that it is conceivable that machines have minds. Therefore Functionalism supports the entities other than humans have minds.
What is the inverted qualia argument?
An argument against functionalism is the inverted qualia objection. Say for example, that two people are looking at a flower. Both people see the flower as what they call ‘red’ but whilst person A knows the word ‘red’ as a reference to the colour of a tomato, Person B knows ‘red’ as a reference to the colour of grass. Person B’s qualia is therefore inverted compared to the qualia of person A. Functionally, therefore, both people receive the same inputs and their minds are functionally indistinguishable, whereas their qualia of each of their subjective experiences is different. Thus, this demonstrates that two people can be functionally isomorphic (corresponding or similar in form and relations, yet differ in their mental states. It also demonstrates, therefore, that functionalism is unable to characterise mental states in terms of the causal relationship to inputs, other states and behaviour.
What is the chinese mind argument?
The Chinese Brain argument uses an analogy whereas the population of China is modelled as neurons within a brain, each with two way radios which models the synapses etc between them. A single ‘command centre’ as such is above the geographical land and is visible to all. This gives inputs to a single person which then is transferred between people before it is an output, going out to the command centre above. Supposing functionalism to be true then entails that this system therefore has a mind, since it has an input and output and follows the definition of a mind given by functionalists. This seems inaccurate as a nation cannot feel pain as I would if I had grazed my knee.
What is Searle’s chinese room argument?
.Another analogy which argues against the possibility that computers could have minds or artificial intelligence is the Chinese Room argument by John Searle. Searle asks you to imagine that a monolingual english speaker is put in a room with chinese writing, chinese script and rules in English on how to respond. The person in the room must respond to the questions in chinese writing with other chinese symbols. The person becomes so skilled at this that no-one can tell that they don’t speak a word of english and thus this person begins to behave like a computer. Searle states “I have inputs and outputs that are indistinguishable from those of the native Chinese speaker, and I can have any formal program you like, but I still understand nothing.” Therefore, no matter how how intelligent a computer seems or behaves and no matter what programming makes it that way, since the symbols it processes are meaningless to it, it’s not really intelligent. It is not actually thinking so it does not really have intentional mental states. Searle argues that artificial intelligence is merely a simulation of intelligence and intentionality is not reducible to functions.
What is Putnam’s twin Earth scenario?
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Is machine functionalism too liberal: should we adopt teleological functionalism?
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Can robots/computers have minds?
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What is the absent qualia objection?
An argument against this aspect of functionalism is the Absent qualia objection. This is similar to David Chalmers Zombie argument against behaviorism. If we can imagine a zombie that is absent of a mind, but yet still responds to inputs with an output. For example, seeing a human or life form and then proceeding to follow it slowly saying ‘brains’. If this is imaginable it follows that it is logically possible somewhere within the universe. If this is possible then this disproves functionalism as a theory as the mind cannot be the function between the input and output, since zombies do not have a mind/mental states yet still proceed to give outputs from an input.
What could be a response to the chinese room argument?
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What could be a response to the chinese mind argument?
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What could be a response to the inverted qualia argument?
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What could be a response to the absent qualia objection?
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