Biological Naturalism Flashcards
What is biological naturalism?
Biological Naturalism is the theory of mind created by John Searle. There are four parts to this theory, these are Non-reductive, materialist, interactionist and supervenience.
How is biological naturalism a non-reductive view of the mind/consciousness?
The mind cannot be reduced to some more basic phenomenon. The mind cannot be reduced in the same way that a sunset or a rainbow can be reduced.
Consciousness cannot be reduced to a more fundamental neurobiological process because consciousness has a subjective or first person ontology. Searle claims that the neurobiological causal basis of consciousness has an objective or third person ontology - it is a lower level physical feature and thus, as consciousness has a first person ontology and is a higher level physical feature which supervenes lower level physical features, it cannot possibly be a third person ontology and therefore, it cannot be reduced to this.
How is biological naturalism a materialist view of the mind/consciousness?
The mind is located in the brain and in one sense can be described in physical qualities.
Simultaneous causation is caused by lower level brain processes and can be continuous throughout time. Much like gravity is not a single process of which the outcome is the downward pressure towards the earth. It cannot be explained simply by stating the behaviour of molecules/particles, since there are current events that must happen before the outcome is reached - such as the need of a significant mass to create the gravity, thus they are simultaneous. In the same way, there is not a specific way the neurons in a brain must behave that creates, at a later time, consciousness. Instead, conscious states happen simultaneously whilst neurons are firing at synapses.
How is biological naturalism an interactionist view of mind/consciousness?
Mental states cause more than just other mental states. For example, when thirsty this causes a desire for water for hydration, but this desire also causes physiological events. Searle gives an example of someone saying “secrete acetylcholine at the axon end plates of your motor-neurons or I will blow your brains out!”. In this case he shall do some ‘downward’ causation, where his higher order mental state causes a lower order physiological event of raising his arm.
How is biological naturalism a supervenience theory of the mind/consciousness?
The mental properties supervene on the physical properties. In other words, there can be no change in an object’s mental properties without a change in it’s physical properties, so the mental properties are determined by the physical properties. However, this is not to say that the physical properties are causal of the mental properties. Searle claims that consciousness is a higher level/emergent feature of the brain and so the lower level features result in the higher level properties of the mind.
Painting Analogy –> Therefore, aesthetic properties of the painting supervene on the physical properties of the painting. This is, according to Searle, how consciousness works.
Problem 1: Is Searle just a property dualist?
According to what Searle has claimed so far - that everything that exists in physical space is in principle accessible to third-person observation and thus exists in physical space - means that Searle’s claim that the mind has a first - person ontology and is subjective, means that it cannot exist in physical space. If Searle is a property dualist then he faces the problem of causation. Since Searle denies epiphenomenalism this means that he could be accused of being either an over determinist, or of having the same issues that interactionist property dualism has.
Problem 2: Is Searle just an identity theorist?
Searle could just say that ‘consciousness just is neurobiological processes’ in the same way as he might say that ‘solidity just is molecular properties’. This sounds like identity theory and he rejects the idea that consciousness can be reduced in this way.
Problem 3: Is Searle in an incoherent posistion if he isn’t a property dualist or an identity theorist?
Searle has no advance on either materialism or dualism.
You can’t actually decide whether this is really the reductionism or materialism to which Searle says he is profoundly opposed or really the property-dualism to which he says he is also profoundly opposed or something merely inchoate.
How could Searle respond to the problems posed?
There is a mistake conception that mental and physical properties are completely separate and set things. This is the traditional view.
Mental: assumption that it is not spatially located, not extended in space, not explainable by physical processes and incapable of acting causally on the physical. The facts that the mental are subjective, have first person ontology, are qualitative and intentional does not prevent it from being an ordinary part of the physical world with spatial locations and extensions and cause and effect relations, just like anything else.
What is Searle’s analogy and explanation of causality?
When you decide to raise your arm you can tell the story at the level of the intention and the bodily movement but you could also tell the story at the micro level, the level of neuron firings in the motor cortex and the secretion of acetyl-choline at the axon end plates of the motor neurons. These are not two independent stories, but descriptions at different levels of one continuous causal system.
What is Searle’s summary of his ‘common sense’ view?
My desire to drink beer is real, subjective and has a first person ontology, qualitative and is intentional as it is at or about beer drinking. It occurs as part of my total conscious field at the moment.
It is entirely caused by brain processes and is located in the brain.and functions causally by motivating me to act on that desire
