phil test Flashcards
the problem of qualitative content
fails to account for subjective experience
inverted spectrum scenario
2 people who describe an object with the same name but perceive it completely differently
Margaret Boden
- Searles intuitions are unreliable and his analogies are misleading
- ignorance
The systems reply
even if Searle doesn’t understand Chinese, the system as a whole does
Searles response to the system reply
if Searle internalizes the system he would still not understand Chinese and therefore neither would the system
the robot reply
give a computer program sensory inputs and behavioural outputs like a robot, then it would have understanding
Searle’s response to the robot reply
even if we still do this we don’t have understanding
the brain simulator reply
the program simulates the actual neuronal activity of the brain of a chinese speaker
searles response the the brain simulator reply
lacks the causal powers of the neurobiological brain
Fred the super colour sensor
no amount of physical information will allow us to know what Fred’s experiece is like when he sees the extra colour red
Mary the neuroscientist
knows all the physical facts about seeing colour
doesn’t know everything about colour
epiphenomenal qualia
the view that qualia do not causally influence the physical world
reason 1 for resisting epiphenomenal
the hurtfulness of pain seems like the obvious cause of subsequent pain behaviours
Jackson’s reply to reason 1
both hurtfulness of pain and behaviours may have an underlying common cause
reason 2 for resisting eq
it’s reasonable to assume that we evolved to have qualia. but if so then it should be conductive to our survival. bt if they are epiphenomenal then they are not.
Jacksons reply to reason 2
qualia may simply be by-products of brain processes that are themselves conductive to survival
reason 3 for resisting eq
the best reason we have for believing other people have qualia stems from behaviour but if other peoples behaviour can only provide reason to believe they have qualia if it is the causal effect of those qualia
Jackson’s reply to reason 3
behaviour can also provide reason to believe in qualia because it is the causal effect of brain events which qualia are the causal effect of as well
the ability reply
knowledge that vs. knowledge how
dennett’s blue banana
they trick mary but she she knows
- intuition is unreliable
Thomas nagel bat
we can’t know what it is like to be a bat
- subjective point of view
Chalmers
easy and hard problems of consciousness
easy problems
those that can be solved in appeal to neural and computational mechanisms using standard methods of cognitive science
hard problems
not about functions or abilities
global workspace theory
the principle function of consciousness is to make information that is needed for complex tasks widely available
recurrent processing theory
conscious visual experience occurs when information processed in higher visual areas reenters lower visual areas in the V1
the principle of structural coherence
the structure of consciousness is mirrored by the structure of awareness and vice versa
the principle of organizational invariance
two systems with the same functional organization will have identical subjective conscious experience
Churchland
cognitive failing
- begs the question
- hornswoggle problem
- left out hypothesis
attention and consciousness
- hemispatial neglect
- inattentional blindness
substitution principle
if s knows fact p, and fact p is fact q then s knows fact q
the phenomenal concept strategy
facts about conscious experience can be known in different ways
2 replies to the phenomenal concept strategy
- the notion of a phenomenal concept is a mystery ( it is possible to wrongly categorize something)
- failing to see that 2 concepts are the same thing is ignorance of some additional fact
