phil test Flashcards

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1
Q

the problem of qualitative content

A

fails to account for subjective experience

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2
Q

inverted spectrum scenario

A

2 people who describe an object with the same name but perceive it completely differently

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3
Q

Margaret Boden

A
  • Searles intuitions are unreliable and his analogies are misleading
  • ignorance
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4
Q

The systems reply

A

even if Searle doesn’t understand Chinese, the system as a whole does

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5
Q

Searles response to the system reply

A

if Searle internalizes the system he would still not understand Chinese and therefore neither would the system

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6
Q

the robot reply

A

give a computer program sensory inputs and behavioural outputs like a robot, then it would have understanding

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7
Q

Searle’s response to the robot reply

A

even if we still do this we don’t have understanding

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8
Q

the brain simulator reply

A

the program simulates the actual neuronal activity of the brain of a chinese speaker

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9
Q

searles response the the brain simulator reply

A

lacks the causal powers of the neurobiological brain

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10
Q

Fred the super colour sensor

A

no amount of physical information will allow us to know what Fred’s experiece is like when he sees the extra colour red

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11
Q

Mary the neuroscientist

A

knows all the physical facts about seeing colour
doesn’t know everything about colour

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12
Q

epiphenomenal qualia

A

the view that qualia do not causally influence the physical world

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13
Q

reason 1 for resisting epiphenomenal

A

the hurtfulness of pain seems like the obvious cause of subsequent pain behaviours

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14
Q

Jackson’s reply to reason 1

A

both hurtfulness of pain and behaviours may have an underlying common cause

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15
Q

reason 2 for resisting eq

A

it’s reasonable to assume that we evolved to have qualia. but if so then it should be conductive to our survival. bt if they are epiphenomenal then they are not.

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16
Q

Jacksons reply to reason 2

A

qualia may simply be by-products of brain processes that are themselves conductive to survival

17
Q

reason 3 for resisting eq

A

the best reason we have for believing other people have qualia stems from behaviour but if other peoples behaviour can only provide reason to believe they have qualia if it is the causal effect of those qualia

18
Q

Jackson’s reply to reason 3

A

behaviour can also provide reason to believe in qualia because it is the causal effect of brain events which qualia are the causal effect of as well

19
Q

the ability reply

A

knowledge that vs. knowledge how

20
Q

dennett’s blue banana

A

they trick mary but she she knows
- intuition is unreliable

21
Q

Thomas nagel bat

A

we can’t know what it is like to be a bat
- subjective point of view

22
Q

Chalmers

A

easy and hard problems of consciousness

23
Q

easy problems

A

those that can be solved in appeal to neural and computational mechanisms using standard methods of cognitive science

24
Q

hard problems

A

not about functions or abilities

25
Q

global workspace theory

A

the principle function of consciousness is to make information that is needed for complex tasks widely available

26
Q

recurrent processing theory

A

conscious visual experience occurs when information processed in higher visual areas reenters lower visual areas in the V1

27
Q

the principle of structural coherence

A

the structure of consciousness is mirrored by the structure of awareness and vice versa

28
Q

the principle of organizational invariance

A

two systems with the same functional organization will have identical subjective conscious experience

29
Q

Churchland

A

cognitive failing
- begs the question
- hornswoggle problem
- left out hypothesis

30
Q

attention and consciousness

A
  • hemispatial neglect
  • inattentional blindness
31
Q

substitution principle

A

if s knows fact p, and fact p is fact q then s knows fact q

32
Q

the phenomenal concept strategy

A

facts about conscious experience can be known in different ways

33
Q

2 replies to the phenomenal concept strategy

A
  • the notion of a phenomenal concept is a mystery ( it is possible to wrongly categorize something)
  • failing to see that 2 concepts are the same thing is ignorance of some additional fact