Parfit Flashcards
C1) What is the transportation case
Imagine a “teleporter” destroyers your brain and body and replicates your exact cells, transmits it to mars and creates an exact you out of new mater. It has the same thoughts and memories as you. Is it you?
C1) What is the branchline case
If we complicate this, where the teleporter malfunctions, and creates an exact replica of you but you survive. It is psychologically continuous with you, and you can then interact with yourself on mars. You are no longer travelling along the main line and wake up as your replica on mars, but remain on earth on the branch line, where there are two of you.
C1) What is it to be a person
“to be a person, a being must be self-conscious, aware of its identity and its continued existence”
C1) What is the physical criterion
• What is necessary is not the whole body, but just enough of the brain (our cells are always changing, our mind is what is needed). X is one and the same as Y only if:
1. Enough of Y’s brain continued to exist and is now X’s brain
2. This continuity is not branching form
3. Personal identity depends on these two facts
This rejects teletransportation cases – all matter destroyed
C1) What is the psychological criteria
• Locke’s view on memory is rejected – states memory is what connects you – Reid’s brave officer analogy, where a brave officer is given a medal and remembers him as a younger boy wanting to gain a medal which he had previously forgotten, disproves this. Parfit expands on Locke’s DMC (direct memory connections) to create psychological continuity
C1) What is psychological continuity
Personal Identity is transitive, DMC isn’t – you cannot have a direct memory connection of what you did 20 years ago. Psychological continuity is therefore overlapping chains of strong connectedness. X is one and the same as Y only if:
1. X is psychologically with Y
2. This continuity has the right kind of cause (normal cause i.e. must be the same brain, isn’t right – any cause, that causes psychological continuity, is the right kind of cause, but for now, he says normal cause is the right cause)
3. No branching
Fits Reid’s brave officer analogy, and doesn’t just depend on memory – psychological intentions, desires etc.
C2) What is the Jean/Paul analogy
In this hypothetical situation, Jane has agreed to have copies of Paul’s memory-traces implanted in her brain – the result is Jane will have memories of Paul’s which she experiences as her own. What conclusions can we draw from this:
• Jane will be unable to distinguish between Paul’s experiences and her own, except for where she knows it is impossible for her memories to refer to her e.g. her memory of Venice, even though she knows for a fact she has never been to Venice
• Some memories however are interchangeable (e.g. hearing a song in a car)
C2) What are the criteria for Quasi-memories
One has a quasi memory if:
- I seem to remember having an experience
- Someone (not ME) did have this experience
- My apparent memory is causally dependent on that past experience
C2) What is Schetman’s criticism of QM
Schetman argues that the concept of quasi-memories is wholly implausible because in order for a psychological state to count as memory, the subject has to regard the content as something regarding to themselves – otherwise it is a delusion.
He summarises: “The mineness of a psychological state cannot be separated from its content”
Whenever we have apparent memories, they are either:
1. Genuine memories which presuppose PI
2. Delusions: experiences that never happened to us but we believe they did
C2) Why should we discard QM
Schetman believes we should discard quasi-memories as a response to Butler as they are incoherent. Even if we were to strip memories of any presupposition to the person experiencing it, then there would be no point in QM’s because it is “no longer plausible to say what is relevant to PI in genuine memory is preserved in QM’s” – i.e. if we get rid of the mineness of mental states, all we would have are random images – this is not substantial for PI
C2) What is the empirical support against Schulman
R.B was a patient who had a car accident, and when woke up, had detached the sense of “self” from all his memories – he remembered everything about his life perfectly, except it was more like knowing facts learnt in a book – none of them felt like “his” experiences. Proof therefore that the “self” and memories do not have to be mutually exclusive
C2) Why is Schetman flawed
Take Parfit’s division – Lefty and Righty (left Parfit, Right Parfit). They presumably assume they are having real memories and will be unable to remove the “mineness” from them, however, it is objectively true that:
- They are not delusional (memories actually relate to Parfit)
- They are QM’s (since neither R or L are identical to Parfit but they remember these experiences)
C2) Why does Parfit still succeed without QM’s
Parfit can still hold on to his theory by rejecting the psychological criteria and accepting the physical criteria – PI = B (brain) + U with B instead of relation R, therefore again showing that when lefty and righty divide, as long as they have brains continuous with Parfit, then that is all that matters in survival. Relation R then in chapter 13-15 is unaffected because we are no longer talking about it as a criterion for PI, but because it is what we value in survival. Therefore, this is a weak criticism overall against Parfit
A) What is Descartes refutation of Parfit
Descartes’ dualism believes the soul is the bearer of personal identity - it is logically conceivable that we are not our bodies
A) What is Swinburnes conceivability argument for Descartes
- If we assume the Cartesian ego (soul), we can conceive of a mind without a body – it is metaphysically possible
- What is metaphysically possible can happen in certain circumstances
- He argues people have a “thisness” about them which is apart from the brain – continuity of matter, memory or character are not sufficient to constitute personal identity
- We consist therefore of a body (non-essential to PI) and a soul (thisness – essential)
