Ozone Regime - Post-Montreal

Question 1

Issues that Remained Unresolved Under MP

Answer 1

• details of tech + financial assistance to developing countries
• whether 50% reduction in CFCs should become complete phaseout
• how to increase number of signatories from the original 24

Question 2

MP Article 6 - 1988 Developments

Answer 2

• under this Article, in 1988, Parties formed the Scientific Assessment Panel (SAP), Environmental Effects Assessment Panel (EEAP), Technology Assessment Panel (TAP), + Economics Assessment Panel to inform govs on current state of relevant science + technical + economic feasibility of phasedown + phaseout schedules
• panel assessments = key tool in evolution + responsiveness of the treaty + are published w/o gov review or modification

Question 3

MP Article 6 - 1988 Assessment

Answer 3

• Assessment basically showed problem was more serious than previously understood (presented first solid data linking CFCs to ozone depletion + showed much more dramatic decline in ozone levels)
  -> lots of industry actors committed to voluntary phaseouts of CFCs

Question 4

London Amendments - Major points

Answer 4

• 1990
• new reduction schedules
• developing countries -> multilateral fund

Question 5

London - Reduction Schedules

Answer 5

• Broad consensus calling for eventual elimination of halons + CFCs
• New goal of 50% reduction by 1995 put in place, w/ total phaseout by 2000 for CFCs + halons
• Also instituted controls for new class of ozone depleting substances (hydrochlorofluorocarbons – HCFCs)
• also extended coverage to carbon tetrachloride + methyl chloroform (both fast phaseouts, 2000 + 2005 respectively)

Question 6

HCFCs

Answer 6

• industry actors had initially considered these an important substitute for CFCs, but these are also ODSs (though less so than CFCs)
• London added controls in a compromise - req to report on product, import + export, + nonbinding resolution discouraging their use by phaseout in 2040

Question 7

HFCs

Answer 7

• NOT addressed at London
• concern though that the London phaseouts would be accomplished in part from reliance on HFCs, which don’t deplete ozone but ARE powerful greenhouse gases -> environmentalists thought swap was short-sighted
• ultimately brought up again in 2008 + addressed through the Kigali Amendment ((2016)

Question 8

Multilateral Fund

Answer 8

• established through Article 10 in the London Amendments in 1990
• provided support for incremental costs + facilitative compliance mechanism -> designed to respond to implementation challenges faced by developing countries
• provide tech + financial assistance
• London Ams didn’t mandate contributions to the fund

Question 9

Multilateral Fund - Governance

Answer 9

• managed by Executive Committee of 7 developed + 7 developing country parties
  -> charged w/ supervising + administering MLF – includes reviewing all projects over $500,000, developing MLF plan + budget, monitoring its activities, developing criteria for project eval, + reporting annually to the Parties on MLF’s activities
• parties oversee Exec Committee + make majority decisions on basis of one-country-one-vote
• implementing agencies: UNDP, UNEP, UNIDO, + World Bank
• UNEP serves as Secretariat to Exec Committee + Treasurer to MLF

Question 10

What do countries need to do to obtain MLF assistance?

Answer 10

• prepare Country Program study detailing their production + consumption of ODSs + a work program detailing steps for reducing ODSs (including tech assistance + pre-investment activities)

Question 11

Kigali Amendment

Answer 11

• 2016
• phase-down ozone-safe but climate-warming HFCs
• marked shift in focus to incorporating measures to address climate pollutants, even where don’t destroy stratospheric ozone
• Prof noted that ability to have Kigali Amendment in some ways reinforces the importance of the Ozone Regime, although some in climate change regime weren’t happy b/c saw it as their domain

Question 12

Incremental Costs

Answer 12

• additional costs of converting to using non-ODSs or tech that relies on them
• incremental in the sense that you can’t ask for this money if you would have been doing what you’re doing anyway

Question 13

Tensions Surrounding MLF

Answer 13

• some tension between recipients + those transferring funds - sense that countries giving $ are dictating how they should be developing + what they need to do (interfering w/ sovereignty)
  -> gets much more contentious in climate change context, b/c much more potential for impact on country’s development
• chicken + egg problem - which comes first, showing of compliance or $?

Question 14

Non-Compliance Procedure for Ozone Regime

Answer 14

• gets set out in Annex IV of the Copenhagen Amendments
• establishes Implementation Committee

Question 15

MP Article 7

Answer 15

• deals with reporting requirements
• important – mechanism by which we can assess what is happening, create baselines, measure success
• requires a lot of work + tech expertise
• VERY big piece of int treaties

Question 16

Annex IV - 1-4

Answer 16

• discuss communications re non-compliance
• 1 says other parties can bring potential non-compliance to attention of Secretariat
• 2 gives those non-compliant parties a chance to respond
• 3 says Secretariat can draw attention to non-compliance in preparing its report (think this info goes to both Meeting of the Parties and the Implementation Committee)
• 4 says party can draw attention to its own concerns about inability to comply w/ the protocol after its best efforts

Question 17

Annex IV - 5-8

Answer 17

• discuss the basics of the Implementation Committee
• 5 establishes the committee (10 Parties elected by Meeting of the Parties for two yrs, equitable geographic distribution)
• 6 says it meets twice a yr
• 7 sets out its functions – there are five bullet points, but essentially the main thing is that they focus on reviewing, considering, + gathering info on the potential non-compliances identified through 1-4 + then reporting it
  ->(e) also specifies that the committee maintains communication with the Multilateral Fund
• 8 says it shall consider the submissions, observations + info from 7 w/ view to securing amicable solution

Question 18

Annex IV - 7

Answer 18

Functions of Implementation Committee:
- receive, consider + report on submissions (from 1,2,4)
- receive, consider + report on any info or observations forwarded by Secretariat
- request, through the Secretariat, further info on matters under consideration as necessary
- undertake, upon invitation of Party concerned, info-gathering
- maintain exchange of info w/ MLF Executive Committee re tech + financial cooperation, particularly re IC’s recs

Question 19

Annex IV - 9

Answer 19

• Committee reports to the Meeting of the Parties, including any recs it considers appropriate -> Parties may then “decide upon and call for steps to bring about full compliance with the Protocol, and to further the Protocol’s objectives”

Question 20

Annex IV - 16

Answer 20

• says info made available to any person upon request (although confidentiality of info received in confidence is protected under 15)

Question 21

Summary of Non-Compliance Mechanism

Answer 21

• if requested by a party to conduct review, the Implementation Committee must make report w/ recs to the Meeting of the Parties, which then decides on the appropriate course of action
• relatively non-confrontational approach (“carrots”), but w/ underlying threat of use of “stick”
• Parties at Copenhagen agreed to Indicative List of Measures That Might Be Taken by Meeting of the Parties in Respect of Non-Compliance with the Protocol in Annex IV

Question 22

Copenhagen - List of Measures Re Non-Compliance

Answer 22

Includes:
- providing assistance
- issuing warnings
- suspending protocol privileges concerning, inter alia, industrial rationalization, production, consumption, trade, transfer of tech, Multilateral Fund, + other institutional arrangements

Question 23

Legitimacy of the Implementation Committee

Answer 23

• should represent parties’ interests
• Prof says size, election by parties, two-year commitments all important (on the assumption parties are invested in the success of the treaty, may influence how comfortable/uncomfortable we feel re IC holding off on sanctions)

Question 24

Copenhagen - Pros and Cons of Attitude Towards Non-Compliance

Answer 24

• want people trying to comply + want to facilitate where possible (best interests of all = ultimately figuring out a way to reach compliance)
  ->trying to create system in which parties have incentive to participate + work w/ the implementation committee
  -> not really productive necessarily to have parties consistently treated as non-parties
• BUT some concern of repeat player effect
• more serious sanction will get more support broadly if they’ve tried everything first + it looks like still getting nowhere
• may be helpful to have it as a reminder that you do need to participate (a state may have no interest in being cooperative if there’s no real threat behind it)

Question 25

Should NGOs be able to make referrals to the Implementation Committee?

Answer 25

- may not really need a formal role - they may be supporting the work of states + the Implementation Committee anyway + may be able to influence what happens

Question 26

Ozone vs. Climate - Similarities + Differences

Answer 26

- concept of living regime that can change - thresholds of achievability shift, pushing the boundaries -> distinction though - fossil fuel companies push back hard on climate change b/c kills their entire business, vs. industry actors in ozone willing to push for treaty b/c knew they could adapt to a degree - Montreal had identifiable consequences, ability to see change + benefits of reduction -> being able to identify problems + see benefit triggers support from states, industry, civil society - possibility of renewable energy trade system – can you broaden the grid, connect access in a way that will support the regime - possibly learn something from the ozone metric, making things fungible for purposes of comparison - technique of using incentives to be party by having a punitive effect of not being a party (translating int trade aspect into climate context) - consumers - pushback on ozone depleting substances -> starting to be seen more in the climate context (effectiveness of mobilizing civil society) - history, text of regime, importance of industry both ways + finding solutions - corporate interests on climate change are very different, but are there ways you can make it more comparable? -> concept that fossil fuel industry really can’t be trusted to engage in good faith though – decades of evidence that they pretty much ignored climate impacts for sake of own profits

Question 27

Nitrous Oxide

Answer 27

- book noted adding this to the Montreal Protocol as a future challenge for the regime - Would benefit both ozone layer + climate - Currently the most significant unregulated ODS, + also the third-most important long-lived GHG (after CO2 + methane) - Proven reduction strategies – include more efficient, targeted use of agricultural fertilizer, capture + destruction of emissions from industrial processes, + improved animal + human waste practices

Question 28

Solar Radiation Management

Answer 28

- aims to reflect sunlight back to atmosphere or otherwise manage amount of solar radiation hitting Earth -> one proposal = release of sulfates into upper atmosphere -> could harm ozone layer (need to assess under MP)

Question 29

Leadership - Ozone vs. Climate Change

Answer 29

- Montreal involved leadership by countries w/ more resources, more contributions to the problem, also political clout –> we’ve seen opposite of ozone regime in the climate context – US not agreeing to Kyoto, told at subsequent meetings if you’re not going to be part of the solution you should at least not stand in the way - leadership from other communities – small island nations (Prof’s point that you might not necessarily expect certain parties to play a role, but wind up being leaders) - not really parallel to Montreal

Question 30

Science - Lessons from Ozone

Answer 30

- shifting to address certain ODSs to address spillage or leakage they hadn’t yet anticipated -> importance of building a regime that responds to science (not just developing + sharing info, but navigating scientific developments + corresponding risk-risk tradeoffs)

Question 31

Structure - Ozone vs. Climate Change

Answer 31

- ozone regime known for using targets + timetables at the international level -> set a limit but didn't dictate how states needed to get there, leaving them to manage their own private entities - climate change similar to the extent that it leaves states control over how to reach the goals, but different to the extent that Paris Agreement doesn't have the top-down approach of setting targets and timetables on the international stage

Question 32

Ozone - Relative Strength of Mechanisms

Answer 32

- concept of not allowing reservations but building flexibility into the regime somewhat - votes binding even if not unanimity - still able to get participation + develop noncompliance despite this

Question 33

Lessons to Be Drawn from Development of Vienna to Montreal + Beyond

Answer 33

- thinking about where to focus energy (ex - noncompliance - parties didn't negotiate at Montreal so as not to get bogged down by the details) - concept that not everything needs to be done all at once (but flip side arg that sometimes not moving as quickly as is actually necessary) - optimistic take that disaggregation might make things more manageable (get industry to the table w/o big picture) but flip side that at the end of the day things are complicated