Offensive and Defensive Neo realism Flashcards
Offensive vs Defensive realism
On the one hand, offensive realism seeks power and influence to achieve security through domination and hegemony. On the other hand, defensive realism argues that the anarchical structure of the international system encourages states to maintain moderate and reserved policies to attain security.
What do both agree
Neither are a result of human nature but a result of the anarchial system.
Hans Moregenthau and E.H Carr share similar assumptions with offensive realists that they want to maximise power. However their reasoning is not similiar.
Classical realists
For classical realists a increase of power will result in a expansion of influence, this results in a never ending struggle among states due to the natural human urge to dominate others.
Why do states want to increase influence
The international system and the distribution of power means that all great powers want to maximise their power and influence, as there are powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals.
The best way for a state to increase its odds of survival is to become the most powerful states, it is the anarchial nature of society that does this.
Mearsheimer on why states should increase their influence
Mearsheimer argues that it would be misguided and naïve for any state to believe that a ‘appropriate amount’ of power is enough and pass up a opportunity to be a regional hegemon, Iran China and Russia are all examples of this right now, there are threats in their region, they want to eliminate them.
Mearsheimer and geography
Mearsheimer speaks of the ‘stopping power of water’ and global hegemony does not exist, the best a major power can achieve is regional hegemony.
He posits that large bodies of water limit the power projection abilities of militaries and thus naturally divide up powers in the globe.
Status Quo powers
Status Quo powers are rare, rarely satisfied with current distribution of power, states cannot be sure when or where the next threat will emerge, uncertainty in the international system leads powers to maximise their power.
States look at each other with fear, mistrust and suspicion according Mearsheimer, his book ‘The tragedy of great power politics’ describes this idea , states have no reason to compete in many cases but they do anyway.
Mearsheimer claim on agressors winning war
Mearsheimer claims states win wars around 60% of the time, between 1815 and 1980 there were 63 wars were the aggressor wins 39 times.
Gilpin
For Gilpin (1981), who also argues that major powers are not mindless expanders, a major state will seek to change the international system as long as the expected benefits exceed the expected costs. Remembers states are still rational actors not mindlessly driven by human nature.
Distribution of power
Distribution of power effects level of fear. Bipolar systems are the most stable and less war prone than multipolar, both are better than unipolar.
For Mearsheimer the configuration of power that generates the most fear and the greatest security competition among states is a multipolar system that contains a potential hegemon or what he calls an unbalanced multipolar system, there is a good chance they can dominate the other powers, so they do.
A threatened great power in a bipolar system must balance against a rival because there is no other great power to “catch the buck.” A distant hegemon can safely stay out of any conflict in such regions because no state is powerful enough to conquer all of the states.
Defensive realists
Defensive realists argue the structure of the international system rarely encourages states to expand in order to increase their security, conquest is rarely profitable and results in counterbalance behaviour.
Anarchy encourages states to adopt defensive, moderate, and restrained strategies, conflict is sometimes necessary in the case of aggressive states, security is threatened or differences are irreconcilable.
Waltz
Defensive realists maintain that states seek to maximize security, preserve the existing distribution of power, are not inherently aggressive, Waltz says ‘security is the highest end’, the first concern of states however is not to ‘maximise power but to maintain their positions in the system’
Four dangers of aggression, expansion and conquest
- First, attempts to achieve hegemony are self-defeating and can leave the state weaker and less secure because it provokes counterbalancing behavior and aggression tends to meet resistance. Periods of sustained hegenomy are not durable, Snyder argues that the international system ‘punishes agressors, it does not reward it’.
- The cost of expansion usually exceeds the benefits
- the offense–defense military balance often favors defenders and the defense over the offensive
- Finally, socialization and lessons from history teach states that expansion and the pursuit of hegemony are often misguided because they provoke counterbalancing rather than bandwagoning behavior.
Balancing and Bandwaggining
The concept ofBalancing derives from the balance of power theory, the most influential theory from therealist school of thought, which assumes that a formation ofhegemony in a multistate system is unattainable since hegemony is perceived as a threat by other states, causing them to engage in balancing against a potential hegemon.
The logic of bandwaggining stipulates that an outgunned, weaker state should align itself with a stronger adversary because the latter can take what it wants by force anyway.
Stephen Walt and Keneth Waltz on balancing
As Stephen Walt notes, “If balancing is more common than bandwagoning, then states are more secure because aggressors will face combined opposition. Status quo states should therefore avoid provoking countervailing coalitions by eschewing threatening foreign and defense policies”
“states that appear aggressive are likely to provoke others to balance” - Waltz
