Objective 4: Provider Reimbursement Flashcards

1
Q

Reasons why a health plan wants to contract with providers (contracting goals) (5)

A

1) Obtain favorable pricing (less than full billed amounts)
2) Obtain payment terms that result in an underwriting gain
3) Get the provider to agree to provide services to the plan’s members
4) Meet service area access standards required by the states and Medicare
5) Obtain contractual agreement for several clauses, many of which are required by the states and Medicare

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2
Q

Provider reimbursement contractual agreements (7)

A

The provider agrees to:

1) Submit claims directly to the plan, not the member
2) Not balance bill the member for any amount above the agreed-upon payment terms
3) Hold harmless the member (not bill for any amounts owed by the plan)
4) Cooperate with the plan’s utilization management program
5) Cooperate with the plan’s quality management program
6) Give the plan the right to audit clinical and billing data for care provided to plan members
7) Not discriminate (and other similar requirements)

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3
Q

Reasons why a provider wants to contract with a health plan (contracting goals) (7)

A

1) Obtain favorable pricing when in a strong negotiating position
2) Ensure that it will not be excluded from the network of a large payer
3) Receive direct payment from the plan, thereby avoiding the need to collect from the patient
4) Receive timely payment (usually 30 days or less)
5) Have plan members directed or steered to it
6) Not lose business (or medical staff) as a payer steers members to others who are contracted providers
7) Receive defined rights around disputing claims and payments

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4
Q

Capabilities of a well-functioning contract management system (13)

A

1) Identify network gaps or where provider recruiting is most needed
2) Track recruiting efforts, provide reminders, and generate recruiting reports
3) Generate new contract blanks and new contracts with information filled in
4) Store copies of different versions of any provider’s contract
5) Track and report contract changes for each provider
6) Track and manage permissions and sign-offs on contracts
7) Store images of signed documents and convert imaged documents into machine-readable formats
8) Support an entirely paperless contracting process
9) Provide early notification or reminders for upcoming actions such as re-credentialing or renegotiations
10) Direct electronic feed of required demographic information to other internal functions
11) Direct electronic feed of market-facing systems such as internet physician services
12) Be searchable on multiple attributes
13) Analyze the potential impact of changes in contract terms

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5
Q

Types of physicians and other professional providers (5)

A

1) PCPs and SCPs - for traditional HMOs, the distinction between PCP and SCP is very important because the PCP acts as a gatekeeper and must authorize any visits to a specialist
2) Hospital-based physicians - specialties include radiology, anesthesiology, pathology, emergency medicine, and hospitalist. These physicians often have exclusive rights at a hospital, so they are reluctant to contract for anything less than full charges.
3) Nonphysician or mid-level practitioners that provide primary care - the most common are physician assistants and nurse practitioners. These are a great asset in managed care because they deliver excellent primary care, tend to spend more time with patients, and are well accepted by most members.
4) Mental health providers
5) Other types of professionals - podiatrists, dentists, orthodontists, optometrists, chiropractors, physical therapists, occupational therapists, nutritionists, acupuncturists, audiologists, respiratory therapists, and home health care providers

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6
Q

Types of mental health providers (7)

A

1) Psychiatrist - a physician who specializes in mental health and is able to prescribe drugs
2) Psychologist - has a doctoral degree in psychology and two years of supervised professional experience
3) Clinical social worker - a counselor with a master’s degree for social work
4) Licensed professional counselor - has a master’s degree in psychology, counseling, or a related field
5) Certified alcohol and drug abuse counselor - has specific clinical training in alcohol and drug abuse and provides individual and group counseling
6) Psychiatric nurse practitioner or nurse psychotherapist - a registered nurse practitioner with special training in psychiatric and mental health nursing
7) Marital and family therapist - a counselor with a master’s degree and special training in marital and family therapy

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7
Q

Contracting considerations for different types of physician groups (7)

A

1) Individual physicians - advantages is the direct relationship with the physician. Disadvantage is the effort to maintain the relationship is large for just one physician.
2) Medical groups - advantage is the same contracting effort yields a higher number of physicians. Disadvantage is that if the relationship is terminated then there is greater disruption in patient care.
3) Independent practice associations (IPAs)
- Advantages: a large number of providers come along with the contract, the IPA may accept more financial risk, and some IPAs perform network management, credentialing, and medical management
- Disadvantages: the IPA can hold a considerable portion of the delivery system hostage to negotiations, and the plan’s ability to select and deselect individual physicians is limited
4) Faculty practice plans (medical groups that are organized around teaching programs)
- Advantages: these programs provide highly-specialized care and they add prestige to the plan by virtue of their reputation for quality care
- Disadvantages: tend to be less cost effective in their practice styles, and they are not set up for case management, so care is not well coordinated
5) Physicians in integrated delivery systems (IDSs) - there are two types
a) Hospital systems that affiliate with private physicians
b) Hospital systems that employe physicians 0 these often have substantial negotiating leverage
6) Patient-centered medical homes (PCMHs) - these coordinate all care for a group of patients
7) Specialty management companies - these focus on managing very specialized services using physicians (e.g., single-specialty case management of neonatal care)

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8
Q

Elements of a typical physician credentialing application (9)

A

1) Demographics, licenses, and other identifiers (such as national provider identifier)
2) Education, training, and specialties
3) Practice details - such as services provided and office hours
4) Billing and remittance information
5) Hospital admitting privileges
6) Professional liability insurance
7) Work history and references
8) Disclosure questions - such as suspension from government programs or felony convictions
9) Images of supporting documents - such as a state license certificate

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9
Q

Types of health care facilities (13)

A

1) Community-based single acute care hospitals
2) Multihospital systems (MHSs) - consolidation has led to most hospitals being part of an MHS, which gives them negotiating leverage
3) For-profit national hospital companies - because these hospitals are owned by national companies, they have much less local autonomy
4) Specialized hospitals - these provide care to only a certain type of patient (e.g., children’s hospitals and psychiatric hospitals)
5) Physician-owned single-specialty hospitals - these restrict themselves to elective procedures within a single specialty, so they are not equipped to handle emergencies and severe conditions
6) Accountable care organizations - these coordinate care for designated Medicare FFS beneficiaries and participate in a shared savings program
7) Government hospitals - may be county-run, state-run, or federal
8) Subacute care (skilled or intermediate nursing facilities) - these are well suited for prolonged convalescence or recovery cases. The cost for a bed day is much less than in an acute-care hospital.
9) Ambulatory surgical centers (ASCs) and procedure centers - are typically equipped to handle only routine cases
10) Hospice - a broad term referring to health care services provided at the end of life, which may be at an inpatient facility, ambulatory facility, or no facility
11) Retail health clinics - small clinics usually associated with a retail store (such as Target or Walgreens)
12) Urgent care centers - a hybrid of a low-level emergency department and a PCP practice
13) Other types of ambulatory facilities - includes centers for birthing, community health, diagnostic imaging, occupational health, pain management, and women’s health

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10
Q

Types of ancillary services (4)

A

1) Diagnostic
a) Laboratory
b) Imaging (such as x-rays and MRIs)
c) Electrocardiography
d) Cardiac testing
2) Therapeutic
a) Cardiac rehabilitation
b) Noncardiac rehabilitation
c) Physical therapy
d) Occupational therapy
e) Speech therapy
f) Other long-term therapeutic services
3) Pharmacy
4) Ambulance and medical transportation services

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11
Q

Ways in which bundled payments have been used (5)

A

1) By providers to attract more business, including from self-pay patients and medical tourism
2) By providers to engage physicians (especially surgeons)
3) By providers to gain the cooperation of physicians to reduce hospital cost
4) By payers to reduce payments
5) By payers to encourage patients to use lower-cost or higher-quality providers

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12
Q

Considerations in contracting for bundled payments (9)

A

These include the key financial, operational, and quality issues

1) Defining the episode - what is the trigger date and when does the case end? Which services are included?
2) Evaluating catastrophic risk - need to do an outlier risk analysis that includes a classical stop loss analysis
3) Financial stability for low case loads - random fluctuation may be greater for provider groups with low case loads
4) Determining provider allocation of funds - the allocation should consider financial incentives for physicians to encourage them to promote more cost-effective care
5) Distinguishing case severity - could limit risk by removing higher-severity patients from the bundled payment approach
6) Quality outcome requirements - minimum thresholds may be needed to ensure quality is not compromised as services are reduced
7) Administrative complexity of supporting the contract
8) Risk-sharing alternatives - contracts that share financial risk between the provider and payer may be more viable than pure bundled payments
9) Potential for increased utilization - contracts for individual providers should not give them incentives to increase utilization to get a larger share of the bundled rate

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13
Q

Definition of accountable care organizations (ACOs) (4)

A

1) ACOs are a new category of health care provider created by the ACA as part of the Medicare Shared Savings Program
2) Definition - a legal entity composed of certified Medicare providers or suppliers. These providers and suppliers work together to coordinate care for a defined population of Medicare FFS beneficiaries, and they have control over the ACO’s decision-making process
3) ACOs that meet specified quality performance standards are eligible to receive payments for shared savings if they can reduce spending growth below target amounts
4) Medicare beneficiaries will be assigned to ACOs based on where they received the greatest amount of primary care and preventive services in the most recent 12 months, as measured by allowed charges

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14
Q

Eligibility requirements for ACOs to participate in the Medicare Shared Savings Program (7)

A

1) Must be an eligible type of provider
2) Must be capable of receiving and distributing shared savings, repaying shared losses, ensuring all providers comply with program requirements, and performing other required functions
3) The governing body must be composed primarily (at least 75%) of participating providers and must also include Medicare beneficiaries served by the ACO
4) Leadership and management criteria include:
a) Clinical oversight must be done by a senior-level medical director who is a board-certified physician
b) Providers must make a meaningful financial or human investment to the clinical integration program
5) Must exhibit a strong patient-centeredness element
6) Must have a sufficient number of beneficiaries (at least 5,000) and primary care providers
7) Must have a compliance plan, a lead compliance official, and mechanisms for identifying compliance problems

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15
Q

Providers eligible to participate in an ACO (7)

A

1) Professionals in group practice arrangements
2) Networks of individual practices
3) Joint venture arrangements between hospitals and professionals
4) Hospitals employing professionals
5) Critical access hospitals that are paid by Medicare in a way that supports the collection of data needed to assign patients to providers
6) Rural health clinics
7) Federally qualified health clinics

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16
Q

Ways ACOs must demonstrate patient-centeredness (8)

A

1) A beneficiary care experience survey
2) Patient involvement in ACO governance by representation in the governing body
3) A process for evaluating the health needs of the population
4) Systems in place to identify high risk individuals and develop individualized care plans for targeted populations
5) A mechanism in place for the coordination of care
6) A process in place for communicating clinical knowledge to beneficiaries in an understandable way
7) A process to allow beneficiaries to access their medical records
8) Processes for measuring clinical or service performance and using these results to improve care and service

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17
Q

Methodology for measuring ACO quality performance (3)

A

1) ACOs are scored based on performance in 33 measures that are grouped into the following domains:
a) Patient and caregiver experience - measures include access to specialists, health promotion and education, and health and functional status
b) Care coordination and patient safety - measures include risk-standardized readmissions, medication reconciliation, and screening for fall risk
c) Preventive health - measures include influenza immunization, adult weight screening and follow up, and tobacco use assessment
d) At-risk populations - measures include diabetes measures (such as hemoglobin control), blood pressure control for hypertension patients, and coronary artery disease measures
2) In each domain, the points earned are divided by the total possible points to determine the percentage for that domain
3) The ACO’s quality performance score is the straight average of the four domain percentages

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18
Q

Methodology for calculating ACO shared savings payments (7)

A

1) Expenditure baseline
a) Calculated from spending data from beneficiaries that would have been assigned to the ACO in the most recent three-year period
b) Data is trended to the most recent year using Medicare national spending growth rates, and is adjusted based on risk scores
c) The three years are combined using weights of 60%, 30%, and 10% (largest weights for most recent years)
2) Spending benchmark - calculated by trending the expenditure baseline and adjusting for changes in health status (based on age and sex for continuously-enrolled beneficiaries whose risk scores increase, and based on risk scores for all others)
3) Actual spending - CMS will use a 3-month run-out of claims when determining the ACO’s actual spending
4) In each contract year, savings = spending benchmark - actual spending
5) Maximum sharing rate = 60% for two-sided models and 50% for one-sided models. ACOs using the one-sided model do not share losses, and therefore receive a lower sharing rate for savings.
6) Shared savings
a) Shared savings rate = maximum sharing rate * quality performance score
b) Shared savings = savings * shared savings rate
c) Shared savings are capped at 10% of the benchmark in the one-sided model and 15% of the benchmark in the two-sided model
d) A minimum savings rate (MSR) is used to reduce the chance of payments due to random fluctuations. This rate is 2% in the two-sided model and for ACOs with 60,000 or more beneficiaries in the one-sided model. Spending must exceed this rate to trigger savings, but once the MSR is met, all savings are shared (even those below the MSR)
7) Shared losses (two-sided models only) = losses * (1 - shared savings rate)
a) Shared losses have an upper limit of 60%
b) Shared losses are also capped, starting at 5% in the first year
c) A 2% minimum loss rate is applied in the same way as the MSR

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19
Q

Major physician remuneration models in Canada (4)

A

These are the major ways in which physicians are paid for their services

1) Traditional FFS - the physician bills for each service provided. Each province establishes a schedule of benefits that lists the fees paid for the different services.
2) Enhanced FFS - most provinces offer bonuses and fee schedule enhancements for family physicians and some specialties. Enhancements include bonuses for chronic disease management, additional funding for treating special-needs populations, and an increase in fees in qualifying rural or remote areas.
3) Alternative payment plans (APPs) - these methods are an alternative to traditional FFS payment
4) Salary - a regular payment which is specified in an employment contract. Remuneration is often done through “time-based payments” such as annual salaries or hourly rates.

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20
Q

Types of payments included in APPs (8)

A

1) Fees for clinical services
2) Capitation
3) Time-based payments, such as hourly pay
4) Rewards for participation in specific clinical initiatives
5) Bonuses for achieving specific quality targets
6) Remuneration for administrative duties and costs
7) Financial contributions for medical information technology
8) Additional payment types for academic physicians:
a) Compensation for teaching
b) Research funding
c) Stipends for administrative duties
d) Partial compensation or subsidies for staff, facilities, and equipment

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21
Q

Components that may be included in APPs that target primary care physicians (12)

A

1) Patient-enrolled models - these models require providers to formally enroll patients in their practices and register this enrollment with the ministry of health (MoH)
2) Rostering - this is the process of enrolling patients and registering that enrollment with the MoH. Many APPs pay the physician a fee for the administrative work of rostering patients.
3) FFS billing - payment is made based on the provincial fee schedule. An APP may incorporate a bonus top-up, such as an extra percentage of the fee for enrolled patients.
4) Capitation payments - the physician receives a fixed payment for the comprehensive annual care of a rostered patient. The payment varies by age and gender.
5) Shadow FFS billing - physicians who participate in a capitation APP must still submit FFS invoices for services provided to rostered patients. The MoH needs this information for evaluating patient access and utilization.
6) Preventative care bonus - annual bonuses are offered for physicians who meet certain percentage targets for preventative health care.
7) Comprehensive care management fee - a payment for the ongoing administrative work and upkeep that comprehensive family doctors do in addition to seeing their patients
8) Chronic disease management bonuses - an annual bonus for managing chronic diseases
9) New patient incentives - fixed bonuses to physicians who accept “orphaned” patients (i.e., those who do not have a family doctor) as new patients into their practices
10) Administrative fees - per-patient fees paid annually to help cover some of the administrative costs of meeting the accountability criteria of capitation APPs
11) Sessional fees - fees based on an hourly rate and paid for specific services. Many emergency departments offer physicians a guaranteed sessional fee for working as the doctor on duty.
12) Block funding - a guaranteed payment to provide medical services for patients in a specific locations (typically a rural or remote area) for a defined interval of time

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22
Q

Description of the unintended incentive in ACO payment models (4)

A

1) Current rules suggest CMS will calculate benchmarks for a new three-year period in the way original benchmarks were calculated. For example, a 60% weight will be applied to the most recent year.
2) This creates an incentive to increase spending in that year in order to increase the benchmark
3) Conversely, this removes the incentive to create savings in that year, penalizing ACOs that do so by giving them a lower benchmark
4) As a result of the unintended incentive, the current payment model may result in higher rather than lower Medicare FFS spending

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23
Q

Proposed strategies for improving incentives in ACO payment models (2)

A

1) Modify the benchmark weights to give equal weight to each of the three years that are used for calculating the benchmark
a) This would reduce the incentive to increase spending in the last year before a new contract
b) Alternatively, even more than three historical years could be used when calculating benchmarks
2) Introduce a form of “yardstick competition”
a) Base an ACO’s benchmark not only on its own past performance, but also on the performance of other Medicare providers or on a local benchmark
b) This would introduce competition into the payment model. The more an ACO lowered its spending relative to that of its competitors, the greater its cumulative rewards would be.

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24
Q

Process for developing episode based measures of quality performance using a claims database (4)

A

1) Opportunities are identified
2) Quality Measurement Event (QME) opportunity is attributed to physicians using fixed attribution rules
3) A compliance rate is calculated for each physician by comparing opportunities with successes
4) Performance can be assessed in terms of a relative compliance rate

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25
Q

Major advantages of episode-based profiling (4)

A

1) Administrative feasibility
2) Minimal administrative burden for data collection
3) Comparable performance against defined standards
4) The “episode” view can be considered more “patient-centered”

26
Q

Limitations of episode-based profiling (4)

A

1) Misidentification of high and low performing physicians
2) Comparative bias of providers
3) Physicians’ cost efficiency scores may be inaccurate if:
a) Episode responsibility is attributed incorrectly
b) Cost outliers distort estimates of underlying performance
c) Episodes considered in profiles are not representative of a physician’s usual practice
d) Risk adjustment is inadequate to control for effects of patients’ comorbid conditions
e) The number of episodes available for profile calculations is insufficient for reliable estimation
4) Inclusion of hospital costs in episode-based profiles represents other challenges
a) Cost efficiency measures can be heavily influenced by hospital costs
b) Hospital costs are largely beyond physicians’ control
c) Adverse impact for physicians practicing in high-cost settings, academic medical centers

27
Q

How episode-based profiling is likely to improve and become more standardized over time (5)

A

1) Electronically submitted claims will increase accuracy
2) Fully documented claims have more reliable episode profiles
3) Comorbidities and other risk-adjustment factors will be credited more accurately
4) Organized and supported practice infrastructure will distinguish performance characteristics
5) Catalyze the medical profession to development administrable evidence-based performance measures

28
Q

The factors that determine the reliability of cost profiles (3)

A

1) The number of observations (i.e., episodes of care)
2) The variation among physicians in their use of resources to manage similar episodes
3) Random variation in the scores

29
Q

Steps to construct physician summary cost profile (3)

A

1) Calculated the average cost of each episode type assigned to physicians in each specialty
2) Adjust the cost using the patient-specific risk score producing the expected cost
3) A physician’s cost profile = sum of (observed costs / expected costs) for all assigned episodes

30
Q

Equation for physician-specific reliability

A

Physician-specific reliability = (physician to physician variance) / (physician to physician variance + physician-specific error variance)

a) Large variations in cost would have a large physician-specific variation
b) Physician-to-physician variance is larger when there is a wider distribution of cost profile scores

31
Q

Significant findings in the reliability of physician cost profiling (9)

A

1) The median reliability of physician cost profiles had a wide range by specialty
2) Overall, the majority of physicians did not have cost profiles that met common thresholds of reliability
3) Doubling the number of episodes produced only modest gains
4) It is recommended that users of physician cost profiles directly assess reliability
5) Surgical specialties in particular appear to have low reliability scores
6) Opportunities for cost control still exist among physicians with more reliable scores
7) Misclassification presents difficulties achieving cost control objectives
8) Developing better measures of cost performance at the physician level appears to be the most promising method to increase the reliability of cost profiles
9) Consumers, physicians, and purchasers are all at risk of being misled by the results produced by these tools

32
Q

Criteria to be considered an Advanced Alternate Payment Model (APM) (3)

A

1) Requires use of certified Electronic Health Record (EHR) technology
a) At least 50% of the clinicians use certified EHRs to document and communicate clinical care
b) Each ACO participant, tax ID, submits data on the advancing care information performance category
2) Requires Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) comparable quality measures
a) Ties payment to quality measures that are evidence-based, reliable, and valid
b) At least one measure must be an outcome measure if an appropriate measure is available
3) Bear a more than nominal amount of financial risk
a) Either it is a Medical Home Model expanded under CMS Innovation Center authority, or it requires participants to bear a more than nominal amount of financial risk

33
Q

Models that are considered Advanced APMs, in the 2017 performance year (7)

A

1) Comprehensive End Stage Renal Disease Care Model (Two-Sided Risk Arrangements)
2) Comprehensive Primary Care Plus (CPC+)
3) Shared Savings Program Track 2
4) Shared Savings Program Track 3
5) Next Generation ACO Model
6) Oncology Care Model (Two-Sided Risk Arrangement)
7) Shared Savings Program Track 1+

34
Q

Steps for eligible clinicians to becoming Qualifying APM Participants (QPs) (5)

A

1) Qualifying APM Participant determinations are made at the Advanced APM Entity level
2) CMS determines “Threshold Score” for each Advanced APM Entity using two methods:
a) CMS will use the method that results in a more favorable QP determination
b) Payment amount method: (Cost for Part B professional services to attributed beneficiaries) / (Cost for Part B professional services to attribution eligible beneficiaries) = Threshold Score %
c) Patient count method: (# of attributed beneficiaries given Part B professional services) / (# of attribution-eligible beneficiaries given Part B professional services) = Threshold Score %
3) The Threshold Score for each method is compared to a QP threshold table
4) If a Threshold is met, the eligible clinicians in the Advanced APM Entity become QPs for the payment year
5) QPs are excluded from Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS), receiving a 5% lump sum bonus, and receive a higher FFS update in 2026

35
Q

As of 2018, the ACO Tracks available and their potential gains/losses (4)

A

1) Track 1: one-sided basis (gainsharing only). Potential savings are limited to 50% of gains to a maximum of 10% of benchmark costs
2) Track 1+: two-sided basis. Potential gainsharing up to 50% of savings to a maximum of 10% of benchmark costs. Loss sharing is fixed at 30% of losses. Loss sharing is limited to 4% of benchmark costs OR 8% of FFS revenues.
3) Track 2: two-sided basis. Potential gainsharing up to 60% of savings to a maximum of 15% of benchmark costs. Loss sharing is between 40% and 60% of losses. Loss sharing is limited to between 5% and 10% of benchmark costs, depending on year.
4) Track 3: two-sided basis. Potential gainsharing up to 75% of savings to a maximum of 20% of benchmark costs. Loss sharing is between 40% and 75% of losses. Loss sharing is limited to 15% of benchmark costs.

36
Q

Steps for an insurer to design a Tiered Network Health Plan (TNHP) (4)

A

1) Start with an existing plan
2) Select a provider category to tier
3) Next, tier providers in the chosen category on cost and quality measures
4) Finally, add additional cost share to providers not meeting desired standards

37
Q

Components of the TNHP pricing formula (6)

A

1) Claims under the control of non-preferred providers: N%
2) Cost differential: P% = 1 - (average preferred cost / average non-preferred cost)
3) Member liability differential = M% = change in non-preferred providers’ costs due to additional cost share
4) Shift = the assumed percentage of non-preferred users reacting to increased member liability by switching to preferred providers
5) TNHP savings formula = N% * [M% + Shift * (P% - M%)]
6) Equilibrium at M% = P%

38
Q

Constraints of the TNHP shift estimation (3)

A

1) Demand curve constraint: Shift will increase as the member liability differential increases
2) Maximum shift constraint: At most, all non-preferred users can shift to preferred providers
3) Limited network pricing constraint: most TNHPs should never be priced less than a plan requiring members to access only preferred providers

39
Q

Shift assumption equation when Shift is 100% for member liability greater than equilibrium (4)

A

1) Shift Line: = mX + b = [100% / Equilibrium] * Member Liability Differential
2) Y-intercept = b=0%, i.e., no shift is expected without a cost share differential
3) Slope = m= [100% / Equilibrium]
4) X variable = Member Liability Differential

40
Q

Practical issues that have determined the success or failure of previous value-based arrangements (7)

A

1) Engaging all stakeholders (e.g., policymakers, actuaries, and providers) is important
2) Payment reform is organization-specific - there is not one payment structure that is the best in all circumstances
3) Results of payment reform are decidedly mixed, with both successes and failures
4) Success in provider payment arrangements depends on good holistic risk management by the payment reform team
5) Organizations need various qualities to succeed under payment reform
6) Insurance companies have an important role in payment reform since they can pool and reduce insurance risk. Providers must be required to take on some insurance risk, which they must carefully monitor.
7) The mechanics and administration of payment models that incorporate provider risk have improved since the 1990s consumer backlash against them

41
Q

Definitions related to payment reform (4)

A

1) Value-based arrangement - a payment model or contract agreement that reimburses services based on quality measures such as patient outcomes and efficiency, often at a predetermined price. It is the opposite of a volume-based arrangement.
2) Payment reform - the environment where more contracts move to value-based arrangements
3) Payment model - the arrangement between a payer and provider to reimburse the provider for services
4) Service delivery model - the manner in which providers organize and deliver care to patients. Can refer to an approach (such as telemedicine) or organization (such as an ACO)

42
Q

The actuary’s role in payment reform (4)

A

1) Lead the pricing exercise
2) Help quantify the risk - help the provider understand the various risks the provider is taking when selecting a payment model
3) Calculate the correct price for the selected payment model
4) Help project and model cash flows

43
Q

Types of risk associated with payment arrangements, from the provider’s perspective (4)

A

1) Utilization risk - the risk that changes in utilization will impact provider profitability
2) Technical risk - the risk of appropriately structuring technical elements of a contract
3) Insurance risk - the risk of variation in demand for medical services over time and the risk of differences in utilization within segments of the insured population. Examples include:
a) Age, gender, and acuity differences
b) Number of high-cost cases vs. average
c) Year-to-year variation in patient demand for services
d) Proportion of the population that has zero claims in a year
4) Performance risk - the risk of inefficiency, suboptimal quality, and high cost of care

44
Q

Types of provider payment models (8)

A

1) FFS - providers are paid for each service they perform, either through a fee schedule or as a percent of charges
2) Global capitation - providers are paid a fixed rate for each member they agree to service. The payment is based on the average costs of the population, rather than the services provided.
3) Shared savings - providers typically get reimbursed using FFS, but they also receive a percentage of the savings they create by reducing utilization below a benchmark. Usually, providers only receive the bonus if they meet certain quality targets.
4) Diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) and case rates - the hospital is paid a single price, or case rate, for an admission rather than a price per day or for each service provided during the stay. There is often an outlier adjustment where the provider gets paid an outlier per diem rate if the admission exceeds a certain number of days.
5) Bundled payments - a single payment is made for an episode of care, which usually starts with a specific DRG or a surgery and extends for a specific future period (typically 30, 60, or 90 days)
6) Reference pricing - a benefit limit (i.e., the reference price) is established for a specific medical procedure or device. The patient must pay the difference between the allowed charge and the reference price.
7) Provider excess loss reinsurance - protects the provider from high-cost outliers. It is generally paired with one of the previous payment models.
8) Pay-for-performance (P4P) - any payment arrangement can include a P4P aspect by including incentives for higher quality of care or disincentives for lower quality. This adds performance risk.

45
Q

Risks to the provider under FFS (4)

A

1) Utilization risk - for most services, the provider’s profit increases as utilization increases
2) Technical risk - this risk is low because FFS is easy to implement, design, and monitor
3) Insurance risk - providers have very little insurance risk. They are not at risk for the year-to-year variation in claims cost of a specified population.
4) Performance risk - this risk may exist if the claims administrators do not carefully monitor nonspecific codes

46
Q

Risks to the provider under global capitation (4)

A

1) Utilization risk - changes in utilization have the opposite impact as in a FFS model. Profit increases for providers as utilization decreases.
2) Technical risk - this risk is quite high. A provider organization will need complex structures in place to allocate money among various providers
3) Insurance risk - all of the insurance risk is transferred to the provider. The provider takes on the risk that members will need more services than was expected when negotiating the capitated rate.
4) Performance risk - the provider is at high risk since it takes on the financial responsibility for all of the care the patient receives

47
Q

Risks to the provider under shared savings (4)

A

1) Utilization risk - because of the complexity of contracts, this risk is hard to quantify
2) Technical risk - this risk is high due to the complexity of calculating benchmarks, reconciling savings, measuring quality, and distributing savings and losses
3) Insurance risk - there is a risk that year-to-year variation in claims costs will result in claims costs that are different than the benchmark
4) Performance risk - there is significant risk regarding whether care management efficiencies can be achieved and whether the benchmark can be met

48
Q

Risks to the provider under DRG/case rates (4)

A

1) Utilization risk - increased admissions lead to increased profits. But the provider has an incentive to reduce the length of stay because for longer stays the provider has additional costs but no additional reimbursement.
2) Technical risk - this risk is low to medium because DRGs have existed for some time and there are established models for creating DRG groupings
3) Insurance risk - the provider is at risk for longer lengths of stay, but not for incidence risk
4) Performance risk - the hospital must be cautious of discharging patients too early. That could increase the risk of readmissions, which carries financial penalties from Medicare.

49
Q

Risks to the provider under bundled payments (4)

A

1) Utilization risk - when the number of episodes increases, provider profits can increase. But within an episode, the provider will need to decrease medically unnecessary services in order to make a profit.
2) Technical risk - this risk is quite high due to challenges such as defining conditions, coordinating care, and partnering among different providers
3) Insurance risk - the provider is at risk for members who have higher allowed costs than the average episode
4) Performance risk - there is risk related to proper discharge planning and communication

50
Q

Risks to the provider under reference pricing (4)

A

1) Utilization risk - members will be less likely to use provider services as their out-of-pocket share increases
2) Technical risk - there is risk related to educating the policyholder on reference pricing
3) Insurance risk - some patients may need high-cost care, in which case the insurance risk is shifted to the patient and away from both the insurer and the provider
4) Performance risk - patients who are charged high amounts for procedures may be unhappy with both their providers and their insurers

51
Q

Risks to the provider under provider excess loss reinsurance (4)

A

1) Utilization risk - this risk is shifted to a reinsurer
2) Technical risk - this risk will vary with the structure of the stop-loss contract. The most common approach is a coinsurance arrangement, which has low technical risk.
3) Insurance risk - the provider’s risk of high outlier costs is somewhat mitigated
4) Performance risk - this risk is highly dependent on the structure of the reinsurance policy

52
Q

Domains of quality from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (5)

A

1) Access to care - whether a patient can readily obtain needed services. Performance measures include the number and geographic distribution of providers.
2) Structure of care - whether care is provided by appropriate providers who use up-to-date technology. Measures include assessment of referral policies and use of electronic health records.
3) Process of care - whether services have been provided to appropriate member subpopulations. One measure is hospital readmission rates.
4) Outcome of care - whether treatment has been effective. Measures include what percentage of patients with diabetes meet blood sugar targets.
5) Experience of care - whether patients are satisfied with the care they have received. Is generally measured by surveys.

53
Q

Factors to consider when modeling payments and cash flows for a provider payment model (7)

A

1) What types of unintended behaviors may occur due to incentives created by the payment model?
2) What other factors would jeopardize achievement of forecasted results?
3) How will results achieved during the model test be replicated?
4) Will the structure and the dimensions of the payment model change over time?
5) Will there be a phased-in approach?
6) How will the payment model promote continuous improvement of the service delivery model?
7) What key factors, including other delivery and payment reforms, may affect this progression?

54
Q

Formula for determining Medicare allowed amounts (3)

A

1) Weights determined based on:
a) RVUs - categorized by CPT codes. There are three components for each RVU: work/practice cost (w), facility/cost of living (f), and malpractice (m)
b) Geographic Practice Cost Index (GPCI) - based on provider ZIP codes
2) Medicare allowed amount = sum of GPCI * RVU for all three components * conversion factor
3) Payments are also adjusted for various reasons, such as who performs the services (e.g., professional surgeon vs. assistant surgeon) and where the service is performed

55
Q

Ways in which provider group-based ACOs are expected to generate savings (3)

A

1) Redirecting care to cost-efficient providers
2) Reducing duplication of services and unnecessary care
3) Preventing medical errors

56
Q

Profit formula for ACOs in the MSSP

A

Net gain/loss = - Revenue reductions + Bonus/share of revenue reductions - start-up costs of the ACO - administrative costs of operating the ACO + Reduction in direct expenses

57
Q

Considerations when negotiating terms of commercial ACO contracts (10)

A

1) Target costs - how are the baseline costs developed? Is there rebasing from one year to the next?
2) Risk adjustment - the actuary can help the payment reform team understand the benefits and impacts of the different risk adjusters to use in creating the target cost
3) Trend - will the baseline and measurement years be trended, and at what rate?
4) Shared savings - what are the savings rate and loss rate, and are the targets achievable?
5) Attribution - the attribution method is extremely important, but the details can be quite complex
6) Random variation - is the number of members attributed to the ACO large enough that gains and losses will not just be due to statistical fluctuation?
7) Stop loss - the ACO and the payer may wish to negotiate specific and aggregate stop loss
8) Data and reports - the ACO will need member-level detail on enrollment, medical claims, and pharmacy claims. It will also need detailed reporting in order to reconcile gains and losses.
9) Quality - are there a sufficient number of measures to ensure reliable results and reasonably determined benchmarks and targets?
10) Infrastructure cost support - will there be a care coordination fee to help the ACO get up and running with its infrastructure?

58
Q

Elements of a DRG contract (6)

A

1) DRG/case rate schedule - shows the case rate for each DRG for an initial length of stay and the per diem for days beyond that level
2) Maximum days - the number of days for which the case rate applies. Cases that exceed that length of stay are then paid a per diem rate for each additional day.
3) Carve-outs for specialty drugs and implant devices - additional payments may be made for these items
4) Stop loss - a contract may also have a stop loss to be applied on a case level
5) Transplants - payment for transplants is usually negotiated separately
6) Readmissions - the contract must state whether payment will be made for readmissions

59
Q

Steps for pricing bundled payments (6)

A

1) Obtain claims data
2) Select DRGs or conditions - look for enough volume, a population that will have similar treatment patterns, and potential for savings that is due to variation in care. Knee and hip procedures are popular selections
3) Define the episode - specify the full time period and mix of services for which the organization is financially responsible and at risk. Typically includes:
a) Anchor stay - period of time between admission and discharge
b) Post-discharge period or post-anchor event period - typically covers 30, 60, or 90 days from the discharge date
c) Post-episode period - covers 30 days past the episode end date as a quality control to make sure providers are not waiting until the end of the episode to provide services
4) Define exclusion criteria - should be easy to implement and not overly specific
5) Estimate cost of the bundle - done by analyzing claims data
6) Identify savings opportunities - these will be different for every episode and every organization. For example, discharging more knee replacement surgery patient to their home instead of a rehabilitation center will lead to savings.

60
Q

Major issues with pay-for-performance methods (5)

A

1) Unintended incentive to avoid the most severely ill patients
2) Gaming the system by miscoding diagnoses or services
3) Coordinated care - incorporating the entire health care system in order to facilitate communication about the patient and discuss best practices among different provider groups
4) Accessible services - providing multiple channels for the patient to be able to reach out and gather information or receive care
5) Quality and safety - implementing quality improvement measures while taking into account the patient’s progress, concerns, and overall well-being

61
Q

Roles of the payment reform team (5)

A

1) Actuary - quantify risks and prepare financial models
2) Chief financial officer - set a budget and allocated resources to keep the health system within the budget
3) Clinicians - provide high-quality care in order to achieve customer satisfaction and good outcomes
4) Coding specialists, data analysts, and information technology specialists - make sure other team members are receiving timely and accurate information
5) Policymakers - address systematic issues such as shortages of primary care physicians

62
Q

Qualities an organization needs to succeed under payment reform (7)

A

1) Highly integrated system
2) Effective care management initiatives
3) More efficient health system than the rest of the market
4) Select and restricted networks
5) Collaborative relationship between the provider organization and payers to reduce costs
6) Reasonable methods to establish capitation rates, episode payments, and other payments
7) Equitable methodology for allocating global capitation payments or quality incentives among the individual participating providers