Notes / Warnings / Cautions (15JAN2019)

Question 1

EMIF (2)

Answer 1

WARNING: Flying with greater than 110% torque with one engine inoperative may result in an unrecoverable decay of Nr in the event of a dual engine failure.

WARNING: With engine anti-ice on, up to 18% torque available is lost. Torque may be reduced as much as 49% with improperly operating engine inlet anti-ice valves.

Question 2

Engine High-Side Failure in Flight (2)

Answer 2

CAUTION: If an Np overspeed condition exists (120%), the overspeed system will flame out the engine and the auto-ignition system will relight the engine. If Nr is not controlled and Np accelerates back to 120%, the overspeed system will flame out the engine again and reset the igniter 5-second timer. The Np overspeed/auto-ignition system will continue cycling until Np/Nr is controlled. A yaw kick may be experienced each time the engine relights.

NOTE: With high collective settings, Nr may increase slowly, making high-side failure confirmation difficult. Reducing collective will reveal increasing Nr and verify high-side failure.

INDICATIONS: all of the following exist

1. TRQ is 10% or greater than the other engine.
2. Ng is 5% or greater than the other engine.
3. Np is matches within 5% of the other engine.
4. Nr is at or above 103%.

Question 3

Engine Low-Side Failure (1)

Answer 3

CAUTION: When an engine is manually controlled with the ENG POWER CONT lever in LOCKOUT, the engine response is much faster and the TGT-limiting system is inoperative. Care must be taken to prevent exceeding TGT limits and keeping Nr and Np in their operating; however, the Np overspeed system will still be operative.

INDICATIONS: all of the following indictions exist

1. TRQ is 10% below the good engine.
2. Ng is 5% or less than the good engine.
3. Np is at or below 98%.
4. Nr is at or below 97%.

Question 4

Engine Torque or TGT Spiking/Fluctuations (1)

Answer 4

WARNING: PCL movement during engine fluctuations may precipitate an engine failure. Consider performing APU Emergency Start procedure prior to manipulating the PCL. Maintaining a low power setting when moving the PCL will minimize the Nr decay rate if the malfunctioning engine fails.

Question 5

Compressor Stall (1)

Answer 5

If the Ng decay relight feature attempts to relight the engine, subsequent compressor stalls may occur and damage the engine. A yaw kick may be experienced each time the engine relights. The engine must be manually shut down.

Question 6

Engine High-Speed Shaft Failure (2)

Answer 6

CAUTION: Following a high-speed shaft failure, the engine will overspeed, the Np overspeed system will flame out the engine, and the auto-ignition system will activate the relight feature. The engine Np governor will eventually bring Np down toward 100%. The engine must be manually shut down to prevent further damage.

NOTE: The engine Np sensor is unreliable with Np < 20%. For this reason any (#1/#2) DRVSHAFT FAIL should be acknowledged and ignored when engine Np < 20%. No maintenance action is required when in this condition.

Question 7

Abort Start (1)

Answer 7

CAUTION: During aborted starts, failure to secure fuel flow may result in engine overtemperature.

Abort engine start if any of the following occur:

1. Ng does not reach 14% within 6 seconds after starter initiation
2. No oil pressure within 30 seconds after starter initiation
3. No light-off within 30 seconds after moving the PCL to IDLE
4. ENG STARTER advisory disappears before reaching 52% Ng
5. TGT is likely to exceed 851* Celsius before idle speed is attained

Question 8

Dual Engine Failure (3)

Answer 8

WARNING: Rotor RPM decays rapidly following a dual-engine failure or the loss of the second engine after a single-engine failure. Delay in lowering the collective will result in loss of rotor RPM and may cause catastrophic failure of the rotor system due to the dynamic instability at low RPM.

WARNING: Altitude hold will remain engaged unless deselected. If the collective TRIM RLSE switch is not depressed, the AFCS will attempt to maintain aircraft altitude. AFCS commanded collective movement could result in a catastrophic loss of Nr.

WARNING: Flying with greater than 110% torque with one engine inoperative may result in an unrecoverable decay of Nr in the event of a dual-engine failure. (If both engines fail, generators will drop offline at approximately 80% Nr, resulting in the loss of both pilot and copilot mission and flight displays.)

Question 9

Single Engine Failure in Flight (1)

Answer 9

WARNING: Engine failure accompanied by an explosion or unusual noise indicates damage to the engine. There is a possibility that any attempt to restart the engine may result in a fire. Under such circumstances, do not try to restart the engine unless it is needed to maintain level flight.

Question 10

Engine Air Restart (3)

Answer 10

WARNING: If APU is unavailable, and a crossbleed start is necessary, maximum torque available will be reduced during the start sequence. Depending on operating conditions, level flight may not be possible. Ensure AIR SOURCE ECS/START switch is placed to ENG for crossbleed starts.

CAUTION: For a crossbleed start, the donor engine should indicated the maximum Ng safely obtainable. Receiving engine Ng less than 24% prior to advancing PCL to IDLE may result in a hot start.

NOTE: Either a single- or dual-engine restart may be attempted following dual-engine failure. Decision should be based on applicability of respective start envelopes and considerations of longer time to idle when executing a dual-engine restart.

Question 11

Unusual Vibrations on Deck (1)

Answer 11

CAUTION: Application of the rotor brake may aggravate the lead/lag tendencies and cause a mechanical failure.

Question 12

Hung Droop Stops (1)

Answer 12

NOTE: While operating in cold weather, consideration should be given to turning the BLADE DE-ICE control panel POWER switch to the POWER ON position. This will activate the droop-stop heaters and aid the droop stops in seating.

Question 13

Main Transmission Malfunction (5)

Answer 13

WARNING: Possible indications of main transmission imminent failure may include: yaw attitude excursions with no control input, an increase in power required for a fixed collective setting, failure of a main generator or hydraulic pump, increased noise, increased vibration levels, or abnormal fumes in the cabin.

WARNING: Operation of the main gearbox with no oil pressure may result in failure of the tail rotor drive takeoff pinion gear and subsequent loss of tail rotor drive.

NOTE: Consideration should be given to performing the applicable steps of the Immediate Landing/Ditching emergency procedure and transiting at a minimum power airspeed and low altitude profile (approximately 80 feet and 80 KIAS) to permit a quick flare followed by and immediate landing/ditching.

NOTE: A loss of all main transmission lubricating oil may result in unreliable temperature indications from the main transmission temperature gauge and temperature sensor (caution).

NOTE: Continued operations in the precautionary range for temperature and pressure are acceptable provided that the ambient conditions and flight regime of the aircraft correspond with the guidance set for in the transmission limitations section of Chapter 4.

Question 14

Tail/Intermediate Transmission Malfunction (2)

Answer 14

WARNING: High power settings require maximum performance of the tail rotor drive system and may precipitate ultimate drive failure.

WARNING: Consideration should be given to transiting at an altitude sufficient to enter an autorotation and performing the applicable steps of the Immediate Landing/Ditching emergency procedure.

Question 15

(#1/#2) Input Chip Caution (1)

Answer 15

NOTE: Consideration should be given to returning the engine PCL to FLY for landing.

Question 16

Loss of Tail Rotor Drive Altitude and Airspeed Sufficient to Establish Autorotation (1)

Answer 16

WARNING: Altitude hold will remain engaged unless deselected. If the collective TRIM RLSE button is not depressed, the AFCS will attempt to maintain aircraft altitude through the collective trim servo. AFCS commanded collective movement can result in an accelerated yaw rate.

Question 17

Loss of Tail Rotor Drive Altitude and Airspeed Insufficient to Establish Autorotation (1)

Answer 17

CAUTION: Altitude may have to be adjusted based on rate of yaw and/or turn.

Question 18

Loss of Tail Rotor Control (6)

Answer 18

WARNING: Servo hardovers in the yaw channel may result in loss of tail rotor control. Consideration should be given to securing the SAS/BOOST and/or TRIM as necessary.

WARNING: Following the appearance of the #1 TAIL RTR SERVO caution without the associated BKUP PUMP ON and #2 TAIL RTR SERVO ON advisories, the aircraft will demonstrate normal yaw responses in flight regimes that do not require excessive tail rotor performance; however, at slower airspeeds, below approximately 40 KIAS, more pronounced effects of loss of tail rotor control may become more apparent.

WARNING: After touchdown, rapid reduction of collective or PCLs may cause excessive and uncontrollable yaw rates.

WARNING: If an uncontrolled right yaw develops at too low of an airspeed, loss of waveoff capability may result. Increasing collective may increase yaw to unrecoverable rates. Performing loss of tail rotor drive (altitude and airspeed not sufficient to establish autorotation) procedures may be required.

WARNING: If the tail rotor control cables are damaged, the hydraulic transients associated with switching the tail rotor servo from NORM to BKUP may cause catastrophic damage to the tail rotor controls.

NOTE: A momentary uncommanded right yaw will occur when the tail rotor servo switches from normal to backup in a hover. The rate and magnitude will primarily depend on power required and wind direction.

Question 19

Tail Rotor Quadrant Caution (1)

Answer 19

CAUTION: If the helicopter is shut down and/or hydraulic power is removed with one tail rotor cable failure, disconnect of the other tail rotor cable will occur when force from the boost servo cannot react against control cable quadrant spring tension. The quadrant spring will displace the cable and servo piston enough to unlatch the quadrant cable.

Question 20

1 Primary Servo or #1 Transfer Module Leak (2)

Answer 20

WARNING: Failure to ensure BACKUP HYD PUMP switch is in AUTO or ON position prior to landing with a #1 RSVR LOW or #1 HYD PUMP caution present will result in a loss of tail rotor control when the weight on wheels switch is activated.

NOTE: Be prepared for loss of tail rotor control.

Question 21

2 Primary Servo or #2 Transfer Module Leak (2)

Answer 21

WARNING: Failure to ensure BACKUP HYD PUMP switch is in AUTO or ON position prior to landing with a #2 HYD PUMP caution present will result in loss of pilot assist servos when the weight on wheels switch is activated.

NOTE: Be prepared for loss of the pilot-assist servos.

Question 22

Boost Servo Hardover (2)

Answer 22

CAUTION: Up to 75 pounds of left pedal force will be required when hovering with boost servos off with starboard crosswinds. This value is significantly reduced with port crosswinds.

CAUTION: Landings with BOST SERVO OFF on all single spot air-capable ships should only be attempted if there is no large landing platform (LPD or larger) or shore base available.

Question 23

AFCS Degraded (1)

Answer 23

NOTE: If the AFCS DEGRADED caution appears during a night/IMC coupled hover or automatic approach, Consideration may be given to continuing hover/approach if not disoriented or unstable.

Question 24

Stab Auto Mode Failure (7)

Answer 24

WARNING: It is possible for the stabilator to fail without illumination of the stabilator caution and associated aural warning tone. In this case, the first indication of failure will be an uncommanded pitch change.

WARNING: Reengagement of the automatic mode after a shutdown results in the automatic mode operating for 1 second. If a hardover signal to one actuator was the cause of the initial shutdown, and reengagement is attempted, the actuator will move before another disengagement is commanded. In this case, subsequent reengagement shall not be attempted since it may result in additional stabilator movement. If acceleration is continued with the stabilator in the full down position, longitudinal control will be lost. The stabilator shall be slewed to 0* as airspeed increases above 40 KIAS.

WARNING: With large fixed stabilator angles, reduction in collective pitch results in increased aft cyclic requirements. Collective reduction during recovery from a trailing edge down stabilator flight condition should be minimal. If the stabilator becomes fixed at or near 0*, nose-high attitudes may occur at slow airspeeds.

WARNING: A combination of high airspeed/low altitude coupled with a runaway down stabilator (indicated by a significant uncommanded nose-down pitch change) will necessitate immediate pilot action to maintain control of the aircraft. Primary consideration is to disengage the automatic mode by activating manual mode slewing as required.

WARNING: At high airspeeds, immediate recognition and flight control input are essential to avoid an unrecoverable attitude. It is essential for the PNAC to slew the stabilator to 0* immediately to gain control of the aircraft. If acceleration is continued with the stabilator in the full down position, longitudinal control will be lost.

WARNING: Without stabilator auto mode, careful aircrew coordination to manually slew the stabilator is required to avoid undesirable and potentially dangerous flight regimes and/or aircraft attitudes.

NOTE: In manual mode, the following are not recommended:

• Swimmer deployments lower than 15 feet AGL.
• Night takeoffs, approaches, and landings (except one-time landing following failure).
• Automatic approaches to a hover.
• Simulated emergency procedures, including practice autorotations.
• Flight into known IMC.

Airspeed vs Stab Angle limits:
0*/ 150 KIAS
10* / 100 KIAS
20* / 80 KIAS
30* / 60 KIAS
40* / 45 KIAS

Question 25

Electrical Power Failure / Dual Generator Failure (4)

Answer 25

WARNING: Loss of electrical power to the engine will result in engine anti-ice activation regardless of engine anti-ice or DE-ICE MASTER switch position, reducing maximum torque available by up to 18%. With a malfunctioning inlet anti-ice valve, torque available can be reduced as much as 49%.

WARNING: Exceeding airspeed versus stabilator angle limits may result in unrecoverable pitch angles.

NOTE: The stabilator position indicator will be inoperative with no power to the AC essential bus. Attempt to check visually.

NOTE: The capability of slewing the stabilator is retained via the DC essential bus using battery power. Travel is limited to 35* if full down or 30* if full up when a power failure occurs

Question 26

(#1/#2) Fuel Filter Bypass or (#1/#2) Fuel Pressure Caution (1)

Answer 26

WARNING: intermittent appearance of a FUEL PRESS caution may be an indication of air leaking into the fuel supply lines, which could cause momentary fluctuations in engine power or flameout.

Question 27

1 and #2 Fuel Filter Bypass or #1 and #2 Fuel Pressure Caution (3)

Answer 27

WARNING: Intermittent appearance of a FUEL PRESS caution may be an indication of air leaking into the fuel supply lines, which could cause momentary fluctuations in engine power or flameout.

WARNING: Be prepared for a dual-engine Failure. Recommended airspeed is 80 KIAS to minimize Nr droop should a dual-engine failure occur.

NOTE: Consideration should be given to performing the applicable steps of the Immediate Landing/Ditching emergency procedure.

Question 28

External Engine Fire (1)

Answer 28

NOTE: HF transmissions, sunlight filtered through smoke, haze, water, or at sunrise or sunset may trigger the fire detectors and cause a false fire indication.

Question 29

APU Fire

Answer 29

NOTE: HF transmissions, sunlight filtered through smoke, haze, water or at sunrise or sunset may trigger the fire detectors and cause a false fire indication

Question 30

Cockpit Fire/Cabin Fire (6)

Answer 30

WARNING: Severity of the fire and conditions present will dictate whether an immediate landing/ditching is required.

WARNING: Vapors from the portable fire extinguisher agent, although not poisonous, can cause asphyxiation by displacement of oxygen in a confined space. The cabin should be ventilated as soon as practicable.

WARNING: It may not be advisable to secure all electrical power, this losing AFCS, ICS, and flight instruments prior to achieving VMC or landing/ditching.

WARNING: Loss of electrical power to the engine will result in engine anti-ice activation regardless of engine anti-ice or DE-ICE MASTER switch position, reducing maximum torque available by up to 18%. With a malfunctioning inlet anti-ice valve, torque may be reduced as much as 49%.

CAUTION: If source of the fire is unknown, consideration should be given to securing Mission Power immediately when securing unnecessary electrical equipment to prevent system damage.

NOTE: Consideration should be given to selecting the Diagnostics (DIAG) page in order to identify failing components.

Question 31

Immediate Landing/Ditching (4)

Answer 31

WARNING: Stores jettisoned at descent rates greater than those listed in the NATIP have not been tested. Aircraft/rotor system impact from jettisoned stores may be possible.

WARNING: After actuation, the position of the emergency jettison window lever may cause snagging or personal survival gear, impeding egress. Time permitting, reset jettison handle to the aft position prior to egress.

WARNING: Failure to remain strapped in aircraft until all violent motion or in-rushing water stops may result in injury or incapacitation.

CAUTION: Time permitting, consideration should be given to executing APU Emergency Start procedure to maintain electrical and hydraulic power upon rotor disengagement.

Question 32

Underwater Egress (5)

Answer 32

WARNING: The downward stroke of the seat will change the frame of reference needed for egress. Extended handles, windows, and controls will not be located in the same relative position. Keep legs clear from under seat area. Downward travel of the seat may cause injury or entrapment.

WARNING: Do not inflate LPU until outside helicopter.

WARNING: Water pressure may prevent opening the emergency egress windows until the cabin fills with water. The windows should be jettisoned prior to water entry to optimize the ability of the crew to safely egress.

WARNING: Failure to disconnect ICS cord can impede egress. Personal gear may snag during egress, notably on collectives, MTS HCUs, Parking Brake and RAST release handles, PCLs/Fuel Selectors/Fire T-Handles, or extended Emergency Jettison Window handles.

WARNING: If entanglement or disorientation delays egress, hold onto a reference point with one hand. Using the other hand, place the Emergency Breathing Device second stage regulator in your mouth, clear water from your mouthpiece, and continue egress.

Question 33

Dual-EGI Failure (1)

Answer 33

NOTE: Do not initiate a manual or auto test via the diagnostics page for troubleshooting EGI issues. It will cause the EGI to freeze and remove the batteries to clear the problem.