moral realism

Question 1

cognitivism and non-cognitivism

Answer 1

• cognitivists argue that sentences express beliefs and so, are propositions which are truth apt (either true or false)
• non-cognitivists argue that moral sentences are not propositions and neither true or false; instead they have another function (eg acting as prescriptive commands)

Question 2

realism and anti-realism

Answer 2

• realists and anti-realists disagree about whether there is anything in the world which our moral concepts (like good) actually refer
• realists argue that there are real moral properties or facts which exist independently of human minds
• anti realists argue that no such properties exist and that moral terms refer to something else, eg the expression of an emotion

Question 3

moral naturalism

Answer 3

• naturalism is type of moral realism, arguing that moral properties/facts are natural properties of the world
• moral naturalism leads to a cognitivist view of moral language since our ethical judgements are true or false insofar as they correctly (or incorrectly) refer to those natural properties of the world

Question 4

moral naturalism and
act utilitarianism

Answer 4

• Jeremy Bentham argued that all humans aim to secure pleasure and avoid pain - these are psychological and hence, natural properties
• following from this descriptive fact, he draws a prescriptive conclusion - we ought to maximise pleasure and minimise pain

Question 5

moral naturalism and rule utilitarianism

Answer 5

• John Stuart Mill begins his ‘proof’ of utilitarianism with a natural fact, namely that happiness is what each person desires
• he concludes that happiness is ‘the good’ because each person’s happiness is desirable
• G.E Moore criticises Mill for arguing ‘desired = desirable = good’ and for appearing to reduce moral terms like ‘good’ to natural terms like ‘desired’ (however, most argue that Moore misunderstood Mill)

Question 6

moral naturalism and virtue ethics

Answer 6

• Aristotle’s virtue ethics may be based on natural facts but it is not a theory that reduces moral terms to naturalistic properties
• however, Aristotle’s theory is naturalistic to this extent:
• for Aristotle, ‘the good’ is the thing humans most value and we can empirically determine this by looking at what people strive for, namely to live the best possible life: eudemonia; this is a natural fact about human behaviour
• for Aristotle, ‘the good’ can be determined by the type of thing we are
• he argues that to live the good life for a human, you need to live as a good human
• to be a good human means fulfilling your function well
• our function is a natural fact about us, which for humans is to be guided by reason
• so using our reason (which is a natural fact) is bound up with moral good

Question 7

moral non naturalism

Answer 7

• there are moral properties/facts but that these aren’t natural properties - they are special, non natural properties
• non naturalism is a form of moral realism and it leads to a cognitivist view of moral language, as our ethical judgements refer (truly or falsely) to these non natural properties

Question 8

intuitionism

Answer 8

• G.E Moore’s analysis of ethical language led him to conclude that naturalism and utilitarianism are wrong about moral judgements
• Moore argued that, in contrast to utilitarianism, we can’t sense moral properties nor can we argue for them on the basis of evidence
• Moore maintains ‘the autonomy of ethics’ - that ethical judgements are unique and cannot be analysed in non moral or natural terms
• if moral properties are not natural, then how do we come to discover them; Moore argues that moral truths (e.g. ‘killing is wrong) are grasped as self evident intuitions (we know things intuitively)
• and his theory is known as intuitionism
• Moore believes he can show naturalism to be deeply flawed through both both his open question argument and his identification of the naturalistic fallacy

Question 9

Moore’s open question argument

Answer 9

• for Moore, terms are either definable (e.g. bachelor) or indefinable
• we can double check a definition with further questioning
• if our double check leads to a closed question (one you can answer only with either a yes or no), then we have found a genuine definition
• if our double check leads to an open question (requiring further investigation), then we have not found a genuine definition
• so for Moore, if we genuinely can define ‘good’ as X, then asking ‘but is X really good?’ would be a closed question
• yet, ‘is X really good?’ is actually an open question which means that ‘good’ is indefinable and that meta ethical theories like naturalism (which reduce moral terms to natural properties) are wrong

Question 10

Moore’s naturalistic theory

Answer 10

the naturalistic fallacy identified by Moore as a further problem for moral naturalism is just a special form of a more general fallacy (mistaken belief), namely:
- a term that is indefinable cannot be defined
- any attempt to define the indefinable is fallacious
- when Moore applies this to naturalism, it becomes the naturalistic fallacy
- good is indefinable (it is simple and unanalysable)
- utilitarians (and other moral naturalists) attempt to define the good on natural terms
- hence, utilitarianism is guilty of the naturalistic fallacy

Question 11

criticism of Moore’s naturalistic fallacy

Answer 11

• Moore may have misunderstood Mill’s argument
• Warnock argues that Mill does not define ‘good’ or ‘desirable’, he simply informs us that people already consider happiness to be good (and desirable)
• it is an empirical observation and it does not entail that Mill thinks good = happiness

Question 12

strengths of moral naturalism

Answer 12

• removes need for reference to anything supernatural or divine
• enables us to determine what is right and wrong
• accounts for how moral disagreement is possible
• accounts for our intuition that morality is universal and objective
• leads to a clear (cognitivist) account of how ethical language is meaningful

Question 13

weaknesses of moral naturalism

Answer 13

• overly reductive - reducing complex moral terms to simple natural properties
• guilty of the naturalistic fallacy
• guilty of Moore’s open question argument
• guilty of moving from an ‘is’ to an ‘ought’
• doesn’t account for some of our experience of morality as subjective or relative

Question 14

strengths of moral non naturalism

Answer 14

• enables us to determine what is right and wrong
• accounts for our intuition that morality is universal and objective
• leads to a clear (cognitivist) account of how ethical language is meaningful
• preserves the ‘autonomy of ethics’
• avoids reducing moral terms to natural terms

Question 15

weaknesses of moral non naturalism

Answer 15

• moral facts exist in a mysterious moral realm
• Mill may not be guilty of the naturalistic fallacy
• we don’t experience moral truths as ‘self evident’
• some experience morality as subjective or relative
• is wrong in its analysis of the meaning of moral terms

Question 16

issues with moral realism

Answer 16

• Hume’s fork
• moral judgements are not beliefs (Hume)
• is-ought gap (Hume)
• Ayer’s verification principle
• arguments from relativity (Mackie)
• argument from queerness (Mackie)

Question 17

Hume’s fork - issue with moral realism
(1/3)

Answer 17

• Hume makes an important distinction between two ways in which we can see, properly reason and find out truths about the world
• this distinction has become Hume’s fork
• moral realists are cognitivists and believe moral judgments can be true or false, but Hume’s fork tells us moral judgments are neither true nor false
• he sees moral judgments as referring to our approval or disapproval when when we see actions
• Hume’s fork tells us the only two possible ways in which a moral judgement could be true or false

Question 18

the two prongs of Hume’s fork
(2/3)

Answer 18

1. relations of ideas:
   - maths, logic
   - known a priori, by thinking about concepts alone
   - true by definition
   - certain (to deny them is a contradiction)
2. matters of fact:
   - science, observations/generalisations about the world
   - known a posteriori
   - true because of the way the world is
   - not certain (it is conceivable to deny them)

Question 19

in what ways are moral judgements true or false
(3/3)

Answer 19

• are they relations of ideas: no - moral judgements are not certain (they can be denied without contradiction)
• are they matters of fact: no - moral judgments are not matters of fact, we can’t ‘see’ that (e.g.) killing is wrong
• conclusion: moral judgments are neither true or false
• so if Hume is correct and moral judgments are neither true nor false, then moral realism collapses
• Hume instead sees moral judgments as referring to our feelings of approval or disapproval when we see virtuous or vicious actions

Question 20

Ayer’s verification principle - issue with moral realism

Answer 20

• distinguishes meaningful statements from nonsense

a sentence is meaningful if and only if;
1. it is a tautology (that is true by definition) or
2. verifiable through sense experience

• in order to say something is meaningful, we must know what makes our statement true (how to verify it)
• Ayer believed that if a statement is not a tautology and if there is no empirical way of discovering its truth, then it is meaningless
• for Ayer, all moral judgements fail the principle: e.g. ‘stealing is wrong’ is not true by definition and it cannot be verified by any empirical investigation
• Ayer argues that moral judgements have no meaning at all:
• P1 only statements that meet the verification principle have meaning
• P2 moral judgements do not meet this principle
• C therefore, moral judgments are meaningless
• Ayer is non cognitivist about moral language and his theory of emotivism views moral judgements as expressions of our feelings of approval/disapproval
• if Ayer is correct, then moral judgments are neither true nor false (thus cognitivism is wrong) and they do not refer to any mind independent properties/facts (thus moral realism is wrong)

Question 21

criticism of Ayer’s verification principle

Answer 21

• it is commonly noted that the most straight version of Ayer’s verification principle fails its own criteria as it is neither true by definition nor empirically verifiable
• by using a flawed conceptual tool (the VP), Ayer may be wrong in his analysis of moral judgments

Question 22

moral judgments are not beliefs - issue with moral realism
(1/4)

Answer 22

• his account of moral motivation leads him to conclude that moral judgments cannot be beliefs and his argument can be summarised as followed:

P1 - moral judgments (e.g. its good to help other people) motivate us to act (internalism)
P2 - beliefs and reason can never motivate us to act (the Humean theory of motivation)
C - therefore, moral judgments cannot be beliefs

Question 23

the Humean theory of motivation
(2/4)

Answer 23

• imagine that moral judgments are founded on beliefs and reason, then we would be motivated by either relations of ideas or matters of fact (Hume’s fork)
• but relations of ideas do not motivate us, simply understanding maths or logic doesn’t drive us to action
• nor do matters of facts motivate us, knowing what is true or false about the world is helpful but it doesn’t make us take action by itself
• there is something else in our psychological make up that drives us to action

Question 24

Hume on ‘desire’
(3/4)

Answer 24

• reason and belief are important as they give us a picture of what the world is like (what is true and what is false)
• but knowing what is true about the world (e.g. knowing that there is jam at the back of the fridge) doesn’t lead to action
• what is needed is desire (what Hume calls ‘affections’ and ‘passions’ (e.g. wanting a marmalade sandwich)
• these passions lead to action
• therefore, according to Hume, it is our passions, not our reasons, that drive action

P1 - moral judgments (e.g. it is good to help others) motivate us to act
P2 - beliefs and reason can never motivate us to act
C - therefore moral judgments cannot be beliefs

Question 25

Hume’s conclusion for moral judgments are not beliefs
(4/4)

Answer 25

• if Hume is right, then moral judgments cannot be true or false (as they are not beliefs), in which case cognitivist theories of ethical language are incorrect
• moreover, if Hume is right, then moral judgments have their source inside us, in our emotions, passions and desires and so moral judgments do not represent something independent to us, they do not refer to external moral properties or facts
• in which case moral realism is incorrect

Question 26

Hume’s is-ought gap - issue with moral realism

Answer 26

• the fact/value problem is based on the principle that there is a difference between what truth (fact) is and what is right (value)
• a fact is an actual state of the world (e.g. Mount Everest is the tallest mountain)
• a value is something good, or something one believes to be good
• Hume argues that philosophers speak about certain facts and then make an illegitimate leap to tell us how to behave
• he argues that we have no justification for making this leap
• Hume argues that any moral judgment about what is right or wrong is beyond the possibility of factual description and human reason
• he says that it is impossible to make any firm moral judgments as we are unable to know exactly what is right or wrong, good or bad because they are based on values rather than on facts

Question 27

the is-ought gap in premises

Answer 27

P1 - judgments of reason describe what is the case
P2 - judgments of value prescribe what ought to be the case
P3 - judgments of reason and judgments of value are therefore entirely different from one another - there is a gap between ‘is and ought’
C - therefore, you can’t draw conclusions about value (ought), based on premises about reason (is), i.e. you can’t derive an ought from an is - this is known as Hume’s law

Question 28

Mackie’s arguments from relativity - issue with moral realism

Answer 28

Mackie aims to show that morality is not objective, it is subjective and that moral realism is incorrect as there are no moral properties or facts that exist independently of us

• P1 - there are differences in moral codes from society to society (moral judgments appear to be made relative to each society)
• P2 - accompanying these radical differences are disagreements between people and moral codes
• P3 - disagreements may occur between people wither because:
  a.) there is an objective truth about the matter but people’s perception of it are distorted
  or
  b.) there is no objective truth about the matter
• P4 - moral disagreements may occur between people wither because:
  a.) there are objective moral values but people’s perceptions of these are distorted
  or
  b.) there are no objective moral values, they are simply reflections of different ways of living
• C - the best explanation of moral disagreements is that there are no objective moral values

so for Mackie, the different moral codes between societies are best explained by viewing those codes as the products of a particular society in a particular context. if this relativistic view is correct, then there are no objective moral values and moral realism is incorrect

Question 29

criticism of Mackie’s arguments from relativity

Answer 29

• perhaps there in fact common ethical principles present in all societies (e.g. don’t tell lies)
• this may be evidence that the moral realist is correct in saying that these fundamental principles are objective and not relative

Question 30

Mackie’s argument from queerness

Answer 30

Mackie’s second argument is that if moral realism is correct, then the world must contain two peculiar features:
1. metaphysical queerness
2. epistemological queerness

Question 31

metaphysical queerness

Answer 31

• Mackie believes that one of the essential features of moral values is that they provide motivation to action
• therefore, according to Mackie, moral realism is committed to a belief
  a.) in the existence of strange objective moral properties in the world and
  b.) that these peculiar moral properties are somehow able to generate a motivation for action
• Mackie argues that this absurd position is a good indication that moral realism is wrong
• it is our needs, desires, hopes, etc that motivates us, not bits of the world out there

Question 32

epistemological queerness

Answer 32

• according to Mackie, the moral realist must also be committed to believing that we have a mysterious faculty which enables us to detect these peculiar moral properties
• Moore talks about ‘intuition’ and other moral realists must also require us to have this strange moral sense which no one can point to or explain or even name
• Mackie calls this ‘lame’ because simply asserting that we have a special moral sense is inadequate as an explanation
• Mackie’s conclusion is that a far simpler explanation is that there are no objective moral properties and so no need for any special faculty or sense