Module 3 Flashcards
Distributive Bargaining
Effective when maximizing your own outcome when relationship is not important
Assumptions of Distributive bargaining
- Fixed resources to be divided
- One party gains the other party loses (win/lose)
- Interests are diametrically opposed.
- Over one single issue
- Relationship is not strong
- hardball tactics are normative and expected.
BATNA
What happens if I don’t make this deal?
Good BATNA
- More Value you can claim
- The more aggressive you can be
- Can anchor you in terms of what you belive is a reasonable outcome.
Reservation Prive
Least willing to accept. Try to learn the other side’s reservation price.
Aspiration Level
What you want to achieve.
Bargaining Zone
The zone between the two offers
Settlement Zone
Where settlement occurs, between the parties’ reservation prices
Information Gathering
- Generally do not want to disclose RP, BATNA
- Pattern of concessions may signal RP
- Pay attention to consistency.
- Watch body language.
HighBall/LowBall
Open with high price often can’t justify it
Intimidation
trying to intimidate the other party
Bogey
pretend that an issue is important when it is not.
Nibble
trying to get them to make a small concession or and the end of the deal you make a small request.
Chicken
making a threat of some negative action tiring to dare them into something
Good cop/Bad Cop
someone in the negotiation to be with you. (What parent to go to when you need something for this or that)