Mixed Questions - Set 33 Flashcards
Thirty years ago, a power company constructed a power dam on a river. At the time the dam was constructed, the power company solicited and received express easements from all of the landowners in the river valley, including a farmer. The power company paid fair value for the easements, which would allow the company to release water from the dam at certain times of the year, resulting in flooding of the land in the river valley.
In the 30 years since the dam was constructed, the farmer’s property has never been flooded, and the farmer has been using his land in the same way as he did 30 years ago. Now, however, the power company wants to substantially increase power production from the dam. All landowners in the valley were notified by the company that henceforth all 200,000 acres (including the farmer’s 200 acres) would be flooded in accordance with the company’s rights under the easement. The farmer reviewed the easement for his property and discovered that it lacked the requisite grantor’s acknowledgment and thus was improperly recorded. The state’s adverse possession statute requires hostile occupation for a period of 20 years.
May the power company properly flood the farmer’s land under the terms of the easement?
A Yes, because such flooding is within the terms of the easement.
B No, because the state’s adverse possession statute requires hostile occupation for a period of only 20 years.
C No, because the company has failed to exercise its rights under the easement for 30 years, and the easement has lapsed.
D No, because the easement was not properly acknowledged and recorded.
A
The power company received an express easement entitling it to flood the farmer’s property. To create an easement by express grant, there must be a writing signed by the grantor. If validly created, an easement is presumed to be of perpetual duration. No facts suggest that this easement was impliedly created or prematurely terminated. (B) is incorrect because the requirements for extinguishing an easement by adverse use for the prescriptive period have not been fulfilled. To extinguish an easement by prescription, the owner of the servient tenement must so interfere with the easement as to create a cause of action in favor of the easement holder. The interference must be open, notorious, continuous, and nonpermissive for the prescriptive period. The farmer has done nothing (such as using his land in a different manner) that would indicate an interference with the power company’s easement so as to give rise to a cause of action in favor of the company. (C) is incorrect because mere nonuse will not terminate an easement. To terminate an easement, the nonuse must rise to the level of abandonment, which requires physical action by the easement holder that manifests an intention to permanently abandon (e.g., construction of a structure on the easement holder’s property that would make it impossible to use the easement). The power company has taken no physical action that could be characterized as an abandonment of the easement. (D) is incorrect because improper recordation does not affect the rights of the original parties to the transaction. To be properly recorded, an instrument generally must be acknowledged before a notary public. Although an unacknowledged instrument does not impart constructive notice to subsequent purchasers, it has absolutely no effect on the validity of the easement as between the original parties.
A grantor executed a valid deed conveying a tract of land to a city “for the purpose of constructing a planetarium thereon.” The city held the property for a number of years, but decided on another site for the planetarium. When presented an offer to purchase the property by a privately owned garbage collection company, the city accepted and conveyed the land to the company.
Which of the following statements about the title of the tract of land is true?
A The grantor’s conveyance to the city created a fee simple determinable in the city and a possibility of reverter in the grantor.
B Upon conveyance of the land to the company, the property reverted back to the grantor.
C The company owns the land in fee simple absolute.
D The company owns the land, but it will revert to the grantor or his successors in interest if the property is used for anything other than a planetarium.
C
The garbage collection company owns the tract of land in fee simple absolute because the city had a fee simple absolute, which it conveyed to the company. The language in the deed “for the purpose of constructing a planetarium” merely expresses the grantor’s motive for conveying the property; the city received the estate that the grantor had, a fee simple absolute. Because the city held a fee simple absolute, that is what it conveyed to the company. (A) is wrong because the grant does not create a fee simple determinable. A fee simple determinable is an estate that automatically terminates on the happening of a stated event. To create a fee simple determinable, durational language (e.g., “for so long as,” “until”) must be used. Here, the grant does not contain the durational language necessary to create a fee simple determinable. Because the interest is not a fee simple determinable, the grantor cannot have a possibility of reverter. (B) is wrong for two reasons: (i) as explained above, a fee simple determinable was not created by the grant; and (ii) even if a fee simple determinable had been created, the transfer of the property would not by itself cause it to revert back to the grantor. Determinable estates are alienable; the successor merely takes subject to the condition. The conveyance of a fee simple determinable would not automatically result in the property reverting to the grantor (i.e., the company could build a planetarium on the property and avoid the property reverting back to the grantor). (D) is wrong because the grant did not create a fee simple determinable. (Had the grant contained the proper durational language, rather than “for the purpose of,” (D) would have been correct. In that case, the company would own the land subject to the estate being terminated if the land is not used for a planetarium.)
Thirty years ago, a power company constructed a power dam on a river. At the time the dam was constructed, the power company solicited and received express easements from all of the landowners in the river valley, including a farmer. The power company paid fair value for the easements, which would allow the company to release water from the dam at certain times of the year, resulting in flooding of the land in the river valley.
In the 30 years since the dam was constructed, the farmer’s property has never been flooded, and the farmer has been using his land in the same way as he did 30 years ago. Now, however, the power company wants to substantially increase power production from the dam. All landowners in the valley were notified by the company that henceforth all 200,000 acres (including the farmer’s 200 acres) would be flooded in accordance with the company’s rights under the easement. The farmer reviewed the easement for his property and discovered that it lacked the requisite grantor’s acknowledgment and thus was improperly recorded. The state’s adverse possession statute requires hostile occupation for a period of 20 years.
May the power company properly flood the farmer’s land under the terms of the easement?
A Yes, because such flooding is within the terms of the easement.
B No, because the state’s adverse possession statute requires hostile occupation for a period of only 20 years.
C No, because the company has failed to exercise its rights under the easement for 30 years, and the easement has lapsed.
D No, because the easement was not properly acknowledged and recorded.
A
The power company received an express easement entitling it to flood the farmer’s property. To create an easement by express grant, there must be a writing signed by the grantor. If validly created, an easement is presumed to be of perpetual duration. No facts suggest that this easement was impliedly created or prematurely terminated. (B) is incorrect because the requirements for extinguishing an easement by adverse use for the prescriptive period have not been fulfilled. To extinguish an easement by prescription, the owner of the servient tenement must so interfere with the easement as to create a cause of action in favor of the easement holder. The interference must be open, notorious, continuous, and nonpermissive for the prescriptive period. The farmer has done nothing (such as using his land in a different manner) that would indicate an interference with the power company’s easement so as to give rise to a cause of action in favor of the company. (C) is incorrect because mere nonuse will not terminate an easement. To terminate an easement, the nonuse must rise to the level of abandonment, which requires physical action by the easement holder that manifests an intention to permanently abandon (e.g., construction of a structure on the easement holder’s property that would make it impossible to use the easement). The power company has taken no physical action that could be characterized as an abandonment of the easement. (D) is incorrect because improper recordation does not affect the rights of the original parties to the transaction. To be properly recorded, an instrument generally must be acknowledged before a notary public. Although an unacknowledged instrument does not impart constructive notice to subsequent purchasers, it has absolutely no effect on the validity of the easement as between the original parties.
A grantor executed a valid deed conveying a tract of land to a city “for the purpose of constructing a planetarium thereon.” The city held the property for a number of years, but decided on another site for the planetarium. When presented an offer to purchase the property by a privately owned garbage collection company, the city accepted and conveyed the land to the company.
Which of the following statements about the title of the tract of land is true?
A The grantor’s conveyance to the city created a fee simple determinable in the city and a possibility of reverter in the grantor.
B Upon conveyance of the land to the company, the property reverted back to the grantor.
C The company owns the land in fee simple absolute.
D The company owns the land, but it will revert to the grantor or his successors in interest if the property is used for anything other than a planetarium.
C
The garbage collection company owns the tract of land in fee simple absolute because the city had a fee simple absolute, which it conveyed to the company. The language in the deed “for the purpose of constructing a planetarium” merely expresses the grantor’s motive for conveying the property; the city received the estate that the grantor had, a fee simple absolute. Because the city held a fee simple absolute, that is what it conveyed to the company. (A) is wrong because the grant does not create a fee simple determinable. A fee simple determinable is an estate that automatically terminates on the happening of a stated event. To create a fee simple determinable, durational language (e.g., “for so long as,” “until”) must be used. Here, the grant does not contain the durational language necessary to create a fee simple determinable. Because the interest is not a fee simple determinable, the grantor cannot have a possibility of reverter. (B) is wrong for two reasons: (i) as explained above, a fee simple determinable was not created by the grant; and (ii) even if a fee simple determinable had been created, the transfer of the property would not by itself cause it to revert back to the grantor. Determinable estates are alienable; the successor merely takes subject to the condition. The conveyance of a fee simple determinable would not automatically result in the property reverting to the grantor (i.e., the company could build a planetarium on the property and avoid the property reverting back to the grantor). (D) is wrong because the grant did not create a fee simple determinable. (Had the grant contained the proper durational language, rather than “for the purpose of,” (D) would have been correct. In that case, the company would own the land subject to the estate being terminated if the land is not used for a planetarium.)
A plaintiff has brought suit in federal district court against the Social Security Administration because it denied her retirement benefits on the asserted ground that she had not reached the requisite age to qualify. At trial, the plaintiff introduced into evidence a family Bible given to her by her father in which is inscribed her date of birth, showing her to be 65 years old. The government introduced a certified copy of the plaintiff’s birth certificate, which shows her age to be 55. The court admitted both items over objection of the nonpropounding party.
Was this error?
A Yes, as to the Bible only, because it contained inadmissible hearsay.
B Yes, as to the birth certificate only, because it was not authenticated by the custodian of records.
C Yes, as to both, for the reasons stated in the previous answers.
D No, both records were admissible.
D
It was not error to introduce either item of evidence, even though both contain hearsay. Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Here, both items of evidence are being offered to prove the truth of what they are asserting—the date of the plaintiff’s birth. However, they both fall within exceptions to the general rule that hearsay is not admissible at trial. Under Federal Rule 803(13), statements of fact concerning personal or family history contained in family Bibles, engravings on tombstones, etc., are admissible (regardless of whether the declarant is available). The plaintiff’s Bible is therefore admissible, and (A) and (C) are incorrect. The certified copy of the birth certificate is also admissible hearsay under Federal Rule 803(9), which admits official records of births, deaths, and marriages. (B) is incorrect because official records are self-authenticating when they are certified [Fed. R. Evid. 902]; the custodian need not authenticate them in court.
An insured purchased a life insurance policy on his life, naming his brother as beneficiary. Fifteen years ago, the insured traveled overseas on what was supposed to be a six-month trip, but has not been heard from since. The brother contacted the insurance company, which refused to pay the claim on the basis that there was no evidence that the insured was dead. The brother filed suit against the insurance company to collect the proceeds under the policy. The jurisdiction in which the action has commenced has a statute that states that a person is presumed dead if missing from the jurisdiction for seven years, and if no one in the jurisdiction has heard from the person in those seven years.
Assume that no other evidence is admitted at the trial on the issue of the insured’s death. Which of the following is the most accurate statement?
A The jury will be permitted to find that the insured is alive.
B The jury will be permitted to find that the insured is dead.
C The judge must rule as a conclusive presumption that the insured is dead.
D The jury must find that the insured is dead.
D
The jury must find that the insured is dead. Because the basic facts that support the presumption were proven at trial, and no other evidence was introduced, the jury must find in accordance with the presumption, because the other party did not meet its burden of going forward with rebuttal evidence. (A) and (B) are therefore wrong. (C) is wrong because the presumption regarding the insured’s death is a rebuttable presumption. A rebuttable presumption will have no force or effect when sufficient contrary evidence is introduced. A conclusive presumption is really a rule of substantive law and cannot be rebutted by contrary evidence.
A city council and park board announced joint plans to tear down some old buildings and erect a park. Before the contracts were made, in order to garner the greatest political benefit from such projects, the city council adopted an ordinance requiring that 35% of the work force of contractors working on city-funded projects be residents of the city.
One of the contractors working on the park project employed several people from the city, but he and most of his employees came from a town in a neighboring state that was a few miles west of the city. When the city projects inspector discovered that the contractor did not employ the required 35%, he told the contractor that if he did not hire a sufficient number of city workers within 20 days the contractor would forfeit the opportunity to work on the project. The contractor immediately filed an action in federal court seeking to have the employment requirement declared unconstitutional.
Of which party should the court should rule in favor?
A The city, because it is acting as a “market participant” here.
B The city, because there is a rational basis for favoring city residents here.
C The contractor, because the requirement interferes with his rights under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.
D The contractor, because the requirement interferes with his Contract Clause rights.
C
The court should rule in favor of the contractor because the pursuit of a livelihood is a right protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the requirement here substantially interferes with that right. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV prohibits states and municipalities from discriminating against residents of other states. Not all discrimination is prohibited—only that which substantially interferes with important commercial activities or civil liberties. The Supreme Court has held that the right to pursue a livelihood is a right protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and also has held that a requirement that private contractors on city projects employ a certain percentage of city residents substantially interferes with the right. [See United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden (1984)] (A) is incorrect because there is no market participant exception under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The market participant exception arises from the Commerce Clause and is not appropriate in privileges and immunities analysis. [See United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, supra] (B) is incorrect because the fact that a rational basis exists for the requirement does not justify it. The Supreme Court has stated that the Privileges and Immunities Clause prohibition on discriminating against nonresidents may be overcome if there is substantial justification for the discrimination. The exception will apply if nonresidents are causing a problem (e.g., unemployment) and the discrimination is the least restrictive means of combating the problem. It is not apparent from the facts here that the city has an unemployment problem or that nonresidents are causing the problem. In any case, the choice states the wrong standard. Therefore, (B) is incorrect. (D) is incorrect because the Contract Clause is a limitation on states’ rights to modify existing contracts retroactively; it is unrelated to a state’s power to regulate contracts prospectively, which is the case here since the resident employee restriction predated the contractor’s contract.
A man is subpoenaed to appear before the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee and answer certain questions. When he appears, he refuses to answer and is cited for contempt of Congress.
Which of the following is the man’s best defense to the charge of contempt of Congress?
A He demonstrates that the questions asked him did not relate to any matter on which Congress could legislate.
B He establishes that he is an employee of the Department of Defense and may not be questioned relating to his duties as an officer of the executive branch of the federal government.
C He establishes that he holds an office by appointment of the President and may not be questioned as to his duties except by the Senate.
D He demonstrates that the questions asked him did not relate to any matter as to which funds appropriated by the House were expended.
A
The man’s best defense is to show that the questions did not relate to a matter on which Congress could legislate. The power to investigate to secure information as a basis for potential legislation is very broad, but the investigation must be for purposes within the scope of Congress’s power. Hence, (A) is the best choice. (D) is incorrect because, while Congress may investigate only matters on which it can legislate or otherwise act, it is not limited to matters as to which it has made appropriations of money. (B) is incorrect because executive privilege is not absolute. (C) is incorrect because both branches of Congress have investigatory powers.
A utility company working underground installed a guardrail around its access hole for safety. Although the guardrail completely surrounded the hole, there was an opening in one part of the rail to make it easier to pass down tools to those working below. The owner of a show dog living across the street from the utility access hole frequently walked his dog in his front yard without a leash. One afternoon, the dog unexpectedly chased a squirrel out of the dog owner’s yard and ran through the opening of the guardrail, falling into the open hole and suffering broken bones and internal injuries. Although expert veterinary care saved the dog’s life, the dog was no longer of “show quality” after the injuries.
The dog owner brought a negligence claim against the utility company to recover his economic losses resulting from the injuries to his dog. At trial, the dog owner presented the above facts. The utility company presented uncontested evidence that the guardrail used by the company meets typical industry standards, and that the opening in the guardrail was not large enough for a person to have fallen through. At the close of the evidence, the utility company moved for a directed verdict.
What should the court do?
A Deny the verdict, because the jury could find that the company failed to exercise reasonable care in making the dangerous condition safe.
B Grant the verdict, because the guardrail used by the company meets typical industry standards.
C Grant the verdict, because the owner’s negligence claim does not support recovery of solely economic loss.
D Grant the verdict, because a reasonably careful person would not have been injured in the same manner.
A
The court should deny the motion, because the jury could find that the company did not exercise reasonable care. Although the extent of precautions necessary may not be as great when the defendant’s conduct poses a risk of harm only to property and not to persons, the same general rules of negligence apply. Hence, the jury could find that the utility company’s conduct created a risk of injury to property that it deems unreasonable (based on the magnitude of the risk and the utility of the conduct), so that it will incur liability even though it created little risk of injury to persons. If the company was negligent, the dog owner could recover any property damage caused by the negligence, including whatever decline in the dog’s value he is able to prove. (B) is incorrect because the fact that the guardrail meets typical industry standards does not preclude the jury from finding negligence. If adherence to industry standards does not prevent an unreasonable risk of harm, the defendant may be in breach of its duty of ordinary care, which is a question for the jury to decide. (C) is incorrect because the plaintiff is entitled to recover all of his damages, both economic and noneconomic, if he establishes the prima facie case elements. In contrast to a products liability claim, in an ordinary negligence claim a plaintiff can recover even though he suffered only economic loss (i.e., property damage). (D) is incorrect because that option does not take into account the duty of care to avoid injury to property, as discussed above.
The owner of a personal watercraft put an ad for its sale in the paper. Her neighbor saw the ad and told her that he wanted to buy the watercraft but had to arrange for financing. The owner suggested that they write a contract for sale then and there so that they would not have to waste any time while he got his financing. They orally agreed that the contract would not become binding unless the neighbor obtained financing, but the written contract did not mention this and appeared to be a fully integrated document. The neighbor could not obtain financing and the owner brings suit to enforce the written contract.
Who will prevail?
A The owner, because the contract was a fully integrated writing.
B The owner, because parol evidence is not allowed to contradict a writing.
C The neighbor, because the oral agreement that the contract would not be binding if the neighbor did not get financing was made contemporaneous with the writing.
D The neighbor, because obtaining financing was a condition precedent.
D
The neighbor will prevail because obtaining financing was a condition precedent. When the parties to a contract express their agreement in a writing with the intent that the writing embody the final expression of their bargain, no other expression made prior to or contemporaneous with the writing is admissible to vary the terms of the writing. However, if a party asserts that there was an oral agreement that the written contract would not become effective until a condition occurred, all evidence of the understanding may be offered and received. This is a condition precedent to effectiveness. The rationale is that the written agreement is not being altered by means of parol evidence if the written agreement never came into being. While (A) and (B) are true statements, they are wrong because the neighbor will not try to vary the writing, but rather he will show that the writing never became effective. (C) is wrong; if the neighbor were seeking to vary the writing with the oral agreement, the fact that it was made contemporaneous with the writing would not make it admissible. Any oral expressions contemporaneous with the written agreement are inadmissible under the parol evidence rule.
A car owner was having problems with her car’s brakes. The brake shop to which she brought her car told her that the entire hydraulic brake system needed to be replaced at a cost of $1,800. The car owner agreed to have the work performed, and the shop replaced the brake system. When the car owner picked up the car, she insisted on testing the brakes before paying for the work. During a test drive, the brakes squeaked when compressed but otherwise worked perfectly. The mechanic told the car owner that the squeak would disappear on its own in a few days. The car owner stated that she would pay the shop when the squeak disappeared and left with her car. A month later, the brakes still squeaked and the car owner refused to pay for the work. The shop files suit to collect the $1,800 contract price.
What is the likely outcome of the suit?
A The car owner must pay the shop the $1,800, because she got the substantial benefit of her bargain.
B The car owner must pay the shop the $1,800, but is entitled to set off the amount necessary to fix the squeak.
C The car owner does not have to pay the shop anything, because the squeak amounted to a breach of contract that relieved the car owner of her duty to perform.
D The shop must “cure” by providing the car owner with a new set of brakes that do not squeak, after which the car owner must pay the shop the $1,800.
B
Because the shop’s breach of contract was minor, the car owner must pay the brake shop the $1,800, but she would be entitled to damages to remedy the squeak. A breach of contract is minor if the nonbreaching party gets the substantial benefit of her bargain, despite the other party’s defective performance. A minor breach does not relieve the nonbreaching party of her duty to perform under the contract, although she will be entitled to remedial damages for the breach. Here, the brakes worked perfectly except for the squeak and, most importantly, stopped the car when compressed, as brakes are supposed to do. Thus, the breach was minor and would not relieve the car owner of her own duty to perform (i.e., to pay the bill), although she could get damages, if the court so decided, for the squeak. (A) is wrong because it does not take into account the fact that the car owner could be entitled to damages for the shop’s breach. (C) is wrong because, as noted above, the breach is minor and does not relieve the car owner of her duty to perform. (D) is wrong because a seller’s right to cure when goods or their tender are not perfect may not apply here, because the facts do not establish whether the defect causing the brakes to squeak is in the product itself or in its installation. The UCC rules regarding the right to cure do not apply to service contracts (e.g., faulty installation of brakes). Moreover, the right to cure arises when the buyer has rejected goods because of defects, and here the car owner did not reject the brake system—she took the car home with her knowing of the squeaking brakes. Thus, it would be too late for a “cure.”
A driver purchased a new automobile from a car dealer. Within a few days of the purchase, the driver returned the car to the dealer for repairs because the car kept pulling to the left whenever the driver applied the brakes. The dealer’s mechanic readjusted the brakes but did not detect any other problem with the brake system. The dealer’s mechanic assured the driver that the brakes were fixed and, even if they did pull the car to the left again, the brakes would still allow the car to stop.
The car worked fine for two days, but then the brakes started pulling to the left again. As the driver was driving the car back to the dealer’s shop for further repair, he saw a pedestrian crossing the street. The driver pressed his foot down on the brake pedal, but the master cylinder failed, and the car would not stop. The driver’s car struck the pedestrian, injuring him.
If the pedestrian sues the driver for his injuries, who will prevail?
A The pedestrian will prevail, because the driver knew that there was a problem with his brakes.
B The pedestrian will prevail, because drivers have a duty to maintain their vehicles in safe working order.
C The driver will prevail, because he had no reason to know that his brakes would not stop the car.
D The driver will prevail, because he diligently had his brakes repaired.
C
The driver will prevail under the facts given. The driver owed to a foreseeable plaintiff a general duty to behave as a reasonable person would under the same or similar circumstances. Continuing to drive the car with knowledge of an attendant danger would create an unreasonable risk of injury to people such as the pedestrian, and would constitute a breach of the driver’s duty of care. However, the driver had no reason to know of the dangerous underlying problem (the defective master cylinder), and he had been assured by the dealer’s mechanic that the car was safe to drive. Thus, the driver has not breached his duty of care here. (A) is incorrect because the driver had been assured by the dealer’s mechanic that a recurrence of the problem would not result in total brake failure. Thus, the driver had a reasonable belief that he could safely drive the car to the dealer. (B) is incorrect because the driver’s duty to maintain his car’s brakes does not make him strictly liable for a brake failure. The driver reasonably relied on the advice of the dealer’s mechanic in believing that the car was safe to drive. It is true that, as (D) states, the driver had diligently had his brakes repaired, but if he had reason to know, subsequent to the repairs, that the brakes were dangerous, he should not have driven the car. Because the driver reasonably relied on the advice of the dealer’s mechanic, the driver had no reason to know of the danger involved in continuing to drive the car. Thus, (C) is a better answer than (D).
The jurisdiction divides murder into degrees, with all murders being second degree murder unless the prosecution can prove premeditation and deliberation, in which case the killing would be first degree murder. The jurisdiction also uses the M’Naghten rule for insanity.
A physician prescribed an experimental drug for the defendant’s severe allergies. The physician told the defendant that the medication was experimental, but failed to inform the defendant that the manufacturer had reported a small risk that the medicine caused severe delusions. After taking the medicine the first day, the defendant began to believe that his next door neighbor was spreading false rumors about him to a few of his other neighbors. While still under the influence of the medication, the defendant grabbed a knife from the kitchen, went to his neighbor’s house, and rang the doorbell. When the neighbor answered the door, the defendant plunged the knife into his neighbor’s chest, killing him instantly.
May the defendant be convicted of first degree murder?
A No, because the defendant was temporarily insane under the M’Naghten rule.
B No, because the defendant’s intoxication was involuntary.
C Yes, because the defendant’s intoxication was voluntary.
D Yes, because the defendant murdered his neighbor without justification and with premeditation.
D
The defendant may be convicted of first degree murder because he was not justified in killing the neighbor and it appears that he did have time to premeditate and deliberate on the murder. The facts here point to involuntary intoxication as a possible defense. Intoxication is involuntary if it results from the taking of an intoxicating substance without knowledge of its nature, under direct duress imposed by another, or pursuant to medical advice. Such intoxication is treated as mental illness, in which case the defendant is entitled to acquittal if, because of the intoxication, the defendant meets the applicable test for insanity. Here, the defendant took the medicine without knowing of its hallucinatory properties and pursuant to the advice of his doctor. Thus, the defendant’s resulting state of hallucination will be considered to be involuntary intoxication. We are told that the applicable test for insanity is the M’Naghten rule. Pursuant to this rule, a defendant is entitled to acquittal if a disease of the mind caused a defect of reason such that the defendant lacked the ability at the time of his actions to either: (i) know the wrongfulness of his actions; or (ii) understand the nature and quality of his actions. If a defendant suffers from delusions (false beliefs), it must be determined whether his actions would have been criminal if the facts had been as he believed them to be. Here, the defendant falsely believed that his neighbor was spreading false rumors about him. Had this delusion been accurate, the defendant obviously would not have been legally entitled to murder the neighbor. Nothing in the facts suggests that the medication prevented him from knowing what he was doing or knowing that it was wrong. As a result, the M’Naghten rule would not allow for acquittal based on an insanity defense, which in turn would also negate the viability of an involuntary intoxication defense. Thus, (D) is correct, and (A) and (B) are incorrect. (C) is incorrect because, as explained above, the intoxication was involuntary even though the defendant voluntarily ingested the drugs.
A driver was operating her car on a city street when she was stopped by a police officer for speeding. As the police officer reached the driver’s car, he saw her put something into her purse. The officer told the driver, “Ma’am, you were speeding; that’s why I stopped you. I’d like your driver’s license, and, by the way, what did you just put into your purse?” The driver responded, “It’s just a marijuana cigarette, but don’t worry, I’ve only had two and my driving judgment hasn’t been impaired.” The officer took her purse, removed the “joint,” and charged the driver with possession of marijuana as well as speeding. At the driver’s trial for marijuana possession, the prosecution seeks to introduce the marijuana cigarette into evidence. The driver’s attorney moves to suppress the evidence.
Should the defense motion be granted?
A Yes, because the cigarette is fruit of the poisonous tree.
B Yes, because the police officer did not have a valid search warrant.
C No, because the police officer’s asking about the contents of the driver’s purse did not constitute custodial interrogation.
D No, provided the police officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
C
The defense motion should be denied because the driver was not in custody when she made the statement. Persons temporarily detained for routine traffic stops are not in custody for Miranda purposes. Therefore, the driver was not entitled to Miranda warnings, and her statement about the marijuana was not tainted. Her statement thus properly provided the probable cause for the search of her purse. (A) is therefore wrong. (B) is wrong because this case falls within the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Under that exception, if the police have probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband or fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of a crime, they may search the vehicle, including the driver’s belongings, without a warrant. Here, the driver’s response established probable cause to search her purse. (D) states the test for a stop, not a search. An automobile search requires probable cause.
